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Defense diplomacy is the cooperative use of military forces through activities like 
officer exchanges and training exercises.  Although individual practices have long 
existed, strikingly little scholarly attention has yet been paid to either defense diplomacy 
as a feature of international relations or its uses as a tool of statecraft.  This study 
critically examines the concept of defense diplomacy and the underlying mechanisms that 
empower it.  I argue that defense diplomacy functions as a military variant of soft power 
which relies on the processes of norm diffusion and state socialization to influence the 
strategic thinking of foreign governments.  Specifically, by bringing soldiers from different 
countries into contact with one another in collaborative environments, defense diplomacy 
allows for the cultivation of transnational links capable of shaping worldviews.  As with 
similar networks in civil society, the ties fostered by defense diplomacy form pathways 
which allow for the rapid diffusion of geopolitical norms, practices and priorities across 
 
borders.  The key with defense diplomacy is that these networks span governing elites 
allowing for the direct translation of shared ideas into policy.   
   I use two case studies to illustrate how defense diplomacy has been employed by 
the United States as a foreign policy tool.  The first case examines the use of defense 
diplomacy by the United States to rebuild its alliances with Australia and the Philippines 
in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War.  Though initially envisioned as 
temporary measure to help restore trust after that divisive conflict, defense diplomacy 
emerged the basis for America’s regional engagement strategy.  The second case 
concerns how defense diplomacy was employed by the United States in the Philippines 
during the Global War on Terror.  Uniquely, the Philippine government restricted 
American forces operating within its territory to non-combat missions.  This compelled 
Washington to rely on defense diplomacy as the primary means of combating groups like 
Abu Sayyaf.  The ensuing focus on strengthening local institutions ultimately proved 
successful in helping to mitigate the militant threat within the archipelago. 
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In 2003, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked for his views on 
soft power, he glibly replied that he didn’t even know what soft power was.1  A scant 
four years later, Rumsfeld’s successor, Robert Gates, not only knew the meaning of soft 
power, but declared the concept to be a core tenet of American security in the 21st 
century.  Speaking in his home state of Kansas in 2007, Gates stated that the trials faced 
by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq were evidence that military strength alone 
was insufficient to triumph in modern conflicts.  Rather, in the War on Terror and the 
conflicts to come “success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a 
function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people 
in between.”  Gates, breaking with the lineage of his office, recognized that such 
objectives cannot be achieved through military coercion alone.  Instead, he championed 
the cause of not only strengthening America’s capacity to use soft power, but the 
necessity of integrating soft power with the hard power mechanism that had come to 
dominate American foreign policy.2  For Secretary Gates, the capability of America’s 
military to redress the trials of the modern age lay not in its capacity to drop bombs but 
rather in its ability to look beyond the use of violence and embrace alternative means of 
promoting its interests.   
 Defense diplomacy has emerged as one of the most important tools of military 
statecraft amid this effort to look beyond the use of force.  While attempts to define the 
                                                 
1 Joseph Nye, "Think Again: Soft Power," Foreign Policy 23 February 2006. 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power>. 
2 Robert Gates, "Landon Lecture." Speech, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS (2007). 
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concept vary, defense diplomacy, sometimes called military diplomacy, is the 
cooperative use of a state’s defense apparatus to advance the strategic aims of a 
government through collaborations with other countries.3  Typically used as an umbrella 
term, activities as diverse as officer exchanges, ship visits, training missions, and joint 
military exercises have all been denoted as practices of defense diplomacy.  However, the 
elasticity with which the term has been employed belies the importance of the underlying 
concept and its increasing salience in world affairs.  Cognizant of the limits of violence as 
a means statecraft, every major world power, including the United States, Australia, 
China and the United Kingdom, has in turn adopted defense diplomacy as a core mission 
of their military doctrine and a primary component of their global strategy.4 
 Despite its burgeoning prominence in world affairs, the formal study of defense 
diplomacy remains in its infancy.  Beyond a general lack of scholarly attention, defense 
diplomacy as a concept continues to be beset by a number of conceptual and theoretical 
flaws.  The term defense diplomacy was developed not as an intellectually distinct 
                                                 
3 The use of “defense diplomacy” or “military diplomacy” is typically determined by the authors preference 
However, in recent years an argument has been advanced that “military diplomacy” refers strictly to the 
actions of military diplomats like military attaches, while “defense diplomacy” encompasses the entirety of 
a country’s defense establishment.   It is in sympathy with this line of argument that I have selected to use 
the term “defense diplomacy” as my preferred designation. 
4 For example see: The Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper 3999 (London: TSO, 1998); Tom 
Dodd, Mark Oakes, The Strategic Defense Review White Paper, Research Paper 98/91 (London: House of 
Commons Library, 1998);  Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, Policy Paper No. 1 (London: 
Ministry of Defense, 2000);  Nicholas Floyd, Dropping the Autopilot: Improving Australia’s Defense 
Diplomacy, Policy Brief (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2010); Daniel 
Baldino, and Andrew Carr. “Defence diplomacy and the Australian defence force: smokescreen or 
strategy?” Australian Journal of International Affairs 70(2) (2016): 139-158; China’s Defense in 2000 
(Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2000); China’s Defense in 2004 (Beijing: Information 
Office of the State Council, 2004); Ian Storey. “China's Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast 
Asia.” Asian Security 8(3) (2012): 287-310; .A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 
(Washington DC: The White House, 1995); The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington DC: The White House, 2006); Quadrennial Defense Review(Washington DC: Department of 
Defense, 2010);   
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concept, but rather as a means of consolidating a series of cooperative military activities 
under a single heading.  As a consequence of this original envisioning, efforts to define 
defense diplomacy have centered on being expansive enough to encompass all of the 
activities currently classified as “defense diplomacy” rather than developing an 
understanding of what defense diplomacy actually is.  Defense diplomacy not only lacks 
a meaningful definition but has been contorted and stretched to the extent that it is now 
both descriptively vacuous and analytically hollow. 
 My dissertation redresses both the theoretical and analytical deficiencies that have 
hamstrung the study of defense diplomacy.  I resolve the conceptual ambiguity 
surrounding defense diplomacy by positing a new definition of the concept which 
formally integrates the practice into the broader study of power and international 
statecraft.  Breaking with the practitioner centric approach used in the current literature, I 
instead examine the concept from the broader question of how states pursue their 
interests in world affairs.  By focusing on how defense diplomacy is used to help 
governments achieved their international objectives, I identify the defense diplomacy as a 
variant of soft power.  Specifically, programs like officer exchanges and training 
exercises are used by one government to help mold the strategic thinking of another state 
in a manner that is beneficial to the practitioner.  By grounding my approach in 
international relations theory rather than tethering it to specific activities, my definition is 
not only accurate, but also possess a high degree of descriptive utility and analytical 
insight.  Furthermore, by engaging the larger theoretical context, my theory of defense 
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diplomacy is not confined to a specific activity, actor or era thus allowing for a more 
comprehensive analysis of defense diplomacy.   
 To illustrate the merit of this new approach, I explore how defense diplomacy 
been used as a tool of statecraft.  In particular, I use two case studies to explore how the 
United States has employed defense diplomacy as a key element of its foreign policy in 
the Western Pacific.  By examining how the United States has drawn on  defense 
diplomacy to shape its relationship with countries like Australia and the Philippines, my 
work illustrates the ability of the military to be used as a source of soft power and 
provides practical lessons about the application of defense diplomacy.  However, it is 
important to note that the purpose of these case studies are not to test the efficacy of 
defense diplomacy as a geopolitical stratagem.  Rather, these studies represent a means of 
illustrating how defense diplomacy is envisioned by governments and the manner in 
which the practice has been employed.  By combining this critical analysis of defense 
diplomacy's previous usage with my own theoretical approach to the practice, my 
dissertation not only remedies the existing vagueness of the concept, but bridges the 
divide within the existing scholarship between theory and application. 
State of Defense Diplomacy Scholarship 
 
Though the term Defense Diplomacy gained prominence only in the late 1990s, 
the use of nonviolent activities like arms transfers, military exercises and training 
programs have been a part of international affairs for millennia.  Despite the age and 
pedigree of these practices, defense diplomacy has received strikingly little attention from 
the security studies community which remains focused on issues of war and political 
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violence.  Though representing a small fraction of the literature dedicated to the use of 
force, the relatively few works which address the cooperative use of military force do 
offer important insights into both the evolution of the practice and its uses.   
To date, the majority of works on defense diplomacy have been primarily 
historical in nature and examined how the practice was employed by specific actors or 
during particular time periods.  The organized study of defense diplomacy can be traced 
to the aftermath of World War II and the early days of the Cold War.  In Europe, defense 
diplomacy was essential to the operations of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  Both 
alliances called upon their members not only to fight alongside one another, but also to 
operate essentially as a single fighting force.  To achieve this level of integration and 
interoperability, intra-alliance defense diplomacy like officer exchanges and training 
exercises became the lifeblood of the opposing alliances.5  Beyond the confines of 
Europe, defense diplomacy served as crucial tool for both the Americans and the Soviets 
as they sought to woo newly independent countries into their respective camps.  Though 
many of the new nations to emerge from colonialism maintained close military ties to 
their former imperial rulers, others acted as free agents who were susceptible to the 
                                                 
5 Charles Barry, "NATO's combined joint task forces in theory and practice."Survival 38(1) 1996 : 81-97; 
Michael Rühle, Nick Williams. "Partnership for peace after NATO enlargement." European Security 5(4) 
(1996): 521-528; Jan Feldman, "Collaborative production of defense equipment within NATO."The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 7(3) 1984: 282-300; Eliot Cohen, "NATO Standardization: The Perils of 
Common Sense." Foreign Policy 31(1978): 72-90; Philip Taylor, "Weapons standardization in NATO: 
collaborative security or economic competition?." International organization 36(1) 1982: 95-112; 
Christopher Jones,. Soviet influence in Eastern Europe: political autonomy and the Warsaw Pact. (New 
York, NY: Praeger, 1981); William Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: arms, doctrine, and strategy. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1982); Karl Birnbaum "A collective goods analysis of the Warsaw Pact after 
Czechoslovakia." International Organization 28(3) 1974: 521-532.  
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influences of either super power.6  Along with economic aid, the willingness of the 
Soviets and Americans to supply arms to these new countries and train their officers 
proved a useful mechanism for building political ties and a close relationship.7  Defense 
diplomacy programs, then known as security assistance, were assessed not by their ability 
to bolster the military functionality of the recipient, but rather by their political utility in 
bringing a recipient into either the American or Soviet camp.  
The end of the Cold War heralded a divide in both the use of defense diplomacy 
and how it has been studied.  In Europe, the fear that the large Soviet-style armies of 
former Warsaw Pact countries could derail the transition to democracy and reignite 
historic grievances led Western governments to embrace a bold strategy which utilized 
their own military forces to help reconstruct the armed forces of former Warsaw Pact 
countries.  Through programs like NATO's Partnership for Peace, Western governments 
used nonviolent activities like officer exchanges and educational programs to reform the 
militaries of Eastern Europe and help instill democratic norms of civil-military.  The 
success of these Western efforts to shape Eastern Europe was emblematic of defense 
diplomacy's evolution from a tool of realpolitik to a means of promoting internal reform 
in recipient countries.8 
                                                 
6 Tarak Barkawi, "Defence Diplomacy in North-South Relations." International Journal 66(3) 2011: 597- 
612. 
7 William Mott, United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective. (Westport CT: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2002); Duncan Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, & Jason Ellis. Send Guns and Money: 
Security Assistance and US Foreign Policy. (Westport CT: Praeger, 1997); Duncan Clarke,  "US Security 
Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?." The Middle East Journal 51 (2) 1997: 200-214; 
William Mott, Soviet Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective. (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 
2001). 
8 Cottey and Forster, Defence Diplomacy, 2004; John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and 
beyond." International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 71(2) 1995: 233-246; Nick 
Williams. "Partnership for peace: Permanent fixture or declining asset?."Survival 38(1) 1996: 98-110; 
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As Europe employed defense diplomacy as a means of continental reconciliation, 
in Asia the outlook has been bleaker. While defense diplomacy has received some use as 
a means of fostering international cooperation, particularly among members of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the rise of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC or China) as a world power has given new life to defense diplomacy as a tool 
for attaining influence abroad.9  Through the PRC dabbled in defense diplomacy during 
the Cold War, primarily to aid ideological clients or as a way of securing income, the 
economic liberalization of the 1980s gave new impetus to the practice as part of Chinese 
foreign policy.10  Notably, whereas the United States and Soviets used defense diplomacy 
to promote political objectives, China has utilized defense diplomacy in regions like 
Africa as a means of securing economic prerogatives.11  Through its willingness to aid 
the militaries of countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, China has been able to gain 
                                                 
Rachel Epstein, "NATO enlargement and the spread of democracy: evidence and expectations." Security 
Studies 14(1) 2005: 63-105; Ronald Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee. "NATO 
expansion: the next steps." Survival 37 (1) 1995: 7-33; Michael Brenner, ed. NATO and Collective Security. 
(New York: Macmillan, 1998); Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for peace: Europe after the Cold 
War."International security 15 (3) 1990: 7-57. 
9 For ASEAN reactions see, Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and 
the ARF. (New York: Routledge, 2012); Ralf Emmers,"The Five Power Defence Arrangements and 
Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia." Asian Security 8(3) 2012: 271-286; Evan Laksmana, "Regional 
Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia." Asian Security 8(3) 
2012: 251-270; See Seng Tan,. "‘Talking Their Walk’? The Evolution of Defense Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia." Asian Security 8(3) 2012: 232-250. 
10 Bruce Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China. 
(Berkley CA: University of California Press, 1973); Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an 
Era of Change,” paper presented at National Defense University Symposium June 20, 2006.  
11 William Sprance, “The New Tournament of Shadows: The Strategic Implications of China’s Activity in 
Sub-Saharan African and AFRICOM’s Role in the U.S. Response,” Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies 10(3) 2008: Todd Hofstedt, “China in Africa, An AFRICOM Response,” Naval War College 
Review 62 (3) 2009:79-100: Chris Rowan, “The China-African Partnership: Working for Whom,” 
Contemporary Review (2009)  60, 62-63; Jonathan Holslag, “China’s New Security Strategy for Africa,” 
Parameters  39(2) 2009; Maxi Schoeman, “China in Africa: The Rise of Hegemony,” Strategic Review of 
Southern Africa  29(2) 2007; Domingos Muekalia, "Africa and China's strategic partnership." African 
Security Studies 13(1) 2004: 5-11; Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise. (New 
York: Routledge, 2006); Chris Alden, "China in Africa." Survival 47(3) 2005: 147-164. 
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numerous concessions on issues like mineral rights and government infrastructure 
contracts.  China’s use of defense diplomacy is not entirely an extension of its economic 
policy, but also a means of building strategic partnerships within its own neighborhood.  
Particularly through the use of arms sales, China has been able to build close relations 
with countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in order to establish military and 
commercial hubs across the Indian Ocean as part of its “string of pearls” strategy.12  
China’s growing assertiveness in world affairs and use of defense diplomacy to gain 
friends has alarmed many of the PRC’s neighbors.  India in particular has become wary 
of China’s growth and has adopted defense diplomacy as a way to build regional 
partnerships of its own in order to counterbalance burgeoning Chinese power.13 
The most recent stage in the evolution of defense diplomacy as a tool of 
international statecraft comes as a result of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and 
American led efforts to combat militant extremism around the world.  Despite the 
unilateralism that characterized the early efforts of the Bush administration, military 
cooperation and defense diplomacy have played an essential role throughout GWOT.  
                                                 
12 Ian Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8(3) 2012: 287-
310; Ian Storey. "China’s Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea." Cooperation from 
Strength: 51; Jacqueline Newmyer, "Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese 
Military Modernization." Orbis 53(2) 2009: 205-219; B.S. Sachar, "Military diplomacy through arms 
transfers: A case study of China." Strategic Analysis 28(2) 2004: 290-310;Gurpreet Khurana, "China's 
‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications." Strategic Analysis 32(1) 2008: 1-39; 
Harsh  Pant,"China Shakes Up the Maritime Balance in the Indian Ocean."Strategic Analysis 36 (3) 2012: 
364-368; James Holmes,Toshi Yoshihara. "China's naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean." The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 31 (3) 2008: 367-394; Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era of 
Change,” Paper Prepared for the National Defense University Symposium on ‘China's Global Activism: 
Implications for U.S. security Interests’, National Defense University, June 20, 2006. 
13 For India’s reaction see, K..A. Muthanna,. "Military Diplomacy." Journal of Defence Studies, Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses 5 (2011); B.S. Sachar, B. "Cooperation in military training as a tool of 
peacetime military diplomacy." Strategic Analysis 27(3) 2003: 404-421. 
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With NATO’s participation in the war in Afghanistan, the interoperability that 
underscored the alliance’s Cold War activities is no longer purely a hypothetical exercise.  
Rather, the organizational and logistical strain of sustaining operations in Afghanistan has 
given new impetus to NATO’s integration and exchange programs.14  Likewise, 
American difficulties in both Afghanistan and Iraq have illuminated the importance of 
local allies in combating militant extremism.  During the Cold War, defense diplomacy 
was largely a symbolic endeavor designed to elicit the favor of political elites rather than 
substantively develop the military capabilities of the recipient.  However, throughout 
GWOT, the support of an organized and efficient local ally has often proven to be a 
decisive factor and a boon to American efforts.  Consequently, American uses of defense 
diplomacy have been given greater substance as Washington aims to build allied 
capabilities in order to support counterterrorism initiatives.15  Addressing this issue 
directly in Foreign Affairs, Secretary Gates stated that “helping other countries better 
                                                 
14Vincent Morelli, NATO in Afghanistan: a test of the transatlantic alliance. (Darby PA: DIANE 
Publishing, 2009); Alexander Mattelaer, "How Afghanistan has Strengthened NATO." Survival 53(6) 2011: 
127-140; Andrew Hoehn, Andrew, Sarah Harting. Risking NATO: Testing the Limits of the Alliance in 
Afghanistan. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010); Mark Webber, "NATO: the United States, transformation and 
the war in Afghanistan." The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 11(1) 2009: 46-63; 
James Sperling, Mark Webber. "NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul."International Affairs 85(3) 2009: 491-511. 
15 Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith, "Winning with Allies Richard B. 
Andres."International Security 30(3) 2005:124-160; Adam Isacson, Nicole Ball. "US Military and Police 
Assistance to Poorly Performing States." Short of the Goal: US Policy and Poorly Performing States, 
Center for Global Development, Washington DC (2006): 412-460; Derek Reveron, ed. America's Viceroys: 
The Military and US Foreign Policy. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Derek Reveron, Exporting 
security: International engagement, security cooperation, and the changing face of the US 
military.(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Derek Reveron, "Military engagement, 
strategy, and policy." Orbis 53(3) 2009: 489-505; Adam Grissom, "Making it up as we go Along: State-




provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership 
and a critical part of protecting U.S. security as well.”16  
To this point, my review of existing scholarship on defense diplomacy has 
followed the interplay between world affairs and the evolving uses of defense diplomacy.  
This descriptive approach is important not just as a means of contextualizing the concept 
of defense diplomacy, but also as a means of illustrating the primary approach that 
scholars have adopted to examine this subject.  While the studies noted offer important 
insights into the uses of defense diplomacy, they also largely have been tied to specific 
time periods, practices or individual actors.  Only a few studies have attempted to break 
this cycle and take a comprehensive approach to defense diplomacy.   Of particular note 
is the Adelphi paper written by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster in 2004 which 
examines the shift in defense diplomacy’s use following the Cold War.  Cottey and 
Forster argue that while the Soviets and Americans used defense diplomacy to pursue 
narrow national interests, the end of this balance of power struggle saw the same 
practices adapted in order to promote cooperation and peaceful coexistence.17  This 
notion of different forms of military diplomacy being adapted to meet different objectives 
is also seen in See Seng Tan and Bhubhindar Singh’s introduction to a special edition of 
Asian Security dedicated to the uses of defense diplomacy in Asia.  Tan and Singh assert 
that there are two facets of defense: pragmatic and transformative.  The pragmatic form 
of defense diplomacy seeks to maintain conditions as they presently exist between two 
                                                 
16 Robert Gates, "Helping others defend themselves: the future of US security assistance." Foreign 
Affairs. 89(3) 2010: 2-6. 
17 Cottey & Forster, Defence Diplomacy, 2004.  
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countries or within a region while transformative defense diplomacy seeks to 
substantively alter existing circumstances.   Tan and Singh conclude that in Asia, the 
majority of defense diplomacy is actually of a pragmatic nature as South Asian countries 
seek to preserve peaceful coexistence, but not advance regional integration.18  
While scholarly studies of defense diplomacy remain rare, works examining 
specific defense diplomacy activities have been more common with several works 
investigating the use of training programs, arms trade and ship visits as tools of 
government policy.  Of these activities, military training programs have proven to be 
particularly controversial with questions being raised about whether such programs 
promote undemocratic practices. The genesis of this question lies in the Cold War and 
American-trained military officers participating in prominent anti-democratic coups and 
the widespread abuses of human rights.19  Although incidents of this kind certainly 
occurred, scholars like Carol Atkinson and Ruth Blakeley contend that American training 
programs have not only improved since the Cold War but have widely been a positive 
influence in terms of promoting democratic rule and respect for human rights.20   
                                                 
18 See Seng Tan, Bhubhindar Singh, “Introduction,”  Asian Security 8(3) 2012: 221-231.   
19 Jack n. Pallmeyer. School of Assassins: Guns, Greed & Globalization. (New Yorek: Orbis Books, 2001); 
Rhonda Callaway, and Elizabeth Matthews. Strategic US Foreign Assistance: The battle between human 
rights and national security. (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013); Katherine McCoy. "Trained 
to Torture? The Human Rights Effects of Military Training at the School of the Americas." Latin American 
Perspectives (2005): 47-64; Steven C. Poe, "Human Rights and the Allocation of US military 
Assistance."Journal of Peace Research 28 (2) (1991): 205-216; Clair Apodaca, Michael Stohl. "United 
States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance." International Studies Quarterly 43(1): 185-198;  
20Carol Atkinson,. "Constructivist implications of material power: Military engagement and the 
socialization of states, 1972–2000." International Studies Quarterly 50(3) 2006:509-537; Carol Atkinson, 
"Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–2006." Foreign 
Policy Analysis 6(1) 2010: 1-22; Ruth Blakeley, "Still Training to Torture? US training of military forces 
from Latin America." Third World Quarterly 27(8) 2006: 1439-1461. 
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Of the other two practices in defense diplomacy to receive scholarly attention, 
arms sales and ship visits, the research has largely focused on whether such activities 
have an effect on the policies of recipient governments.  In the case of arms sales, the 
belief that selling a country arms will result in improved relations has proven to be 
dubious at best.  While anecdotal works have identified specific incidents where this 
practice has worked, recent quantitative studies have found virtually no evidence of arms 
sales fostering cooperation between the patron and the client.21  The scholarship on ship 
visits has also been mixed with a few case studies attempting to assess their value in 
molding foreign opinion.  On the positive side, Zachary Goldman, Mira Rapp-Hooper 
and Forster have respectively identified ship visits as useful way to maintain alliances 
and build popular support with foreign populations.22  However, in her examination of 
routine ship visits and military exercises, Deborah Sanders warns that such activities can 
actually prove counterproductive and trigger a public backlash against the interests of the 
practitioner.23 
However, beholden to its initial creation in the 1990s and an existing usage 
among foreign policy practitioners, defense diplomacy has never been developed as a 
                                                 
21 Patricia L. Sullivan, , Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li. "US Military Aid and Recipient State 
Cooperation." Foreign Policy Analysis 7(3) 2011: 275-294; David Kinsella,  "Arms transfer dependence 
and foreign policy conflict." Journal of Peace Research 35 (1) 1998: 7-23; Keith Krause, "Military 
Statecraft: Power and influence in Soviet and American arms transfer relationships." International Studies 
Quarterly 35(3) 1991: 313-336; Karl Derouen, Jr., and U. K. HEO. "Reward, Punishment or Inducement? 
US economic and military aid, 1946–1996." Defence and Peace Economics 15 (5) 2004: 453-470; Te-Yu 
Wang. "US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: an analysis of important issues."International Studies 
Quarterly 43(1) 1999 : 199-210. 
22 Zachary Goldman, Mira Rapp‐Hooper. "Conceptualizing Containment: The Iranian Threat and the 
Future of Gulf Security." Political Science Quarterly128(4) 2013: 589-616; Larissa Forster. "The Soft 




theoretically distinct concept.  The absence of this theoretical depth is evident throughout 
the literature as descriptive studies detail the ways that countries practice defense 
diplomacy, but fail to link these enterprises to the broader study of international relations 
and statecraft.24  Rather, each study of defense diplomacy exists within a vacuum – 
addressing a specific instance or case while doing little to deepen our understanding of 
either the concept or its role in world affairs.  As long as defense diplomacy is allowed to 
remain a loose collection of peaceful military practices without conceptual coherence or 
theoretical identity, the study of this subject will continue to flounder as a field of inquiry 
and fail to match its burgeoning significance as a tool of statecraft.  It is precisely this 
lack of theoretical and analytical content that my dissertation aims to resolve. 
Overview:  
 
 My dissertation divides into three distinct sections which examine both the 
concept of defense diplomacy and its practical application as a foreign policy tool.  
 Section I addresses the theoretical underpinnings of defense diplomacy and posits 
a new framework for our understanding of the practice. Chapter 1 critically analyzes 
defense diplomacy as a concept and particularly the difficulties it has endure in 
establishing itself as a distinct form of statecraft.  Plagued by competing definitions and 
                                                 
24 For Examples see: Phil Kelly, “What is the Post-War Role of the U.S. Military?” Thesis presented at 
Joint Forces Staff College, April 6, 2011; Jeffrey Meeker Large Scale Security Force Assistance: A 
Measured Approach. Strategy Research Program Army War College, February 17, 2011; Christopher Paul, 
et al., What Works Best when Building Partner Capacity and Under what Circumstances?(Santa Monica 
CA: RAND- National Defense Research Institute, 2013); Jennifer Moroney, Lessons from U.S. Allies in 
Security Cooperation with Third Countries : the cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom 
(Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2011); Anton Du Plessis. "Defence Diplomcay: Conceptual and Practical 




conceptual stretching, existing scholarship has been restrained by its inability to 
adequately answer what precisely defense diplomacy actually is.  This chapter remedies 
this problem by advancing a new understanding of defense diplomacy grounded in 
international relations theory.  Specifically, I argue that defense diplomacy functions as a 
military variant of soft power.  Through collaborative endeavors like officer exchanges 
and joint training exercises, defense diplomacy affords governments a direct means of 
influencing the thought process of foreign government officials.  As such, defense 
diplomacy enables the coopting of foreigner personnel in order to advance a preferred 
strategy or policy.  This molding of foreign minds and opinions can substantively alter a 
country’s policies and allow defense diplomacy practitioners to achieve favored 
geopolitical outcomes. 
Although the term defense diplomacy itself did not gain prominence until the 
1990s, both individual defense diplomacy activities and the processes which empower 
them have long been prominent features in world politics.  Serving both as a historical 
overview and literature review, Chapter 2 traces the evolution of defense diplomacy from 
its conceptual origins until its modern incarnations.  Critically, this chapter illustrates the 
enduring strategic dilemma faced by governments whose international ambitions 
outstripped their resource and how defense diplomacy has been employed in an attempt 
to circumvent this problem.   
Chapter 3 endeavors to illuminate the underlying mechanisms which enable 
defense diplomacy’s use as a tool of statecraft.  Building on recent literature on 
transnational networks, I hold that defense diplomacy succeeds in achieving preferred 
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geopolitical outcomes through norm diffusion and state socialization.  By bringing 
soldiers from different countries into contact with one another in collaborative 
environments, defense diplomacy allows for the cultivation of transnational links capable 
of shaping worldviews and ultimately influencing events.   As with similar networks in 
civil society and amongst medical professionals, the ties fostered by defense diplomacy 
enable the rapid diffusion of ideas, strategies, and geopolitical priorities across borders 
countries. The key with defense diplomacy is that these transitional networks span 
governing elites allowing for the direct translation of shared ideas into government 
policy. 
To illustrate how defense diplomacy is used as a tool of statecraft, my dissertation 
relies on two historical case studies of American defense diplomacy in the Pacific to 
demonstrate how cooperative forms of military engagement have been employed by one 
government to influence another.  These cases are not empirical tests of defense 
diplomacy’s effectiveness, but rather serve as examples of how defense diplomacy is 
viewed by practitioners and its uses as a foreign policy instrument.  Not only do these 
case studies support the linkage between defense diplomacy and soft power, but also 
offer keen insights into the role which the practice has played in shaping world affairs.  
Section II considers the use of defense diplomacy by the United States to sustain 
its alliances with the Philippines and Australia following the disastrous experience of the 
Vietnam War. Although it was concern for regional allies that first fueled American 
intervention in Indochina, the war’s unsuccessful conclusion produced a region racked by 
conflict and alliances strained by long years of conflict.  Chapter 4 explores how this 
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experience manifest within the U.S.-Philippine relation.  Deeply disturbed by the 
American failure in Vietnam, and particularly Congress’s inaction in the face of South 
Vietnam’s collapse, President Ferdinand Marcos undertook a fundamental reevaluation of 
his country’s reliance on the United States as the guarantor of Philippine security.  This 
uncertainty took form as both a profound doubt about the credibility of American 
commitments to the Philippines and a desire for the Philippine military to assume a 
greater role within the country’s defense.  These imperatives played out during the 
renegotiation of the agreement governing American military bases in the Philippines.  
During negotiations, the United States wrestled with the lingering doubts about American 
resolve stemming from its actions in Indochina as well as the peculiarities of the Marcos 
regime.  The United States eventually overcame these objections by offering reassurances 
of its continued fidelity and by fundamentally restructuring the nature of the U.S.-
Philippine alliance.  In particular, the United States embraced practices like defense 
diplomacy and reforms over how its bases in the Philippines were run.  These changes 
expanded Filipino participation and enshrined cooperation as the heart of the defense 
relationship. 
A similar process occurred with Australia as recounted in Chapter 5.  By the 
conclusion of the Vietnam War, the government in Canberra had transformed from being 
of Washington’s greatest advocates in Asia to an ardent critic.  Even after the war’s end 
and the dismissal of the quarrelsome Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, the fracture with 
the United States persisted with Canberra continuing to embrace a more independent 
foreign policy.  As with the Philippines, the American withdrawal from Vietnam had 
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exposed the folly of Australia’s past dependence on the United States and underscored 
the need for Canberra to assume greater responsibility for the country’s security.  In order 
to preserve the U.S.-Australian alliance, Washington embraced defense diplomacy as a 
means of allowing Australia to achieve its desire for greater defensive self-reliance within 
the overarching framework of the alliance.  Through frequent consultations and joint 
exercises, Washington and Canberra succeeded in transitioning the alliance from its 
previously hierarchical structure to a true partnership.   
 Section III investigates how the United States used defense diplomacy during the 
War on Terror to combat terrorist organizations in the Philippines. This application of 
defense is of particular importance because it not only helped mold the strategic thinking 
of the target government, but actually had the recipient serve as a proxy for the 
practitioner. In the case of the Philippines, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) not 
only benefited from American security assistance, but effectively functioned as an 
extension of American policy.  Chapter 6 looks into the origins of the conflict by 
exploring both the roots of terrorism within the Philippines and its inclusion as part of 
America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT).   Even as the ruins of the World Trade Center 
smoldered, the perilous situation in the Philippines in 2001 garnered special attention 
from the Bush administration who designated the Philippines a “front-line” state in the 
War on Terror.  However, though the Philippines were an American ally, the government 
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo banned the United States from conducting combat 
operations within her county.  As a result, the United States was obliged to embrace 
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defense diplomacy as its primary means of combatting regional militants like the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).   
Chapter 7 illustrates how this process occurred at the onset of the War on Terror 
in the form of Balikatan 02-1.   Dubbed the “Second Front” in the War on Terror, 
Washington sent hundreds of soldiers to the Philippines in 2002 in the largest deployment 
of U.S. forces outside of Afghanistan.  In the Philippines, the U.S. forces undertook a 
robust counterterrorism program which combined civic-engagement, training and 
operational assistance to the AFP.  The centerpiece of this endeavor was Balikatan 02-1, 
a joint mission on the island of Basilan which blurred the lines between training and 
operations.  Though eschewing combat operations, U.S. forces worked closely with their 
Philippine counterparts throughout Balikatan to facilitate counterterrorism operation and 
supplement the AFP’s own capabilities.  Ultimately, the mission succeeded in driving 
Abu Sayyaf from Basilan and the elimination of Abu Sabaya the group’s outspoken 
figurehead. 
However, Balikatan 02-1 was far from an unmitigated success.  Rather it exposed 
both the severity of the problems in Mindanao and the AFP’s inability to address those 
issues.  Chapter 8 explores the aftermath of Balikatan 02-1 as both Washington and 
Manila wrestled with the complex realities of fighting a War on Terrorism.  In the face of 
competing ambitions, political posturing and differences over the role of American forces 
in the Philippines, the cohesion which defined U.S.-Philippine relations at the start of 
GWOT began to founder.  This increasing divergence culminated in 2004 and the 
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withdrawal of the Philippine contingent from Iraq.  The ensuing wave of acrimony 
threatened to derail both the bilateral relationship as well as ongoing efforts in Mindanao. 
Fortunately, as discussed in Chapter 9, defense cooperation provided an anchor 
for the partnership which helped steady the relationship and overcome the discord which 
has almost consume it.  Particularly during the tenure of Secretary of National Defense 
Avelino Cruz, the United States became an active partner in reforming the Philippine’s 
defense institutions as well as combatting terrorism.  Through exchanges, subject matter 
experts and increased dialogue, the United States helped to address some of the 
underlying faults which had hindered the AFP’s past operations.  These institutional 
changes combined with ongoing training and operational assistance began to produce 
meaningful results in Mindanao.  Through the effective application of defense diplomacy, 
the United States was able to shift the AFP’s warfighting strategy and enhance its 
operations.  The benefits of these changes were evident on the island of Jolo in 2006 and 
2007 when a major AFP offensive, supported by U.S. forces, succeed in eliminating Abu 
Sayyaf’s leadership group.  The dismantling of Abu Sayyaf constituted one of the rare 
triumphs in the War on Terror and owed its success largely the effective use of defense 
diplomacy. 
I conclude by discussing defense diplomacy’s place in world affairs and the need 
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Chapter 1: Defining Defense Diplomacy 
Introduction: 
Defense diplomacy, or the nonviolent uses of military forces and institutions as 
tools of international statecraft, finds itself in a state of intellectual limbo within the field 
of international relations.1  For centuries, central practices of defense diplomacy like 
training exercises and officer exchanges have been common features of geopolitics and 
have been embraced by most world powers as a means of furthering their international 
agenda.2  Yet, despite both its historic lineage and current prominence, the study of 
defense diplomacy remains on the fringes of international security studies and beset by 
several significant shortcomings.  Not only has the study of defense diplomacy suffered 
from a lack of scholarly attention, but it has also been plagued by a conceptual ambiguity 
that has hindered our ability to even understand precisely what defense diplomacy 
actually is.  Rather, since the term first gained prominence in the 1990s, scholars have 
adopted U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's colloquialism on obscenity - we 
may not be able to define defense diplomacy, but we know it when we see it.  The 
                                                 
1 Defense diplomacy is sometimes known as military diplomacy.  The use of “defense diplomacy” or 
“military diplomacy” is typically determined by the author’s preference.  However, in recent years an 
argument has been advanced that “military diplomacy” refers strictly to the actions of military diplomats 
like military attaches, while “defense diplomacy” encompasses the entirety of a country’s defense 
establishment.   It is in sympathy with this line of argument that I have selected to use the term “defense 
diplomacy” as my preferred designation. 
2 For example see: The Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper 3999 (London: TSO, 1998); Tom 
Dodd, Mark Oakes, The Strategic Defense Review White Paper, Research Paper 98/91 (London: House of 
Commons Library, 1998);  Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, Policy Paper No. 1 (London: 
Ministry of Defense, 2000);  Nicholas Floyd, Dropping the Autopilot: Improving Australia’s Defense 
Diplomacy, Policy Brief (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2010); China’s 
Defense in 2000 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2000); China’s Defense in 2004 
(Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2004); A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement (Washington DC: The White House, 1995); The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington DC: The White House, 2006); Quadrennial Defense Review(Washington 
DC: Department of Defense, 2010). 
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unfortunate result of this approach has been a series of informative studies detailing the 
uses of defense diplomacy by a single country or in certain situations, but a failure to 
examine the practice as a whole and its role in international politics. 
 It is the purpose of this chapter to address this difficulty by positing a new theory 
of defense diplomacy which resolves the lingering uncertainty about the concept.  
Breaking with the existing literature which focuses on the manifestations of the practice, I 
instead approach the concept from the broader question of power and how states pursue 
their interests in world affairs.   I argue that our struggles to envision defense diplomacy 
stem from deeper flaws in both our conceptions of the military as an institution and the 
utilization of power in international affairs.  By rectifying these two issues, and 
particularly the conflating of specific power resources like the military with the manner 
in which they are used, I advance a new definition of defense diplomacy that is firmly 
grounded in existing international relations theory.  Specifically, I argue that defense 
diplomacy is not merely a collection of nonviolent military programs, but is a form of 
soft power designed to shape the views of foreign governments.   This new approach to 
defense diplomacy not only accurately answers precisely what defense diplomacy is, but 
also integrates the subject into the larger study of world affairs. 
Can Defense Diplomacy Exist? 
When investigating defense diplomacy as a geopolitical practice, the first 
challenge lies in resolving the apparent contradiction that exists in the term itself.  
Defense diplomacy appears to be oxymoronic as it attempts to combine the inherently 
violent nature of the armed forces with the peaceful practice of diplomacy. Such a 
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combination seems impossible as the military cannot seemingly be divorced from the use 
of force while diplomacy cannot ostensibly spring from the muzzle of a gun.  In order to 
understand how defense diplomacy can exist, it is first necessary to revisit these core 
assumptions and recognize that they are intrinsically flawed.  Tying the military solely to 
the use of violence not only misrepresents the function of the armed forces, but also fails 
to account for how the concept of security has itself evolved.   
The central link between violence and the military is tied to the functional 
imperative that underscores the very existence of the armed forces.  From its inception as 
an institution, the fundamental purpose of the military has been to defend the state and its 
interests from those who seek to do it harm.3  While numerous government institutions 
exist to protect the wellbeing of the state, the armed forces are unique in that they are 
sanctioned to use violence on behalf of the government.  This warrant to legitimately use 
violence as a means of government service has become central to the identity of the 
military and efforts to define its place in society.   For example, Harold Laswell has 
asserted that the essence of the military is as specialists in violence.4  Samuel Huntington 
and Morris Janowitz have further developed this link by arguing that military 
                                                 
3 Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988); Louis W. 
Goodman, “Military roles past and present,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, Civil–military 
relations and democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  It is important to note that 
opponents to the state are not always external threats.  Often, the military is called upon to support the 
government against secessionist movements, insurgents and other internal political rivals.  For perspective 
on the role of the military in protecting the state from internal threats see Mohammed Ayoob, The Third 
World Security Predicament: state making, regional conflict and the international system (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1995).   
4 Harold Lasswell, "The garrison state." American Journal of Sociology  4(1941) 455-468. 
24 
 
professionalization exists as the development of expertise in both the application of 
violence under certain conditions and its organized use.5   
However, it is a mistake to confuse the violent means that the military can employ 
with its actual function.  The violent acts committed by the armed forces are not ends in 
themselves, but rather violence committed in the service of the state with the purpose of 
achieving a political objective.6  This distinction is significant as it separates war from 
acts of pure violence undertaken solely with the intent of inflicting harm on a victim.7  If 
a soldier were to shoot a man amid a traffic dispute, it would not be war but murder.  
Acts of pure violence committed without government sanction are criminal and subject to 
the judicial system regardless of who perpetrates them.  Conversely, as identified by 
Clausewitz and Jomini, war is not merely a series of violent acts, but fundamentally the 
organized use of violence for a political purpose.8 Thus the armed forces’ use of violence 
cannot be detached from the political ends that it is supposed to achieve.  Therefore 
violence alone is not the singular rationale of the armed forces, but only the most 
prominent way in which the military is used to achieve a political objective.  This raises 
an important point of distinction in how we conceive of the armed forces as an instrument 
                                                 
5 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the theory and politics of civil–military relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The professional soldier: a 
social and political portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960). 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press,1976); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966). 
7 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2-6.  




of statecraft: Although the military can use violence on behalf of the state, this does not 
mean that it can only use violence.   
If we take a moment to consider the military’s domestic counterpart, the police 
officer, this distinction becomes more apparent.  Like soldiers, police officers are 
sanctioned to use force when necessary as part of their service to the government. 
Though a police officer can use force to subdue a drunken hooligan, the officer’s function 
in society is not limited to this use of violence.  Indeed, it is not considered out of place 
for that same officer who pacified the ruffian to peaceably dispatch speeding tickets the 
following day.  While police officers are afforded this recognition of a broader purpose in 
society beyond their ability to lawfully employ violence, the same courtesy is lacking in 
our envisioning of the armed forces.  Although the potential to legitimately use violence 
is a key component of the military’s institutional identity, this does not mean that its 
function as a tool of state is confined solely to the battlefield.   
Over the past half century, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, this 
question of the military’s utility outside of violent conflict has become increasingly 
poignant.  While our current era would never be confused for one of universal world 
peace, scholars like Joshua Goldstein and Steven Pinker have identified a general decline 
in instances of militarized international conflict and overall human violence.9  Though 
violence is by no means extinct, in comparison to human history, the prevalence of 
                                                 
9 Joshua Goldstein, Winning the War on War (New York: Dutton, 2011); Steven Pinker, The Better Angels 
of Our Nature: why violence has declined (New York: Penguin Books, 2011); Azar Gat, War in Human 
Civilization. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jack Levy, William Thompson , The Arc of War: 
Origins, Escalation, and Transformation  (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2011); John Muller, “War 
Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment,” Political Science Quarterly 142(2) 2009:297-321. 
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violence within society has noticeably waned.  Within world affairs, this trend has 
manifest in the fading use of war as a tool of international politics.  A quick survey of the 
headlines shows that war continues to be a part of the world today, but the attention 
afforded to conflicts like those in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq have masked a general 
trend of war’s increasing rarity.10  This is particularly true of traditional interstate wars 
between two rival governments which have virtually disappeared over the past two 
decades.  It is worth noting that this trend can be reversed and that we may only be 
enjoying a brief respite from world conflict.  Yet, the simple fact that violent statecraft 
may return as a norm of world affairs does not negate the fact that it is presently the 
exception, with most of the world enjoying unprecedented periods of peace and 
stability.11 
                                                 
10 Bruno Tertrais, "The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?." The Washington 
Quarterly 35(3) (2012): 7-22. 
11 Joshua Goldstein. Steven Pinker, “War Really is Going out of Style,” The New York Times, December 
17, 2011:17.   
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Figure 1: The Waning of War 12 
 
 
For the armed forces, the decline of violent conflict has meant that traditional 
tasks like war fighting and military expeditions have become infrequent.  Yet, even as 
these historic uses of the armed forces have become scarce, a host of non-traditional 
missions have emerged as pressing concerns.  In a globalized world in which people and 
ideas can flow across borders with ease, issues like terrorism, organized crime, illegal 
immigration, piracy and narcotics trafficking have surfaced as major security concerns.13 
These new challenges cannot be resolved by bombs or military maneuvers alone and 
have required states to reassess how their armed forces are employed.  While militaries 
remain important components in meeting these trials, they are called upon not as agents 
                                                 
12 Steven Pinker, “Violence Vanquished,” The Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2011.   
13 Examples of this literature include: Peter Andreas, Richard Price. "From war fighting to crime fighting: 
transforming the American national security state." International Studies Review 3( 3), (2001): 31-52; 
Victor Cha,. "Globalization and the study of international security." Journal of Peace Research 37(3): 391-
403; Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Security After the Cold War." Cooperation and Conflict 32(1): 5-28.  
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of violence but as general tools of state capable of undertaking a wide variety of tasks.  
Although violence does remain an aspect of some of these new missions, especially 
counterterrorism, others such as nation-building, peacekeeping, and disaster relief 
expressly highlight the utility of the armed forces in nonviolent roles.14  Initially, many 
generals and military professionals were reluctant to embrace these new operations but 
have since come to embrace the value of nonviolent missions to prevent crises and 
promote peace and stability.15 
The ability of the armed forces to promote the interests of a government through 
nonviolent operations has been particularly evident in Europe since the end of the Cold 
War.   Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, the nations of Eastern Europe posed a 
unique challenge to their Western counterparts.  Western governments feared that the 
large Soviet-style armies of former Warsaw Pact countries would be major obstacles in 
                                                 
14 David R. Segal, eds, The Postmodern Military: armed forces after the Cold War (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Ashton Carter, William James Perry. Preventive defense: a new security strategy 
for America. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); Volker Franke,  "Warriors for peace: the 
next generation of US military leaders." Armed Forces & Society 24(1) (1997): 33-57; Matthew Jones,Dag 
Anderson. "From Mission Creep to Smart Power: Creating Balance Within Defense and State." PhD diss., 
Air University, 2011; Timothy Edmunds,. "What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military 
roles in Europe." International affairs 82 (6) 2006: 1059-1075; Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging war and 
keeping peace with America's military. (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2004); Derek Reveron, 
Exporting security: International engagement, security cooperation, and the changing face of the US 
military. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Derek Reveron, ed. America's Viceroys: 
The Military and US Foreign Policy. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
15 This conflict over mission has been examined extensively through the lens of civil-military affairs: 
Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: the changing security environment (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999); Peter Feaver, “Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the 
Souring of American Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces& Society 24(3), 407-434; Deborah Avant, 
“Are the Reluctant Warriors out of Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to Post-Cold 
War Low-Level Threats,” Security Studies 6(2), 51-90; Betts, Soldier, Statesman, (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's Press-MQUP, 1991); Christopher Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in 
American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military 
Conflict and the Use of Force,” in Donald Snider and Miranda Carlton-Carew (eds) U.S. Civil-Military 
Relations: in Crisis or Transition?(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995). 
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the delicate transition to democracy.  Not only could unreformed militaries derail the 
transition process, but they could also reignite historic grievances which had been 
suppressed by Soviet domination.16  Such fears of Eastern Europe sinking into chaos led 
Western governments to embrace a bold strategy which utilized their own military forces 
to help reconstruct the armed forces of former Warsaw Pact countries.  Through 
nonviolent activities like officer exchanges and educational programs, Western 
governments mobilized their own defense establishments in order to reform the militaries 
of Eastern Europe.  Programs like NATO’s Partnership for Peace were implemented in 
order to help instill democratic norms of civil-military relations and to integrate Eastern 
Europe into European collective security organs.  These efforts highlight the evolution of 
the armed forces as a tool of statecraft beyond its capacity for violence.  The success of 
Western efforts to reform the militaries of Eastern Europe was predicated not on the 
capacity of Western forces to impose their will, but rather their ability to constructively 
engage their Eastern brethren and use cooperation to bring about a mutually desirable 
outcome.17  The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), in an attempt to bring 
clarity to the wide variety of cooperative programs and activities undertaken by its 
                                                 
16 This concern was particularly acute in light of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and within former 
Soviet Republics like Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova.  John Mearsheimer, "Back to the future: instability 
in Europe after the Cold War." International security 15(1) (1990): 5-56. 
17 Gheciu, Alexandra. NATO In the New Europe: the politics of international socialization after the cold 
war. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005); Alexandra Gheciu. "Security institutions as agents of 
socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’." International Organization 59(4) (2005): 973-1012. 
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military during the transition of the 1990s, sought to consolidate these new military 
missions under a single conceptual framework.  They called it defense diplomacy.18    
  
                                                 
18 The Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper 3999 (London: TSO, 1998); Tom Dodd, Mark Oakes, 
The Strategic Defense Review White Paper, Research Paper 98/91 (London: House of Commons Library, 
1998);  Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, Policy Paper No. 1 (London: Ministry of Defense, 2000). 
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Defense Diplomacy Activities: 
 Bilateral and multilateral contacts between senior military and civilian 
defense officials. 
 Appointment of defense attaches to foreign countries. 
 Bilateral defense cooperation agreements. 
 Training of foreign military and civilian defense personnel 
 Provision of expertise and advice on democratic control of armed forces, 
defense management and military technical areas. 
 Contacts and exchanges between military personnel and units, and ship 
visits. 
 Placement of military or civilian personnel in partner countries’ defense 
ministries and armed forces (exchanges). 
 Deployment of training teams. 
 Provision of military equipment and other material aid. 
 Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for training purposes. 
Figure 2: Defense Diplomacy Activities 19 
 
What is Defense Diplomacy? 
Recognizing that the armed forces have a role in world affairs beyond the 
application of violence helps us understand how activities like defense diplomacy can 
exist and appreciate the full spectrum of the military's role as a tool of state.  However, 
while a clear divide exists between violent and nonviolent uses of the military, the lines 
of demarcation between the various nonviolent practices are less clear cut.  Activities like 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, gunboat diplomacy, and nation-building are all 
                                                 
19 Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, “Adelphi Paper 365: Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles 
for Military Cooperation and Assistance.” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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nonviolent means for a government to use the military yet represent strikingly different 
forms of engagement.  Delineating between these different variants of nonviolent military 
statecraft is an essential step to understanding each practice as it allows us to digest not 
only the unique manners in which the military can be employed, but also the different 
mechanism which empower each form as an extension of government policy. 
 Distinguishing itself from the other nonviolent forms of military statecraft has 
been particularly challenging for defense diplomacy.  This difficulty stems largely from 
the unique circumstances of the concept's creation.  As noted earlier, defense diplomacy 
developed not out of an effort to understand a distinct geopolitical practice, but simply as 
a way of corralling a group of similar nonviolent military activities under a single 
heading.  As a result, the idea was functional rather than being either theoretical 
substantive or descriptively distinct.  Consequently, like terrorism and unconventional 
warfare, defense diplomacy has become an expression without a fixed meaning and only 
the vaguest wisps of conceptual coherence. Without conceptual boundaries, it has 
become virtually impossible to say what an act of defense diplomacy is and what is not.   
The British effort to encapsulate the peaceful undertakings of the UK military in 
Europe during the 1990s not only gave rise to the term defense diplomacy, but also 
inaugurated the effort to define the concept. Instead of detailing specific programs, the 
MOD focused on what they hoped to achieve through the use of defense diplomacy. 
Specifically, the provision of forces: "to meet the varied activities undertaken by the 
MOD to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust and assist in the development of 
democratically accountable armed forces, thereby making a significant contribution to 
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conflict prevention and resolution."20  By focusing on the proposed objectives of defense 
diplomacy, rather than its underlying mechanics, the characterization offered by the 
MOD intrinsically limits this definition to the British worldview of the 1990s. Notably, 
while the development of democratically accountable armed forces is in line with the 
post-Cold War Western agenda, it cannot be applied to the activities of countries like 
China or eras like the Cold War and War on Terror where the promotion of democratic 
norms has often been subservient more immediate concerns. Furthermore, the MOD 
definition does not specify how the armed forces are supposed to achieve these 
objectives. While the phrase "varied activities" allows for a vast array of tasks to be 
deemed as defense diplomacy, it is strikingly unhelpful in distinguishing defense 
diplomacy activities from other nonviolent forms of military statecraft.   
 Cognizant of the limitations in the United Kingdom's conception of defense 
diplomacy, several scholars have attempted to offer their own definitions. Unfortunately, 
these efforts still fall victim to many of the same problems. Specifically, in an effort to 
encompass a myriad of current activities, scholars have defined the term so broadly that it 
loses any descriptive utility. This is particularly evident in the expansive definition 
offered by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster who posit defense diplomacy as "the 
peacetime use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defence ministries) as 
a tool of foreign and security policy."21  Martin Edmonds echoes this approach, defining 
modern defense diplomacy as "the use of armed forces in operations other than war, 
                                                 
20 MOD, "Defence Diplomacy," 2. 
21 Cottey & Forster, Defence Diplomacy, 5-6. 
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building on their trained experience and discipline to achieve national and foreign 
objectives abroad."22 While these authors do emphasize specific activities like military 
assistance in their respective works, simply stating defense diplomacy exists as the use of 
the military as a foreign policy asset in an operation other than war does little to enrich 
our understanding of the concept.  Such a definition fundamentally fails to delineate in 
any way between non-wartime military missions, with the result that activities such as 
gunboat diplomacy, peacekeeping and the building of military bases abroad would all be 
classified as defense diplomacy.  
 Other scholars have revisited the approach initially taken by the United Kingdom 
and focused on the goals of defense diplomacy as their defining characteristic. These 
efforts have attempted to correct for the bias in worldviews present in the British 
definition by identifying general goals which defense diplomacy can be used to achieve. 
See Seng Tan and Bhubhindar Singh describe defense diplomacy as "the collective 
application of pacific and/or cooperative initiatives by national defense establishments 
and military practitioners for confidence building, trust creation, conflict prevention, 
and/or conflict resolution."23 K.A. Muthanna likewise relies on this objective-centered 
approach and envisions defense diplomacy as constructing "sustainable cooperative 
relationships, thereby building trust and facilitating conflict prevention; introducing 
transparency into defence relations; building and reinforcing perceptions of common 
                                                 
22 Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills. Beyond the Horizon: Defence, Diplomacy and South Africa's Naval 
Opportunities. (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for Defence 
and International Security Studies, 1998), 106. 
23 Tan and Singh, “Introduction,” 5-6. 
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interests; changing the mind-set of partners; and introducing cooperation in other 
areas."24  
Though both definitions are significant improvements over the one initially 
offered by the British MOD, they still focus on what defense diplomacy is supposed to 
achieve – namely fostering cooperation and preventing conflict – rather than how it is 
supposed to get there. Following this logic would be akin to defining war as all actions 
taken to achieve victory or trade as measures used to acquire wealth. The emphasis on 
peaceful means to achieve these aims is important, but only rules out the use of violence 
as a form of defense diplomacy rather than shedding light on mechanisms that make 
defense diplomacy unique. Perhaps more importantly, these objective-based definitions 
fail to explain why elements like cooperation and transparency are important and worth 
obtaining. Notably, are these goals an outcome or are they a means towards achieving 
something else?  
 The limitations of the existing efforts to define defense diplomacy all stem from 
the same fundamental problem: defense diplomacy's origin as a concept was clerical 
rather than theoretical.  Though our appreciation for the practice as a distinct form of 
statecraft has evolved, our conception of defense diplomacy remains beholden to its 
existing usage.  Consequently, efforts to define defense diplomacy center on including all 
of the activities currently labeled as exercises in defense diplomacy rather than actually 
describing what defense diplomacy is or how it functions.  As such, defense diplomacy 
has never been developed as a theoretically distinct form of statecraft.  Rather defense 
                                                 
24  Muthanna , "Military Diplomacy," 3. 
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diplomacy has continued as a loose collection of peaceful military practices without 
conceptual coherence or theoretical identity.  This lack of conceptual clarity has had a 
deleterious effect on the broader study of the subject, causing it to flounder as a field of 
inquiry despite its burgeoning prominence in world affairs. 
In order to resolve the conceptual ambiguity that has beset defense diplomacy, it 
is necessary to revisit the origins of the concept and correct the flawed process which first 
created this difficulty.  Rather than observing existing government programs and 
attempting to build a concept around them, I propose we invert this process and instead 
start with the larger question of how states pursue their interests in world affairs and 
where defense diplomacy fits within the wider pantheon of international statecraft.  This 
approach will not only allow us to discern what makes defense diplomacy distinct as a 
tool of state, but also firmly incorporate the concept into the wider study of international 
relations.  The result is an intellectually coherent definition that not only accurately 
captures defense diplomacy as it is currently practiced, but also illustrates the underlying 
mechanisms that empower it.  
Power and Power Resources in Global Affairs: 
The initial premise of international statecraft is that in the absence of an all-
powerful central authority, the world exists in a state of anarchy in which countries are 
responsible for protecting and promoting their own interests.  Within this largely self-
help world, the challenge for governments is that having identified their interests, how 
can they mold world affairs in a manner that produces their preferred outcome?  While 
countries may share the same or similar interests, the unique characteristics of each state, 
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as Hans Morgenthau notes, produce different agendas that often conflict with one 
another.25  Consequently, power is the ability of a country to alter the behavior of other 
actors in the international system in a manner that benefits its interests.26 
As central as the concept of power has been to international relations, it is only in 
the past few decades that scholars have begun to analyze the myriad of ways in which 
power can both be generated and applied.  Joseph Nye in particular has attempted to 
discern the different types of power and how they are utilized. In his seminal works on 
the subject, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Soft Power: The 
Means of Success in World Politics and The Future of Power, Nye identifies three 
specific varieties of power: hard power, economic power and soft power.27  Each of these 
three forms of power illustrates a unique mechanism which allows one actor to shape the 
conduct of another.   
                                                 
25 Hans  Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Alfred 
Kopf, 1973). 
26 How "power" is defined in international relations is subject of a great deal of disagreement with various 
interpretations.  The key to understanding power is some form of intervention by an actor that brings about 
a type of change in another actor’s behavior.  Traditionally, this dynamic has centered on the issue of 
choice and the ability to make a target government select a policy or course of action that they would not 
prefer without foreign pressure.  Although the ability to alter an actor's decision making process is an 
important example of the application of power, it is also not comprehensive.  Instead, a more encompassing 
conception of power, and its successful application, is the ability to bring about a preferred outcomes 
(including altering a government's decision-making process) that would not occur without intervention.  By 
focusing on outcomes instead of just decision-making, it is possible to incorporate the numerous features of 
world affairs which exist outside of individual actor decisions such as the promotion of norms and agenda 
setting.  However, it is also important that we not fall victim to the Exercise Fallacy which mistakenly 
holds that power only exists when it is actively applied.  Power, and the ability to bring about change, is not 
necessarily an active application by a practitioner, but may radiate while still in a latent state.  Dowding, 
Keith. "Why should we care about the definition of power?" Journal of Political Power 5(1) (2012): 119-
135: Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, 2nd edn., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2002). 
27  Joseph Nye, Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power. (New York: Basic Books, 1990); 
Joseph Nye. Soft Power: The means to success in world politics. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 13; 
Josef Nye, The Future of Power. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 
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Type of Power  Mechanism  Illustration 
Hard Power Coercion Country B does what Country A 
wants because Country A would 
harm B if it does not comply 
Economic Power Incentive Country B does what Country A 
wants because Country A will reward 
Country B for complying 
Soft Power Co-Option  Country B does what Country A 
wants because B is convinced that 
what A wants is best.   
Figure 3: Types of Power  28 
Of these three, hard power is the most established and concerns the use of pressure to 
coerce another actor into altering its behavior.  Syria’s willingness to destroy its chemical 
weapon stockpiles in order to prevent American air strikes is an apt illustration of hard 
power as it was the threat of force which compelled Syrian President Bahsar al-Assad to 
surrender his chemical arms.  Conversely, economic power is the ability to incentivize 
compliance by offering some form of reward to a country in exchange for its support.  
Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the People’s Republic of China and the 
Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) have used economic aid in their competition to be 
recognized as the legitimate government of China.  In the case of the Pacific country of 
Nauru, it has repeatedly switched between recognizing Beijing and Taipei based on 
which faction offers the greater economic aid package.29   
                                                 
28 Nye, Means to Success, 13. 
29 Philip Dorling. "China, Taiwan buy influence with secret payments to Nauru politicians." The Sydney 
Morning Herald  August 29, 2011. 
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Among Nye’s three forms of power, soft power is the hardest to pin down.  
Whereas hard and economic power represent the proverbial carrots and sticks of 
punishment and reward respectively, soft power relies on a far subtler mechanism.  While 
the other two forms of power rely on external conditions to alter a target's behavior, soft 
power depends on the concept of co-option and fundamentally shaping the thinking and 
preferences of a subject through such elements as attraction and persuasion.  Instead of 
using incentives or disincentives to produce a preferred outcome, soft power succeeds by 
molding the agenda and beliefs of a target government in a manner that is amenable to 
the practitioner.30  For example, the European Union (EU) has deftly exercised soft 
power during its Eastern expansion.  The appeal of being “part of Europe,” has served as 
one of the EU’s key selling points and encouraged many reluctant countries to undertake 
significant, and often painful, institutional reforms in order to join the organization.31  
Unfortunately, since Nye first posited this typology of power, a flawed heuristic 
has taken root which mistakenly ties each form of power to a particular aspect of 
statecraft.  Rather than focusing on the mechanisms encapsulated in the three forms of 
power, each term has become synonyms with the aspect of a country most readily 
identified with the individual practice.  For example, hard power has ceased to be an 
independent concept but has become shorthand for all uses of the military.  Additionally, 
                                                 
30 Though also known as structural power, these particular manifestations are what Nye identifies as the 
Second and Third Faces of Power; Joseph Nye, The Future of Power. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 
14; Clarissa Hayward, De-Facing Power (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 37. 
31 This actually illustrates how Soft Power can be adapted to all three Faces of Power as the idea of being 
European has been used deftly to coerce, incentivize and attract potential partners.  John Lloyd. "The EU's 
Soft Power and the Big Carrot." Reuters Online December 17, 2013; Anna Michalski. "The EU as a Soft 
Power: The Force of Persuasion." The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. Ed. 
Jan Melissen. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005: 124-144. 
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economic power and soft power have become tied to financial prosperity and culture, 
respectively.   
The flaw in this approach is that it incorrectly conflates a source of power with 
how it is actually used.  Collapsing these two dimensions of power into a single concept 
fails to account for the unique relationship between each element of the power equation.  
Power does not have a physical form or possess any independent agency.  It cannot be 
manufactured in factories, mined from hillsides or traded on a stock exchange.  Rather, 
power exists as an extension of some other facet of a state’s existence such as a strong 
military, booming economy, natural resource or attractive idea.32  These aspects of a state 
which can be utilized as sources of power are known as power resources.  Yet, power 
resources are themselves inert objects which must be operationalized as a tool of 
statecraft.  For decades oil was an important commodity and source of wealth, but truly 
emerged as an important tool of foreign policy in the 1970s when it was weaponized by 
the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).33  While power and 
power resources are interdependent they nevertheless represent two distinct concepts.34  
Within international relations, power resources serve as the source of influence and 
power is the manner in which a power resource is employed by a country to get what it 
                                                 
32 Alexander Wendt has pointed out that power resources must be considered as existing in a social context.  
Rather than an item inherently having value as a power resource, it derives its status from 
social/political/economic conditions that make it important. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
33 Jordan Paust, and Albert P. Blaustein. "The Arab Oil Weapon--A Threat to International 
Peace." American Journal of International Law 68(3)(1974): 410-439;David Yergin, The Prize: The epic 
quest for oil, money & power. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011. 
34 For more on the distinction between a power resource and the application of power see; David Baldwin, 
"Power and International Relations."  in Walter Carlsnaes (ed.) Handbook of International Relations. 
(London: Sage, 2005) 177-191. 
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wants.35  Arguing that a type of power resource (the military, economy or culture) and the 
method of its use (hard, economic, or soft) are the same thing is a fallacy which 
misconstrues both elements of the dynamic. 
Fortunately, in recent years this flawed heuristic attaching specific types of power 
to power resources has come under assault from Nye as well as scholars like Mai'a Cross 
and Zaki Laїdi who have reasserted that there is no intrinsic link between a particular 
power resource and a type of power.36  Any type of power resource, be it military 
strength, financial wealth, natural resources, culture or moral bearing can be used as a 
source of hard, economic or soft power.  As economic prosperity can be used to 
incentivize cooperation, so to can it be employed as a tool of hard power to coerce an 
adversary.   For example, the use of international sanctions on South Africa in the 1980s 
served as a clear use of financial resources as a tool of hard power to coerce South Africa 
into ending apartheid.  Conversely, the economic prosperity of the German Federal 
Republic (West Germany) served as a tremendous source of soft power throughout the 
Cold War as the stark contrast with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
clearly highlighted the deficiencies of the communist system. 
                                                 
35 This confusing of a power resource with power is actually a fairly old problem that was first addressed in 
the late 1980s by Peter Morris known as the vehicle fallacy.  However, this fallacy has become increasingly 
destructive following Nye's typology of power as scholars and practitioners have erroneously attempted to 
classify individual power resources as exclusively belonging to a specific power type:  For more on this 
fallacy see: Morris, Peter. Power: A Philosophical Analysis; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View.  (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).   
36 Nye, Cross, and Laїdi also correctly point out that merely possessing a power resource is not in itself 
valuable. Rather, it is only in through the effective application of a resource that a country can be deemed 
as powerful. As an illustration of this point, North Korea presently has the fourth largest military in the 
world (the largest if you include reserves), yet few outside of the Kim family would consider North Korea 
to be a leading world power. Nye, Future of Power, 3-25; Mai'a K. Cross, "Europe, a Smart 
Power." International Politics 48(6) 2011: 691-706; Zaki Laïdi, Norms Over Force. (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008).  
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What then does this mean for the use of the military as a tool of statecraft?   As 
the initial tie between the armed forces and the use of violence has stunted our 
understanding of their broader role as a tool of state, so too has this mistaken attachment 
to hard power hindered our ability to conceive of the military's uses as a tool of statecraft 
outside of coercion.  In terms of economic power, it is possible to envision how arms 
sales or security guarantees could be used to incentivize another country into a desired 
course of action.37  However, the question of the military’s use as a source of soft power 
is a bit more difficult to address, but is also an essential step towards understanding the 
theoretical origins of defense diplomacy. 
Defense Diplomacy: Soft Power by other Means   
The potential of the armed forces to be used as a source of soft power was first 
raised by Nye in some of his earliest works on the subject.38  In particular, Nye theorized 
that a successful military campaign could demonstrate the military prowess of a 
government to observers and serve as a means of attracting allies.  Far from being a novel 
idea, Nye's thinking on this dynamic tracts closely with the scholarly literature on 
reputation effects in world affairs.  Scholars like Kathryn McNabb Cochran, Todd 
Sechser and Mark J. C. Crescenzi have explored the role of reputation in shaping actor 
behavior and have described how decisive military victories can produce positive 
diplomatic benefits or bandwagoning, while military failures can encourage new 
                                                 
37 For example America’s offer to include allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia under America’s 
nuclear umbrella has served as an important inducement for non-nuclear allies to forgo acquiring nuclear 
weapons of their own and thus limiting the spread of nuclear arms. 
38 Nye, Soft Power: Means of Success, 25-30  
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challengers seeking to take advantage of apparent weakness.39  Although an apt 
demonstration of how the effective use of the armed forces can yield soft power benefits, 
the geopolitical advantage produced in this scenario is not necessarily the objective of the 
undertaking.  Rather the soft power generated is merely a fortuitous byproduct of some 
other form of international action – in this case a successful military campaign.  What 
remains at issue is whether the armed forces can be employed as a source of soft power 
without also engaging in some form of violent conflict. 
Addressing this issue requires us to revisit the actual process through which soft 
power is deployed as a foreign policy tool. While soft power has gained prominence 
within foreign policy circles, the actual mechanics of the process still remain unclear.  
Recent work on the process of socialization and norm diffusion has helped to illustrate 
practices used to mold specific beliefs and practices.40  Yet, despite this progress several 
scholars have acutely questioned the underlying causal mechanisms of soft power and 
                                                 
39 Kathryn McNabb Cochran,. Strong Horse or Paper Tiger? Assessing the Reputational Effects of War 
Fighting.  PhD. Diss., Duke University, 2012; John Mercer. Reputation and International Politics. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996);  Daryl Press. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military 
Threats. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005) ; Mark Crescenzi. "Reputation and Interstate Conflict."  
American Journal of Political Science 51( 2) (2007): 382-396; Todd Sechser. Winning Without a Fight: 
Power, Reputation, and Compellent Threats in International Crises. PhD diss. 2007, Stanford University; 
Scott Wolford. "The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict." American 
Journal of Political Science 51(4) (2007): 772-788. 
40 For example see Richard Niemi, and Mary A. Hepburn. "The rebirth of political socialization." 
Perspectives on Political Science 24(1) (1995): 7-16; Virginia Shapiro. "Not Your Parents’ Political 
Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation." Annual. Review of Political Science 7 (2004): 1-23; Jon 
Pevehouse. "Democracy from the outside-in? International organizations and 
democratization." International Organization 56(3) (2002): 515-549; Frank Schimmelfennig. "Strategic 
calculation and international socialization: membership incentives, party constellations, and sustained 
compliance in Central and Eastern Europe." International Organization 59(4) (2005): 827-860;  Carol 
Atkinson. "Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–
2006." Foreign Policy Analysis 6(1) (2010): 1-22. 
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specifically whether it can actually be enlisted by a government as an effective means of 
foreign policy.41   
In The Future of Power, Nye attempts to addresses this challenge directly by 
describing two causal pathways through which soft power can be used to alter 
government policy.  The first method, known as the indirect model, relies on cultivating 
support for a position within a foreign population who will then mold the political 
atmosphere of their country to favor your interests.  This can occur by the population 
asserting pressure on their government officials either through democratic processes 
(where they exist), other forms of civic engagement, or the creation of conditions which 
limit the policy options available to leaders.42 
Indirect Model: 




Resource  Governing Elites  Attraction (Cooption) Elite Decisions 
 
The study of this indirect model of soft power has focused largely on the use of 
public diplomacy where governments use education, development and social programs to 
communicate directly with foreign populations as a means of gaining their support. Such 
activities like Radio Free Europe and other activities of the United States Information 
                                                 
41 Some examples include: Colin Gray. Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an 
Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century. (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011); Adrian Hyde-Price. 
"Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique." Journal of European Public Policy 13(2) (2006): 217-234; 
Josef Joffe. "The Perils of Soft Power." The New York Times Magazine 14 May 2006: E15. 
42 Nye, Future of Power, 94-97. 
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Agency fall into this category as they seek to directly engage the populations of foreign 
countries and promote an American worldview.   
 Nye’s second method of soft power application is the direct model through which 
a government directly appeals to the governing elites of another country in an effort to 
get the leaders of that country to embrace a favored position.43 Traditional practices of 
diplomacy such as state visits and international conferences fall into this category of soft 
power as they are direct government-to-government measures designed to produce a 
preferred outcome. Such dynamics often take on a personal quality with friendship 
between leaders and direct appeals being used to persuade a foreign government to adopt 
a preferred position. 
Concerning the military as a source of soft power, we can see how the military 
has adopted the indirect approach with military-public diplomacy and publicity missions 
emerging as important operational components.  Missions like disaster relief, 
development assistance and humanitarian aid are not simple acts of charity but ways of 
developing favorable relations between the military and a foreign population.44  This has 
been particularly prominent within the counterinsurgency literature and the ubiquitous 
efforts to win “hearts and minds.”45  A notable case of the military utilizing this indirect 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 94-97. 
44 Joseph Nye, Future of Power, 21-22; Joseph Nye. "Public diplomacy and soft power." The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616(1) 2008: 94-109; Liam Kennedy, and Scott 
Lucas. "Enduring Freedom: public diplomacy and US foreign policy." American Quarterly 57(2) 2005: 
309-333; Ben Mor. "Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy." Foreign Policy Analysis 2(2) 2006: 157-176; 
Göran Swistek, The Nexus between Public Diplomacy and Military Diplomacy in Foreign Affairs and 
Defense Policy. (Munich: GRIN Verlag, 2013); Larissa Forster. "The Soft Power Currencies of US Navy 
Hospital Ship Missions." International Studies Perspectives (2013), 1-21. 
45 A host of counterinsurgency literature actually addressed this approach before the term Soft Power was 
even used.  For recent examples linking counterinsurgency and soft power see: Steven Lukes, “Power and 
the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power,” in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. 
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method of soft power, in a non-counterinsurgency context, was the Berlin Airlift.  The 
willingness of American and British pilots to risk their lives in defiance of the Soviet 
blockade in order to aid suffering Berliners helped heal the wounds of World War II and 
unite West Germany behind the Western cause in the nascent Cold War.46   
But what of the direct model of soft power application?  Here we return to the 
issue of defense diplomacy: the military-to-military activities which the term defense 
diplomacy was created to encompass are all characterized by the use of the defense 
establishment to co-opt foreign government institutions. Military diplomats, officer 
exchanges, training programs, joint exercises, and ship visits are not merely peaceful 
means of using military force, but efforts to directly communicate the ideas, worldviews, 
and policy preferences of one country to another. The ultimate objective of such 
endeavors is not just to foster cooperation as a universal good, but to build partnerships 
that are beneficial to the interests of the practitioners.  
To understand this point, it is useful to contrast how the United Kingdom and the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) have used defense diplomacy as a tool of statecraft.  
Both countries have relied on defense diplomacy to construct close relations with foreign 
governments, but these partnerships mean strikingly different things to each of them. 
                                                 
Williams, Power in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2007); Alexander Lennon (ed). The Battle for 
Hearts and Minds: Using soft power to undermine terrorist networks. (Boston: MIT Press, 2003); Robert 
Egnell,. "Winning ‘hearts and minds’? A critical analysis of counter-insurgency operations in 
Afghanistan." Civil Wars 12(3) 2010: 282-303; Daryl Copeland, and Evan H. Potter. "Public Diplomacy in 
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46 Richard Reeves. Daring Young Men: The Heroism and Triumph of The Berlin Airlift-June. (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2010); Andrei Cherny, The Candy Bombers: The Untold Story of the Berlin Aircraft 
and America's Finest Hour. (New York: Penguin, 2008). 
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Whereas the UK employed defense diplomacy to build close ties with other European 
militaries as a means of maintaining stability on the European continent, China has used 
similar methods to gain access to foreign markets and secure extraction rights for natural 
resources.  In both cases, the defense establishments of each country are used to co-opt 
the governing elites of a foreign country in order to further international cooperation.  
However, the very nature of that cooperation is intrinsically self-serving for the 
practitioner with the UK benefiting from a continued European peace and China securing 
economic prerogatives.  From the diffusion of liberal norms integral to NATO's 
Partnership for Peace to the Soviet Union's efforts to use training programs to spread 
Marxists ideology in the third world, defense diplomacy has consistently been used as a 
means of directly engaging with foreign government agencies in order to alter their 
behavior in a manner that produces a desirable outcome. 
This conception of the defense establishment as a direct source of soft power has 
recently been broached by Carol Atkinson in her seminal work examining the impact of 
the American military education and training on foreign officers.47  Specifically, 
expanding on research concerning political socialization and educational exchanges, 
Atkinson illustrates how the experience of foreign officers at U.S. War and Staff Colleges 
succeeds in socializing them to the American worldview and integrating them into a 
                                                 
47Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Education Exchanges (Lanham 
MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2014); Carol Atkinson,. "Constructivist implications of material power: Military 
engagement and the socialization of states, 1972–2000." International Studies Quarterly 50(3) 2006:509-
537; Carol Atkinson, "Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 
1980–2006." Foreign Policy Analysis 6(1) 2010: 1-22;  
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transnational network of likeminded military officers.48  This process is not merely a 
social phenomenon, but is demonstrated to have significant political ramifications for the 
foreign officer’s home country.  Specifically, using data from the United States’ 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Atkinson establishes a 
clear link between participation in American military education and democratization.  
Such a robust finding not only illustrates the significance of military education as a tool 
of international statecraft, but underscores the utility of defense institutions as a means of 
promoting soft power. 
By approaching the concept of defense diplomacy from the perspective of 
statecraft rather than limiting our perspective to the defense diplomacy activities 
currently employed by governments, we can identify its distinctive characteristics as an 
exercise in the direct application of soft power.  Consequently, it is possible to generate a 
definition of defense diplomacy that not only encompasses defense diplomacy as it is 
currently practiced, but also illustrates its function as a tool of statecraft: defense 
diplomacy is the peaceful use of the defense institutions by one country to co-opt the 
institutions of another government in order to achieve a preferred outcome. 
  
                                                 
48 Elmo Wilson., and Frank Bonilla. "Evaluating exchange of persons programs." Public Opinion 
Quarterly 19(1) (1955): 20-30; Jeanne Watson, and Ronald Lippitt.“Cross-Cultural Experience as a Source 
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Havel, and Stuart W. Cook. Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States. 
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The Velvet Gauntlet: 
Defense diplomacy as both a foreign policy tool and a field of study has suffered 
from two great conceptual failings.  The first of these flaws has been of a bias within our 
thinking about the military as an institution and holds that the armed forces can only be 
used for violence and coercion.  Although both of these elements are prominent features 
of the military's use as a government tool, it is a mistake to conflate these two activities 
with the institution's totality.  Moreover, as the nature of both conflict and statecraft have 
continued to evolve, the nonviolent uses of the armed forces have not merely persisted, 
but have become increasingly central to the daily activities of the defense establishment.  
Far from being an oxymoron or an institutional abomination, defense diplomacy reflects 
the maturation of the military as a tool of statecraft and is indicative of the institution's 
ability to further a government's interests away from the battlefield. 
 The second conceptual flaw to plague defense diplomacy stems not from external 
bias, but from the imperfect nature of the concept’s origins.  Crafted as a means of 
encapsulating a diverse range of cooperative military practices, this formulation had the 
unintentional effect of ignoring the characteristics of those practices beyond their 
nonviolent nature.  Consequently, the concept of defense diplomacy became saddled with 
an existing usage which reduced the concept to a single dimension: nonviolence. Ensuing 
attempts to develop the concept have floundered largely because they remained beholden 
to this initial usage.  As a result, scholars have struggled to delineate between defense 
diplomacy and other forms of nonviolent uses of the defense establishment such as 
humanitarian assistance and gunboat diplomacy.  
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 My approach to defense diplomacy corrects this initial error by recognizing that 
while the absence of violence is a key feature of defense diplomacy, it is not the sole 
unifying characteristic.  At the heart of each instance of defense diplomacy has been an 
effort by one country to mold the strategic thinking and behavior of another in a manner 
that was beneficial to the practitioner's interests. Endeavors like NATO's Partnership for 
Peace were not undertaken out of a sense of international altruism, but served a strategic 
purpose – maintaining stability in Eastern Europe amid the transition to democracy.  
Programs like officer exchanges and training exercises helped to attain this goal by 
imbedding democratic norms into former Warsaw Pact militaries and integrating former 
enemies into preexisting collective security organizations. Defense diplomacy is thus not 
cooperation for its own sake, but actually the method of bringing the strategic thinking of 
one country (the recipient) into harmony with another (the practitioner). This nonviolent 
use of military institutions to convince officials from the recipient government that they 
actually want what the practitioner wants is the essence of soft power. 
While understanding defense diplomacy as a form of soft power resolves the 
conceptual ambiguity that has shadowed the concept, it also opens the field for deeper 
inquiry. The process of cooption that is central to defense diplomacy's success remains a 
little understood phenomenon in world affairs. Since Joseph Nye first identified the 
concept of soft power, it has been hounded by questions of its own including its ability to 
be operationalized as a tool of government policy and the conditions which determine its 
successful applications. Defense diplomacy has inherited these concerns as our ability to 
now properly identify it only reveals how little we actually know about the actual 
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practice. For example, it is unknown how the different defense diplomacy activities 
produce different results or how defense diplomacy compares to other forms of soft 
power. Despite this uncertainty, what remains clear is that these questions are no longer 
purely theoretical. Rather, as countries increasingly emphasize the use of their defense 
institutions beyond the use of force, deepening our understanding of defense diplomacy 
as a tool of statecraft is no longer a choice, but a necessary component in our analysis of 
world affairs.  
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Chapter 2: The Rise of Defense Diplomacy 
Introduction: 
When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the future success of 
American foreign policy was predicated not on Washington’s ability to impose its will on 
others but rather on its capacity to shape their behavior, he was in effect giving voice to 
the riddle that stalks every world power.  Lacking the capacity to force other actors in the 
world system to do as you wish, how then can a state succeed in achieving its 
international aims in light of a country’s own finite abilities?  Although the means 
through which power can be acquired and wielded have evolved, this quandary cuts to 
the very heart of geopolitics and has bedeviled great powers throughout recorded history.  
Indeed, it is the effort to comprehend the nature of this challenge and the various means 
governments have employed to answer this conundrum that underscores much of our 
collective understanding of international relations.  Even though the study of defense 
diplomacy is only a recent addition to this enterprise, the practice itself dates back 
hundreds of years and represents an attempt to resolve this dilemma.  Identified as a 
means of bridging the gap between a state’s desired ends and limited means, defense 
diplomacy has consistently been adapted and utilized as a way for governments to 
achieve their international objectives. 
The purpose of this chapter is to delve into both the theoretical and historic 
underpinnings of defense diplomacy.  First, using the works of Niccolo Machiavelli as a 
base, I diagnose the theoretical dilemma which initially gave rise to defense diplomacy.  
Specifically, in light of the constraints on a government’s coercive abilities, I survey the 
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choice that must be made between forgoing an objective or hazarding the uncertainties of 
international partnerships. Mercenaries, auxiliaries and allies all enhance a country’s 
ability to achieve an aim that is otherwise outside its own capabilities.  Yet each option is 
beset by uncertainties and compromises that have often proved disastrous for those 
willing to gamble trusting such allies.  The uniqueness of defense diplomacy is that it 
seeks to bypass this central problem by using partners to augment a government’s 
capacity while also mitigating the inherent risks.    
Having diagnosed the impetus which first gave rise to defense diplomacy, I then 
trace the practice’s evolution as a tool of world politics. From the age of imperialism to 
the modern day, I explore how defense diplomacy has itself changed in concert with the 
shifting dimensions of world affairs.  It should be noted that it is not the intent of this 
chapter to provide a comprehensive history of defense diplomacy documenting every 
manifestation of its storied past.  Rather, the purpose of this exercise is to broadly follow 
the interplay between defense diplomacy and world events to illustrate the ends to which 
it has been employed and ways in which it has evolved.  This approach has the added 
advantage of also reviewing how the practice of defense diplomacy has generally been 
studied by scholars culminating in the recent literature on its use in world affairs today. 
Ultimately, by marrying the theoretical underpinning of defense diplomacy with an 
examination of its historic lineage, I endeavor to construct a foundation of both theory 




Stilicho’s Dilemma - The Crucible of Statecraft: 
 To understand defense diplomacy’s place within the realm of international 
statecraft, it is first necessary to understand the particular problem in world affairs that it 
seeks to resolve.  The instructive case of the Roman General Stilicho serves as a useful 
window into this particular dilemma and the difficult choice faced by world leaders in 
being forced to select between means which are either inadequate or unreliable. 
  Flavius Stilicho was a Roman general of Vandal and Roman parentage who rose 
to power at the end of the 4th century.  Following the death of Emperor Theodosius I in 
395, Stilicho was named caretaker for the Western Roman Empire until Theodosius’ son 
Honorius came of age and assumed the post of Emperor.1  Though a capable general, 
upon surveying his new charge Stilicho could not have been filled with much confidence. 
Not only had the Roman Empire, only recently reunited under Theodosius, again been 
halved, but both entities were besieged by a myriad of strife. Within the short years of his 
stewardship, Stilicho would wrestle with a rebellion in Africa, unrest along the Alps and 
the general collapse of the Empire’s frontiers.  Most perilous of all was as series of 
incursions by the Goths under the leadership of Alaric, a former ally of Stilicho, who led 
invasions of both Greece and Italy.  Stilicho’s task was daunting not only because of the 
sheer scope of the challenges he faced but also the paltry resources at hand to meet these 
                                                 
1 Theodosius I was the last Emperor to rule both the Western and Eastern halves of the Roman Empire after 
defeating the Western Emperor Euginius at the Battle of the Frigidius in 394.  However, on his deathbed, 
Theodosius decreed that the Empire would again be divided between his sons with his eldest son Arcadius 
becoming Emperor of the East and the younger Honorius being given the West.  Though caretakers were 
named for halves of the Empire, Stilicho’s appointment is of particular note as Honorius was not only 
underage, but also had significant mental limitations. Throughout Honorius’ nominal rule, Stilicho 
effectively operated as Emperor.  
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threats.  Plagued by poor recruiting, lethargy, failing institutions and internal divisions, 
the Roman military at the dawn of the 5th century was short on soldiers and a mere shade 
of the force that had conquered the Mediterranean.2  Unable to secure the Empire with 
Rome’s own diminished legions, Stilicho’s desperate need for soldiers led him to depend 
on the use of auxiliaries and Germanic allies to supplement his forces.  In one illustrative 
instance, after besting tribes of Alemanni in Raetia, Stilicho immediately enlisted his 
defeated foes in order to repulse Alaric’s first invasion of Italy.3  Stilicho even hired 
Alaric himself to turn his Goths east and fight on behalf of the Western Empire in a 
dispute with the Byzantine.   Stilicho nevertheless succeeded in repulsing several 
invasions of Italy and for a time preserving the Western Empire in the face of seemingly 
imminent collapse. 
 Yet Stilicho’s triumphs came at a grave price and proved all too fleeting.  
Though Stilicho himself was felled by court intrigue in 408, his actions would ultimately 
speed the collapse of the Western Empire.  In his scramble for soldiers, Stilicho 
depopulated the Empire’s frontier fortresses, enabling both the Germanic invasion of 
Gaul and the rebellion of Constantine III’s in Britannia.  Though severe, it was Stilicho’s 
reliance on auxiliaries and allies which was the most costly.  Alaric abandoned his 
mission against the East and turned his army, recently bolstered by the now deceased 
Stilicho, against his former masters in the West.  In 410, Alaric’s forces sacked Rome for 
                                                 
2  Thomas Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome: A study of Roman Military Policy and the 
Barbarians, ca. 375-425 AD. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Brian Campbell. The Roman 
Army, 31 BC-AD 337. (London: Routledge, 1994). 
3 Edward Gibbon. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: Vol. II 395 AD-1185 AD. (New York: 
Modern Library, 1983), 101. 
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the first time in over 800 years heralding the ultimate demise of the Western Empire.4  
Given an impossible task, Stilicho gambled the future of the Western Empire on the use 
of auxiliary forces.  However, this wager was a Faustian bargain allowing Stilicho to the 
preserve the Empire for a bit, but at the expense of its lasting viability.5 
 Though the difficulties faced by Stilicho were particularly acute, the dilemma 
that he confronted was by no means unique.  In the face of an objective that he could not 
possibly achieve with his own meager resources, Stilicho was forced to choose between 
the unattainable goal of preserving the Empire and trusting unreliable allies.  Although 
the use of allies and auxiliaries allowed Stilicho to achieve what was otherwise beyond 
his ability, it necessitated a loss of control over those means which ultimately undermined 
what success he was able to achieve.  It is the juncture of these two important facets of 
international affairs, a state’s limited capacity to act unilaterally and the unreliability of 
international partners, that is the central dilemma which defense diplomacy seeks to 
resolve. 
 The freedom of a country to act internationally is not only constrained by those 
external checks placed on it by other actors in the system, but also the innate limitations 
of its own abilities.  While the actors that populate the international arena come in a 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that the administrative center of the Western Empire had recently been moved to 
Ravenna by Stilicho as it was rightly seen as a more defensible location.   
5 Stilicho’s tenure remains a source of contention among historians with supporters defending Stilicho’s 
actions as a valiant attempt to stave off decline and detractors who view him as an unwitting traitor who 
irrevocably harmed the empire.  Edward Gibbon is firmly a defender of Stilicho, but for examples of each 
camp see; Ian Hughes, Stilicho: The Vandal who Saved Rome. (Barnsely: Pen & Sword, 2010); John 
O'Flynn, Generalissimos of the Western Roman Empire. (Edmonton: University of Alberta press, 1983); 
John Bury. History of the Later Roman Empire, Vol. 2: From the Death of Theodosius I to the Death of 
Justinian. (New York: Courier Dover Publications, 2013); Thomas Hodgkin. The Barbarian Invasions of 
the Roman Empire.(London: Folio Society, 2003); Joseph Vogt. The Decline of Rome: the metamorphosis 
of ancient civilisation. (London: Trinity Press, 1969). 
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myriad of forms; from the hamlet to the hegemon each nevertheless remains bound by its 
own finite resources.  This ceiling on an actor’s own capabilities can manifest in a variety 
of forms such as economic decline, public disenchantment, military dysfunction and 
institutional atrophy.6  As Alexander’s armies refused to march past the Hyphasis and 
Rome’s legions were eroded by an inability to recruit soldiers, it is worth remembering 
that even the greatest empires are not free from curbs on what they can achieve with their 
own resources.  
 While a country’s capability to act in world affairs may be constrained by limited 
resources, neither the ambitions of its leaders nor its global needs are subject to such 
tethers.  Though the reasons why a government may embark on an international 
undertaking are many and span the gambit from delusions of grandeur to strategic 
imperatives, these motives are the product of not what is possible, but rather what is 
deemed necessary or at the very least desirable.  The decision to launch a particular 
endeavor might not even be that of the subject government, but instead thrust upon it by a 
rival. As Machiavelli warns, “it is impossible for a republic to remain long in peaceful 
enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier.  For should it forbear from molesting 
others, others are not likely to refrain from molesting it.”  Machiavelli cautions that any 
state seeking to abstain from an active approach to world affairs “would find not safety 
but rather death and destruction.”7  
                                                 
6 Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. (New York: Random House, 1987). 
7 Niccolo Machiavelli. Discourses on Livy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), Chapter XIX. 
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 In confronting the disparity between what governments want from the world 
system and what they can actually achieve, the challenge of statecraft lies not in doggedly 
testing the limits of a state’s unilateral abilities, but rather in skirting these constraints and 
finding alternative means of attaining its goals.  Though a state may not be able to realize 
an objective by itself, international partnerships allow governments to add the strengths 
of others to its own and accomplish what would otherwise be beyond its capabilities.  
This was precisely what Stilicho endeavored to do: unable to rely on his own legions to 
defend the Empire, he recruited allies to supplement his own forces.  However, the case 
of Stilicho also demonstrates that while international partnerships may empower an actor, 
they come with their own perils. 
 The works of Niccollo Machiavelli offer insights into the dangers of 
international partnerships and how such prospects can be gainfully navigated.  In both 
The Prince and The Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli addresses the risks of relying on 
other countries to achieve your aims through his discussion on the uses of mercenaries 
and auxiliaries. On both institutions, Machiavelli is scathing and effectively implores his 
reader to pursue any course of action rather than rely on either mercenaries or auxiliaries.  
Though the concept of mercenaries, at least as they existed in the time of Machiavelli, are 
no longer a prominent feature of world politics, the lessons concerning these soldiers for 
hire remains poignant.8  Specifically, from Machiavelli’s discussion of mercenaries it is 
possible to divine the utility of partners motivated solely by incentive such as those allies 
                                                 
8 Though variants of this practice remained prominent into the 1800s. Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, 
Pirates and Sovereigns. (Princeton: Princeton: University Press, 1994).   
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persuaded by arms transfers or promises of aid.9  Machiavelli is highly critical of the 
employment of mercenaries and others motivated solely by the promise of reward.  
Among the litany of grievances against soldiers of fortune, Machiavelli argues, “they 
have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is 
not sufficient to make them willing to die for you.”  Consequently, mercenaries are bold 
when there is no fighting, but liable to flee when actually needed in battle.  Machiavelli 
further notes that mercenaries are an inherent catch-22 as a capable mercenary captain 
cannot be trusted since he will always be looking for his own advancement while an 
ineffective captain is utterly useless.10   
 Even as Machiavelli is critical of mercenaries and the power of incentive to win 
allies, he is outright damning of the use of auxiliaries.  Machiavelli characterizes 
auxiliaries in a more expansive manner than his Roman forbearers and employs the term 
to encompass all “troops sent to our assistance by some other prince or ruler, paid by him 
and under officers by him appointed.”11  In this way, Machiavelli’s auxiliaries are better 
thought of as international allies and the reason why they are deemed even more 
                                                 
9 The role of incentive in modern statecraft is discussed both in the previous chapter and in the later 
discussion of defense diplomacy during the Cold War.  Of particular salience is the utility (or more 
accurately - the lack thereof) of arms transfers and foreign aid as a means of securing allies.  Recent events 
like the arming of opposition forces to confront the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL), show that 
such practices remain common in world affairs today despite their strikingly dubious record.       
10 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1997), Chapter XIII. 
11 Here Machiavelli’s definition of auxiliaries is particularly important as it diverges from that used by Livy 
and the traditional Roman auxiliaries.  Roman auxiliaries were the non-citizen legions who nevertheless 
were composed of Roman subjects.  However, Machiavelli uses auxiliary to describe those forces not only 
outside the military structure, but fundamentally under the command of another prince and composed of his 
citizens.  Consequently, though Machiavelli uses the word auxiliaries, “allied” might be a more appropriate 
term to signify the distinction actually described.  Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, (New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press, 1997), Chapter XIII; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Chapter XX; Kenneth Grundy. "On 
Machiavelli and the mercenaries." The Journal of Modern African 6(3) (1968): 295-310; Sean Erwin, “The 
Metabolism of the State: Instrumental and Aleatory Aspects of Auxiliaries in Machiavelli,” Époché: A 
Journal for the History of Philosophy. 20(1), 81-104. 
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dangerous than mercenaries is that they are organized, united and explicitly in the service 
to another state.  This means that a leader who depends on auxiliaries actually becomes 
their hostage as the survival of his state or anything he may accomplish is predicated not 
on his own abilities but on the discretion of a foreign power.  For this reason Machiavelli 
warns that the prince who calls in auxiliaries for assistance will either fail in the usual 
manner or effectively become a captive of the auxiliaries in the case of success.12   
 Though distinct, Machiavelli’s criticism of both mercenaries and auxiliaries 
revolve around the same central pivot – a frailty of allegiance.  Mercenaries and 
auxiliaries can enhance a state’s own military abilities, but necessitate a forfeiture of 
control over the operation, outcome and the very forces themselves.  Such a sacrifice of 
control is made tolerable by the understanding that the allegiance of the new force has 
been secured allowing the employer to retain authority if not absolute command.  This is 
a fool’s bargain as the enhanced capabilities resulting from international partnerships are 
themselves an illusion.  The augmented abilities that such measures represent are never 
really those of the employer and any objective that may be accomplished is dubious at 
best and subject to the whims of a foreign leader.13  This was the snare which beguiled 
Stilicho and so many others.  Stilicho staked the security of the Empire on the use of 
allies and in the process made Rome’s safety susceptible to the treachery of its partners.  
That this gambit ultimately failed is indicative not of Stilicho’s flawed reasoning, but 
rather the impossibility of the decision that he and many others have been forced to make.   
                                                 
12 Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XIII. 
13 This is precisely why Machiavelli is so adamant that neither mercenaries nor auxiliaries should ever be 
relied on and that a good prince should only undertake what his state can accomplish by itself. 
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 The novelty of defense diplomacy, and its utility as a tool of foreign policy, is 
that rather than trying to resolve Stilicho’s dilemma, it instead seeks to subvert the entire 
problem.  At its heart, Stilicho’s dilemma is the impossible choice of having to embrace 
either means that are inadequate or others which are unreliable.  Defense diplomacy 
circumvents this choice by endeavoring to amplify a state’s abilities through the use of 
allies while simultaneously minimizing the subsequent loss of control.  Mercenaries and 
auxiliaries are dangerous precisely because of the imperfect mechanisms which guarantee 
their loyalty; specifically the flagging power of incentive and the capricious favor of 
foreign benefactors, respectively.  Defense diplomacy attempts to remedy this uncertainty 
by changing the way in which fidelity is maintained.  By engaging, persuading, and 
attracting foreign leaders to your worldview, you shift the means of securing support 
from an external stimuli to an internal one.  Rather than trusting the strategic thinking of 
a foreign government to guarantee the allegiance of the forces needed to accomplish a 
goal, instead defense diplomacy alters that same government’s thinking so that it is 
brought in line with your own desires.  Instead of relying on the fleeting goodwill of 
another government to achieve an objective, a state can rather depend on that allied 
government to pursue an objective that it is convinced that it also wants.  By bringing a 
foreign entity’s internal decision making process into concert with your own, in effect 
you reduce the risks of defection and the unreliability of foreign forces.  The result is that 
defense diplomacy allows a country to bypass Stilicho’s dilemma by enabling it to 
supplement its own abilities with foreign support without incurring the traditional doubts 




Native Armies - From Discovery to Empire: 
 The value of defense diplomacy in redressing Stilicho’s dilemma is aptly 
illustrated in the practice’s own ancestry and the transition from Europe’s Age of 
Discovery to empire building.  In the 15th century, technological revolutions in navigation 
and shipbuilding allowed Europeans to traverse the world’s oceans with a degree of 
reliability and ease that had hitherto been unknown on the continent.  Driven by 
missionary zeal as well as a hunger for gold, spices, and other precious goods, Europeans 
crossed the seas to establish distant bases in order to meet the needs of both commerce 
and conquest.  Aided by technology, biology and the ability to exploit native divisions, 
small numbers of European explores were able to topple empires and claim vast swaths 
of land as their own.14  Despite the rapid speed of discovery, for the first centuries of their 
existence the great European empires amounted to little more than a scattering of 
outposts cloistered along foreign shores. This was particularly true in Asia where the 
native populations and institutions had not suffered the same devastation at the hands of 
pathogens and slavers that befell their counterparts in Africa and the Americas.  While all 
the advantages enjoyed by the European explorers enabled them to triumph over native 
forces with seeming ease, efforts to extend this dominion beyond their coastal hovels 
repeatedly failed as a result of their own paltry personnel.15  Not only were the European 
forces numerically small, but those individuals present proved to be strikingly ill-suited 
                                                 
14 Jared Diamond. Guns, Germs and Steel: a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years. (New 
York: Random House, 1998). 
15 This process was particularly evident in Dutch efforts in Indonesia, the British conflicts with the Mughal 
Empire in India and Spain’s struggles to control the Southern Philippines. 
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for the challenges of empire building.  White soldiers were expensive, disorderly, unfit 
for colonial warfare and died from disease at an alarmingly rapid rate.16  The result was 
that out of necessity as much as design, the European presence persisted as small 
toeholds along the coasts while the vast interiors of the newly broached continents 
remained the purview of the native population.   
 Small and precarious as they were, the European settlements endured in a state of 
constant danger.  In places like India, China and Japan, the European enclaves survived at 
the behest of the local authorities rather than despite them.17  Given the unsuitability of 
European soldiers for the task of protecting these outposts, a different approach to 
security was needed to protect these western bastions.  The most expedient solution was 
simply to form alliances with native authorities and to depend upon these local allies for 
safety.  While a sensible approach given the limited utility of European personnel, relying 
on native allies was not itself a sound solution.  Rather, such partnerships often turned out 
to be no more dependable than the European alliances derided by Machiavelli.  In cases 
like the Mataram King Amangkurat II and the Powhatan Confederacy, local allies turned 
out to be a source of insecurity rather than protection.  With European soldiers being 
                                                 
16 Philip Curtin. Death by Migration: Europe's encounter with the tropical world in the nineteenth century. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Jaap A. de Moor, and Henri L. Wesseling, 
eds. Imperialism and War: essays on colonial wars in Asia and Africa. Vol. 8. (Lieden: Brill, 1989); David 
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ineffective and local allies proving unreliable, the perils of Stilicho’s dilemma were all 
too real for European pioneers of the 16th and 17th centuries.18    
 To resolve this crisis of insecurity a new hybrid solution was developed in the 
form of native armies which meshed the advantages of native personnel with the 
reliability of European leadership.  The soldiers for these native armies would be 
recruited from the indigenous populations who were not subject to the same shortcomings 
and poor health which beset their European counterparts.  Yet while the bulk of the 
personnel would be drawn from local peoples, they would be led by European officers 
and trained to fight in the manner of western armies.  Conscripting the native populations 
into European service helped answer the problem of manpower, but left unresolved the 
question of reliability.  As described by Jaap de Moore in his discussion of the Dutch 
experience in Indonesia, there was a need for military allies, “but not at any price, above 
all they needed reliable and trustworthy soldiers, who were unconditionally loyal.”19  
Simply giving indigenous soldiers white officers and a paycheck would not foster such 
loyalty and indeed might even court disaster.  
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 The true innovation of native armies was not merely their use of indigenous 
personnel for European ends, but rather how it answered the question of fealty.  Initially, 
allegiance to the European cause was attained through selective recruitment which 
leveraged cleavages and rivalries within the native populations to western advantage.  
Specifically, by drafting ethnic, religious and cultural minorities into native armies, the 
Europeans succeeded in wedding the fortunes of these social factions to the success of the 
imperial endeavor.20  More importantly, the native armies themselves functioned as a 
means of cooption which not only secured European prerogatives but actively propagated 
them.  As detailed by David Killingray in his work on the subject, beyond food, clothing, 
pay and opportunity, “military service also gave men new loyalties to officers and to 
regiment, and an identification with the colonial territory and, perhaps, with colonial 
authority.”21  Like mission schools and churches, the native armies as institutions 
endeavored to engender in their recruits an imperial ideology which placed allegiance to 
the colonial authority as its highest tenent and the center of its worldview.22  Imperial 
authorities did not need to choose between their own ineffectual forces and unreliable 
allies.  Rather, by coopting the loyalties of local populations and incorporating them into 
native armies, colonial governments combined a handful of white officers with 
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21 Killingray, Guardians of Empire, 14. 
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indigenous peoples and fashioned them into a tool that was free of the failings of 
progenitors and ideally suited for the task of empire building. 
 Initially, native armies were not armies at all, but simply local guards hired by 
agencies like the Dutch and British East India Companies to secure their foreign outposts 
and trade.  Yet, these small companies of guards quickly ballooned into full regiments 
and their missions grew from protecting settlements to conquering territory.23  The 
growth of native armies under the command of imperial authorities, or the charter 
companies that represented them, quickly supplanted the previous use of local allies and 
abolished the need for such pacts.24  Freed from the manpower constraints which had 
hindered earlier efforts, European authorities were now able to push into the continental 
interiors and usurp or coerce native governments as need be.  Use of native armies was 
not reserved for campaigns against indigenous populations and they proved to be a 
valuable asset amid colonial disputes between rival European powers.  Tellingly, it was 
the use of locally raised forces at both the battles of Plassey in 1757 and throughout the 
Third Carnatic War which allowed the British East India Company to soundly defeat both 
the Mughals and French respectively and establish hegemony over the Indian 
subcontinent.25  
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  Native armies were not merely a feature of European empires, but in fact the 
very bedrock on which they were built.  For example, under British rule Indian troops 
acted as “an imperial 'fire brigade' dealing with crises from China to Africa; and the 
subcontinent.”26  Furthermore, the cooption and mobilization of local populations under 
the banner of European powers not only made imperialism feasible it also made colonies 
governable.  As indigenous personnel filled the ranks of native armies, so too were they 
called upon to staff the local militias and police forces which formed the martial 
infrastructure of colonial rule.27  It was the prominence of indigenous individuals in 
colonial institutions that led W.E.B. Du Bois to grimly conclude that “the darker world is 
held in subjection to Europe by its own darker soldiers.”28 
 Though the cooption of native peoples into imperial service proved to be an 
effective mechanism for empire building, the question of reliability never wholly 
subsided.  Rather, the use of locally recruited soldiers was a delicate process where the 
goal was creating a content and pliant army which was “sufficiently close to civil society 
for social contentment, but not too close to compromise its willingness to act as a 
coercive arm.”29  Such a balance was difficult to maintain and mutiny remained a 
constant threat.  The most infamous of such uprisings was the Indian Rebellion of 1857 
when large factions of the Sepoy army, then by far the largest colonial force, rose up 
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against their British rulers.30  Though the uprising, which lasted over a year and spread 
across the subcontinent, was eventually suppressed it provoked a radical rethinking of 
how India was ruled and protected.  Beyond the usurpation of colonial authority from the 
East India Company by the British government, dramatic changes were also made in the 
native armies.  Notably, while the use of native soldiers survived the transition from 
company to direct imperial rule, severe limitations were imposed on the types of 
armament provided to indigenous troops and a fixed ratio of native to European soldiers 
was implemented.31  The Indian Rebellion and similar episodes in Singapore and Congo 
may feature prominently in our memory, but such incidents were strikingly rare.  Perhaps 
more importantly, of the mutinies and strikes by native soldiers to occur during imperial 
rule, the overwhelming majority were fueled not by anti-colonial fervor, but by mundane 
grievances over issues like pay and service conditions. 32 
 The use of colonial forces as tools of state reached its zenith during the two 
World Wars when both the British and French relied heavily on their foreign forces to 
support their war efforts.  During World War II, the Indian army grew to over two million 
men, sustaining the Empire’s presence in Asia and serving as “the leading British 
strategic reserve on land.”33  The situation was even starker for the French, who relied on 
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colonial forces to not merely buttress Paris’s colonial holdings but to protect France 
itself.  During both World Wars, the French relied on colonial soldiers to offset its 
demographic disadvantage to Germany.  During World War I over 200,000 French 
colonial soldiers saw service in the trenches.  By 1940, over nine percent of the French 
Army were West Africans who eventually composed over twenty percent of Free French 
forces.34  The significant use of colonial soldiers during the two World Wars illustrates 
the dramatic arc of the role played by native armies in imperial service.  From mere 
guards hired to protect trading forts, these units ballooned into massive armies as their 
mission evolved from protecting settlements to conquering continents and eventually 
even serving in Europe.35  All of this was made possible by marrying the ideology of 
imperialism with the building of native armies. That colonial soldiers were not only 
entrusted with the security of the empire but even the literal defense of the metropole 
shows both the blurring of lines between national and colonial forces as well as the 
effectiveness of the cooptive mechanisms used to instill imperial allegiance.   
 As World Wars mark the height of colonial forces in imperial service, they also 
signaled their demise.  The war served as a watershed moment for European colonialism 
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as the unparalleled destruction of the conflict left the European powers painfully aware of 
their own limitations and diminished abilities.  Unable to maintain their colonial holdings 
or stem the growing torrent of nationalism spreading around the world, the European 
empires gradually and often grudgingly faded from existence to be replaced by a bevy of 
newly sovereign states.  As colonialism ended, the native armies which had served as the 
guardians of empire transitioned to become the national armies of independent states.  
Yet, as explored by Tarak Barkawi, the break between colony and country was not as 
clear as it may initially appear.  In the wake of gaining independence many former 
colonies, particularly in the Middle East and Francophone Africa, chose to maintain close 
ties with their former rulers.  The European officers and noncommissioned officers who 
had been essential to the training and leading of colonial forces persisted but were 
transitioned from military commanders to the ubiquitous role of military advisors.36    
 The continued prominence of links between the militaries of newly independent 
counties and their former colonial rulers belies the seismic shift that underscored these 
relationships.  Despite the seeming continuity in military affairs between countries like 
Oman and the United Kingdom, the dynamic had effectively been inverted.37  From 
exercising complete control over colonies and their armies, former imperial powers now 
enjoyed advantages in their former realm in proportion to their ability to cultivate 
influence with the newly independent governments.  Such a dramatic shift necessitated 
not the perpetuation of military cooption as it had existed under imperial rule, but the 
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development of new mechanisms capable of swaying sovereign governments rather than 
merely mollifying colonial holdings.  Military advisors, training programs and arms 
transfers evolved into what Andrew Scott labelled as “techniques of informal 
penetration,” which furthered international aims by offering “direct access to the people 
and processes of another society.”38  Military academies like Sandhurst in the United 
Kingdom and Saint Cyr in France, are emblematic of these efforts.  Not only do these 
schools offer military training to soldiers from foreign countries, but they also served as a 
conduit for European countries to garner influence abroad and to mold the strategic 
thinking of future military and political leaders.  These efforts marked not only the 
metamorphosis of imperial means of control into instruments of foreign policy, but also 
the birth of defense diplomacy as a means of international statecraft.   
Cold War Security Assistance – the Quest for Influence: 
 The Cold War served as the ideal incubator for defense diplomacy as it fanned the 
embers of military cooption emerging from colonialism into a critical tool of foreign 
policy.  Defense diplomacy’s rapid growth as a geopolitical asset reflects the unique 
conditions of the Cold War which perfectly compliment the practice’s distinct attributes. 
Though the Cold War can be viewed as a classic international competition between rival 
great powers, its global nature and ideological underpinnings shaped the conflict in a 
distinctive manner.  Unlike previous great power struggles, the devastation wrought by 
World War II and the unparalleled destruction promised by atomic warfare engrained in 
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both the United States and Soviet Union a deep compulsion to avoid direct military 
conflict.  Consequently, the geopolitical impetus shifted to identifying means of 
achieving international objectives while minimizing the risk of a nuclear exchange 
between the superpowers.  While such a reluctance to engage in direct military combat 
alone would have increased the significance of nonviolent means of statecraft like 
defense diplomacy, the practice gained additional salience due to the ideological 
dimensions of the Cold War.  With the founding of rival military alliances in Europe and 
the building of national armies in former colonies, both the United States and USSR were 
able to use arms sales and military training, collectively known as military or security 
assistance, to fortify geopolitical allies and woo world governments into their respective 
ideological camps.39 As a result, defense diplomacy moved to the forefront of the 
international competition for influence.     
 The idea of using military resources as a cooperative mechanism to support allies 
and confront geopolitical rivals was directly addressed by George Kennan during his 
discussion of how containment might be achieved without resorting to war.  In a series of 
lectures delivered at the National War College in 1946, Kennan warned his audience 
about the dangers of relying on force as a primary means of statecraft and instead 
advocated the use of alternative levers of influence including economic might and 
measures to shape world opinion.  While most of Kennan’s talk focused on these 
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different means of pursuing containment, he also addressed the use of military power as a 
tool of cooperation. Kennan in particular noted that the provision of arms and military 
assistance could be a useful tool for containing the spread of Communism.  However, 
Kennan cautioned that such measures were often inappropriate because as it is easy to 
confuse the political deficiencies of an ally with a military shortcoming.  Kennan stated 
that this was particularly true in the case of the Greek Civil War where the inability of the 
government to suppress a small communist guerrilla force spoke to far larger failings in 
the Greek establishment that would not be resolved by supplying additional weaponry.40  
 Using security assistance programs to confront and contain the spread of 
communism, as outlined by Kennan, gained increased importance in 1949 following the 
Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. While it was the 1948 Berlin Crisis which 
offered the initial impetus for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb in August 29, 1949, underscored the 
need to enhance NATO’s credibility as a military alliance.  The United States’ Military 
Assistance Program (MAP), established in September 1949, was designed to address this 
problem.  Functioning as a military adjunct to the economically oriented Marshall Plan, 
the MAP provided equipment and training to bolster American allies and solidify their 
military capabilities.41  The outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 
reinforced the global nature of the Cold War and the dangers posed by communist 
expansion in areas other than Europe.  Subsequently the MAP was itself expanded on a 
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global scale to include American allies like Japan, Iran and the Philippines.  Confronted 
with the perceived threat of communist expansion, military assistance offered a viable 
means of promoting collective security and protecting American objectives while 
avoiding the perils of direct military confrontation.42  This point was expressly made by 
President Eisenhower who following the Korean conflict noted that the U.S. could not 
“maintain old-fashioned forces all around the world,” but instead must “develop within 
the various areas and regions of the free world indigenous forces for the maintenance of 
order, the safeguarding of frontiers, and the provision of bulk of the ground capability.”43 
 Yet it is a mistake to look at military assistance as purely an attempt by one super 
power patron to enhance the fighting capabilities of a recipient state.  Stephanie 
Neumman in her study of military assistance programs notes that training was the often 
overlooked element of these agreements, but an essential factor in their utility.  Beyond 
enabling recipient soldiers to effectively use the equipment they were given, training 
allowed suppliers to also further political aims. Specifically, “when successful, [training] 
transmits to the recipient military the supplier's particular orientation toward war, the 
doctrine and tactics for which the weapons were designed, and sometimes a specific 
world view.” 44 More than a means of building military capacity, military assistance, and 
more importantly the training that accompanied it, served as a means of disseminating the 
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competing philosophies of the two super powers.  As William Mott explains in his 
comprehensive studies of arms transfers during the Cold War; 
“Military training that inculcates donor values and doctrines may socialize 
recipient military leaders, establish personal relationships that transcend national 
interests, and provide a robust foundation for donor influence.  Indeed many 
donor-educated officers and donor-trained soldiers actively sought to shape their 
states' policies and preferences around donor values, aims and interests well after 
the termination of donor-recipient relationship.”45 
 
 Military assistance as a means of building allied capabilities and molding their 
strategic thinking was particular significant in Europe where it was essential to the 
operations of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  Both alliances called upon their 
members to not only fight alongside one another, but essentially operate as a single 
fighting force.  To achieve this level of interoperability, intra-alliance defense diplomacy 
like officer exchanges and training exercises became the lifeblood of the rival alliances.46  
Though these alliances were often characterized by internal feuding and acrimony, the 
mechanisms used to build military integration also produced political benefits for the 
super powers as their priorities diffused throughout the alliances.  Geoffrey Wallace has 
shown that highly institutionalized alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact served as 
an important conduit for powerful countries to mold the strategies of their smaller 
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partners.47  However, it is important to note that such influence was not a one way 
process.  As illustrated by Thomas Risse-Kappen, in the case of NATO the European 
members of the alliance often wielded considerable influence over the United States- 
substantively influencing American foreign policy on subjects like human rights and 
nuclear posturing.48   
 Beyond the confines of Europe, security assistance served as crucial tool for 
expanding influence in the Third World.  Though many of the new nations to emerge 
from the end of colonialism maintained close military ties to their former imperial rulers, 
others acted as free agents and were liable to be swayed by either super power.49 Along 
with economic aid, the willingness of the Soviets and Americans to supply arms to these 
new countries and train their officers proved a useful mechanism for building political 
ties.50  The competition for allies in the developing world was of particular importance to 
the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin in 1953.  While the United States 
attempted to contain the Soviet Union, Moscow viewed this posturing as an attempt to 
encircle the USSR with American allies.  Cultivating friends in the Third World offered 
the Soviets a means of breaking this encirclement by extending its own defensive 
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perimeter and fracturing American led alliances like the Baghdad Pact.51  Despite the 
communist underpinnings of the USSR and the Marxist courses included in all of its 
training programs, the Soviet Union’s use of security assistance was largely pragmatic 
and not ideological.  While the promotion of communism was a welcome occurrence, the 
primary aims of Soviet aid to Third World governments and liberation movements were 
strategic objectives.  Mindful of Lenin’s maxim that the road to Paris and London ran 
through Asia and Africa, the Soviets endeavored to develop leverage in the Third World 
in order to frustrate Western efforts, disrupt the supply of raw materials to Western 
markets and most importantly as a means of excluding American influence.52  Notably, 
despite its anti-capitalist inclinations, the Soviets readily used arms sales and defense 
diplomacy as a means to achieve economic goals like the opening of markets and the 
earning of hard currency.53 
 However, it is important to note that both Soviet and American efforts to use 
defense diplomacy to cultivate influence suffered significant shortcomings.  As the 
success of soft power relies on the ability to attract others to a specific idea or worldview, 
it also carries the potential to repel.  Rather than attracting a target to a particular 
viewpoint, an unappealing prospect not only fails to persuade the target recipient but 
actively alienates him.  This was often the situation that befell both Moscow and 
Washington in their attempts to use military training to advance their international 
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agendas.  In the Soviet Union, the harsh conditions paired with pervasive racism and 
xenophobia left many foreign soldiers disillusioned with the USSR.54  Similarly, in the 
United States, racism, segregation and the overall mistreatment of minorities not only 
limited the effectiveness of American engagement with countries like the newly 
independent African states, but undercut Washington’s rhetoric on democratic values and 
liberty.55 
 By the 1970s, the enthusiasm evident in the early phase of security assistance had 
waned as both world powers found themselves cast upon the shoals of Stilicho’s dilemma 
though in strikingly different manners.  For the United States, the effort to hem in the 
Soviet Union had, in the words of Henry Kissinger, “projected America into the frontline 
of every international crisis,” and “set goals that were beyond America’s physical and 
emotional capabilities.”56  The inability of the United States to bring the war in Vietnam 
to a successful conclusion exposed not only the extreme extent to which the concept of 
containment had been stretched, but also the limitations of America’s abilities to be the 
sole guarantor of this posture.  Seeking to correct this imbalance, President Nixon 
advanced a new doctrine in American foreign policy that would limit America’s direct 
involvement in containment and instead look to those countries directly threatened by 
communist expansion to provide the manpower for containment.  In practice this meant 
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renewed emphasis on security assistance and defense diplomacy as Washington promoted 
the use of training programs like the International Military Education and Training 
program (IMET) and heavily armed regional proxies like Iran to protect western interests 
while limiting American participation in regional conflicts.57 
 Conversely, as the United States was realizing the limits of its own abilities in the 
international arena, the Soviet Union was recognizing the unreliability of its allies.  The 
pragmatic approach to security assistance that allowed the Soviets to build international 
partnerships and achieve strategic aims without ideological cohesion had become a 
victim of its own agnosticism.  Specifically, Moscow had become increasingly frustrated 
with fickle Third World leaders who would happily accept Soviet aid, but then abandon 
the Soviets to pursue closer ties with the West.58  President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was 
the prototype of this thorn in the side of Soviet statecraft as after decades of copious 
amounts of Soviet aid, Sadat had no qualms about radically changing tack and expelling 
Soviet advisors in order to ally with the United States.59  Discouraged by such 
squandering of resources, Primer Brezhnev reemphasized ideology as a key component 
of Soviet assistance and as a means of curbing such defections.  Practically this policy 
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manifest in both the Brezhnev Doctrine which committed the Soviet Union to protecting 
socialist governments where they had been established and a shift in Soviet assistance 
policy away from nonaligned governments to communist parties and movements.60  This 
change in policy was typified in the USSR’s handling of the Ogaden War between 
Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 1970s.  During the conflict, the Soviet Union abandoned 
its erstwhile client in Somalia in order to back the Derg government in Ethiopia which 
Moscow believed was building a true Marxist-Leninist state.61   Indeed, by the 1980s the 
majority of Soviet military aid was confined to just ten countries who possessed 
ideological ties to the Soviet Union or existing treaties of friendship and cooperation.62   
Ironically, in their efforts to correct their earlier approaches to security assistance 
the USA and USSR only succeeded in switching their respective problems.  Rather than 
resolving Washington’s difficulties, the emphasis on proxies enshrined in the Nixon 
doctrine ultimately exposed Western strategy to the unreliability of allies like the Shah of 
Iran or Marcos in the Philippines.  Meanwhile Moscow’s commitment to supporting 
ideological clients led directly to the Soviet’s disastrous intervention in Afghanistan.  
These setbacks were not merely the byproduct of ill-conceived policies, but speak to a 
larger failing in how defense diplomacy was employed during the Cold War. 
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Though the dimensions of the Cold War were uniquely suited to defense 
diplomacy’s attributes as a tool of statecraft, the long struggle between East and West 
succeeded primarily in illustrating the limitations of the practice rather than its strengths.  
From the onset of the Cold War, the Soviets and Americans eagerly adopted security 
assistance programs which primarily relied upon arms transfers as a means of furthering 
their own international ambitions. Both Washington and Moscow developed massive 
programs and expended considerable resources in this mad dash to win over prospective 
allies and secure their allegiance in a bipolar world. This approach was deeply flawed.  
The focus on geopolitical factors, particularly when conceived as a zero sum game where 
one super power’s gain was the other’s loss, obscured all other elements in the patron-
client relationship other than its place within the Cold War paradigm.  All other questions 
about strategic assistance programs, such as the nature of the recipient government, 
potential benefits for the patron, long term implications or even its actual effectiveness 
were all overshadowed if not entirely ignored in the face of simple bipolar logic.  The 
unfortunate result was largely a shared neglect for the cooptive potential of defense 
diplomacy in favor of strategic expedience.63  In their quixotic quest for influence abroad, 
both super powers mistakenly confused ambivalence towards their geopolitical rival as 
influence and conflated warmed over rhetoric for strategic agreement.   Rather than 
exerting influence over security assistance recipients, the super powers often became 
prisoners of their own programs.  No matter how frustrated a patron would become with 
an unruly or insubordinate aid recipient, the perceived exclusion of the rival super power 
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was viewed as enough to justify the continuation of military assistance despite its dubious 
gains.  Rather than the patron exercising influence over recipients, wily governments 
leveraged the super powers’ dread of defection to their advantage and thus were free to 
pursue their own agendas without fear of serious repercussions.  Instead of swaying 
potential allies, the Cold War era security assistance programs largely succeeded in only 
producing a host of frustrations for patrons and the mere illusion of influence over 
recipient states.  Yet as poor a bargain as this deal appears, it was readily accepted by 
Washington and Moscow.  Simply under the logic of the Cold War, the semblance of 
influence was preferable to the risk of appearing impotent in the face of a geopolitical 
rivalry.   
The 1990s and the Revolution in Defense Diplomacy: 
 
During the Cold War, security assistance programs were weighed not by their 
ability to enhance the military capabilities of the recipient, but rather their utility in 
ushering the recipient into either the American or Soviet camp – even if this influence 
was never actually real.  However, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse 
of the Warsaw Pact did not end defense diplomacy’s role as a key foreign policy 
instrument.  During the 1990s defense diplomacy witnessed a revolution in both the 
manner in which it was practiced and how it was studied by scholars.  Liberated from the 
bipolar mentality of the Cold War, policy makers and scholars alike were free to delve 
into the nuances of military training programs and their ramifications for world affairs.  
Specifically, this afforded a window to not only examine the errors of defense 
diplomacy’s past uses, but also to understand how such measures could be adjusted to 
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meet the evolving challenges  of world politics.  These lessons were particularly 
significant in continental Europe where the mechanism of defense diplomacy used to 
maintain Western cohesion during the Cold War were adapted to serve as tools of 
transition for the former communist countries of the Eastern bloc.   
 The sudden collapse of the USSR and the lifting of the Soviet yoke from Eastern 
Europe did not resolve the danger that haunted Europe, but did succeed in transforming 
the nature of the threat faced by the continent.  While the risk of World War III and a 
nuclear exchange abated with the ending of the Cold War, these recognized dangers were 
replaced by more amorphous challenges to regional stability.  In addition to the litany of 
transnational threats like organized crime, illegal immigration and terrorism which 
characterized the rapid speed of globalization in the 1990s, the end of communist rule in 
Eastern Europe posed two particular threats to European security.64  Under the tutelage of 
the Soviet Union, the countries of the Warsaw Pact had built standing armies designed to 
fight a conventional war on the European plain.  After the Cold War these armies were 
not only obsolete, but posed an active threat to the democratic transition then taking root 
in Eastern Europe.  These armies were not only in need of structural reform, but were 
also unfamiliar with the democratic norms of civil-military affairs.65   More worryingly, 
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the removal of Soviet control over its former satellites also enlivened the threat of 
renewed conflict between the states of Eastern Europe.  Old hostilities and national 
grievances that had long been suppressed by Soviet domination would again be freed to 
fester.66  The prospect of open warfare between former communist states seemed 
particularly ominous in the wake of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and fighting 
throughout the Caucuses.  Instead of heralding a new era of peace in Europe, the ending 
of the Cold War carried the potential to unravel the decades of relative calm that the 
continent had enjoyed.   
 In order to resolve the danger that the end of the Cold War posed to Europe, a 
radical approach was adopted by the Western Alliance.  With the Cold War over, the 
security institutions that had ensured the safety of Western Europe throughout the long 
struggle, most importantly NATO, were not allowed to wither and die having outlived 
their initial purpose.67  Instead, these organs were revitalized and adapted to address the 
new challenges to emerge in the Cold War’s wake.  After enduring Soviet domination for 
over four decades, the emancipated states of Eastern Europe saw integration in 
organizations like NATO and the ascendant European Union (EU) as a bulwark against 
ever again being left to the suffer under Russian control.  Recognizing the unique agency 
that institutional membership represented, the application process was amended to 
specifically neutralize the dangers stemming from Eastern Europe.  This was particularly 
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true of NATO whose security portfolio afforded the organization considerable leverage in 
the reforming of former Warsaw Pact militaries. NATO’s great achievement during the 
Cold War was not only its success in deterring a communist invasion, but also its ability 
to smooth relations between members and sustain relatively peaceful relations within the 
alliance.68 Programs like the Partnership for Peace were specifically designed to extend 
this international order eastward by reforming the bloated, Soviet-style militaries of the 
Eastern bloc and transitioning them to the more manageable institutions then typical in 
Western countries.  While the structural reforms achieved by these initiatives were 
important, of far greater significance was the mental and strategic conversions which 
these programs accomplished.  Through the extensive use of officer exchanges and 
training programs, Western militaries were able to socialize their Eastern counterparts to 
democratic norms of governance and achieve a radical reorientation in strategic thinking.  
After spending decades as adversaries, the heavy use of defense diplomacy in the years 
immediately following the Cold War helped to bridge the cultural and strategic divide 
between East and West.  It successfully integrated former foes into existing security 
communities and created a shared strategic vision for the continent. From an exercise in 
realpolitik during the Cold War, defense diplomacy became a liberalizing agent to fortify 
democratic gains in the East and achieve what NATO Secretary-General, Lord George 
Robertson deemed the “disarmament of the mind.”69   
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 As noted in the previous chapter, the heavy reliance on defense diplomacy during 
the 1990s to assimilate former Warsaw Pact countries into European security 
organizations not only first gave rise to the term defense diplomacy, but also its formal 
study.  On the government side, this venture was led by the United Kingdom’s Ministry 
of Defense (MoD) during its 1998 Strategic Defense Review.  Recognizing the 
importance of such activities to the preservation of peace and stability in Europe, the 
MoD both minted the term “defense diplomacy” to describe these undertakings and also 
firmly entrenched the practices as a strategic priority.70  The MoD’s recognition of 
defense diplomacy as an important new mission and its utility in stemming the 
uncertainties of Eastern Europe reverberated in the academic community.  Of particular 
note is the Adelphi paper written by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster in 2004 which 
builds directly on the British experience of the 1990s.  In their detailed examination of 
defense diplomacy, Cottey and Forster highlight the practice’s transition from pursuing 
narrow national interests during previous eras to a means of promoting transnational 
cooperation and peaceful coexistence.71  In their examination of the transition period, 
Harvey Waterman, Dessie Zagorcheva and Dan Reiter, went even further in expressly 
asserting that the Partnership for Peace, Membership Action Plans and other programs 
employed by NATO co-opted Eastern European actors in order to alter how they both 
think and behave.  Specifically, NATO activities “socialized” Eastern governments and 
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militaries into “Western ways.”72  In her work on the transition, Alexandra Gheciu delved 
deeper into how this process actually unfolded and it relation to constructivist theories on 
socialization by illustrating how NATO programs helped instill democratic norms in both 
the Czech Republic and Romania.73  Emanuel Adler later built on this work by showing 
the important role of NATO programs in spreading the deposition of self-restraint during 
the transition process which proved essential in the building of a cooperative security 
community.74 
Beyond the immediate analysis of how defense diplomacy was employed in 
Europe, the 1990s also afforded scholars the academic space to reflect on the security 
assistance programs employed during the Cold War and discern why such extensive 
initiatives ultimately produced only middling results.  This was particularly true with 
regard to the heavy use of arms transfers as a means of gaining influence throughout the 
Cold War.75  Though studies, like those offered by Bruce Moon and T. Y. Wang, 
suggested a link between aid from the United States (including military grants) and pro-
Washington voting at the United Nations, studies championing the effectiveness of arms 
transfers as a tool of statecraft are rare.76 For example, Brian Lai and Daniel Morey argue 
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that such positive effects from aid are dependent on recipient regime type.  In particular, 
aid-for-influence efforts only produce positive results with undemocratic regimes while 
democratic aid recipients were actually more likely to vote against the United States.  The 
comprehensive studies of both American and Soviet arms transfer programs provided by 
William Mott not only offer a sweeping overview of the security assistance programs 
employed by both super powers, but also a damning assessment of their efficacy.  Caught 
between the conflicting goals of promoting their respective international agendas while 
also minimizing the risk of conflict, both Washington and Moscow became susceptible to 
exploitative recipients who readily accepted arms without yielding any meaningful policy 
concessions to their patron.77  Mott’s work has been echoed in more recent periods of 
America’s use of arms transfers to garner influence abroad.   Examining arms transfers 
between 1990 and 2004, Patricia Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li find the 
counterintuitive result that with few exceptions, increases in American arms transfers 
actually reduces recipient cooperation and suffer no subsequent reduction of arms 
shipments as punishment.  Conversely, recipient cooperation with the United States 
actually results in a decline in arms transfers.78  
Crucial to this reexamination of arms transfers has been a deeper investigation 
into the very nature of the patron-recipient relationship.  In one of the first efforts to delve 
into the arms transfer dynamic, Keith Krause argued that far from being a uniform 
dynamic, arms transfers actually manifest in three distinct forms with the supplier 
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attempting to gain either bargaining, structural or hegemonic influence over their 
recipients.  Krause notes that while arms transfers might have limited use as bargaining 
power, whereby arms are provided in exchange for a particular policy change in the 
recipient, they could nevertheless maintain significant importance on the structural or 
hegemonic levels which influence recipient policy at a broader and less immediate 
level.79  An example of this broader influence on arms recipients beyond specific policy 
outcomes was provided by David Kinsella who illustrated that while arms transfers can 
fuel a tendency towards conflict in recipients, this propensity is actually tempered when 
the recipient is highly dependent on an external arms supplier.80  Karl Derouen Jr. and 
U.K. Heo, further challenge the conception of patron-recipient dynamic by demonstrating 
that aid and arms transfers rather than being an inducement actually were primarily 
deployed as a reward by the United States to support those governments whose policies 
were already in line with American objectives.81  
In addition to examining the actual effectiveness of arms transfers as a tool of 
statecraft, the post-Cold War period has also witnessed a growth in studies investigating 
the use of military training programs.  Encouraged by the example of officer training 
courses aiding the Eastern transition, scholars have sought to extend the scope of this 
inquiry beyond the confines of Europe and examine both its history and broader 
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application.  As with arms sales, the initial focus of this endeavor was a highly critical 
examination of how training programs were utilized during the Cold War.  Unlike the 
critique of arms transfers which focused on their general ineffectiveness as a tool of 
statecraft, the assessment of training programs has centered on the domestic ramifications 
resulting from soldiers participating in such programs and particularly whether such Cold 
War programs promoted illiberal and undemocratic practices.82  The genesis of this 
question lies in the prominent presence of American-trained military officers in anti-
democratic coups in places like Chile and Brazil and the widespread abuse of human 
rights by U.S. trained personnel throughout the Cold War.83  Garnering particular 
attention from researchers has been the School of the Americas, where military and 
police officers from Latin America received extensive counterinsurgency training.  In 
addition to extensive attention from Amnesty International, researchers like Lesley Gill 
and Jack Pallmeyer have all linked training at the School of the Americas to extensive 
human rights violations and systemic abuses.84  In her examination of the School, 
Katherine McCoy concluded that while the overall number of human rights abusers to 
graduate from the School of the Americas was relatively small, those who committed 
such abuses were overwhelming military officers (as opposed to enlisted personnel) and 
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that those individuals who spent the most time at the School were also the most likely to 
be abusers.85  Ruth Blankely, whose work analyzes the actual training materials from the 
School of the Americas, argues that the institution has made considerable progress in the 
years since the end of the Cold War in terms of instructing greater respect for human 
rights and democratic institutions.  However, this headway has shown evidence of 
receding in the years since 9/11 and Blankely contends that American military training in 
general lacks sufficient instruction on respecting human rights.86 
Although incidents of American trained officers precipitating coups and violating 
human rights certainly occurred, a more recent group of scholars has charged that such 
episodes misrepresent the larger influence of American training programs.  Using 
attendance data from U.S. Staff Colleges, Timothy Ruby and Douglas Gibler found that 
having foreign officers’ attendance at high and intermediate U.S. military schools 
actually led to increased political stability in their home country, a marked decrease in 
coup attempts and actually helped to facilitate the spread of democracy.87  Whereas Ruby 
and Gibler focus on military professionalization, Carol Atkinson dramatically expands 
the scope of this inquiry by investigating the International Military Education and 
Training program which is the largest of America’s foreign military training initiatives.  
Employing a mixed methods approach, Atkinson uses surveys to demonstrate how the 
experience of American military training programs socializes foreign officers to 
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democratic norms, and then employs a large-N quantitative analysis of IMET 
participation since 1976 to show that American military training programs have been a 
crucial aid to spread democracy.88  While not negating the ills that have been committed 
by foreign officers trained by the United States, the studies offered by Ruby, Gibler and 
Atkinson indicate that American training programs have also been a successful 
mechanism in fostering democratic growth abroad.  
The Past as Prologue: 
The gradual development of defense diplomacy as a tool of statecraft has been 
intertwined with the evolution of international relations with the practice being adapted to 
meet the changing dimension of world politics.  That interplay has continued into the 
current era of defense diplomacy, but has itself undergone a transformation.  The 
previous progression of defense diplomacy can be envisioned as a layering of practices 
with the mechanisms established to address the obstacles of one era directly building on 
its immediate predecessor.  Though this linear process has continued and is reflected in 
how defense diplomacy is utilized today, there has also been a collapsing of this earlier 
stratification into overlapping spheres of statecraft where different forms of defense 
diplomacy are concurrently employed to meet distinct challenges.  As much as the past 
decade has witnessed the accelerated embrace of defense diplomacy by world 
governments as well as its institutional growth, the actual missions with which it has been 
tasked echo its own past incarnations.   
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 The harbinger for the current era of defense diplomacy were the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent efforts by the United States to combat militant 
extremism under the auspices of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  Despite the 
unilateralism that characterized much of the Bush administration’s early response to the 
crisis, America’s limited ability to redress this threat alone has made military cooperation 
an essential instrument of Washington’s global response.   The role of international 
coalitions in prosecuting the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq has served to highlight the 
ability of allied militaries to conduct joint operations.  This has been particularly true 
with NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan which has seen the interoperability that 
underscored the alliance’s Cold War existence become more than a hypothetical exercise.  
Rather, the organizational and logistical strain of sustaining operations in Afghanistan has 
given new impetus to NATO’s integration and exchange programs.89  Amid the winding 
down of combat operations in Afghanistan, the focus within the alliance has now shifted 
to identifying means of maintaining the unprecedented level of intra-alliance cohesion 
produced by over a decade of joint operations.90 
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 As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the utility of inter-military 
connections, American inability to bring either conflict to a successful end underscored a 
far more grating question about whether victory in the War on Terror was even possible 
let alone within America’s abilities.   Stung by the failures of its early efforts, the United 
States attempted to re-diagnosis the root of the problem and how it could be overcome.  
In the 2006, National Security Strategy of the United States specifically identified the 
existence of ungoverned territory, outside the control of any effective governance, as a 
breeding ground for extremist groups and a principal threat to the United States.91  In 
places like Somalia, Yemen, Northern Nigeria and the Pakistani Tribal regions where 
writ of governments is tenuous at best, terrorist organizations can operate with impunity 
and grow in strength.  The United States strove to conquer such ungoverned spaces and 
prevent their use by militant organizations by empowering local forces to extend their 
authority and bring these wayward regions to heel.  Though certainly not an exact 
parallel, the American use of defense diplomacy to strengthen the militaries of partner 
states and extend their control over ungoverned spaces harkens back to the early efforts 
by European imperialists to raise native armies in order to subdue the unruly interiors of 
India and Africa.   
Even by the standards of our time, the use of defense diplomacy to strengthen 
local governments is not unique, but the centrality of this mission to the War on Terror 
and unprecedented scope of its usage warrants special attention.  Addressing this issue 
directly in Foreign Affairs, Secretary Gates stated that “helping other countries better 
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provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership 
and a critical part of protecting U.S. security as well.”92  During the Cold War, defense 
diplomacy existed as largely a symbolic practice designed to elicit the favor of political 
elites rather than substantively develop the military capabilities of recipients.93  This has 
not been the case with GWOT where the increased functionality of partner militaries is 
both the primary objective of defense diplomacy and the chief means of measuring its 
success.  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United State effectively needed to build a 
state’s security apparatus from scratch with each country needing both new national 
armies and police forces to maintain rule by the central government even as America’s 
own presence was shrinking.94  The Sunni Awakening in 2007, when Sunni militias in 
Iraq were coopted by the United States and turned against Al-Qaeda linked groups, 
dramatically illustrated the importance of local forces and the critical role that they could 
play in defeating terrorism.95  That these gains were subsequently squandered by 
shortsighted policies from Baghdad, serve as a warning that such methods should not be 
taken for granted and warrant continued attention.   
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Outside the immediate confines of Iraq and Afghanistan, defense diplomacy has 
become the primary means used by the United States to fight extremist groups.  Drones 
strikes and wiretaps undoubtedly receive more public attention, but in 2013 alone 
approximately 64,000 students from 152 countries participated in American training 
programs.96 Derek Reveron in his sweeping study of America’s military evolution during 
the War on Terror explores the growth of military-civilian cooperation with U.S. military 
personnel undertaking a host of collaborative missions in foreign countries.  Reveron 
argues that far from blunting America’s fighting prowess, these new undertakings, be 
they development assistance, training missions or humanitarian operation, which used to 
be reserved for civilian agencies actually promote American interests by bolstering 
international stability.  More importantly, such activities can prevent security crises from 
emerging.97  By emphasizing engagement as a military priority and aiding allied forces in 
their own struggles with extremism, the United States has brought defense diplomacy to 
the forefront of its efforts to defeat terrorism. 98   
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While the use of defense diplomacy in the Global War on Terror is reminiscent of 
the raising of native armies during the age of imperialism, its services as a tool of great 
power politics during the Cold War has also been reprised in Asia.  Though the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC or China) dabbled in defense diplomacy during the Cold War, 
primarily to aid ideological clients or as a way of securing income, the economic 
liberalization of the 1980s gave new impetus to the practice as part of Chinese foreign 
policy.99  Notably, whereas the United States and Soviets called on defense diplomacy to 
promote political objectives, China has utilized defense diplomacy in regions like Africa 
as a means of securing economic prerogatives.100  Through its willingness to aid the 
militaries of countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, China has been able to gain numerous 
concessions on issues like mineral rights and government contracts.  China’s use of 
defense diplomacy is not entirely an extension of its economic policy, but also a means of 
building strategic partnerships within its own neighborhood.  Particularly through the use 
of arms sales, China has been able to build close relations with countries like Pakistan, 
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Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in order to establish military and commercial hubs across the 
Indian Ocean as part of its “string of pearls” strategy.101    
  China’s rise as a world power and use of defense diplomacy as a boon to its 
international standing has generated particular concern among its neighbors.  These 
worries are especially evident in India, where fears of China’s string of pearls morphing 
into a garrote have led New Delhi to reassess its own dealings with neighboring 
countries.  Belatedly, India has attempted to develop its own defense diplomacy programs 
to blunt China’s burgeoning influences in the Indian Ocean and garner support from 
dithering governments. 102  For its part, the United States has been piqued by China’s 
growing geopolitical influence and Beijing’s antagonistic relations with American 
regional allies Japan and the Philippines.  The response from Washington has been a 
twofold approach which exploits defense diplomacy’s ability to both confront and 
engage.  On the side of confrontation, the United States has stepped up training exercises 
and equipment transfers to its regional partners in order to both bolster their own military 
capabilities and signal America’s support for its allies in the face of Chinese threats.103  
                                                 
101 Ian Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8(3) 2012: 287-
310; Ian Storey. "China’s Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea." Cooperation from 
Strength: 51; Jacqueline Newmyer, "Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese 
Military Modernization." Orbis 53(2) 2009: 205-219; B.S. Sachar, "Military diplomacy through arms 
transfers: A case study of China." Strategic Analysis 28(2) 2004: 290-310;Gurpreet Khurana, "China's 
‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications." Strategic Analysis 32(1) 2008: 1-39; 
Harsh  Pant,"China Shakes Up the Maritime Balance in the Indian Ocean."Strategic Analysis 36 (3) 2012: 
364-368; James Holmes,Toshi Yoshihara. "China's naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean." The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 31 (3) 2008: 367-394; Kristen Gunness, “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era of 
Change,” Paper Prepared for the National Defense University Symposium on ‘China's Global Activism: 
Implications for U.S. security Interests’, National Defense University, June 20, 2006. 
102 For India’s reaction see, K..A. Muthanna,. "Military Diplomacy." Journal of Defence Studies, Institute 
for Defence Studies and Analyses 5 (2011); B.S. Sachar, B. "Cooperation in military training as a tool of 
peacetime military diplomacy." Strategic Analysis 27(3) 2003: 404-421. 
103 The recent partial lifting of the arms embargo on Vietnam is particularly of note as while it is unlikely to 
impact the military balance of power in the region this change is of great symbolic significance.   Hillary 
100 
 
Whereas defense diplomacy has been used by Washington to demonstrate its resolve if 
challenged by China, the practice has also been called upon to engage with the Beijing 
government and build bridges between the two states.  When not suspended amid 
diplomatic wrangling, military-to-military talks between the United States and China are 
seen as a key component in bilateral affairs in order to build clear lines of 
communications and prevent misunderstandings that could lead to conflict.  As part of 
this engagement strategy, in 2014 for the first time the United States invited China to 
observe its biennial Rim of the Pacific training exercises, which are the largest military 
practice exercises in the world.104    
 The boon of great power politics that is now increasingly coloring global affairs 
in Asia has overshadowed a more intricate process unfolding among the region’s less 
powerful players.  After years of being derided as merely a talk shop with little substance, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become integral in regional 
affairs as its members strive to find their way amid the competing interests of their larger 
brethren.  This subject was the focus of a special issue of Asian Security in 2012, which 
specifically examined regional defense cooperation, its history and potential to shape area 
politics.  In their introduction to this work See Seng Tan and Bhubhindar Singh examine 
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defense diplomacy as a tool of statecraft and argue that it can be bent to either 
transformative proposes where the objective is to revise the domestic order of another 
country (as with NATO in post-communist Europe), or pragmatic which simply seeks to 
better manage affairs between two states.105  Under this dichotomy, and as expertly 
illustrated by Ralph Emmers and Evan Laksmana in their respective studies of the Five 
Powers Defense Arrangement and regional attempts at defense diplomacy respectively, 
defense diplomacy in South East Asia has primarily been of the pragmatic variant 
designed to help regulate regional relations and improve communications between 
participants.106  While this achievement may seem slight at first, See Seng Tan warns that 
it should not be overlooked as such small but substantive achievements for defense 
diplomacy help boost regional order and may even constitute a type of proto-NATO 
which could revolutionize security relations in Asia.107 
 ASEAN’s budding experience utilizing defense diplomacy to promote regional 
stability mirrors a broader international push to use proactive military engagement and 
cooperation to prevent conflict situations from developing.  Following the experience of 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the United Kingdom has continued to pair defense 
diplomacy with development assistance as a means of supporting stability farther afield.  
In his assessment of UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy, Matthew Ford 
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investigates the success of British military engagement in Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe and 
Uganda.  Ford determines that though this strategy can be successful, it is contextually 
dependent and requires a detailed understanding of each situation rather than a blanket 
approach.108  Though subsequent events have quashed the initial optimism that greeted 
the Arab Spring in 2011, Carol Atkinson asserts that amid the turmoil of the Arab 
uprisings, the transnational military networks developed over decades of training 
programs played a key role in restraining ruling regimes and helped temper government 
actions.  This was particularly true in cases like Egypt and Tunisia where such networks 
were most active.109   Lastly, the receding of the polar ice cap as a result of climate 
change has enlivened fears that the Arctic Circle, and the mineral wealth it holds, may 
spark regional competition between the claimant states.  Amid such fears, Heather Exner-
Pirot explores the potential role that defense diplomacy plays in this dynamic.  Though 
largely confined to cooperation on search and rescue operations as opposed to military 
matters, Exner-Pirot contends that these activities are nevertheless significant in 
establishing lines of communication between countries and means of defusing mistrust.110 
 Aldous Huxley noted that the charm of history and its enigmatic lesson consist in 
the fact that, from age to age nothing changes and yet everything is completely different.  
This has certainly been the case with defense diplomacy.  Over the centuries the practice 
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has been adapted, remodeled, warped and contorted to meet the varied rigors of world 
affairs.  Be it the East India Company, Soviet Union or United States, each in turn looked 
to defense diplomacy to further its international agenda and advance its interests. Yet 
amid the changes in practitioners and priorities, the underlying goal of defense diplomacy 
has remained constant.  Whether it is building an empire or defusing tensions over the 
South China Sea, each exercise of defense diplomacy has centered on the use of military 
institutions to engage foreigners and peacefully mold their thinking in a manner 
benefiting the practitioner’s worldview.  That this distinctive mission has endured speaks 
not just to defense diplomacy’s versatility, but the complexity of the problem which it 
seeks to address.  It is here, in understanding how defense diplomacy functions as a 
cooptive mechanism, where greater attention must be paid.  As more countries embrace 
the practice and the spectrum of problems which defense diplomacy is expected to 
redress grows to encompass issues as distinct as terrorism and arctic security, it is 
necessary that we grasp not only the practice’s history, but how defense diplomacy 
activities shape the thinking of participants and how these alterations can produce 
substantive gains.   
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Though today the idea of soft power enjoys widespread acceptance within the 
field of international relations, it is free from neither detractors nor lingering questions 
about its place within foreign affairs.  While not inherently questioning the existence of 
soft power, individuals like Josef Joffe, David Baldwin and Michael Cecire have voiced 
important questions about its utility as a foreign policy tool.1  As stated by Colin Gray, 
"soft power tends to be either so easy to exercise that it is probably in little need of a 
policy push, being essentially preexistent, or too difficult to achieve because local 
interests, or culture, or both, deny it political traction."2  The underlying criticism of soft 
power is that while it may exist, it is at best an ineffectual tool unable to be marshalled to 
meet an imminent crisis or untangle complex political dilemmas.  
 At its heart, the critique of soft power concerns the means through which the 
sentiment of individuals can be translated into government policy and ultimately 
geopolitical outcomes.  As a variant of soft power defense diplomacy inherits this 
criticism.  As such it is necessary to identify the mechanics through which educational 
exchanges and training missions can advance a country’s political aims and produce 
substantive geopolitical gains.  Unlike with hard power and economics, there is no soft 
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power bomb which can be dropped or intellectual sanctions which can be imposed.  
Rather, the ethereal nature of soft power means that the causal mechanisms through 
which it and defense diplomacy both operate are themselves also intangible.  The 
cooptive process that defines soft power's existence relies upon the process of state 
socialization which causes individuals to ultimately reorient the disposition of a state.  
Borrowed from the fields of sociology, state socialization details how outside ideas and 
modes of behavior are adopted by other actors and incorporated into their own internal 
decision making.3  As all government institutions and bureaucracies are in essence an 
accumulation of individuals, state socialization occurs when the intellectual contagion 
spreads sufficiently for a government to be compelled, either by external or internal 
forces, into accepting this new idea and altering its behavior appropriately. 
 State socialization serves as the causal mechanism for defense diplomacy's use as 
a tool of statecraft allowing nonviolent military practices to effectively alter the policies 
and behavior of other countries.  To illustrate this link, this chapter breaks into three 
sections.  First, I will review the intellectual foundations of state socialization and its rise 
as an alternative to the rationalist understanding of state behavior.  Having surveyed the 
basis of socialization as a political process, I will then explore how defense diplomacy 
functions as an ideal incubator for this process.  Specifically, building on the work on 
Carol Atkinson, I discuss how the unique dimensions of defense diplomacy, especially 
education exchanges, facilitate the socialization process and the altering of government 
                                                 




behavior.  Lastly, I link the corresponding manifestations of state socialization and 
defense diplomacy through the clear parallels that exist between Jeffrey Checkel’s types 
of socialization and the two forms of defense diplomacy posited by See Sing Tan and 
Bhudhindar.  
State Socialization in World Affairs: 
 
In order to understand the process of state socialization and its salience for 
defense diplomacy, it is first necessary to understand the differences between the 
rationalist and constructivist approaches to world affairs.  Here the Melian Dialog from 
Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War offers us a useful window, as both schools 
of thought are represented and presented in stark contrast to one another.  During the 
discourse, the Athenian generals rebuke the representative from Melos for privileging 
future possibilities over the imminent destruction that Melos faces if it does not 
surrender.  Here the Athenians give voice to the rationalist approach to state behavior 
which holds that governments function as rational actors on the world stage who seek to 
maximize potential gains while simultaneously acting to avoid pain. In this conception of 
world politics, states are inert entities with only limited agency.  Instead, their interests 
and actions are shaped by external stimuli with states responding positively to incentives 
and negatively to disincentives which may cause harm.4  Hence, the willingness of the 
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Melians to gamble with their own destruction rather than surrendering strikes the 
Athenians as fundamentally irrational.   
International norms do exist in the rationalist envisioning of world affairs, but 
they are the creations of the most powerful actors in the system and designed to 
perpetuate their own wellbeing.  Weak states in the system concede to these stilted norms 
to evade punishment and perhaps elicit some reward.5  Indeed, it was the preference of 
the Melians to choose war rather than conform to the norms established by Athens that so 
befuddled the two Athenian generals.   
Yet, the Melian refusal to surrender exposes the limitations of the rationalist 
approach and illustrates the alternative advanced by the constructivist school.  
Constructivists hold that states are neither inert nor uniform in their composition.  Rather 
than being beholden to external forces, the interests of states are internally determined by 
their own distinct identities, ideologies and preferences.6  Therefore international 
behavior is not merely a result of a cost/benefit analysis, but is inter-subjectively 
determined.  Each government constantly assesses and reassesses its foreign policy in 
light of the shifting conduct of world affairs and its understanding of its own evolving 
interests.7  It is this intersubjective exchange which informs the Melian resistance to 
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Athens.  The Melians placed great value on their independence and were thus willing to 
gamble their potential destruction rather than surrender to the perceived tyranny of 
Athens.  Beyond highlighting the individuality of states, the spread of international norms 
also plays an important role in the constructivist approach to world affairs. Unlike the 
rationalist school where norms are driven by self-interests, constructivists believe norms 
work by creating shared meanings between countries.8  For constructivists, "the 
dissemination of international norms shape state behavior through the reconstitution of 
conceptual categories rather than by changing a payoff structure external to the actor."9  
Norms exist and succeed by convincing governments that the ideas being promoted 
themselves are correct and worth accepting.  Though interests may be endogenously 
formulated, this does not mean that their crafting is free from external influence.  Rather, 
the malleability in how states define their interest under the constructivist conception of 
world affairs means that once a government is exposed to a new idea it can be 
internalized within the state and become part of that country's global identity.  For 
example, in order to join the European Union, Eastern European states were required to 
undergo a rigorous process of economic reform including the privatizing of state 
industries and opening their economies to competition.  Despite early resistance, many of 
the countries benefited from these reforms and some, notably Slovakia and Latvia, have 
emerged as the most ardent promoters of economic reform on the continent.10  The 
process through which states are convinced of the soundness of an outside idea which is 
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of the State." International Organization 40(4) (1986), 753-775. 
9 Alderson, “Making Sense,” 420. 
10 “The New Awkward Squad,” The Economist, 20 June 2015. 
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then incorporated into its own worldview is known as state socialization and it is of the 
greatest importance to the exercise of defense diplomacy. 
Socialization is "the process by which actors acquire different identities, leading 
to new interests through regular and sustained interactions within broader social contexts 
and structures."11  Originally conceived in the fields of sociology, the initial 
understanding of socialization concerned not the conduct of states but rather the behavior 
of individuals within society.12  Yet, the potential of socialization theory to help explain 
political behavior was rapidly seized by political scientists who recognized its ability to 
address issues like democratic transitions and flagging political engagement in the 
general population.13  Socialization offers an important means of understanding how and 
why shifts in political behavior occur.  Particularly it offers a window on how exposure to 
beliefs from outside of a political unit can be adopted and produce changes in how that 
unit conducts its affairs.  In order to understand how this process works and its 
significance for defense diplomacy, it is necessary to delve further into the progression of 
                                                 
11 David Bearce,Stacy Bondanella. "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State 
Interest Convergence." International Organization 61 (4) (2007), 706: For additional discussions on the 
definition see Jeffrey Checkel. "Social Construction and Integration." Journal of European Public 
Policy 6(4) (1999), 548; Alastair I Johnston. "Treating International Institutions as Social 
Environments." International Studies Quarterly 45(4) (2001), 494. 
12 For example see: Maccoby, Eleanor E., and John A. Martin. "Socialization in the Context of the Family: 
Parent-child interaction." Handbook of Child Psychology. Paul H. Mussen (ed) (New York: Wiley 
Publishing, 1983);  Parsons, Talcott, and Robert F. Bales. Family, Socialization and Interaction Proce. 
(Glencoe IL: Free Press 1955); Hyman, Herbert. Political Socialization (Glencoe IL: Free Press 1959); 
Bell, R.Q., 1968. “A reinterpretation of the direction of effects in studies of socialization.” Psychological 
Review, 75(2), pp.81-95; Dawson, Richard E., and Kenneth Prewitt. Political Socialization: an Analytic 
Study. (Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1968);. 
13 Virginia Sapiro. "Not Your Parents’ Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation." Annual 
Review of Political Science 7 (2004), 1-23. 
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state socialization and the various stages which lead from the initial exposure to a new 
idea to the ultimate change in government behavior.  
 The first stage in the process of state socialization is that of the initial contact 
whereby a foreign idea is introduced.  Simply existing in an international system with 
multiple actors means that daily interactions expose government officials to alternative 
beliefs and ways of conducting their affairs.  Although these routine exchanges can 
facilitate the diffusion of a particular idea or new norm, the manner of transmission can 
also be extremely influential.  At the individual level, examinations of student exchange 
programs have shown themselves to be a particularly successful method of conveying 
foreign practices to new countries.  Studies such as those offered by Atkinson, Wang and 
Richmond show that foreign students often return to their home countries with not only 
positive impressions of their foreign hosts, but also with new knowledge about how 
things are done abroad which they intend to use to improve conditions in their own 
country.14  
The challenge is not merely in communicating an alternative idea, but doing so in 
a way where it is actually accepted.  Alexandra Gheciu has explained the importance of 
effective communication in the context of military education programs.  She notes that in 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that this phenomenon is by no means universal.  For example African nationals who 
travelled to the United States during the early Cold War were often discouraged by segregation and 
pervasive racism in the South.  Similarly, many foreign officers were disillusioned by conditions within the 
Soviet Union that they observed while attending education programs within the USSR.  Carol Atkinson, 
"Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006." Foreign 
Policy Analysis 6(1) (2010), 3; Elmo Wilson, Frank Bonilla, "Evaluating Exchange of Persons 
Programs." Public Opinion Quarterly 19(1) (1955): 20-30; Xiao-Lun Wang, “Cultural Mediators or 
Marginal Persons?”  Geographical Review 81 (1991), 292-303; Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and 
the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain. (University Park PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
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the training being offered, "a significant, though subtle form of power is involved."  
Whereby "if the pedagogic work is effective, it effectively shapes subjects, leading them 
to regard the scheme of thought and action disseminated by the socializing agent not as a 
contingent cultural product, but as the normal way of thinking and doing things."15  
Hence when successful, the new idea introduced is not considered as simply one possible 
option, but is treated by the socialization target as the correct manner of thinking.  Such a 
disposition eases the socialization process and facilitates the rapid adoption of the new 
practice.   
Although the major concern of this paper is state socialization, the process of 
individual socialization should not be discounted.  As noted by Jan Beyers, "practices, 
norms, and preferences are not only internalized by individual actors, but, because they 
are shared by many, also characterize and shape the identity of larger social aggregates 
(that is, a bureaucratic agency, a political party, a country, and so on)."16  States and their 
composing institutions and communities are at their most basic level collections of 
individuals.  By socializing a critical mass of those individuals to a new idea or practice it 
is sufficient for this new approach to take hold and be adopted by the larger body.  This is 
precisely the process to unfold in Gheciu's work on the socializing of Romanian and 
Czech soldiers to Western military practices after the Cold War.  By converting large 
numbers of individual soldiers through training and classroom instruction, Western 
                                                 
15 Alexandra Gheciu. "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New 
Europe’." International Organization 59(4) (2005), 980. 
16 Jan Beyers. "Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The case of Council 
Officials." International Organization 59(4) (2005),900. 
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governments were able to reform the Czech and Romanian militaries away from the 
norms of the Warsaw Pact and to those practiced in Western Europe.17 
The gradual accumulation of socialized individuals within government institutions 
is not the only way for foreign norms and ideas to take root inside a state.  One mode of 
externally driven socialization occurs when political pressure from outside of a 
government (such as from the international community, NGOs and the general 
population) is applied to force the regime to alter its policies in order to conform to a new 
standard.18  This pathway for socialization has largely been informed by examinations of 
how human rights norms spread throughout the international system and in particular the 
works of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's.19  Episodes like the ending of 
Apartheid in South Africa stand as important examples of how the international 
community can wield its authority and oblige wayward governments to adopt new 
standards of behavior.20  Importantly, though this method of state socialization is 
compelled from outside the government, this does not mean that it is necessarily driven 
by forces outside the country.  The civil rights movement in the United States and Orange 
                                                 
17 Gheciu, “Security Institutions.”   
18 Checkel “Why Comply,” 559. 
19 Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink. "International Norm dynamics and Political Change." International 
Organization 52(4) (1998), 887-917; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of 
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
20 Although the process of state socialization has traditionally been the purview of constructivists, cases like 
that of South Africa suggest that there can also be rationalist motives behind state socialization.  This is in 
line of recent scholarship which has explored the link between rationalist conceptions of world affairs and 
socialization.  For examples see: Michael Zürn and Jeffrey T. Checkel. "Getting Socialized to Build 




Revolution in Ukraine are both keen examples of populations forcing their own 
governments to comply with international standards of behavior.21  
Lastly, states can be socialized through the process of social learning.  Whereas 
the previous models of socialization featured outside force compelling a government to 
adopt new polices, social learning relies on persuasion and what Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
termed "the power of the better argument."22  Unlike the external manipulation theme of 
other models, social learning is free of outside pressure.  Instead, the target government is 
free to pursue whatever course of action that it chooses and through deliberation is 
persuaded of the benefits of adopting a new policy.23  There is no compellence in this 
mode of socialization. Governments simply possess the ability to recognize superior 
policies when they are presented and embrace these new ideas.   
Regardless of whether a state is socialized through internal metamorphosis, 
external pressure or social learning, the final stage of the process is the same.  
Socialization means governments don't only change policies, but internalize the new 
standard and incorporate it into their worldview.24  Instead of the cost/benefit calculus of 
the rationalist school, where state behavior changes in accordance with shifts in incentive 
structure, the internalization of the change induced through socialization is not subject to 
such fluctuations.  The internalization of the new ideal functions as a form of 
institutionalization which engrains the shift in the very nature of government’s 
                                                 
21 Interestingly, this population based path of state socializations is in many ways similar to Nye's indirect 
variant of soft power.  See Chapter 1 for more information on this concept. 
22 Alexander Warkotsch. "The OSCE as an Agent of Socialisation? International norm Dynamics and 
political change in Central Asia." Europe-Asia Studies 59(5) (2007), 838.  
23Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, Power of Human Rights, 6-11.  \ 
24 Alderson, “Making Sense,” 417-418. 
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behavior.25  Thus the effects of socialization are longer lasting as they are not the 
byproduct of a momentary geopolitical calculus, but are imbedded in the state's internal 
thinking.   
It is the lasting nature of state socialization which makes it such a powerful 
geopolitical force and why the effects of both soft power and defense diplomacy can be 
so profound despite their subtlety.  While not as prominent or immediate as coercion and 
incentive, the changes in state behavior prompted by the exercise of soft power are often 
more substantive and enduring.  Be it the democratic transition in Eastern Europe or 
China's adoption of market based economics, each can in part be attributed to state 
socialization facilitated by soft power.  What makes defense diplomacy itself such a 
potent foreign policy tool is that its unique characteristics directly complements the state 
socialization process and the instilling of new ideas in foreign governments.   
Defense Diplomacy as a Socializing Agent: 
 
 In Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Education, Carol 
Atkinson argues that military education programs, a subset of defense diplomacy, 
function as a socializing agent for foreign military officers. By engaging with military 
personnel from other countries, American initiatives like the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program help inculcate western norms like democratic 
governance into foreign officers which are then carried back to their home countries.26  
                                                 
25 Ibid., 419; Deborah W. Larson, "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-
Making." Political Psychology 15(1)(1994), 17-33; Jon Elster. The Cement of Society: A survey of social 
order. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Ethan A. Nadelmann. "Global Prohibition Regimes: 
The evolution of norms in international society." International Organization 44(4) (1990): 479-526;  
26 Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military Educational Exchanges. 
(Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). 
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Yet, officer education programs are more than just a military counterpart to the 
socialization process that occurs through civilian education programs.  As elaborated in 
her 2010 piece, defense education programs possess three contextual conditions which 
accentuate the socialization process:  
1: The depth and extent of social interaction.  
2: The sharing of a sense of community or common identity 
3: The attainment of politically influential positions by exchange participants.27  
Each of these characteristics reflects key findings from the wider literature on state 
socialization and specifically the circumstances which best facilitate the process.  
Furthermore, these contextual factors are evident not only in educational exchanges but 
pervade the range of defense diplomacy activities. By understanding how defense 
diplomacy enables state socialization it is possible to gain added insight into how its use 
as a tool of statecraft can produce substantive geopolitical benefits.   
Depth of Social Interaction 
  One of the key challenges of the socialization is ensuring that individuals who are 
exposed to new ideas actually embrace the concepts being presented.  This obstacle has 
long been the bane of soft power proponents.  Thanks to the media, internet and simply 
existing in a globalized world, states and their citizenry are regularly bombarded with 
alternative perspectives.  Yet contact alone is insufficient or at best an inefficient means 
                                                 
27 Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter?” 5-7; similar conditions for easing socialization through social 
learning were also identified by others.  See: Frank Schimmelfennig. The International Promotion of 
Political Norms in Eastern Europe: a Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Central and Eastern Europe 




of triggering the socialization process.  Though exposure to a new idea is a crucial step 
towards altering political behavior, the manner in which this contact occurs has a 
significant impact on whether the concept is internalized or merely shrugged off amid the 
deluge of competing ideas. 
 The effectiveness of student exchange programs as socializing agents has 
highlighted this distinction.  Although the positive effects of such exchanges, particularly 
in terms of engendering favorable feelings towards the host country among participants, 
have been repeatedly demonstrated, such effects are by no means universal.28  The 
success of these exchanges as tools of soft power are predicated on the extent to which 
participants are actually integrated into their host communities.  Notably, the beneficial 
effects of student exchanges are largely mitigated when rather than engaging with their 
host community, foreign students instead form tight clusters amongst themselves with 
only limited interactions outside of their own sub-grouping.29  Furthermore, the utility of 
student exchange programs for socializing individuals is also contingent on the 
impressionability of the participants.  As the students involved are usually young and 
possess only limited experience, they are considered "novices" and thus both more open 
and more susceptible to external lines of thought.  Though this openness to outside ideas 
does make socialization easier, it also means that these undertakings are less fruitful 
                                                 
28 Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter,” 3; Jeanne Watson, Ronald Lippitt. "Cross-Cultural Experience as a 
Source of Attitude Change." Journal of Conflict Resolution 2(1)(1958), 61-66. 
29This has been particularly observed as happening with Chinese students while abroad. Ning Qian, 
Chinese Students Encounter America. Translated by T.K. Chu. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2002); Weili Ye. Seeking Modernity in China's Name: Chinese students in the United States, 1900-1927. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
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when targeting older individuals – such as government officials – with more engrained 
preferences.30 
 These trends are reflected in the micro level analysis of the socialization among 
Moroccan government officials conducted by Tina Fryeburg.  In examining attitudes 
towards democratic governance, Freyburg found no evidence that diffused types of 
engagement like exposure to foreign media broadcasts and international education 
socialized officials towards democratic norms.  However, Freyburg did find transnational 
exchanges in trans-governmental networks did positively influence attitudes of state 
officials towards democratic governance.  Specifically, those officials who participate in 
"activities and policy reform programs undertaken by established democracies show a 
higher agreement with democratic administrative governance than their non-participating 
colleagues." 31  Freyburg concludes that the reason that the transnational exchanges 
succeeded in fostering socialization is because they created "a site for interpersonal and 
structural exchanges bringing together people from democracies and non-democracies."32  
Hence it was the structured and embedded nature of the exchanges which sustained 
socializing efforts over the more desultory forms of contact.  Nor is Freyburg alone in 
recognizing the importance of interpersonal ties and structured engagement for 
facilitating socialization.  Several studies have recently asserted that international 
                                                 
30 Trine Flockhart. "‘Masters and Novices’: Socialization and Social Learning through the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly." International Relations 18(3) (2004), 361-380; Atkinson, “Military Soft Power,” 
p83; Checkel, “Why Comply?,” 
31 It is worth noting that the influence Freyburg finds does not appear strong enough to make participants 
reject non-democratic features of administrative government. Tina Freyburg, "Transgovernmental 
Networks as an Apprenticeship in Democracy? Socialization into Democratic Governance through Cross‐
national Activities." International Studies Quarterly 59(1) (2015), 70. 
32 Ibid., 69. 
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organizations are not only means of propelling state socialization, but are themselves 
incubators for the socialization process.33  The frequent meetings between government 
officials, permanent secretariats and prolonged sessions create a haven for officials from 
many different governments to build interpersonal relationships eventually yielding 
transnational social networks that serve as pathways for socialization.  Through this 
process international organizations are sites of socialization.34  For example, the frequent 
meetings between national government officials under the auspicious of the European 
Union and its subsidiary agencies has helped introduce national officials to European 
mindset which can trump respective national interests.35   
 On both the depth of interaction and structured engagement, defense diplomacy 
enjoys distinct advantages which allow the practice to excel as a socializing process.  
Military education exchanges parallel their civilian counterparts in enabling close 
interactions between foreign officers and a host society.  Carol Atkinson has explored this 
work using survey research to investigate the experience of foreign military officers 
                                                 
33 Ibid., Jon Pevehouse,Bruce Russett. "Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote 
Peace." International organization 60(4) (2006), 969-1000; Beyers. "Multiple Embeddedness,” Bearce, 
“Member-State Interest Convergence.” 
34 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
framework." International Organization 59(4) (2005), 801-826; Ernst B. Haas. When Knowledge is Power: 
three models of change in international organizations. (Oakland CA: University of California Press, 1990); 
Jan Beyers. "Where does Supranationalism Come From? Ideas floating through the working groups of the 
Council of the European Union." European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 2(9) (1998); Jan Beyers, 
Guido Dierickx. "Nationality and European Negotiations: The working groups of the Council of 
Ministers." European Journal of International Relations 3(4) (1997): 435-471; Hooghe, Liesbet. 
"Supranational Activists or Intergovernmental Agents? Explaining the orientations of senior Commission 
officials toward European integration." Comparative Political Studies 32(4) (1999): 435-463. 
35 The extent to which an individual may be susceptible to this European identity may be shaped by 
domestic factors.  Frank Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: 
Membership incentives, party constellations, and sustained compliance in Central and Eastern 
Europe." International Organization 59(4) (2005), 827-860; Beyers, “Multiple Embeddedness.” 
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attending America's elite military academies.36  Although not "novices" like young 
students, Atkinson found that participants in military education programs had a similar 
effect on foreign officers who left the U.S. with an increased understanding of the United 
States and positive feelings towards their host.  That such an impact was evident despite 
the experienced nature of the participants speaks highly of military exchanges as an 
instrument of soft power.37  The extracurricular elements of these programs should not be 
underestimated as many participants treasured their friendly interactions and social 
experiences more than the content of the actual education program.38  Atkinson argues 
that integration into the American social as well as intellectual community is a key 
element of the success of military education programs by reinforcing the academic 
content of the program and incorporating foreigners into the American worldview.39 
 Nor are education exchanges alone successful in facilitating the socialization 
process. As security institutions, organizations like NATO, ANZUS and the FPDA serve 
as military counterparts to civilian international organizations in providing havens for 
socialization.  Regular security conferences and training exercise provide fora for the 
transnational networks to be sustained and furthered.  Like the European Union, the 
frequent interactions that are crucial to the operations of military alliances offer the 
structured engagement that fortifies the socialization process and perpetuates the 
internalization of worldviews within foreign military officers.  The goal of such 
                                                 
36 For details of survey sample see Atkinson, “Military Soft Power,”  78-80 
37 Ibid., 107-108. 
38 The families of foreign officers who also travel to the United States are identified as being very 
significant in terms of stimulating social interactions and socializations. Ibid., 103-104, 108. 
39 Ibid., 108. 
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undertakings is not just to enhance interoperability but to foster a common purpose and 
geopolitical understanding among participants.40  
Common Identity: 
 Although it is the purpose of socialization to bring outsiders into internal 
alignment with a preferred manner of behavior, for this to occur there must first be some 
type of affinity between the socializer and its target.  One can imagine that no amount of 
proselytizing will do much to remedy the dearth of Jews among neo-Nazis nor the 
scarcity of African-American members in the Ku Klux Klan.  Rather, scholarship in 
several fields has shown the socialization of individuals to be greatly aided when both 
socializer and subject share a common identity.41  
These commonalities provide a basis for understanding between the two parties and 
provide a natural pathway for socializing influences to flow.  This is reflected in recent 
constructivist studies linking successful persuasion to the framework of the Habermasian 
concept of "common lifeworld" composed of "collective interpretation of the world and a 
common system of rules perceived as legitimate."42 Here, defense diplomacy again has 
an advantage based on the common identity shared by service members around the world.  
                                                 
40 For more information on security organizations as socializing environments Carol Atkinson. 
"Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military engagement and the socialization of states, 1972–
2000." International Studies Quarterly 50(3) (2006),509-537. 
41 Ibid., 514; Clair Selltiz, June R. Christ, Joan Havel, and Stuart W. Cook. Attitudes and Social Relations 
of Foreign Students in the United States. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963); Ye. Seeking 
Modernity;  George A. Akerlof, Rachel E. Kranton. "Identity and Schooling: Some lessons for the 
economics of education." Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2002), 1167-1201; George A. Akerlof, 
Rachel E. Kranton. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 
(2005): 9-32. 
42 Gheciu, “Security Institutions,” 979. 
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 Our traditional conception of military engagement is strikingly literal in nature 
and envisions armies fighting one another on a battlefield.  Yet, the inherently 
confrontational nature of warfare masks the underlying dynamic that characterizes the 
relationship between different foreign militaries.  Armed forces constitute what is known 
as a "community of practice" which consists of "people who are informally as well as 
contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice."43  
Communities of practice are not defined by borders, nor are peace and harmony 
prerequisites for their existence.44  Rather they are "like minded groups of practitioners 
who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and 
applying a common practice."45  As such, individuals need not have direct contact with 
one another let alone actually like one another to inhabit the same community of practice.  
Yet even when comity is absent, the transnational links within a community of practice 
serve as avenues of diffusion for new concepts, procedures and beliefs.46  For example, 
consider the field of medicine where a new medical procedure like dialysis or disease 
diagnosis such as SARS quickly spreads around the world without regard for borders or 
grievances. 
 Tangentially we already understand and accept the idea of armed forces as 
constituting a community of practice, yet have failed to appreciate its importance for 
                                                 
43 Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and 
NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation." European Journal of International Relations 14(2) (2008), 199; 
Etienne Wenger, Richard Arnold McDermott, and William Snyder. Cultivating Communities of Practice: A 
guide to managing knowledge. (Cambridge MA: Harvard Business Press, 2002). 
44 Adler, “Security Communities,” p200, Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, meaning, 
and identity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wegner et al, Cultivating Communities. 
45 Adler, “Security Communities,” 196. 
46 Ibid., 196,  202-205 
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interpersonal relations.  Specifically, while the spread of military tactics, strategies and 
technologies between militaries has been well documented, we overlook how ideas may 
be spread along these same pathways.47  United by their profession, soldiers from around 
the world share a common identity shaped by their military service.48  This commonality 
serves as a bridge between soldiers from different countries and affords them a "common 
lifeworld."  The result of shared identity is that the military organizations can exercise a 
socializing influence with ideas and political beliefs being transmitted between soldiers 
and not just tactical thinking.49  This is precisely the mechanism which underscores 
defense diplomacy's function.  By relying on inter-military contacts to propagate a 
preferred worldview, defense diplomacy uses the common identity of soldiers as military 
members to add credence and credibility to its message.  The similarities between the 
parties facilitate the socializing process and thus the overall utility of defense diplomacy. 
Attainment of Political Influence: 
 Whereas the first two conditions that enhance defense diplomacy's utility for state 
socialization concern the circumstances that increase the likelihood of converting an 
individuals to a new way of thinking, the third characteristic, embeddedness, addresses 
how these individual can transform their personal transformations into state policy.  As 
                                                 
47 Emily O. Goldman, "Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion." Review of International Studies 32(1) 
(2006), 69-91; Emily Goldman,Leslie C. Eliason (eds.). The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: 
Causes and Consequences for International Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
48 Atkinson, “Military Engagement,” 512-514; Akerlof, “Economics of Organization,”; Atkinson, “Military 
Soft Power,” 46-48. 
49 Atkinson, “Military Engagement,” 510-512.  Both the Decembrist Uprising in Russia is an interesting 
example of this process, see: Anatole G. Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 1825: The Decembrist 
Movement, its origins, development, and significance. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961);  
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the ultimate endgame of state socialization is the altering of a foreign government's 
behavior, this constitutes a significant challenge as the bureaucratic inertia of government 
bodies are notoriously hard to sway and can stifle even the most ardent of reformers.   
 Of the different courses of state socialization discussed earlier, defense diplomacy 
as a direct form of soft power application has the benefit of engaging directly with 
individuals already active inside government.  This represents a distinct asset in terms of 
state socialization as these officials, once convinced, have clear lines of influencing 
government policy either through institutional channels or their personal promotion up 
the government hierarchy.  This method of state socialization is in line with what Barry 
Buzan described as "vanguard theory" whereby the evolution of an institution or social 
structure occurs from the inside out.  In particular, a group of likeminded individuals or 
"vanguards" act as carriers in bringing a new idea or practice across an international 
border and bring about the evolution of their home institution through their activities.50  
The issue being that from a relatively small seed of individuals operating within a 
government, their influence can multiply and eventually alter state behavior with global 
ramifications.51 
 As the participants in defense diplomacy programs are members of their home 
country's militaries their jobs and gradual ascent up the military ranks offer a chance for 
the lessons they learn abroad to diffuse throughout their own institution.  In the cases of 
Fidel Ramos in the Philippines, Lee Hsien Loong in Singapore and Susilo Bambang 
                                                 
50 Barry Buzan,, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of 
Globalization. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 




Yudhoyono of Indonesia, graduates from American military schools not only climbed the 
military ranks but actually served as the head of state for their respective governments.52  
Nor is this occurrence particularly rare.  Although records of defense diplomacy alumni 
are scant, in 2012 the U.S. Command and General Staff College concluded that of the 
more than 7,300 international students to graduate from their institution, "more than half 
had attained the rank of general, and 241 officers from sixty-seven different countries 
[having] become heads of their militaries or heads of state."53  Similarly, Air University 
at Maxwell Air Force Base concluded that of its international alumna 413 had been 
promoted to either the head of their country's air force or an equivalent high ranking 
civilian or military position.54  Nor do these graduates exist purely as individuals.  Rather, 
successive classes of international participants in defense diplomacy programs form 
epistemic communities in their home countries which in turn advance their underlying 
doctrine while also maintaining links to the international network of officers who have 
shared similar experiences.55  The result is an internal motor of socialization which 
germinates within a government’s own institutions and ultimately alter state behavior.  
Manifestations of State Socialization: 
 
                                                 
52 Ramos attended the University of Illinois-Campaign and the United States Military Academy.  Lee 
attended Trinity College –Cambridge, Harvard University and the United States Army Command & 
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University in Missouri. 
53 Atkinson, “Military Soft Power,” 65. 
54 Atkinson, “Military Soft Power,” 69.   
55 Ibid., 104; Emanuel Adler, Peter M. Haas. "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World order, and the 
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125 
 
 Writing in International Organizations, Jeffrey Checkel argued that the 
behavioral changes induced by state socializations could be divided into two distinct 
types.  The first kind of socialization, Type 1, was characterized by a government altering 
its activities to comply with a prevailing international norm, but not necessarily changing 
its belief structure.  This contrasts with Type 2 socialization whereby the identity of a 
state and its worldview are effected by the socialization process with the government 
internalizing a new way of thinking and mode of behavior.56  What is particularly 
interesting about this divide in manifestations of state socialization is that it parallels the 
demarcation in defense diplomacy drawn by Michael Wesley, See Seng Tan and 
Bhudhindar Singh.57  As Checkel distinguishes between the socialization which modifies 
behavior alone and those altering underlying interests, so too is defense diplomacy 
bifurcated between the pragmatic variant designed to manage existing relations and a 
transformative strain intended to fundamentally shift the internal order of a target state. 
Type 1- Pragmatic Defense Diplomacy: 
 Checkel defines Type 1 socialization as when a country learns what constitutes 
socially acceptable conduct within the given community and adopts this behavior to 
comply with expectations.58  What is telling about this form of socialized behavior is that 
there is no underlying change in how the country conceives of its interests, but merely 
how it chooses to act.  As such, Type 1 socialization can be a bit superficial and subject 
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to the whims of the current government.  While a particular state may change its actions 
to comply with an international norm of appropriateness, this conversion is not 
necessarily permanent and can be reversed if it becomes overly burdensome.  Presently, 
we can see such stresses emerging in the European Union with regards to asylum seekers 
as the recent influx of migrants has led states like Hungary and Italy to break with 
accepted EU practices and adopt more self-serving policies.  Yet, it is a mistake to 
dismiss Type 1 socialization as a matter of diplomatic convenience.  The moral weight of 
international expectations and acceptable practices helps govern world affairs and 
establish boundaries for state behavior.  For example, although most countries today are 
capable of developing their own nuclear weapons, the overwhelming majority have 
chosen to forgo such an endeavor as to do so would violate the anti-proliferation norm.59  
Although not fundamentally changing how states view international relations or their 
interests, the nuclear taboo does guide their behavior. 
 The practicality evident in Type 1 socialization is reflected in what Tan and Singh 
characterize as the pragmatic variant of defense diplomacy.60  Pragmatic defense 
diplomacy does not seek to radically alter how states view one another.  Instead it seeks 
to use defense diplomacy to foster understanding and coordinate actions in areas of joint 
concern.  Though coming in numerous forms, the underlying objective of this pragmatic 
variant is the preservation of order by using engagement to avoid misapprehensions and 
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establish shared behavioral patterns.61  Here, defense diplomacy is critical as it 
consciously brings together individuals from different militaries and allows them to 
establish behavioral norms which can immediately be implemented in numerous 
countries. 
 The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), constitutes a critical case 
on the link between Type 1 socialization and pragmatic defense diplomacy.  Since its 
inception in the 1960s, ASEAN has been guided by its core values of equality among 
members and a mantra of non-intervention.  These ideals form the basis of what has 
become known as the “ASEAN Way” which places a premium on achieving consensus 
among the organization’s members and fervent opposition to any external interference in 
a country’s internal affairs.62  The ASEAN way has provided a basis for regional 
engagement as well as a shield to protect national governments from the hectoring of 
outsiders.  While accepting the inviolability of each other’s sovereignty, ASEAN 
members have come to recognize the risk of several transnational issues like piracy, 
smuggling and terrorism and the need for cooperation in confronting them.  The result 
has been a renaissance in regional defense diplomacy spearheaded by initiatives like the 
ASEAN Security-Political Community, the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, 
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and the ASEAN Regional Forum.63  These political undertakings have been marked by an 
uptick in multinational military exercises between members to improve coordination and 
establish shared procedures for combating problems like maritime piracy.64  Underlying 
all of these initiatives is not a desire to reform the interests of member states, but the 
extension of the behavioral norms of the ASEAN Way into the field of regional security.  
Even with China, whose rapid ascent and border disputes have unsettled the regional 
security dynamic, ASEAN has relied on defense diplomacy to engage with China in the 
hope of influencing Beijing’s behavior.  In particular, ASEAN has worked to include 
China in its management of non-traditional security threats through the ASEAN Regional 
Forum.65  The clear intent is to demonstrate to China the accepted mode of regional 
behavior in the hope of socializing China into this pattern.66 
Type 2- Transformative Defense Diplomacy: 
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 Type 2 socialization differs from Type 1 in that the target country doesn’t just 
adopt a role to conform to international expectations but actually undergoes an internal 
transformation.  Checkel states that Type 2 socialization “implies that agents adopt the 
interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part,” with 
“conscious instrumental calculation [being] replaced by ‘taken-for-grantedness.’”67  
Under Type 2 socialization a fundamental shift occurs in how a country thinks about its 
foreign relations and itself.  Internalization is the key to this dynamic as it is the 
attitudinal (and potentially ideational) evolution within a country that alters the behavior.  
The nature of this socialization and its embeddedness within a state’s worldview makes it 
an especially powerful process.  Whereas Type 1 changes can be easily reversed if they 
become overly inconvenient, the engrained character of Type 2 anchors the alteration in a 
government’s own internal thinking.  Rather than adopting a standard of behavior 
because it is what the international community expects, the new mode of conduct is 
adopted because the government itself believes that it is the right way to act.  
 The systemic changes to a state that occur in Type 2 socialization match the 
process of transformative defense diplomacy.  Whilst pragmatic defense diplomacy 
reflected the desire to manage relations between states, transformative defense diplomacy 
endeavors to use nonviolent military engagement to reform the internal workings and 
worldviews of another state.68  Transformative defense diplomacy is grounded in the 
recognition that the military is a government institution.  As such, inducing changes in 
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the armed force offers an opening to substantively influence government policies and 
identity.  This was the case throughout the Cold War as both the United States and Soviet 
Union strove to use defense diplomacy to sway governments towards capitalism and 
Marxism respectively.69   
 The conceptual harmony between Type 2 socialization and transformative defense 
diplomacy is most evident in the spread of Western European ideas and institutions into 
Eastern Europe after the Cold War.  Programs like the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council and the Partnership for Peace were used by NATO to fundamentally alter the 
identities of its former adversaries in the East.  As detailed by Alexandra Gheciue, 
“NATO was especially heavily involved in the eastern projection of liberal-democratic 
norms in the field of security,” specifically “accountability and transparency in the 
formulation of defense policies and budgets, the division of powers within the state in the 
area of security, government oversight of the military through civilian defense ministries, 
and accountability for the armed forces."70  These were more than just a preferred manner 
for running a military, but a means of socialization.  NATO "co-opted" the former 
Warsaw Pact members “into activities that are likely to affect the ways in which the latter 
think and behave.  In other words, NATO has been involved in ‘socializing’ Central and 
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Eastern Europeans into the Western ways.”71  Nor is post-Cold War Europe alone in 
illustrating the ability of defense diplomacy to transform state conduct as Carol Atkinson, 
Tomislav Ruby and Douglas Gibler, have shown clear links between American defense 
diplomacy and the spread of democratic norms of governance.72 
Conclusion: 
 
 The challenge to soft power as a tool of statecraft voiced by its critics is not 
unfounded.  No amount of exchange programs, cultural festivals or media broadcasts will 
end the Syrian Civil War or spontaneously restore Crimea to Ukraine.  Yet, the error in 
such statements is not that they are untrue, but rather that they fundamentally misconstrue 
the means through which soft power functions.  Constructivists hold that identities and 
interests are not fixed values which remain static throughout the lifespan of an individual, 
government or state.  Rather, within world affairs actors are in a constant state of 
evolution with each new idea or episode refining their understanding of geopolitics and 
their place in it.  It is this fluidity which has allowed Germany and France to become 
allies after centuries of discord and permitted Japan to shed its warlike past.  Soft power 
works by molding the course of this constant metamorphoses.  By advancing new ideas it 
allows one country to possibly alter how another state conceives of itself and its interests.  
It is this socialization process which characterizes Soft Power’s role in world affairs and 
underscore’s defense diplomacy’s effectiveness.  
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 What makes defense diplomacy such a potent form of soft power promotion is 
that the very nature of the practice facilitates the socialization mechanism through which 
soft power operates.  The combination of persistent interaction, common identity and 
nature of program participants facilitates not only the ability of defense diplomacy to 
disseminate new ideas but also their translation into government policy.  By engaging 
directly with governing elites, defense diplomacy seeks to coopt individuals who either 
are already in positions to alter government policies or may be later in their careers.  
Though far from a perfect instrument, the fact that the U.S. Command and General Staff 
College alone can count among its alumni over 240 individuals who became either heads 
of state or head of their respective military establishment is indicative of the direct link to 
foreign leaders that defense diplomacy affords its purveyors and means of shaping their 
worldviews.  Indeed, consider that while 7,300 individuals have graduated from the 
General Staff College since it first admitted foreign officers, over 64,000 individuals 
from 152 countries participated in International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program during fiscal year 2013 alone.73  Nor are these social sinews mere garnish as 
evidenced by Atkinson, Gheciu, Ruby and Gibbler’s research demonstrating defense 
diplomacy to be effective in promulgating democratic norms and respect for human 
rights.   
 Yet, while the apparent success of defense diplomacy in promoting the spread of 
liberal norms is proof of its utility as a tool of state socialization, it also raises the 
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important question of whether such measures can be used to achieve other aims.  Even 
though the participants in defense diplomacy programs must be at some level susceptible 
to the ideas being propagated, the process itself is content neutral.  Herein lies the next 
challenge in establishing defense diplomacy as a tool of statecraft.  Whereas soft power 
allows us to establish what defense diplomacy is and state socialization lets us understand 




















AFTER THE FALL:  
 










President Gerald Ford can be excused for being preoccupied on 10 April 1975 as 
the South Vietnamese government crumbled in the face of a Northern offensive and all 
Americans were ordered to evacuate neighboring Cambodia. With the dominos in 
Southeast Asia teetering on the abyss, Ford travelled to the capitol building that evening 
to ask Congress for $722 million in emergency military and humanitarian aid for South 
Vietnam in a final bid to salvage some remnant of America’ long involvement in 
Indochina.  Ford took account not just of the tragedy unfolding in Indochina, but of the 
deep concern those events engendered throughout the region.  Aware of the growing 
disquiet among America’s regional allies, Ford noted that he had already scheduled 
consultations with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Indonesia.1   Surprisingly 
absent from that list and the entirety of Ford’s speech was any mention of the Philippines, 
America’s oldest ally in Southeast Asia.  This oversight did not go unnoticed in Manila. 
 As much as Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, then enjoying the third year 
of Martial Law, raged at being omitted from Ford’s speech, this apparent slight 
constituted only the latest manifestation of Marcos’ growing uncertainty about his 
partners in Washington.  Whereas Ford’ speech was an annoyance, more disconcerting to 
Marcos was Congress’s recalcitrance in aiding South Vietnam.   Like the government in 
                                                 




Saigon, Manila relied on its alliance with the United States as the essential guarantor of 
Philippine security.  In the case of the Philippines, these guarantees were codified in the 
form of the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) which committed the United States to 
defend the Philippines from external threat and the 1947 Military Base Agreement 
(MBA) governing the sizable American military installations located in the Philippines.  
Horrified by Washington’s striking inaction in the face of South Vietnam’s collapse, 
Marcos began to question both the credibility of America’s commitments and his 
country’s close alignment with the United States.  Spurred by the debacle in Indochina 
and uncertain of American dependability, Marcos adopted a new, independent approach 
to Philippine foreign policy. This initiative culminated in a demand to amend the Military 
Base Agreement in order to show greater deference to both Philippine sovereignty and 
security needs.   
Long overshadowed by the tumultuous aftermath of Saigon’s fall, the renegotiation of the 
U.S.-Philippine base agreement in the 1970s provides a critical window on the challenges 
faced by the United States in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War.  Though 
unquestionably informed by growing Philippine nationalism and personal greed, Marcos’ 
driving motivation was an acute sense of insecurity rather than cupidity.  For Marcos, the 
negotiations were not merely a means of revising the administration of the American 
military bases but a platform to solidify American security commitments whilst 
simultaneously improving the ability of the Philippines to provide for its own defense. 
  This paper follows the course of these events from the upheaval of April 1975 
until the amending of the base agreement in January 1979.  In wrestling with both the 
137 
 
profound skepticism of a once steadfast ally and the peculiarities of the Marcos regime, 
Washington confronted more than just the uncertainties bred by the failure of its 
Indochina policy.  To reassure Marcos and bring negotiations to a successful conclusion 
the United States needed to navigate such thorny issues as Congress’s role in foreign 
affairs and the importance of human rights to U.S. policy. Ultimately, during 
negotiations, the U.S. adopted practices like defense diplomacy and positions on issues 
like the South China Sea which helped redefine America’s role in Southeast Asia after 
the Vietnam War and continue to underpin American policy in the region today.  
After the Fall:   
 
 What limited scholarship exists on the American activities in Southeast Asia after 
the Vietnam War largely focuses on Washington’s growing absence.  Still politically and 
socially reeling from the traumatic experience in Vietnam, the United States seemingly 
withdrew from the region.  Though certainly eager to embrace groups like the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and benefit from the region’s 
burgeoning economic dynamism, Washington was also clearly content to step away from 
the dominant role that it had previously played in regional affairs.2  Amongst the few 
works to challenge this narrative is Andrew Gawthorpe’s sweeping examination of the 
Ford Administration’s policies in the Asia-Pacific.   By probing President Gerald Ford’s 
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management of America’s regional alliances as well as his handling of specific crises, 
Gawthorpe undercuts the depiction of American abandonment and contests attempts to 
treat the Ford administration as a mere appendage to the Nixon Presidency.3   Similarly, 
President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human rights as a cornerstone of American foreign 
policy had pronounced manifestations in Southeast Asia.  Washington’s willingness to 
reprimand even friendly regimes over their abusive practices indicated the progression of 
American policy interest in Southeast Asia rather than their nonexistence.4   
Yet, underscoring all of these works is a simple conceptual flaw which mistakenly 
conflates the hyperactivity of American regional engagement during the Vietnam War 
with normality and its absence with disinterest.  Though certainly a decline in relative 
terms, the United States neither abandoned Southeast Asia nor lost sight of its continued 
role as a Pacific power.  Instead the evolution of American policy parallels the changing 
nature of the problems it faced in the region.  From its ultimately futile effort to prevent 
the spread of Communism in Indochina, Washington’s task shifted to reassuring allies 
and placing American regional involvement on a more sustainable basis.  These 
objectives could not be achieved by adhering to the bullish policies of the recent past.  
Instead, they required a recalibration of American engagement which married a 
responsiveness to the particular concerns of individual governments with a new approach 
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to security affairs.  It is here where the renegotiation of the U.S.-Philippine base 
agreement is particularly instructive as it encapsulates both the challenges faced by 
Washington in the wake of South Vietnam’s defeat and the changes in American policy 
needed to overcome these obstacles. 
American concerns about the Philippines had grown as the Vietnam conflict 
progressed towards its ignoble conclusion. When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
questioned his senior staff in August 1974, about the effect of a South Vietnam defeat on 
perceptions of the United States, David C. Cuthell, the Philippines Country Director, 
voiced particular concern about how Manila would respond.  Cuthell stated, “I think they 
would worry very much about their own security.”  Particularly, Cuthell foresaw that in 
the event of South Vietnam’s fall Macros might move “more heavily… with the notion 
that the Philippines should be an independent sanctuary.”5  Yet, in a prelude of future 
policy debates, this opinion was not universal.  Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Sneider believed that any doubts engendered by 
the fall of Vietnam would be insufficient for regional governments to forgo their 
partnerships with the United States.  Sneider listed the Philippines as among “the spoiled 
brats” in the region who had gotten too accustomed to being taken care of by the United 
States without regard to Washington’s wider commitments.6 
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For his part, Marcos had appeared reluctant to voice any concern about America’s 
commitment to the Philippines prior to Ford’s speech on 10 April 1975.7  However, the 
speech itself and the events that followed sparked a firestorm in Manila. What unnerved 
the Philippine government was not the setbacks in Indochina but the manner in which 
both South Vietnam and Cambodia had been left to fall.  Despite Ford’s plea, Congress 
refused to furnish the emergency military aid needed to forestall South Vietnam’s 
collapse.  Recounts historian Robert McMahon, “realizing that the end was near, few 
legislators displayed any inclination to throw additional money at what seemed the most 
hopeless of causes.”8   
Congress’s dithering in the face of the crisis horrified Manila. Newspapers carried 
banner headlines about the need for the Philippines to reassess its security arrangements 
with the U.S. following the “abandonment of Cambodia in Vietnam.”9   Ambassador 
William Sullivan described to his superiors in Washington how Philippine officials were 
“shocked by U.S. inaction,” and urged his government to take these concerns seriously.10    
Philippine anxiety sprung from the grave realization that the Philippines was 
uniquely vulnerable to suffering a similar fate at the hands of Congressional inaction.  
Long comforted by American security guarantees in the form of the MDT, Congress’s 
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handling of the Indochina issue brought the trustworthiness of these assurances into 
question.  Sullivan related that Philippine apprehensions were based on “the emerging 
view that commitments made by American presidents are nothing more than statements 
of intent that do not bind the American people, the congress or the government.”11  Such 
uncertainty was further fueled by conspicuous absence of any mention of the Philippines 
in President Ford’s speech which struck a nerve in Manila.  Philippine officials 
repeatedly cited the oversight as evidence of American indifference and justification for 
Manila’s reassessment of its security arrangements.12  
Word of a Philippine reassessment emerged soon after Ford’s speech and gained 
greater substance as the situation in Indochina deteriorated.  The American embassy got 
its first insight into what this might entail during brief remarks by Marcos on 15 April to 
students of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) who were visiting 
the Malacañang Palace.  Marcos told the students that owing to its long relations “the 
Philippines understood the United States better than other powers and up to now had been 
able to tell what the United States would do.”  However, “in the face of the debacle 
occurring in Indochina it was necessary to review the relationship.”13  Marcos 
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specifically identified the U.S. military bases and the utility of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
as points of concern.  The following day, Marcos made a more substantive and public 
address to the University of the Philippine’s Law School Alumni Association.  Marcos 
began his address by detailing how events in Indochina had placed the Philippines in the 
frontline of America’s defense posture and mandated a review of MDT in order to 
determine its actual value to the Philippines.  Marcos found the alleged assurances 
contained within the MDT to be lacking:  
Literal interpretation of treaty provides no guarantee for Philippines.  US proposes 
to react only to attack on US bases but what would happen if insurgency led to 
infiltration of agents directed against Philippine government but not against US 
bases?  Moreover, responses to treaty obligations by any US government would 
have to be approved by Congress contrary… to automatic retaliation clause in 
NATO which is more binding on US Congress.14   
 
The speech culminated in Marcos declaring a need for the U.S.-Philippine relationship to 
be built on the basis of complete reciprocity. 15   
On 25 April 1975, Marcos chaired a meeting of his Foreign Policy Council to 
review the existing military agreements between the Philippines and the United States.   
The Council “decided that the status quo was no longer tenable,” and Marcos reiterated 
his stance “that national survival dictates the adoption of a policy that will serve best the 
interest of the country.”16   That same day, after his own meeting with Marcos, Sullivan 
dispatched a telegram to Washington detailing the mood in Manila.  Sullivan warned that  
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This current Philippine concern is genuine. It is not merely a ploy to squeeze 
more money out of us.  Although it is aggravated by our inexplicable failure to 
mention Philippines in either Ford or Schlesinger statements, the problem is 
deeper and more significant. As Marcos has told me, much of it derives from 
Presidential and Secretarial statements that congressional failure to provide aid to 
Indochina would make residential assurances meaningless.17 
 
Less than a year after Richard Sneider had belittled Asian states for not appreciating 
American commitments, governments like the Philippines were beginning to question 
whether those commitments had any value at all.  Marcos and his compatriots were 
dismayed by American inaction in Indochina and aghast at the ability of a reticent 
Congress to negate American security guarantees. Rather than an ironclad assurance of 
safety, American commitments to defend the Philippines had now become shrouded in an 
ambiguity which desperately needed to be redressed.   
The Cocoon Conundrum:  
  
Ambassador Sullivan characterized the Philippine security reassessment as trying 
to have “your cocoon and leaving it, too.”18  Painfully aware of Philippine reliance on 
American forces and Manila’s close relationship with Washington, Marcos moved to 
demonstrate greater independence in his foreign policy.  This new approach was 
characterized by efforts to build relationships with Communist states, improve Philippine 
standing within the Third World and a new emphasis on “self-reliance” in its relationship 
with the United States.   However, Marcos did not want to completely severe the defense 
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relationship with America.  Indeed, the opposite was true. Even as Marcos questioned the 
utility of American defense guarantees he actively sought the reaffirmation of these 
commitments rather than their abrogation.  This produced a seemingly paradoxical 
strategy where Macros both sought greater independence from the United States while 
simultaneously demanding stronger assurances from Washington of American fidelity. 
The duality of this policy reflected the underlying dilemma of Philippine foreign policy 
after the Vietnam War.  Now aware of the dangers of overdependence on the United 
States, the challenge for Marcos resided in mitigating that dependence without forgoing 
the benefits which the Philippines continued to enjoy. 
 Marcos’ emphasis on greater independence began before the fall of Indochina.  
However, the pace and prominence of this pivot towards independence escalated after 
April 1975.  Related Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip 
Habib, “No longer are the Filipinos prepared to suffer third-word allegations of [being a] 
‘U.S. stooge.’ No longer are they willing to be considered the retarded ex-colonials of 
[Southeast Asia].”19  The most visible manifestation of Marcos’ new foreign policy 
approach was his handling of Communist governments.  Prior to 1975, the Philippines 
had no relationship with the People’s Republic of China and remained the only country in 
Southeast Asia to have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.  Both situations 
were promptly remedied by state visits by Marcos to Beijing in June 1975 and Moscow 
the following year.20   Marcos also moved rapidly to establish relations with the 
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Communist government of the newly unified Vietnam. This zeal actually provoked a 
diplomatic incident when the Philippine envoy to Hanoi signed a joint communique 
deemed offensive to the United States and at odds with Philippine policy.21   
The greatest concern for Washington was not Marcos’ openings with communist 
governments but his handling of the American bases inside the Philippines.  Since its 
colonial administration of the Philippines, the United States had maintained a number of 
major military installations inside the Philippines including the sprawling Clark Air Field 
and Subic Bay Naval Base which were among the largest U.S. military bases in the 
world.22   These bastions of American military might in Southeast Asia had been a 
frequent irritant within U.S.-Philippine relations.23  Of particular annoyance were the 
extraterritorial rights which the United States enjoyed with the bases largely functioning 
as extensions of American territory outside of Philippine authority.24  Such conditions 
had long inflamed nationalist sentiments within the Philippines and had triggered 
previous rounds of negotiations including the 1966 agreement which shortened the tenure 
of the 1947 MBA from 99 years to a term of 25 years.   
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While discord over the bases had been frequent the U.S. officials saw indications of a 
new seriousness in Marcos’ treatment of the issue amid his efforts to establish greater 
Philippine control over its own affairs.25 
Fundamental in Marcos’ posturing is the U.S. base issue, largely because of its 
overwhelming visibility in the relationship.  We, of course, conduct our business 
at both Clark and Subic…essentially without reference to the GOP [government 
of the Philippines].   That has been how we wanted it, and have practiced it 
without significant modification for about thirty years….Now, however, the GOP 
strikes me as dead serious in its intent to evoke major changes during the base 
negotiations.26 
 
The two central objectives of the Philippine government were establishing Philippine 
sovereign control over the installations and increasing the military capabilities of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).   Continued American extraterritorial rights 
constituted a painful vestige of the Philippines colonial past which hamstrung Philippine 
independence.27  Worse, the continued presence of American forces in the archipelago 
had actually hindered Philippine defense capabilities with the development of AFP being 
retarded by an excessive dependence on American forces.  Events in Indochina had 
illustrated the folly of this approach and the Philippine government would push for both a 
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greater role for Philippine forces in the country’s security and considerable aid to bolster 
its own abilities.28      
 Interestingly it was also in the posturing over the American bases where evidence 
of Marcos’ desire for reassurance from Washington first began to manifest. While calling 
for a revision of the MBA, Marcos made it clear to American officials that he did not 
wish to hinder American operations at the bases or want their removal.29 In one notable 
instance, Marcos said that he “was not waving placards saying ‘Americans go home’ 
because Americans and Filipinos [were] too deeply attached to one another,” adding that 
the bases had “not outlasted their usefulness.”30   
The same might not have been true for the MDT.  Manila’s concern centered on 
two critical questions about American obligations under the MDT.  First, several 
Philippine government officials parroted a misstatement made by James Wilson, then 
Deputy Chief of Mission at the  U.S. Embassy in Manila, before a Senate Committee in 
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1969.  Wilson mistakenly told the committee that the MDT only required the United 
States to defend the Philippines if the American bases inside the Philippines were 
themselves attacked.31  As a result, the treaty provided no real protection to the 
Philippines or the Philippine government.  U.S. officials constantly and unequivocally 
repudiated this misinterpretation. Yet,  Ambassador Sullivan wrote of the Philippine 
reverence for Wilson’s statement on the MDT that, “the description of the Wilson 
Statement in the Symington Hearings is grossly inaccurate and falls into the category of 
Philippine folklore, in which the constant repetition of the misstatement of fact is 
construed to produce the alchemy of converting it into fact.” 32   
Secondly, and greatly exacerbated by events in Indochina, Article IV of the MDT 
notes that either party will come to the other’s common defense “in accordance with its 
constitutional processes.”33  The American Constitution’s endowing Congress with the 
power to declare war and 1973 War Powers Act led Philippine officials to conclude that 
American defensive obligations under the MDT were not automatic – but contingent on 
the whims of Congress.  In the event of an attack on the Philippines, what assurances did 
Manila have that it would not fall victim to the same Congressional intransigence which 
befell Cambodia and South Vietnam? 
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Despite these concerns, Marcos’ goal was not to scrap the treaty in the face of its 
allegedly dubious benefits, but rather to strengthen the arrangement.  He sought sufficient 
guarantees from Washington which would dispel any question of America’s obligations 
and reaffirm the security commitment.34  Thus on both the bases and the MDT the major 
thrust of the Philippine security review was not to break with the United States at all, but 
rather to revise the existing arrangements in a manner which enhanced Philippine 
security. 
 In this task, Marcos found an affable partner in President Ford.  From the onset of 
the crisis in April 1975, the Ford administration had made frequent efforts to reassure 
Marcos of America’s continued support.  For example, in late April, Secretary of the 
Treasury William Simon was instructed to deliver a personal message from Ford to 
Marcos on the sidelines of a conference in Manila.   The message from Ford stated, “Let 
me assure you in unequivocal terms that, when I said in my State of the World address 
that the U.S. would honor its commitments, I was including most specifically the 
Philippines.  You need have no doubt on this score.”   
 In the weeks that followed the United States tried as best possible to respond to 
anxieties in the Philippines with sympathy and reassurance. This included both 
understanding for Manila’s independent foreign policy streak and an openness to 
amending the base agreement.35  Yet no letter, telegram or meeting seemed sufficient to 
assuage the disquiet in Manila.   
                                                 
34 Telegram from Sullivan (Manila) to State, No.6987, “May 21 Meeting with Marcos: Base Security 
Arrangements,” 21 May 1975: CFPF, NARA: accessed via AAD.   
35 Memorandum from the Assistant Director for East Asia and the Pacific, United States Information 
Agency (Payeff) to the Director (Keogh) and Deputy Director (Kopp), 9 May 1975:FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. 
150 
 
 As early as mid- April, Ambassador Sullivan had identified a visit by President 
Ford as the most effective means of soothing the situation. 
I trust you will appreciate that the promise of a visit will do more to hold this 
situation together than any other move I can suggest.  It is apparent that 
Washington has not yet realized the extent of the shock which Indochina has 
caused her in Southeast Asia.  We will have to make some extraordinary moves to 
preserve our most important assets, among which are our security arrangements 
with the Philippines.  A Presidential visit is not too high a price, and a rapid 
decision on it now is not an unreasonable request.36 
 
Kissinger concurred and worked to attach an overnight stop in Manila during President 
Ford’s return trip from Beijing in December.   
 When Ford arrived on 6 December, he was treated to an elaborate show along the 
several mile route from airport to the palace which had been personally orchestrated by 
Imelda Marcos.37  While the showmanship captured the attention of many observers, the 
actual substance of the meeting remains clouded.  According to Maurice Lee, a public 
affairs officer attached to the American embassy, the two Presidents were supposed to 
have their official talk in Marcos’ cabin aboard the Presidential yacht.  “When it came 
time for the meeting Marcos escorted Ford into the cabin and closed the door in the face 
of Kissinger and the Ambassador.”38  To this day there is no known record or the 
meeting, however, the substance of the exchange can be inferred from subsequent 
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statements.39  In an analysis of Martial Law written in 1976, the Embassy remarked that 
especially during Ford’s visit, “Marcos made clear that despite previous rhetoric about 
reassessment… his nation’s security arrangements with the United States [remained] the 
keystone of Philippine security policy.”40  A later review recounted that “President Ford’s 
visit…put an end to post-Viet Nam speculation that the United States was withdrawing 
from Southeast Asia,” and “helped to establish a more solid and congenial premise for 
negotiations on military facilities.”41   
This “congenial premise” was the joint communique issued at the visit’s 
conclusion.  While affirming the importance of the MDT to both countries, the 
communique notes that the two presidents “agreed that negotiations on the subject of 
United States’ use of Philippine military bases should be conducted in the clear 
recognition of Philippine sovereignty.”42  This formulation officially established that the 
American bases within the Philippines were not in fact American bases at all, but rather 
Philippine bases under Philippine sovereignty which they permitted the United States to 
use in accordance with the Military Base Agreement.  Furthermore, Marcos informed 
Ford of his desire to attain military self-reliance within the Philippines, to which Ford 
“expressed support for those realistic policies and to this end indicated that the United 
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States intended to continue to provide assistance to the Philippines within the framework 
of available resources.”43 
 Though brief, President Ford’s visit represented an important turning point in the 
development of U.S.-Philippine relations in the post-Vietnam era.  It helped assuage 
lingering doubts about America’s abandonment of Southeast Asia and reaffirmed 
Washington’s commitment to remaining an active participant in Pacific affairs.  In the 
case of U.S.-Philippine relations, it provided a sound basis to start developing a new post-
war dynamic which better accounted for the needs of both parties.  Yet, the Ford-Marcos 
meeting was strictly a beginning.  The actual process of renegotiating the base agreement 
and satisfactorily answering the underlying questions exposed by events in Indochina 
would ultimately require three years of difficult negotiations. 
For a Few Dollars More: 
 
 Formal negotiations between Kissinger and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos 
Romulo began on 12 April 1976.  The Philippine negotiating position centered on the two 
critical issues which had been articulated by Marcos the previous summer.  The 
Philippines wanted to eliminate any inkling of American extraterritorial rights by 
enshrining Philippine sovereign control of the bases.  However, in exchange for allowing 
continued use of the bases by American forces, the Philippine government demanded just 
compensation in the form of rent which was to be paid by the U.S. government.44  Thus 
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the negotiations themselves revolve around how Philippine sovereignty over the bases 
was to be exercised and how much money the United States would pay the Philippines 
for continued access.  
 On the question of sovereignty, the Ford-Marcos communique had cleared the 
first obstacle by acknowledging that the bases belonged to the Philippines.  As important 
as this step was, it created a series of challenges for negotiators.  Specifically, American 
officials worried that Philippine authorities would interfere in American operations and in 
effect grant Manila a veto over how American forces in the Philippines could be used.45  
Therefore the primary goal of American negotiators was to cede control of the bases to 
the Philippines while retaining unfettered and unqualified operational authority over 
American forces and facilities.  Opening negotiations seemingly justified American 
trepidations with Philippine negotiators adopting a hardline approach to control of the 
bases.  Notably, Manila’s opening proposal on the bases placed “highly restrictive 
limitations” on American forces including a requirement that routine American activities 
as well as combat operations be approved by a Philippine base commander.46   
While American officials speculated that many of the more drastic provisions had been 
inserted purely to be traded for higher levels of American compensation, the severity of 
the demands caused concern in Washington.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
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recalled being “shocked by the extent of the proposals,” and Philippine intransigence on 
critical issues.  He later wrote to Kissinger that unless the Philippine leadership became 
more receptive to American concerns, “I believe we should avoid reinforcing the 
impression that our need for the bases is unmatched by the Philippine need for us to be 
there.”47  Rumsfeld’s apprehensions were characteristic of the Pentagon’s reticence 
throughout the entire process.  Given that the current base agreement didn’t expire until 
1991, the Pentagon saw no reason to engage in a renegotiation or make significant 
concessions which could complicate American operations.48 
 The compensation package, often referred to as “the quid” in the quid-pro-quo for 
the bases, proved equally thorny.   Even before the collapse of Indochina, Marcos had 
made known his displeasure at the level of American military and financial assistance.  In 
particular, Marcos remained bitter over a perceived lack of American responsiveness to 
requests for military equipment in 1972 when attacks by Muslim separatists in Mindanao 
first began.49  Extracting rent payments for base access would circumvent such 
difficulties by explicitly guaranteeing copious amounts of American assistance for as 
long as the bases were in use. Furthermore, amid Marcos’ efforts to cultivate a self-reliant 
military capability, he had an incentive to maximize the amount of aid he could receive in 
                                                 
47 Letter from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to Secretary of State Kissinger, 13 September 1976. FRUS: 
East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976, Vol. E-12. 
48 Kissinger and other state department leaders often railed against Pentagon foot-dragging and inability to 
comprehend the difficult political dynamics at play in the Philippines. Secretary of State’s Senior Staff 
Meeting, 16 August 1976, DNSA: Memo from Thomas Barnes to Brent Scowcroft, “Your March 31 
Meeting with Ambassador William Sullivan,” 31 March 1976: NSA, PCF- EA&P, Country File: People’s 
Republic of China, Box 15: GFPL.  
49 Telegram from Sullivan (Manila) to State, No. 1733, “Marcos-Robinson Meeting,” 6 August 1976: NSA, 
NSC EA&P Staff, Subject Files Box 31, GFPL. 
155 
 
negotiations as a means of jumpstarting the modernization of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines.  When negotiations began in April, Romulo took a strong stance on the 
question of compensation.  Romulo asserted that past security assistance had “never 
[been] fully satisfactory” and that the Philippines did not want compensation to “be an 
aid or a dole or a grant” which were regarded as demeaning.  Instead, Manila wanted “[a] 
lump sum cash payment, with no strings attached” to be paid on a multi-year basis.50 
 This stated preference for rent posed an immediate problem for the United States.  
While Washington had long accepted the formula of providing certain types of assistance 
for access to military bases, it had actively eschewed the term rent and the direct payment 
of cash for bases.  As Kissinger tried to explain to Romulo, “with respect to rent –this is a 
question of principle with us because if we start paying rent in one country then all other 
countries are going to raise the same issue,” adding that rent “really removes the 
impression that we are doing this in the common interest.”51    
Beyond disagreement over the form of compensation, the United States was 
having difficulty pinning down the amount of assistance which Manila actually expected.  
In May, Ambassador Sullivan requested that he be authorized to offer a package of $50 
million annually split between grants and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits.  
However, at the time Sullivan predicted that the United States might eventually have to 
double those amounts to a $100 million annually, bringing the total package to $500 
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million over five years (roughly $2.1 billion when adjusted for inflation).52  Frustratingly, 
Philippine officials refused to cite any specific amount of compensation.  They preferred 
vague references to the need for defensive support sufficient to fund military 
modernization which would allow them to use “almost any figure.”53  
Hindered by foot-dragging in Washington and evasiveness in Manila, negotiations 
dragged throughout the summer of 1976 with little progress.54  Hoping to spur some 
movement, Deputy Secretary of State Charles Robinson was dispatched to Manila in 
early August.  However, instead of furthering negotiations, Robinson’s visit only exposed 
another complication.   Owing to repeated assurances from Ford, Kissinger, Habib 
and Sullivan, Philippine trepidations about the authenticity of American obligations 
under the MDT had seemingly subsided from their zenith in 1975, but had never fully 
dissipated.  Instead these concerns evolved in a new direction.  Rather than questioning 
whether the United States would fulfill its commitment to defend the Philippines, Manila 
demanded a clarification of exactly how far those commitments extended.  Specifically, 
Marcos wanted an answer to whether the MDT covered Philippine activities in the 
increasingly contentious South China Sea.  
 Philippine concern over the South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands in particular, 
first emerged in 1975 as both China and North Vietnam took control of several islands 
from the crumbling government in South Vietnam.   In April 1975, the North Vietnamese 
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took over Parola and Pugad islands in order to preempt their possible seizure by China 
following Beijing’s confiscation of the Paracel group a year earlier.  Parola and Pugad are 
located roughly 30 miles north of the Philippine occupied and administered Thitu Island.  
Fearing either Chinese or Vietnamese aggression against it holdings, Marco’s queried 
whether such an attack would mandate an American response under the MDT or the still 
active Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).55  At the time, the State Department 
concluded that since the Spratlys were disputed territories and that the U.S. took no 
stance on the question of sovereignty in the South China Sea, the MDT did not cover 
either Philippine possessions or forces in the Spratlys.  Given the legal nuances involved, 
Washington also urged that American diplomats in Manila avoid discussing the matter.56  
Aware of the incendiary nature of this conclusion, Sullivan urged that copies of the State 
Department’s determination be tightly controlled since “if its contents were ever to come 
to attention of [the] Filipinos they would confirm their worst fears and suspicions 
concerning value off U.S. treaty commitments.”57 
 Angst over the Spratlys began to climb again in 1976 amid stepped-up oil 
exploration by the Philippines in the disputed area of Reed Bank near Vietnamese and 
Chinese occupied islands.  On May 14, Vietnamese forces on Parola Island even fired on 
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a Philippine reconnaissance plane.58  Fears about Reed Bank and the Spratly Islands 
increasingly bled into negotiations over the MBA and landed firmly on Deputy Secretary 
Robinson’s lap when he arrived in Manila in August.  
  Prior to his meeting with Marcos, Robinson had been instructed to offer firm 
reassurances on American obligations under the MDT but to balk at the treaty’s 
extensions to the South China Sea.  “We do not believe it useful to try to envisage how 
the treaty would be applied in particular circumstances such as attack in disputed areas 
(e.g., the Spratlys).  Our reaction in such a case would depend entirely on the 
circumstances.”59  During the meeting Marcos pressed his advantage and presented 
Robinson with a formal Aide Memoire asking Washington for an explicit statement of 
American obligations under the MDT and primarily in reference to the Philippines’ 
disputed claim to Reed Bank.  Marcos also played his trump card by informing Robinson 
that progress in base negotiations was directly related to a satisfactory response on this 
issue and even threatened to suspend negotiations until an acceptable answer was 
delivered.60 
 At first, American officials seemed to discount the seriousness of Marcos’ dictate.  
For example, Thomas Barnes of the National Security Council saw the move as a way to 
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stall the base negotiations until after the American election.61  During a State Department 
meeting on 16 August, Robinson and Habib both took issue with Marcos “playing 
games” with the base negotiations.  Kissinger, initially seemed more sympathetic, but by 
September conceded that “Marcos may be seeking to maneuver us into a position where 
he can pin us with the responsibility for a breakdown or indefinite recess in the base 
negotiations.”62 
 Regardless of Marcos’ motivation, the United States needed to formulate a 
response to the Aide Memoire.  The heart of the matter was Article V of the MDT which 
defined the defense commitments of the treaty as applying to “an armed attack on either 
of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either 
of the Parties, or on the Island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its 
armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”63   In the case of the Philippines, 
the “metropolitan territory” was defined by the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of 
Washington defining land transferred to the United States by the Spanish after 1898 and 
subsequently transferred to the Philippines upon independence; neither of which included 
the Spratlys.  The second category of island territories in the Pacific Ocean also was not 
applicable since the Spratlys remained disputed and Philippine sovereignty over the 
islands had not been recognized by the United States or the international community.64  
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Thus, Philippine hopes for the MDT being extended to the Spratlys hinged on third 
proviso about armed forces, public vessels or aircraft. 
 From the initial question of the MDT’s applicability in the Spratly Islands, the 
U.S. had been extremely wary of extending coverage to Philippine forces active in the 
Spratlys.  American officials feared that any such extension of the MDT would 
inadvertently give the Philippines a blank check in the South China Sea.  Confident of 
American support, Washington feared that the Philippines might potentially take 
provocative actions and embroil the United States in a conflict which it did not support.65  
Noted Donald Rumsfeld about expanding the MDT to cover the Spratly Islands, “in my 
view our base rights position in the Philippines would have to be much more precarious 
than is the case to justify such risks.”66   
 When Kissinger met with Romulo and Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce 
Enrile in New York on 5 October he did so under a cloud of pending disappointment.  In 
consultations with Sullivan on the 4th, both concluded that a base agreement before the 
election was virtually impossible.  Sullivan also informed Kissinger that “Marcos is 
convinced that Carter will be President by an avalanche,” and as a result “he assumes the 
next administration will not implement an agreement that this administration makes.”67   
Nevertheless, the American officials hoped to make progress on the Aide Memoire and 
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the quid.  On the Reed Bank question, the State and Defense Departments had agreed on 
an answer proposed by Rumsfeld in a letter to Ford.  The United States would confirm 
that the MDT did cover Philippine ships and aircraft in the Spratly Islands, but only “as 
long as their presence is consistent with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
particularly Article I regarding peaceful settlement of disputes and refraining from the 
threat or use of force.”68  The construction of the response was designed to afford the 
United States maximum flexibility without either greatly expanding or curtailing the 
scope of the MDT.  On the compensation issue, Ford approved an opening offer of $64 
million in security assistance a year over a 5 year period for a total of $320 million, 
which could be increased if needed to $100 million a year for a total of $500 million.69   
 When the meeting itself began, Romulo read a prepared statement which again 
outlined Philippine concerns about the base agreement and the MDT.  Kissinger, who 
found the agreed response on the Reed Bank/Spratly question to be nonsense, moved 
quickly to defuse the question of the Aide Memoire.  He again assured his Filipino 
counterparts that the MDT did indeed require the U.S. to defend the Philippines in the 
event of an external attack, but if the Philippines wanted Reed Bank and the Spratly 
Islands included, then the U.S. would need to insert some waffling language to allow for 
flexibility. In response, Romulo confirmed that Manila did not consider the Spratly 
Islands to be part of the metropolitan area.  He clarified that “we want to exclude 
controversial areas.  We want the treaty to cover the defense of the metropolitan area of 
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the Philippines,” adding later of the non-metropolitan areas “we’ll settle those ourselves.”   
In so doing, Romulo effectively resolved the issues of the Aide Memoire himself by 
negating its contents.70    
 Yet, the progress on the Reed Bank question was undermined by a setback on 
compensation.  When Kissinger asked Enrile if the National Defense Secretary had a 
“shopping list” Enrile responded directly, “our proposal would amount to over a billion 
dollars over five years, about half a billion the first year.” This was the first time a sum 
had been explicitly stated by Philippine officials and it was already twice the highest 
point authorized by Ford.  Aghast, Kissinger replied that the sum:  
Is totally beyond conception, completely out of range of what we can ever agree 
to.  Congress would never agree….There’s no point in bargaining on this. We 
need to arrive at a realistic figure; we’re not in a bazaar.71 
 
Kissinger tried to make progress by asking the Philippine officials to define specific 
defense priorities where the U.S. could be helpful, but the breaking point for negotiations 
had become clear.  While the talks moved on to questions about nuclear weapons and 
ship visits, the question of the quid loomed over everything.  In light of Enrile’s huge 
figure, Kissinger refused to even table the maximum offer of $500 million.  Instead, he 
said he needed to consult with the National Security Council (NSC).72   
 After a flurry of activity in Washington, Kissinger met again with Romulo on 30 
October. This meeting began with Kissinger presenting an Aide Memoire confirming 
American obligations under the MDT to come to the aid of the Philippines in response to 
                                                 





an external attack on its metropolitan territory.  Afterwards, Kissinger played his final 
gambit.  The United States offered the Philippines a financial package totaling $900 
million over five years; $500 million in military assistance and $400 million in economic 
aid.  Kissinger stated that in light of the offer he expected the remaining issues to be 
satisfactorily settled with the Philippines being flexible in dealing with the unresolved 
issues.  
 Yet, when Romulo called on Kissinger again on 23 November he came with a 
dagger rather than an agreement.  Romulo presented Kissinger with a new Aide Memoire 
stating that the Philippine request for compensation was now $2 billion over five years 
split evenly between military and economic aid.  An apoplectic  Kissinger stated that he 
“saw no possibility that we could agree to any such figure…I fear we will just have to 
leave this for the next administration, you know, the Democrats like to spend lots of 
money.  Perhaps they could fashion it as social reform program – slum clearance for 
instance.”73   
 Whereas the 23 November meeting had an air of finality about it, the Kissinger 
round of negotiations enjoyed a brief revival before their ultimate collapse.  Kissinger 
and Romulo met yet again on 30 November in Mexico City where the two reached 
agreement on a $1 billion aid package split evenly between military and economic aid.74  
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Seemingly successful after so much discord, the State Department raced forward to 
arrange a signing ceremony for the amending of the MBA.  However, on the night of 3 
December, Romulo, now in New York, phoned Habib to inform the diplomat that Marcos 
rejected the agreement and insisted that the $1 billion be entirely in military aid.75  After 
consulting with Kissinger, Habib informed Romulo that the change was not acceptable 
and that the matter would have to await consideration by the Carter administration.76  
With the deal cancelled, press reports became filled with mutual recrimination as 
both parties sought to shift blame for the fiasco.  Romulo claimed not to have been 
informed about the 50/50 split and blamed the State Department for trying to pressure 
him into an agreement.   Washington countered that Romulo had been informed of the 
split and officials speculated privately that Romulo had acted without Marcos’ 
authorization in Mexico City77  However, even as blame swirled like a typhoon, 
Robinson advised the American diplomats in Manila that it was best to “let [the] matter 
fade if possible.”  Besides, in a few short weeks it would be Jimmy Carter’s problem.   
The Benefits of Ambivalence: 
 
 Jimmy Carter’s potential occupation of the White House had colored the base 
negotiations well before he took the oath of office.   State Department officials saw in 
Marcos’ foot-dragging and obstinance throughout the fall of 1976 a clear plan to delay 
talks until after the election.  With Carter’s election, Ambassador Sullivan inferred that 
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Marcos lost all interest in signing an accord with Ford, “not because he expected to be 
able to obtain a better deal from the new administration but rather because, in typical 
Filipino personalization of politics, he wished to be sure that the new U.S. administration, 
which will have the task of executing the agreement, feels a sense of responsibility for its 
terms.”78  As such, Sullivan suggested that the $2 billion price tag presented by Romulo 
should not have been considered a serious offer, but the setting of an unrealistically high 
starting position for the start of the Carter round of negotiations.79   Such posturing for 
future negotiations became even clearer throughout December as in a series of speeches 
Marcos reverted to both his initial demand for rent and a hardline position on the question 
of sovereign control of the bases.80 
 For its part, the defining characteristic of the Carter administration’s approach to 
Southeast Asia was a self-awareness of its status as the first truly post-Vietnam 
administration.  Whereas Ford had been preoccupied with containing the fallout from the 
Indochina conflict, this immediacy had faded by the time Carter assumed office.  Instead, 
for the first time in a generation, Carter was free to question what American interests in 
the Southeast Asia actually were.81   This reassessment manifested clearly in Carter’s new 
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prioritizing of human rights in American policy with a general downgrading of Southeast 
Asia’s importance amongst America’s strategic priorities.   
President Carter’s enshrining of human rights as a national priority was a global 
initiative, but carried particular importance in Southeast Asia.  Autocratic regimes in 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines in particular, had long been criticized by 
Congress for their human rights problems, but had been shielded from significant 
consequence owing to their status as Cold War allies.  Carter’s insistence that America 
hold its allies as well as its enemies accountable for their abuses meant that this 
exemption no longer existed.82   
Underlying this increased willingness to censure allied governments in Southeast 
Asia was the region’s diminished importance in Washington.  Early in the 
administration’s tenure, officials like Secretary State Cyrus Vance and Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke sought to assuage fears 
of American desertion.83  Yet, such statements rang increasingly hollow as American 
involvement in the region continued to flag.  Recounted Deputy National Security 
Advisor David Aaron after meeting with ASEAN leaders in Canberra; 
After decades of American over-involvement, our friends in Southeast Asia now 
feel neglected to the point of feeling abandoned.  Many of them were quite blunt 
in saying that U.S. statements of continued interest in Asia of our determination to 
remain a Pacific power simply lacked credibility.  This view was most strongly 
held by the Indonesians and Thais but it was shared by others as well.84 
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The growing sense of American neglect reflected not an abandonment of the region, but 
rather a recalibration of American interests.  With the Vietnam War over and its 
underlying logic discredited, Washington became conscious of its limited interests in 
Southeast Asia and American attention simply waned accordingly.  In Manila, the Carter 
administration’s marriage of human rights and relative indifference proved a volatile 
combination.   
Even before Carter’s inauguration, Marcos had sought to build bridges with the 
new administration.  In November 1976, within weeks of the election, Jack Valenti of the 
Motion Picture Association of America and friend of the Marcos family (especially 
Imelda), sent Carter a letter on behalf of the Philippine leader, defending martial law and 
bolstering Marcos’ credentials as an American ally.85  In December, Imelda Marcos 
travelled to New York reportedly with the goal of meeting then President-elect Carter.86  
Such antics only accelerated after Carter assumed office and a conspicuous silence from 
the White House fed Marcos’ doubts about how the new administration viewed his 
government. 
Ambassador Sullivan characterized American policy towards Southeast Asia in 1977 as 
one of “benign neglect” which, at least in the case of the Philippines, was yielding 
positive results.   In response to Washington’s standoffishness, Sullivan witnessed a 
general muting of typical Philippine criticism of the U.S.  Marcos’ gnawing concern 
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about the White House’s disposition spurred a flurry of activity designed to attract 
American attention including hiring a publicist to improve the Philippines image and 
endowing a chair at Tufts’ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.  According to one 
report, hoping to build a more direct and personal link with the Oval Office, Marcos even 
suggested that the President’s ne’er-do-well brother, Billy Carter be appointed as the next 
U.S. Ambassador to Manila.87    
The first senior level contact between Marcos and the Carter administration 
occurred in mid-April when Assistant Secretary Holbrooke travelled to Manila.  During 
his visit, Holbrooke met with both President Marcos and Imelda during an impromptu 
overnight cruise of Manila Bay aboard the presidential yacht.  Though the discussion was 
wide-ranging, human rights and the bases featured prominently in the discourse.  Marcos 
particularly tried to impress upon Holbrooke the importance of building Philippine self-
reliance in its defensive posture.88  Predictably, Marcos concluded that rent for the bases 
would be the most expedient way of resolving these issues.  For his part, Holbrooke was 
notably more taciturn on the bases than his predecessors.  He recalled that the bases had 
first gained their significance when Washington and Manila had jointly feared a united 
Soviet -China-Vietnam axis which threatened to spread communism throughout Asia.  
Now though, with the Sino-Soviet split and the opening of relations with Beijing, such 
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misconceptions had been dispelled and American need for the bases had been reduced 
accordingly.89   
Whilst Holbrooke was ambivalent on the bases, he was emphatic on stressing the 
importance of human rights with both President and Mrs. Marcos.90  Holbrooke 
emphasized President Carter’s strong personal feelings on the issue and cryptically 
warned that though the U.S. “had not yet singled out any Asian country in the human 
rights context…President Carter’s willingness to remain reticent is limited and that he 
would have to speak out at some point.”91  When Marcos expressed concern about the 
potential lionizing of dissidents like former Senator Benigno Aquino if he were released 
from prison, Holbrooke retorted that if the Marcos government “was truly strong it would 
not be hurt by criticism.”92    
Such sharp statements only fed the Marcoses growing sense of alienation from 
Washington.    At the end of Holbrooke’s visit a dour Sullivan concluded: 
It is clear that Marcos (and especially Imelda) feel out of touch with current 
Washington scene…and they are anxious to establish some contact with its main 
stream.  It is doubtful, however, that in their crass and cynical world, they would 
find any reason to make other than cosmetic concessions on human rights to 
obtain intangibles which they can not yet discern.  The Holbrooke conversation 
was nevertheless a very effective overture to explain to this hardnosed, self-
serving diarchy the fact that the Carter administration is prepared to be generous 
to its allies, but only if there is some harmony in mutual values.  It will be 
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interesting to assess what sort of gimmickry they will summon to cope with this 
fact.93 
 
Between Human Rights and a Hard Place: 
 
 By mid-August, Marcos’ patience had run out.  Frustrated with Washington’s lack 
of engagement Marcos delivered a demarche to the State Department demanding the 
immediate reopening of the base negotiations.94  As coy as the Carter administration 
appeared on the base issue, behind the scenes the administration had moved with 
deliberate resolve.  Within days of his inauguration, Carter and National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski identified the bases as a national security imperative and ordered a 
full review of American policy and negotiation tactics.95  In April, the Presidential 
Review Committee confirmed that Subic Bay remained essential to American defense 
posture and the retention of Clark was highly desirable.  However, the committee advised 
adopting a “wait and see” approach to negotiations.96  When Marcos demanded a 
resumption of negotiations, the administration happily agreed and moved quickly to take 
advantage of the new found momentum.   
 In late September, Holbrooke returned to Manila to begin the process with a series 
of informal talks designed to provide a foundation for future negotiations.  On 
sovereignty, Holbrooke confirmed American recognition of Philippine sovereignty over 
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the bases, but stressed the need to retain American operational control.   The issue of 
compensation was not addressed in detail beyond reiterating that the U.S. would not be 
willing or able to match the $1 billion offered by Kissinger.  Though the general 
atmosphere was friendly, a row irrupted when Holbrooke again raised the human rights 
issues and particularly its ability to complicate Congressional approval of any 
compensation package.97  
 However, the most interesting factor to emerge from the discussions was a greater 
appreciation of Marcos’ motivations and objectives.  Holbrooke related that through the 
talks: 
A recurrent theme was the lack of satisfaction with the existing consultative 
arrangements regarding our defense relationship.  This was included in Marcos’ 
concern about: the perceived vulnerability of the Philippines to attack due to our 
presence…the need for a self-reliant defense poster, and characterization of the 
MDB [Mutual Defense Board] as “useless” in resolving operational issues. 98 
 
This point was reaffirmed in the embassy’s assessment of the talks.   
 
Marcos wants to know what he can expect from us on his security problems, 
internal and external.  He has formulated an equation in which the more credible 
the security assurances the U.S. can offer, the less the military assistance the 
Philippines will require.  Put the other way, the extent to which U.S. security 
arrangements cannot be assured, the more the [government of the Philippines] 
must become self-reliant, i.e. in effect must look to the U.S. to help provide the 
means by which the Philippines can defend itself.99 
 
The genesis of this change was a shift in how Marcos himself approached the question of 
Philippine security.  As events in Indochina had underscored the dangers of relying on 
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Washington, they had also highlighted the inability of the AFP to defend the Philippines 
without American assistance.  Such concerns were only magnified by the fact that the 
two most pressing security concerns for the Philippines, secessionists in Mindanao and 
the Spratly Islands, were areas not covered by American defense guarantees.100  During 
the Kissinger round of negotiations, Marcos had sought to resolve this insecurity 
dilemma by pursuing two parallel tracks.  He sought both to harden American’s security 
commitments under the MDT whilst also building up the Philippine’s own self-reliant 
military capabilities through copious amounts of American military aid.  With the 
renewal of talks under Holbrooke, these two initiatives were no longer independent, but 
joined in a more comprehensive assessment of U.S.-Philippine defense relations.  Rather 
than parallel tracks, the issues of reassurance and compensation functioned as a kind of 
seesaw whereby Marcos’ confidence in Philippine security and his demands for 
compensation were inversely related.  Increased confidence in American defense 
commitments would reduce the demand for a self-reliant Philippine military, and thus 
reduced compensation demand.  However, added uncertainty would cause demands for 
recompense to climb in order to bankroll Philippine defense capabilities.101   
Aware of this relationship and aware of its ability to facilitate agreement on 
remaining base issues, the Carter administration moved deftly to seize Marcos’ initiative 
and enhance confidence in the overall state of the U.S.-Philippine alliance.  Instead of 
treating a strong alliance and Philippine self-reliance as mutually exclusive endeavors the 
                                                 




two goals became self-reinforcing with the emphasis placed on strengthening Philippine 
participation within the defense partnership.102   The primary mechanism for this 
enterprise was the increased use of defense diplomacy between Washington and Manila.  
In the months following the Holbrooke talks a series of collaborative defense initiatives 
were undertaken independent of the base negotiations designed to accentuate military 
cooperation between the two countries and demonstrate American resolve to help 
improve Philippine defense capabilities.   Carter made this point directly to Imelda 
Marcos when the President met the Philippine First Lady on the sidelines of the UN 
General Assembly Meeting in October 1977 and was echoed a few weeks later in a 
personal letter to Marcos delivered by Ambassador David Newsome when he presented 
his credentials as the new U.S. ambassador in Manila.103   As evidence of American 
commitment to enhancing Philippine defense cooperation, Carter informed Marcos of his 
personal interest in developing new mechanism to facilitate cooperation between their 
respective militaries.  Newsome also informed Marcos of American willingness to 
expedite the delivery of certain military equipment as Manila had requested.   
The United States subsequently took significant steps to use defense diplomacy to 
strengthen the bilateral relationship. For example, Marcos had repeatedly criticized 
existing mechanisms for defense cooperation and particularly attacked the Mutual 
Defense Board responsible for coordinating U.S.-Philippine defenses as being 
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“useless.”104  In response, the U.S. instituted a regular series of Joint Defense 
Consultations where senior figures from the defense establishments of both countries 
would meet to discuss bilateral security issues as well as operational initiatives.  
Underscoring these new defense meetings was a desire to keep senior Philippine leaders 
informed about important defense issues and improve the functionality of the U.S.-
Philippine alliance.105  Importantly, this initiative also included American security 
briefings for Marcos in order to keep him apprised of defense affairs.106  In light of the 
Philippine military’s material woes, the Pentagon dispatched an assessment team in 
January 1978 to conducted a detailed study of the AFP’s needs and identify the areas 
where American assistance would be the most useful.  The goal being that whatever 
security assistance the U.S. provided as part of its compensation package would not 
merely be valued in dollars, but also its ability to enhance Philippine defense capabilities 
and strength the alliance.107 The result of this new approach was rapid progress in the 
base negotiations as the impetus shifted from political posturing to increased 
functionality.   
This progress, however, remained captive to the unanswered question of 
compensation and the simmering discord over human rights.  Both factors exploded in 
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March 1978 when the United States submitted to Marcos its initial compensation offer.  
After reviewing the findings of the Department of Defense’s equipment team, the 
Presidential Review Committee had determined that Ambassador Newsome should make 
an offer of a five year package totally between $380 and $450 million composed of $150 
million in security support assistance (SSA), $30-50 million from the Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) and $200-$250 in FMS Credits.108  The issue of economic assistance 
was to be separated from the base discussions and handled independently. More 
importantly, Washington instructed Newsome that the package “should be presented not 
as a binding commitment but as an indication of compensation the administration will 
make every effort to obtain from Congress.”109  During the presentation, Newsome was 
also to stress that improving the human rights situation and curtailing of martial law 
would be essential to winning Congressional support for the assistance package. 
When Newsome presented the package to Marcos, Romulo and Enrile on 16 
March the Philippine officials reacted poorly to both the paltry sum and absence of a firm 
multi-year commitment. Romulo in particular derided the absence of a multi-year 
commitment as being “no commitment at all,” and bemoaned that the package was 
entirely subject to the whims of Congress.  Newsome tried to refute these claims noting 
both the impossibility of a true multi-year package owing to the American system of 
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annual appropriations and that in raw numbers the offer of military assistance was similar 
in size to that made by Kissinger.  Romulo retorted that the offer was different, that “you 
have put conditions on it with all this business about human rights.”110   Within a week, 
the Philippine government responded with a hardline Aide Memoire which both labelled 
the compensation offer as unacceptable and adopted a series of more stringent positions 
on unresolved sovereignty issues.  During the presentation of the Aide Memoire, Marcos 
joined his subordinates in criticizing the size of the compensation package and especially 
the lack of a multi-year guarantee.  Marcos noted that agreeing to the package would be 
“political suicide” since the base agreement was a binding, multi-year commitment on his 
part while Congress could simply refuse to appropriate funds for compensation.111 
 Matters only got worse in the weeks ahead as discord over human rights 
consumed the bilateral relationship.  In April 1978, partially after prodding from the U.S., 
the Philippines held a general election for an interim parliament.  Rather than salving 
American discomfort with Martial Law, the elections only became a new flashpoint 
within the relationship.  During the campaign, Marcos and especially Imelda, embraced 
anti-American rhetoric.  They assailed the U.S. for allegedly backing the opposition and 
attempting to interfere in Philippine domestic politics.112  For its part the U.S. was 
unreserved in expressing its concern about widespread voter fraud which occurred during 
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the election and the repression of the opposition which followed the poll.113   American 
disquiet became so severe that Vice President Walter Mondale weighed cancelling a 
planned trip to Manila in May but relented only after receiving assurances that he would 
be allowed to meet with opposition figures.114 
Mondale’s visit from May 2-4 served to encapsulate the duality of U.S.- 
Philippine affairs.  Whereas Mondale’s insistence on meeting with opposition figures like 
Cardinal Sin and announcing American concerns about human rights irritated his hosts, 
the ability to directly discuss ongoing issues had an overall positive effect of relieving 
tensions.115  Importantly, the visit served as a catalyst for the still stalled base 
negotiations.   
Mondale and Marcos agreed to circumvent political disagreements over the base 
negotiations by shifting the talks to a military-to-military dialog.  Here again, defense 
diplomacy showed its value as the existing relationships between AFP and U.S. military 
figures and a shared understanding of the bases as operationally vital military facilities 
rather than political pawns provided the basis for resolving many troubling issues over 
sovereignty.116  From the onset of negotiations the overall framework for addressing the 
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sovereignty issue had been clear, but resolving the particularities had proven difficult.  
The United States had accepted Philippine sovereignty over the bases and the vast 
majority of the base areas as well as facilities would be transferred to Philippine control 
and overseen by a Philippine base commander who had overall control of the 
installations.  However, the United States would retain control of key facilities deemed 
important to its operations at the bases and American facilities, equipment and personnel 
would remain under the jurisdiction of an American base commander.   The result of this 
formula was that the Philippines gained control over most of the bases, but the U.S. 
retained its operational independence and ownership of critical facilities.117  While that 
framework had remained largely unchanged, the actual process of determining which 
buildings belonged to whom and how base functions were to be divided required arduous 
negotiations.  It is here that the military-to-military dialogue proved most effective.  
Removed from the political arena, talks headed by AFP Chief of Staff Romeo Espino 
moved rapidly to resolve outstanding issues about the bases and by the end of summer 
had settled virtually every issue except the politically sensitive matters of criminal 
jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen and the ever present thorn of compensation.118 
And Congress Makes Three: 
 
 As the military-to-military talks resolved many of the sovereignty issues, their 
rapid progress on substantive issues underscored the philosophical questions which 
                                                 
State, No. 13485, “Base Discussions Next Steps After Military-to Military Talks,” 4 August 1978: CFPF, 
NARA: accessed via AAD. 
117 Berry, US Bases. 
118 Telegram from Ambassador Richard Murphy (Manila) to State, No. 13485, “Base Discussions Next 




continued to linger. The practical questions of sovereignty and indeed even compensation 
were not themselves the driving force behind the negotiations but rather the strategic 
uncertainty in Manila.  Initially sparked by America’s inaction in Indochina during 1975, 
both Ford and Carter had sought to reassure Marcos of America’s continued commitment 
to both the region and the U.S.-Philippine Alliance.  Efforts to enhance the partnership 
through defense diplomacy and expand Philippine participation in security affairs had 
helped to achieve this end by bolstering the functionality of the alliance.  However, 
Marcos’ misgivings about America’s commitment to the Philippines had never been 
about practical concerns but rather doubts about Washington’s political wherewithal. 
Throughout talks with both American administrations, negotiations had been haunted by 
the spectral threat of Congressional obstinance and its ability to scuttle any commitment 
made by the White House regardless of its occupant.   
 At the start of talks, Marcos’ anxieties about Congress’s effect on American 
foreign policy had manifested in his fears about the MDT and how the United States 
would respond to an attack on the Philippines.  These concerns had not subsided with 
Carter’s ascension but rather morphed with the introduction of human rights as a point of 
contention between the two governments.  Specifically, Marcos could not help but 
question whether Congressional antipathy for his regime would make any compensation 
offer from Carter meaningless since Congress could simply reject the appropriation.  
Such concerns were far from baseless as already a congressional spat in 1977 had 
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threatened to gut the security assistance package for the Philippines in 1978.119  Thus the 
combination of Congressional badgering on human rights and Carter’s inability to offer a 
multi-year compensation package simply added more kindling to Marcos’ misgivings 
about Washington.   
Regrettably, when it came to congressional affairs, the Marcos regime was often 
its own worst enemy.  In July 1978, Imelda Marcos travelled to Washington as part of a 
U.S.-ASEAN dialog.  While in Washington, Imelda took it upon herself to personally 
resolve the problem of congressional disapproval by independently arranging a meeting 
with a group of Congressmen.   Imelda purposefully selected a hostile group of 
Congressmen who were known Marcos- critics, many of whom had signed a letter 
protesting the treatment of Philippine opposition leaders.  The meeting on 26 July 1978 
was a disaster.  Reportedly the Congressmen gave the Philippine First Lady a very rough 
time.  According to one report, she was in tears at one point during the meeting.  Imelda 
later told Holbrooke that the meeting had been “the most difficult meeting that she had 
ever had,” and even Holbrooke noted that “she seemed shaken in a way which I do not 
think will ultimately prove to be productive.” 120 
 The fallout from Imelda’s foray into congressional affairs was swift and 
devastating.  Marcos had had no foreknowledge of Imelda’s plans to meet with his 
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congressional critics, but still resented how rudely she had been treated.121  Imelda stated 
that “her visit served to confirm her growing feeling that US-Philippine relations were at 
their all-time low,” and her conviction that “the administration [was] not in control of 
[the government] and particularly of congress.”122  Rather than reinforcing the severity 
with which Congress took the issue of human rights in the Philippines, the disastrous 
encounter only compounded Marcos’ belief of undue congressional prejudice against his 
government and justified his incredulity about any compensation package Carter offered. 
In the weeks that followed, the deliberate progress of base negotiations began to 
founder.  On 16 August, the day after Imelda’s return to Manila, Marcos ordered Chief of 
Staff Espino to suspend military-to-military talks indefinitely.123   Two days later the 
influential Kabataang Barangay youth organization headed by Imee Marcos, Ferdinand 
and Imelda’s eldest daughter, issued a letter condemning the American bases and 
demanding their removal.124  Although Marcos privately continued to voice support for 
the base agreement, his public comments became increasingly critical of the U.S. and the 
relationship.125    In a long report in October, the Embassy concluded that differences 
between the U.S. and the Philippines “appear to be at their highest level since the fall of 
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Vietnam” and that “Marcos’ frustrations with the US derive from what he perceives as 
inadequacies in US support both materially and psychologically.”126   
Marcos’ grievances with Washington colored the base negotiations throughout the 
fall of 1978 as talks threatened to collapse amid a wave of acrimony.127   However, as 
Imelda’s failed attempt to woo critics on Capitol Hill had triggered the breakdown, it fell 
to one of the Philippines’ closest friends in Congress to rescue the agreement.  Senator 
Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii had a long history with the Philippines having travelled to 
the country on numerous occasions.  In Congress, he had emerged as one of the Pacific 
nation’s most ardent friends and had fought numerous legislative battles on its behalf 
including a crusade to provide benefits to Filipino veterans who had served with the U.S. 
forces during World War II.   Inouye had a personal relationship with Marcos and was 
considered a friend.  On 21 October, Inouye informed the State Department that he 
planned to travel to the Philippines to discuss the base issue with Marcos.  Inouye hoped 
to communicate several messages to Marcos about Congressional sentiment on 
compensation and that “Filipinos should realize that the Philippines ‘were not Israel.’”128 
Inouye’s visit lasted five days and was judged “highly successful.”  The Embassy 
reported that “Inouye’s visit reminded the Filipinos that they have friends in 
Washington,” and that “Inouye was able to interpret U.S. positions on base 
                                                 
126 Telegram from Murphy (Manila) to State, No. 18793, “Reflections on Marcos, Imelda and US-RP 
Relations,” 21 October 1978: CFPF, NARA: accessed via AAD. 
127 Telegram from Vance (State) to Manila, No. 253272, “Holbrooke-Romulo Meeting,” 5 October 1978: 
CFPF, NARA: accessed via AAD.   
128 Inouye had recently met with Romulo who likely made the initial suggestion that Inouye visit Manila. 
21 October  1978: State to Manila, no 259598 




negotiations…forthrightly, in a way that Filipino audiences not only understood but also 
found palatable.”129   In particular, Inouye was able to communicate to Marcos that a 
compensation package similar to the $1 billion offer made by Kissinger was unrealistic 
and that a multi-year commitment was simply impossible.  The visit also provided 
Marcos with a chance to vent his frustrations with the United States, especially the 
hectoring about human rights.  Upon request, Marcos wrote Carter a letter about these 
perceived irritants in the U.S.-Philippine relationship which Inouye personally delivered 
to the President.130   Yet, the most significant benefit from Inouye’s visit was in 
identifying a way out of the compensation conundrum.  Although Carter could not offer a 
multi-year agreement, Inouye suggested a public letter from Carter stating his personal 
intention to make the best effort to fulfill the terms of the five-year package.  Marcos said 
that a public letter of this kind would be acceptable.131  Upon returning to Washington, 
Inouye met with both senior officials at the State Department and President Carter to 
communicate this message.  On 27 November, the White House sent a personal letter 
from Carter to Marcos reading,  
If we can agree on all elements of an amendment to the Military Base Agreement, 
I am prepared to send a letter to you stating that my administration will use its 
best efforts each year to secure the appropriations from Congress needed to fund 
the compensation package if you agree that it would be useful, we would make 
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the text of this letter part of our public presentation to Congress on the 
Amendment. 132  
 
Marcos responded well to the letter.  He accepted the terms and stated his desire to 
complete negotiations before the end of the year.133   
Never one to make things easy, Marcos submitted two additional requests in 
December as negotiations ended.  At the last minute, Marcos requested an additional $50 
million in aid in order to enlarge the size of the compensation package so that it didn’t 
suffer so much in comparison to the 1976 offer.  When the State Department balked at 
this demand, Marcos placed a 2am phone call to Inouye asking for the additional $50 
million in assistance which eventually was granted.134   
Yet the second and far more telling act occurred on 20 December when Marcos 
submitted five questions to the U.S. government about the MDT which he wanted 
answered prior to any final agreement.  They were: 
 
1: What is the definition of aggression? 
 
2: What is the definition of the Metropolitan Area? 
 
3: What is the definition of Constitutional process?  
 
4:  What is the Relationship between the MBA and the MDT 
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5: Would termination of one affect the other?135 
 
As pointed as each question appears, they collectively reflected the same uncertainty 
about American security commitments to the Philippines which had colored Marcos’ 
actions since April 1975.  Throughout the ups and downs of negotiations, the underlying 
fear of abandonment had remained constant and Marcos still wanted assurances of how 
the United States interpreted its obligations under the MDT.   When the State Department 
referenced Kissinger’s Aide Memoire from October 1976, Marcos responded that he did 
not consider that position to be official and requested a formal issuance of America’s 
commitment to abide by its pledge to defend the Philippines.136 Again, Washington 
agreed to a formal exchange of diplomatic letters detailing America’s interpretation and 
obligations under the MDT. 
 On New Year’s Eve 1978 it was announced that a final agreement on amending 
the MBA had been reached.  President Carter sent Marcos a public letter on 4 January 
1979 stating his administration’s intentions over the coming five-years to “make its best 
effort to obtain appropriation for the Philippines” a security package of $500 million.137  
Two days later, Secretary Vance sent Secretary Romulo a formal diplomatic note 
regarding America’s interpretation of the Mutual Defense Treaty.  The letter explicitly 
answered Marcos’ Five Questions and reaffirmed America’s obligation to defend the 
Philippines from external aggression.138  With the MDT issue resolved, Secretary 
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Romulo and Ambassador Murphy exchanged notes formally amending the 1947 Military 
Base Agreement.  In the end, while U.S. forces remained, Philippine sovereignty over the 
bases was jointly recognized and approximately 90% of the base areas were transferred to 
Philippine control.139    
Conclusion: 
 
In the fall of 1976, as negotiations foundered, Kissinger repeatedly scoffed at 
Marcos’ prospect of securing a better deal from a Carter administration.  That the deal 
signed in 1979 paled in comparison to Kissinger’s $1 billion offer seemingly justified his 
scorn.  Yet Kissinger’s derision in 1976 accentuated how badly he had misread the 
situation.  While several of Marcos’ actions suggest a strong financial motive, the totality 
of his behavior during the base negotiations cannot be explained by avarice alone.  Rather 
in the aftermath of Indochina’s collapse, a profound sense of uncertainty motivated 
Marcos rather than greed. 
 As much as Marcos bristled at being overlooked in President Ford’s speech, what 
echoed most from that evening was not Ford’s omission, but the deafening silence of 
Congress in response to the President’s pleas for emergency assistance.  Congress’s 
disregard of a President’s wishes was sufficient to rattle even the most stalwart advocates 
of American leadership and it was the manner with which Congress ignored its 
commitments to South Vietnam which most unnerved Marcos. 
 What Kissinger failed to appreciate was that though Marcos would be unable to 
obtain a larger deal from Carter, a President Carter could offer something of even greater 
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value – the commitment of a Democratic President.  Despite the incessant jockeying over 
the quid for the bases, of greater importance than the size of the package was assurances 
that the United States would uphold its MDT obligations and that Congress would 
actually appropriate the aid promised by the President.  The sum offered by Ford may 
have been larger, but his ability to get a hostile Congress to actually fulfill that 
commitment was dubious. Indeed, it was precisely this concern over Congress that made 
Jimmy Carter’s insertion of human rights into the base negotiations so damaging.  Not 
only did Marcos regard such lecturing as insulting, but it implicitly created an out for 
Congress to renege on any compensation offer.  It was only the direct intercession of a 
trusted intermediary like Senator Inouye and a public pledge that Carter was able to 
overcome this fear of Washingtonian duplicity.    
 However, it is a mistake to think of Marcos’ misgivings only in terms of 
Congressional appropriations.  Rather, the entire issue of compensation was itself the 
manifestation of a far deeper concern about Philippine security.  In 1976, Kissinger 
dismissed Marcos’ demand for a clear statement of American obligations under the 
MDT, especially as they pertained to the South China Sea as a negotiating tactic designed 
to stall talks until after the presidential election.  Yet, Marcos’ five questions to Vance 
about the MDT at the close of 1978 demonstrated how genuinely those fears about the 
MDT were felt.  Marcos’ insistence that the questions not only be answered clearly, but 
included in a formal correspondence between Vance and Romulo reflected the lingering 
uncertainty about America’s reliability and a desire for a more binding understanding of 
the MDT.    
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Though the Vance-Romulo letter in 1979 addressed the questions about the MDT, 
it did not remedy the fact that American defense commitments to the Philippines no 
longer aligned with the country’s most pressing security concerns.  Specifically, while the 
MDT offered a firm commitment in the event of an external attack, in the 1970s the 
greatest challenges to Philippine security were in the Spratly Islands and Mindanao where 
the MDT either did not apply or was of uncertain value.  As such, Marcos’ desire for the 
Philippines to cultivate a self-reliant military capability and provide for its own security 
also remained a constant theme throughout each stage of the base negotiations.  Indeed, 
as the negotiations raced to conclusion in November 1978, Marcos informed an 
American researcher that one of his goals in establishing Philippine sovereignty over the 
bases was to open Clark and Subic Bay to the Philippine military so that they could be 
trained by the Americans.140  Indeed, the Carter round of negotiations succeeded 
principally because it took such desires seriously and worked to accommodate them 
within the framework of the U.S.-Philippine alliance.   Increased military-to-military 
cooperation, military assistance, defense diplomacy and senior level engagement did 
more than advance the functionality of the alliance, but helped shift the security 
relationship towards a true partnership.  During negotiations, military-to-military talks 
proved vital for resolving questions over how Philippine sovereignty over the bases was 
going to be implemented and propelled talks forward when they became ensnared with 
political jockeying.  Furthermore, Carter’s commitment to expanding meaningful 
                                                 
140 Telegram from Murphy (Manila) to State, No. 20142, “CSIS Study on Bases-Visit of Dr. Samuels,” 13 
November 1978: CFPF, NARA: accessed via AAD.   
189 
 
cooperation between U.S. and Philippine militaries helped transform the alliance from an 
artifact of Cold War containment to a substantive partnership which benefited both 
countries.  This approach both aided the successful resolution to the base negotiations and 
shaped the defense relationship in the years that followed. Prior to the amending of the 
base agreement, unfettered American control of the bases had allowed U.S. forces in the 
Philippines to exist as a world apart.  They operated independently of Philippine 
authorities and undertook only token cooperation with the AFP.  Yet, with the 
establishment of Philippine sovereignty over the bases such segregation became an 
impossibility.  Instead, direct contact between armed forces became unavoidable and 
cooperative endeavors like joint military exercises emerged as the hallmarks of the U.S.-
Philippine alliance.  Ultimately, it was this embedding of military cooperation at the heart 
of the alliance where the 1970s base negotiations gained their lasting significance.   
Marcos’ initial demand to renegotiate the base agreement in 1975 epitomize 
America’s faltering defense posture after the Vietnam War and the anxieties it 
engendered.  However, the negotiations themselves succeeded in producing a new 
collaborative approach to the U.S.-Philippine defense affairs which assuaged Manila’s 
doubts and placed the alliance on firmer footing.  Even after Clark and Subic Bay were 
shuttered in 1993, defense diplomacy activities like the Balikatan exercises initiated as a 
result of the 1979 agreement endured and continue to underpin the bilateral relationship.  
Thus instead of heralding the end of the U.S.-Philippine alliance, Marcos’ demand 
ultimately, and perhaps unwittingly, succeeded in identifying a formula which would 
allow the alliance to endure for decades to come and even outlast the bases themselves.    
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American involvement in Vietnam cannot be considered independent of 
Washington’s regional allies.  Indeed, it was Washington’s fear of the communist 
contagion spreading from Indochina to its partners which first drove American 
involvement in Vietnam.  However, the war’s unsuccessful conclusion yielded only a 
region racked by conflict and associations strained by long years of fighting.  Far from 
defending America’s partners, the Vietnam War had instead jeopardized the very 
alliances which it had been intended to protect.   
No connection encapsulated the trying nature of the Vietnam conflict on 
America’s alliances more than its relationship with Australia.   During the early days of 
the conflict, Australia had been a stalwart backer of the American mission.  In 1966, 
Prime Minister Harold Holt had declared his willingness “to go all the way with LBJ,” 
and deployed thousands of Australian soldiers to Vietnam.1  However, as the conflict 
spiraled the relationship between Washington and Canberra soured.  In 1972, riding a tide 
of anti-Vietnam sentiment, Gough Whitlam led the Labor party to its first electoral 
victory in over two decades. An ardent opponent of the Vietnam War, Whitlam 
condemned American conduct in Indochina and emerged as one of President Richard 
Nixon’s most prominent critics. Whitlam’s truculence so enraged President Nixon and 
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the two even considered abandoning the 
Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS).  
Yet, while scholars have examined both Australia’s initial support for the 
Vietnam War as well as the rancor of the Whitlam period, the rebuilding the U.S.-
Australian alliance after the war’s end remains overlooked.  Far from being a mere coda 
to the Vietnam era, the events of the mid-to-late 1970s exposed the lasting impact of the 
conflict on the alliance.  The rift between Washington and Canberra did not dissipate 
with Nixon and Whitlam’s respective exits from office.  Rather, through the missteps of 
the Vietnam conflict, Australia had learned that simply following America’s lead was no 
longer an acceptable approach to world affairs.  Although Whitlam’s successor Malcom 
Fraser was friendly to the United States, this partiality did not negate the lessons gleaned 
during America’s long involvement in Indochina.  As National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft surmised, Fraser had “no intention of returning Australia to the client-patron 
relationship” of earlier Australian governments.2  
To preserve the U.S.-Australian alliance as a pillar of American defense policy in 
the South Pacific, Washington needed to adapt its own policies to account for this new 
independence in Australian foreign relations.  This chapter explores how this process 
unfolded from the Fall of Saigon in 1975 until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 
1979.   In response to the signals from Canberra, Washington embraced a policy of 
constructive engagement which married an increased responsiveness to Australian 
                                                 
2  James Curran. “The Dilemmas of Divergence: The Crisis in American-Australian Relations, 1972–




concerns with a more inclusive approach to defense relations.  Frequent consultations and 
practices like defense diplomacy helped restore the alliance’s health and allowed it to 
successfully counter new threats like the burgeoning Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean.   Ultimately, more than just helping overcome the divisiveness of the Vietnam 
War, the revitalization of the U.S.-Australian alliance in the late 1970s established a new 
basis for the relationship which has continued to endure. 
The Long Goodbye: 
 
Studies of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War and that conflict’s 
deleterious effect on its alliance with the United States can be divided into two distinct 
categories.  The first category concerns Australia’s early support for the war effort and 
the experience of Australian forces sent to South Vietnam.  At the onset of the Cold War, 
Australia emerged as a staunch American ally and a bulwark of Western strategy in the 
Indo-Pacific region.3  A partnership that was codified in the 1951 Australia, New 
Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS).  Canberra also became an original 
member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954.   Conceived by 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, SEATO was a multilateral alliance committed to 
containing the spread of Communism in Asia.4  American efforts in South Vietnam were 
                                                 
3 David McLean. “From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the cold 
war.” Australian Journal of Politics & History 52(1) (2006): 64-79; David McLean. “America and 
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4 Leszek Buszynski.  “SEATO: Why it survived until 1977 and why it was Abolished.” Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 12(2) (1981): 287-296; Buszynski, Leszek. SEATO, the Failure of an Alliance 
Strategy. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983); Victor D. Cha. “Complex patchworks: US 
alliances as part of Asia's regional architecture.” Asia Policy, 11(1) (2011): 27-50; Henry Brands Jr. “From 
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emblematic of this containment strategy and Washington’s involvement in Indochina 
rapidly came to dominate all of America’s relations in Asia, including its ties with 
Australia.   In 1964, hoping to burnish the legitimacy of the anti-Communist fight in 
Vietnam, Johnson actively recruited military contributions from allied countries under the 
“Many Flags” initiative.  Johnson’s goal was to convert the American war effort in 
Vietnam into an international coalition.5  Australia featured prominently in this enterprise 
as one of President Johnson’s most enthusiastic supports.   Prime Minister Harold Holt 
backed the American plan and dispatched several thousand soldiers to Vietnam.6   
 Whereas the first body of literature details how Australia’s close relationship with 
America culminated in its entry into the Vietnam War, the second set details the 
damaging effects of that conflict.  As the conflict in Vietnam became a quagmire, popular 
opinion in Australian shifted decisively against the conflict.7  This opposition culminated 
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7 Paul Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2007); Peter Edwards, A Nation at 
War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy During the Vietnam War 1965-1975, (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1997); Frank Frost, Australia’s War in Vietnam, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
194 
 
in the 1972 election when the Australian Labor Party (ALP) won a majority of seats in 
House of Representatives and Gough Whitlam became Prime Minister.  Whitlam had 
long opposed the Vietnam War and moved deftly to end Australian involvement in the 
conflict. Beyond withdrawing Australian forces from Vietnam, Whitlam and his 
government emerged as some of the fiercest critics of American conduct in Vietnam.8  As 
aptly detailed by James Curran, Whitlam’s condemnation of American actions in 
Vietnam struck a nerve in Washington and heralded a wave of mutual acrimony with the 
Nixon administration.9  On a host of controversial issues, including relations with 
communist countries and the future of American military installations in Australia, 
Whitlam broke with Canberra’s historic deference to Washington and instead charted a 
more independent and assertive course for Australian foreign policy.10   In response to 
Whitlam’s rebelliousness, the Nixon administration actively sought retribution against his 
government and even considered abandoning the ANZUS treaty.11 
Yet, while both Australia’s initial support for the Vietnam conflict as well as the 
discord of the Whitlam period have been studied in detail, the evolution of the U.S.-
Australian relationship in the aftermath of the Vietnam War remains largely unexamined.  
Whereas the war itself constituted a major irritant in the relationship, neither the 
                                                 
8 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 1972-1975. (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); Gough 
Whitlam, Whitlam, Gough. The Truth of the Matter. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2005); 
Edwards, Nation at War; Freudenberg, Graham, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whitlam's Life in Politics, 
(Syndey: Penguin, 2009); Rick Kuhn, “The Australian Left, Nationalism and the Vietnam war." Labour 
History 72 (1997): 163-184;  
9 Curran, “Divergence”; James Curran. Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War. (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Publishing, 2015). 
10 Ibid; Halvorson, Dan. “From Cold War Solidarity to Transactional Engagement.” Journal of Cold War 
Studies 18(2) (2016): 130-159. 
11 Curran, “Divergence”; Curran. Unholy Fury. . 
195 
 
withdrawal of American forces in 1973 nor President Nixon’s ignominious exit from 
office resolved the underlying issues exposed by the conflict.  Instead, as Washington 
struggled to reaffirm America’s role in Asia after its withdrawal from Indochina, it 
confronted in Australia the lasting damage wrought by the conflict on America’s 
alliances. The ending of the Vietnam War did not trigger a return to Canberra’s past 
reverence for Washington, but a reiteration of the autonomous approach pioneered by 
Whitlam.  For the United States, the challenge resided in finding a means of 
accommodating this new Australian independence within the framework of the U.S.-
Australian alliance instead of attempting to undermine it as Nixon had tried.  
Though much of the bitterness of Whitlam’s early tenure endured, signs of 
moderation eased his relations with the Ford administration.  Whitlam remained 
committed to his independent foreign policy, but recognized the importance of preserving 
Australia’s security ties with the United States.12  This shift was most evident in 
Whitlam’s treatment of American defense installations inside Australia.  Though not 
traditional bases, the United States maintained critical intelligence facilities in Australia 
including the satellite uplink station at Pine Gap and a naval communication station on 
the North West Cape.  Whitlam had previously denounced the secretive American 
                                                 
12 Telegram from Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) William Harrop to State, No. 1839, “South Pacific 
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installations, but as Prime Minister, had come to appreciate the vital nature of the work 
done at these facilities.13  From a former opponent, Whitlam emerged as a defender of the 
installations including from critics within his own party.  As a result of this moderation, 
when Whitlam visited Ford in October 1974, the mood was cordial and focused on issues 
of mutual concern rather than lingering disagreements.14   
Still, the absence of open discord did not equate to a renewed harmony in U.S.-
Australian affairs.  As noted by Kissinger, “Whitlam does not belittle Australia’s alliance 
with the U.S., but wants to carve out a more distinctive foreign policy.”15  Even as Ford 
and Whitlam reaffirmed the importance of good relations between their countries, 
problems were still apparent.  In particular, Whitlam voiced his displeasure with 
increasing U.S. and Soviet military activities in the Indian Ocean and particularly the 
expansion of the American facility at Diego Garcia.  For his part, Ford questions 
Australia’s continued opposition to port visits by American Nuclear Powered Warships 
(NPWs). 16 Far from being fleeting concerns, these and other disagreements underscored 
that the ending of the Vietnam War had not removed all sources of friction from the 
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relationship.  For example, though Whitlam had become a defender of existing American 
installations in Australia, he actively opposed plans to build a new radio transmission 
station as part of the Omega radio navigation system.17  Likewise, Whitlam’s government 
continued to question Washington’s handling of the recently unified Vietnam and 
American efforts to diplomatically isolate the Hanoi government and of denying it 
admission to the United Nation (UN).18  
 The two most prominent sources of tension concerned the ongoing dilemma over 
NPWs and the future of SEATO.  In 1971, the Australian government requested that 
visits by NPWs be halted until and understanding could be reached on matters of nuclear 
safety, liability and environmental concerns.19  This delay posed a particular problem for 
the United Sates since nearly a third of the navy at the time (including virtually the entire 
submarine fleet) was nuclear powered.  By spring 1975, the United States believed that it 
had satisfactorily addressed these issues and so sought a resumption of NPW visits.20  
However, when pressed on this matter, Whitlam stated his refusal to permit visits by any 
foreign warship unless Australia first received assurances that the vessel did not carry 
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nuclear weapons.21  Besides Whitlam’s conflating the questions of nuclear weapons with 
nuclear power, as a matter of policy the United States Navy refused to either confirm or 
deny the presence of nuclear weapons onboard any ship.  As a result, Whitlam’s dictate 
effectively banned all U.S. naval vessels.  Marshall Green, the U.S. Ambassador in 
Canberra, informed his Australian colleagues that he “found this appalling” and that 
“surely [Whitlam]] could grasp the far-reaching implications of his position which was 
contrary to that of [Australian government] officials and ….rather suicidal.”22  Though 
Whitlam reversed this stance in time for an American naval task force to participate in 
the annual Corral Sea celebration in May, the ban on NPWs remained in place.23  
Whitlam’s handling of the NPW issue was a source of frustration in Washington, 
but his treatment of SEATO threatened to unravel what little remained of America’s 
defense architecture remained in Southeast Asia.  The fall of South Vietnam had exposed 
SEATO as an anachronistic holdover from the Eisenhower era that had outlasted its 
usefulness.  Except for Thailand, all five of the remaining non-American members of 
SEATO had separate mutual defense treaties with the United Sates which afforded them 
far more substantive protection.24   Whereas SEATO seemingly offered few benefits in 
1975, members like Australia and the Philippines increasingly saw clear costs in 
maintaining the alliance with the anti-communist pact representing a diplomatic albatross 
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22 Ibid. 
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which handicapped their efforts to establish normal relations with communist countries 
like China and Vietnam.25  On 18 July 1975, Australia informed the United States of its 
intention to pursue the dissolution of SEATO.26   Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Philipp Habib responded “that his immediate reaction was 
negative to the abandoning of SEATO,” and that “there had been enough shock in the 
area for the moment and we should not take disturbing initiatives.”27  Washington was 
not blind to SEATO’s deficiencies, but had hoped to let the organization slowly fade in 
order to avoid suffering another dramatic setback in Asia..  American concern principally 
centered on Thailand who was not only the SEATO member most directly threatened by 
events in Indochina, but also was the only member without additional security ties to the 
United States.28  While Washington could accept the dissolution of the SEATO 
organization, it hoped to preserve the underlying Manila Pact as a diplomatic agreement 
and constituted the only defense treaty between Thailand and the United States.29   
Whitlam accepted the preservation of the Manila Pact, but remained adamant about the 
immediate elimination of the SEATO organization and activities.30  In late September 
1975, SEATO’s Permanent Working Group adopted the American position of both 
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preserving the Manila Pact and implementing gradually phase out of the organization.31  
Displeased by this decision, Whitlam responded by unilaterally and immediately ceasing 
all Australian participation in SEATO.32     
When Australian diplomats had first begun to push for the immediate dissolution 
of SEATO, American officials speculated that the maneuver was a ploy by Whitlam to 
distract from his growing domestic problems.33  By the time Whitlam ended Australian 
involvement in the organization four months later, those domestic political woes had 
become all-consuming.   Beset by economic difficulties and scandals, Whitlam’s political 
standing became perilous in October 1975 when the opposition controlled Senate refused 
to vote on an appropriations bill unless Whitlam agreed to hold elections.34  This dictate 
from the Senate threw the country into chaos with both Whitlam and the Senate refusing 
to budge amid a constitutional standoff.  The situation was brought to a controversial end 
on 11 November 1975 when the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, dismissed Whitlam 
from office and dissolved both houses of parliament.  Kerr then invited the opposition 
leader Malcom Fraser to form a caretaker government until elections could be held in 
mid-December.35   
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Whitlam’s dismissal remains one of the most controversial chapters in Australian 
politics and accusations of American involvement in his ousting have continued to swirl 
around the events of November 1975.  Both during and after the crisis, Washington 
emphatically denied allegations or having any hand in Whitlam’s removal.36  Regardless 
of the controversial manner in which Whitlam lost his position, the United States would 
not miss the quarrelsome Prime Minister.  Yet, just as the ending of the Vietnam War did 
not restore U.S.-Australian relations to their previously placid state, so too would 
Whitlam’s removal fail to curb Canberra’s new assertiveness  in its foreign relations.   
Building a Better Alliance: 
 
The Liberal Party’s landslide victory in the December election and Malcom 
Fraser’s ascent to Prime Minister was a welcome change for the United States.  The 
American embassy described Fraser as “a deeply conservative man who values 
Australia’s defense relationship with the United States,” and whose “attitude towards 
U.S, defense facilities in Australia and other politico-military issues will be more 
forthcoming than Whitlam’s.”37  Ford even personally informed his new Ambassador to 
Canberra, James Hargrove, that he was “going to a government we approve of more than 
when Whitlam was there,” adding that “Fraser has already taken some steps in our 
favor,” and “you can tell him we support him with enthusiasm.”38   
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Within days of becoming Prime Minister, Fraser asserted his desire to improve 
relations with Washington and made several pro-American decisions.39  For example, 
Fraser quickly authorized the building of the delayed Omega station.40 Critically, Fraser 
also stated his intention to allow NPWs to again use Australian ports and made this a 
priority for his administration.41  Fraser helped navigate the remaining bureaucratic issues 
and on 4 June 1976 announced that NPWs could again visit Australian ports.   On 15 
August 1976, the USS Snook, a nuclear powered submarine, visited Cockburn Sound 
becoming the first U.S. NPW to visit Australia in nearly five years.42   
However, though Fraser was certainly more supportive of the United States, he 
did not return Australia to its previously subordinate status within the bilateral alliance.   
In its initial assessment of Fraser, the embassy cautioned that: 
It should be borne in mind however, that Fraser is assuming power in an Australia 
which has changed markedly from the “all the way with LBJ” days.  The Vietnam 
War, a growing sense of nationalism, and 25 years of peace have all combined to 
create an atmosphere in which defense alliances and threats of war seem to the 
average Australian to have a somewhat unreal quality about them.  Moreover, 
close identification with things American has lost some of its luster in recent 
years.  Vietnam, the Watergate Affair, the Kennedy and King murders, student 
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unrest, radical problems, and the lot have blurred the traditional and more hopeful 
vision of American life.43 
 
The embassy surmised “Fraser is very much aware that the situation has changed 
and will carefully consider [Australia’s] position on each politico-military issue so as not 
to create the impression that his government is giving the [U.S.] too much too fast.”44 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft echoed this sentiment in his guidance to Ford 
prior to the President’s meeting with Fraser in July.  Scowcroft advised that, “Fraser has 
no intention of returning Australia to the client patron relationship that earlier Liberal-
Country party governments,” and “the more independent attitude of the Whitlam 
government was popular in Australia, and Fraser will continue it.”  Scowcroft urged that 
“we thus should not appear to take Australia for granted or to be patronizing.”45   
T.B. Millar, the Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, wrote 
at the time that in its, “statements and actions since it came to power, the Fraser 
government has for the most part indicated changes of emphasis rather than of 
direction.”46  On the vast majority of international issues, including the opening with the 
People’s Republic of China, the handling of the discriminatory regimes of Southern 
Africa, Fraser continued Whitlam’s approach often at the expense of his party’s past 
positions and even his previous statements.47   Even as Fraser moved to improve relations 
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with Washington, he was equally quick to underscore Australian autonomy from the 
United States.  Fraser noted that “the interests of the United States and the interests of 
Australia are not necessarily identical,” and while in Washington dismissed the notion 
that “concurrence and common action means subordination to the larger nation.”48 
 Fraser’s independence manifested most clearly in his handling of the Soviet 
Union and détente.49   Unlike his predecessor, Fraser was deeply suspicious of the Soviet 
Union and wary of putting undue faith in détente.  Both he and his Foreign Minister 
Andrew Peacock used their first foreign policy speeches to parliament to assail Soviet 
conduct in world affairs.50  During his own speech Fraser alleged that the Soviets were 
“engaged in a major worldwide political offensive backed by force and propaganda” and 
that Moscow sought “to expand its influence throughout the world to achieve Soviet 
primacy. 51     
Uniquely for an Australian Prime Minister, Fraser’s first trip abroad was not a 
pilgrimage to Washington or London, but to Beijing and Tokyo where he endeavored to 
rally a united Asian front against Soviet expansionism.  Indeed, while in Beijing a 
transcript of Fraser’s meeting with Premier Hua Guofeng was mistakenly passed to the 
press which showed the Australian Prime Minister questioning America’s ability to 
counter the Soviet Union.  According to reports, Fraser told the Chinese leader that 
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détente was a “delusion” and that the Soviets had built up military powers which was 
much greater than necessary for defensive purposes 52  Worse, Fraser expressed grave 
doubts about the United States.  Specifically, Fraser worried about “the difficulty of the 
U.S. being unable to implement its foreign policy with resolution when there is a 
difference between the executive and congress.”53 He added that “there is now a risk of 
the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy being reduced very severely,” because of these 
differences, which had “materially contributed to Soviet intervention in Angola and their 
belief that there would be no reaction from the U.S.”54   
After the transcript became public, Fraser vigorously disavowed the interpretation 
of his remarks and sent Ford a letter to this effect.  Nevertheless, the episode provided a 
window into Fraser’s grave fears about the Soviet Union and uncertainty over America’s 
ability to meet this challenge.  Though Fraser repudiated his critical comments about 
American resolve, he reiterated his call for all anti-Soviet states, including China, to work 
together to counter Moscow’s maneuvers.55   
To understand the foreign policy of Malcom Fraser, it is necessary to look beyond 
his personality and recognize the larger strategic dilemma that Australia faced in the mid-
1970s.  Though not facing an immediate threat from abroad, shifting geopolitical realities 
forced Canberra to undertake a substantive reassessment of Australia’s global strategy.  
Since the 1950s, Australia had embraced a defense strategy based on the concept of 
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forward defense whereby it joined with allied countries to counter threats abroad before 
they could spread to endanger Australia directly.56  It had been this philosophy which 
underpinned Australian involvement during the Korean War, Malayan Emergency and 
the Vietnam War.  Critical to this arrangement were Australian’s alliances with the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  Yet, beginning in the late 1960s, this framework 
sustained a serious of blows which undermined Australia’s security strategy.  The 
announcement in 1968 of Britain’s withdrawal of forces from East of Suez deprived 
Australia of both a key patron and an essential pillar of its defensive strategy.57  Shortly 
thereafter, in July 1969, during a stopover on Guam, President Nixon announced a shift 
in American policy.  Nixon stated that going forward Washington would expect its allies 
to do more to provide for their own defense rather than simply relying on the United 
States for their defense.  Worryingly for countries like Australia whose defense was 
predicated on American security guarantees, the Guam Doctrine signaled that American 
commitments were neither absolute nor invariable.58    Such trepidations only grew 
following the American withdrawal from Vietnam.  The American departure from 
Southeast Asia after the loss of Indochina struck the Australians as being reminiscent of 
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the earlier British withdrawal and raised the very real prospect in Canberra of Australia 
being abandoned by its allies.  
As a result, it was necessary for Australia to fundamentally reassess its security 
strategy. The reimagining of Australia’s defense policy began under Prime Minister 
William McMahon with the 1972 Australian Defense Review.  The review asserted 
Australia’s need to balance its reliance on its alliances with a more self-reliant defense 
capability.59   Whitlam refined this approach by explicitly abandoning the concept of 
forward defense in order to focus principally on protecting the physical territory of 
Australia.60   
Significantly, Whitlam continued the process of reforming the country’s defense 
institutions under the stewardship of Secretary of the Defense Department Arthur 
Tange.61   The experience of fighting in Vietnam had exposed some of the critical 
deficiencies of the Australian military.  In particular, each of the three military branches 
(Army, Navy and Air Force) possessed its own department and this bureaucratic divide 
translated into operational difficulties with Australian forces struggling to conduct joint 
operations.  During the Vietnam conflict this difficulty with inter-service activities 
became particularly apparent in comparison to the highly integrated approach used by the 
American military.  Under Tange, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) was consolidated 
into a single department while simultaneously implementing reforms designed to 
modernize the military and burnish its self-reliant capabilities.62  
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The 1976 Defense White Paper was the culmination of Australia’s defense 
review.   The White Paper acknowledged that the importance of the American alliance, 
but nevertheless recognized that “it is not our policy, nor would it be prudent, to rely 
upon US combat help in all circumstances,” as “it is possible to envisage a range of 
situations in which the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite high.”63   
While the alliance remained a crucial facet of Australian security, American guarantees 
were not sufficient to justify Australia’s lack of its own capabilities.  Instead, the White 
Paper firmly committed the development of a self-reliant military capacity with goal of 
providing for its own defense and promoting stability in its own neighborhood.  
Importantly, self-reliance was not a substitute for the American alliance but a 
complement to it.  The White Paper particularly stressed that “by accepting our local 
responsibilities we can contribute to the alliance relationship and to the US,” and that 
self-reliance would allow Australia to effectively contribute to future joint endeavors 
with the United States.  Forged in the aftermath of the British withdrawal, the Guam 
Doctrine and the debacle in Indochina, the purpose of self-reliance was for Australia to 
assume greater responsibility for its own security both inside and outside of the alliance. 
It is precisely this philosophy which informed Malcom Fraser comments in 
Beijing and which underscored his engagement with Washington.  Whereas past Liberal 
Party Prime Ministers had been defined by their subordination to Washington, and 
Whitlam by his insubordination; Fraser wanted the alliance to function as a partnership.  
                                                 




During his early meetings with State Department officials in March 1976, Foreign 
Minister Peacock impressed upon his American colleagues the importance of not taking 
Australian support for granted and a desire for regular consultations between the two 
governments.64    
The challenge for U.S. policymakers resided in adopting a new approach which 
was responsive to Australia’s more independent policy while simultaneously developing 
mechanism which embraced Australian self-reliance within the overarching framework 
of the alliance.   American efforts to develop a more collaborative relationship with 
Australia hinged on the effective use of defense diplomacy and a renewed emphasis on 
defense cooperation.  The subject of expanded defense cooperation first emerged during 
U.S.-Australian defense consultations, and gained traction when the Australian Minister 
of Defense James Killen visited the Pentagon in June 1976.  Killen responded positively 
to the prospect of more joint activities and identified Indian Ocean surveillance, 
intelligence gathering and joint exercises as potential areas for added cooperation.  When 
Fraser visited DC in July, the subject was a point of emphasis for American officials and 
cooperation on Indian Ocean reconnaissance flights was among the first subjects raised 
by Ford during the meeting.65 
Defense diplomacy activities had long been a part of U.S.-Australian defense 
relations but gained new significance in the 1970s.  Military exercise, in particular were 
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identified as critical as they provided a means of furthering both tenets of the 1976 White 
Paper by improving inter-service operations within the Australian Defense Force (ADF) 
as well as improving combined operations with allied forces.66 Central to this idea were 
the biennial Kangaroo hosted by Australia.    Begun in 1974, the Kangaroo series of 
exercises were among the largest in the world and provided an important platform to 
enhance the functionality of the alliance.  For example, Kangaroo I in 1974 involved 
15,000 soldiers and 40 ships.  In addition to Australian forces, the United States sent an 
amphibious task force, the British dispatched Royal Marines and eight ships and New 
Zealand supplied contingents from all three of its military services.67  Though the 
Kangaroo exercises were designed around the direct defense of continental Australia, 
much of the conceptual framework was predicated on key facets of Australia’s 
relationship with the United States; namely intelligence sharing, the American nuclear 
umbrella and “Australia’s respect for American military power and what it could do if 
Australia were to face a real emergency.”68  The United States recognized the importance 
of combined military exercises within the alliance and the political benefits they could 
yield.  For example when advocating for American participation in Kangaroo I, John 
Froebe Jr. of the National Security Council staff argued that American participation, 
“would be supportive of our efforts to maintain good working-level relations with the 
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Australian government, while we attempt to work out our differences with Prime 
Minister Whitlam.”69    
Such endeavors only increased after Fraser came to office.  Fraser’s efforts to 
resolve the NPW issue directly influence American participation in exercises and allowed 
for American nuclear powered ships to participate.  The State Department envisioned 
NPW participation as having clear benefits for the alliance. “U. S. participation in 
Kangaroo II means that Australian forces will receive direct benefit from training with 
NPWs which in turn should make [Australian] support for these visits easier to defend 
publicly than would be the case with a casual U.S. NPW visit.”70   To take advantage of 
the public diplomacy aspects of American involvement in these exercises, port visits 
were arranged for participating U.S. ships.71  This included a very successful visit to 
Tasmania by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise.  The Enterprise was 
personally toured by Fraser and the visit in general “demonstrated unequivocally [the] 
tremendous favorable impact that a well-organized, well-timed USN Ship visit makes on 
U.S.-Australian relations.”72  
Of particular importance to both countries was cooperation on Indian Ocean 
surveillance flights.  The decision by Thailand’s government in 1976 to largely end the 
American military presence within their country greatly limited America’s ability to 
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support its operations in the Indian Ocean.  In response, the United States approached 
Singapore about staging P-3 Orion surveillances flights from its territory in support of 
operations at Diego Garcia.  Singaporean President Lee Kuan Yew “agreed in principle to 
allow support flights to transit his country but expressed some concern about the political 
sensitivity of P-3 flights.” As such, “Lee suggested that a joint U.S.-Australian operation 
would make his acceptance of our proposal much easier.”73   Though the U.S. considered 
it “premature” to inform Fraser that the idea of joint U.S.-Australian operations was 
Lee’s idea, Washington decided to gauge whether Australia would be interested in such a 
joint venture.74  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld described the idea as “an ideal project 
that Australia could help us with.”75  During his meeting with Fraser, Ford noted, “I want 
close cooperation with you. Perhaps we can cooperate with you on the P–3 flights and 
other aspects of an Indian Ocean military presence. Perhaps you could be of some help 
with Singapore on this too.”76  Fraser responded positively and spearheaded a joint appeal 
to Singapore.  Within weeks of the meeting with Ford, Fraser instructed the Australian 
High Commissioner in Singapore to approach the Singaporean government about staging 
P-3 flights from its territory.77  By working together, Canberra and Washington were able 
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to address an area of shared interest while simultaneously helping to sidestep some of the 
political difficulties which a strictly American request would have caused for Singapore.   
The Cold War on the Far Side of the World:  
 
 That the United States and Australia readily found common cause over the Indian 
Ocean was by no means an accident.  Rather, it reflected growing disquiet in both 
countries about the burgeoning Soviet naval activity in the region.  Throughout the first 
part of the Cold War, the Indian Ocean had been a British lake secured by sizable UK 
military facilities which ringed the Ocean.  Yet, the withdrawal from East of Suez ended 
this British dominance and transformed the Indian Ocean into the newest theater in the 
Soviet- U.S. rivalry. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean began in 1968 when a 
naval flotilla of four ships from Vladivostok toured the region on a goodwill tour.78  Such 
activities became routine with the Soviet naval presence gradually increasing and 
expanding as Moscow gained the use of key port facilities in South Yemen and the Horn 
of Africa.79  The Soviet’s justified their growing interest in the region on the fear that 
American submarines operating in the Indian Ocean could launch ballistic missiles at the 
southern flank of the Soviet Union with impunity.  However, commentators like Richard 
Haass found this claim dubious and instead saw increased Soviet interest in the Indian 
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Ocean as means for Moscow to assert influence over shipping lanes and flow of oil from 
the Middle East.80   
The United States maintained its own naval activities in the region under the 
auspices of the Seventh Fleet and gained a more permanent presence with the expansion 
of joint US-UK military facilities on Diego Garcia.   The imprint of the Cold War only 
grew as the 1970s progressed as, “the flag-waving exercises and patrolling activities of 
small contingents, during the early 1970s… gradually increased in scale with the 
developments which changed the Indian Ocean region from an area of little consequence 
to one of crucial geostrategic importance.81  
 As one of the Indian Ocean’s littoral states, Australia was both deeply concerned 
about this budding front of Cold War competition.  To Washington’s frustration, the 
military buildup in the Indian Ocean became yet another source of friction with the 
Whitlam government.  Instead of backing American efforts, Whitlam instead sided with 
the region’s nonaligned states in calling for the Indian Ocean to be declared a “zone of 
peace” and demilitarized.  Repeatedly, Whitlam pressed his American counterparts to 
open talks with the Soviets about limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean and the 
need for “mutual restraint.”82  Furthermore, he also publically voiced strong opposition to 
American plans to expand the military facility at Diego Garcia.   
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Malcom Fraser represented a complete reversal of Whitlam’s approach to security 
in the Indian Ocean.  Fraser endorsed the expansion of Diego Garcia and voiced serious 
concern about Soviet activities.  He identified the growing Soviet presence as a 
destabilizing factor and dedicated considerable energy in Washington, Beijing and Tokyo 
to highlighting the danger posed by the Soviet naval buildup.83  The Ford administration 
greatly appreciated the shift in the Australian position and saw activities like the maritime 
surveillance flights a means of using cooperative endeavors to counter Soviet actions.84   
Unfortunately, this new found harmony proved short-lived.  
The dramatic reversal on Indian Ocean security from Whitlam to Fraser was 
matched by the shift in American strategies when Jimmy Carter replaced Ford in 1977.  
Carter wished to demonstrate to the world that the United States and Soviet Union could 
work together towards finding peace and identified the Indian Ocean as an ideal test case 
for how this could be achieved.  During a press conference on 9 March 1977, Carter 
announced his intention to pursue the complete demilitarization of the Indian Ocean as 
part of a series of bilateral arms control talks with the Soviet Union.85  There had been no 
consultations prior to Carter’s press conference and the announcement caught the 
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Australian government completely by surprise.86 Foreign Minister Peacock attempted to 
put a positive spin on the new development by arguing that it has been Australian policy 
to seek military balance in the Indian Ocean at the lowest level possible and that arms 
control talks between Washington and Moscow represented a means of achieving this 
end.87  Arthur Tange was less sanguine.  He described the initiative as “one of Carter’s 
woollier foreign policy forays,” scoffing that, “the President had chosen for the 
experiment in disarmament the most distant location from his own territory.”88  Even less 
charitable was New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon.  When asked about 
Carter’s demilitarization proposal during a visit to Sydney on 16 March, Muldoon 
responded bluntly that though Carter was “the President of the most powerful country in 
the world; he is also a peanut farmer from Georgia.”  Muldoon added that “we hope that 
in due time he would absorb the realities of America’s role in the world, and Americans 
cannot retreat from their global responsibilities.”89 
 What seemingly bothered the Australian government the most about Carter’s 
demilitarization proposal was less the policy itself than the lack of any prior consultation 
on the subject.  Such disregard for Canberra’s opinions smacked of arrogance and lack of 
appreciation for Australian support which Fraser had previously warned Ford and 
Kissinger about.  More importantly, it undermined all pretenses of the U.S.-Australia 
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alliance being a true partnership.  At the end of March, Peacock travelled to the U.S. for a 
weeklong visit.  Throughout his trip he sought assurances from the U.S. about its policies 
in the region and both publicly and privately emphasized the need to confer with 
Australia on matters of mutual concern. 90 
 Peacock’s message took root within the Carter administration.  Throughout 
negotiations with the Soviet Union over the Indian Ocean, the U.S. embraced a policy of 
consultation and reassurance with its South Pacific partner.  This philosophy was on full 
display during Fraser’s visit to DC in June 1977.  Noted Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
in his briefing memo to Carter, “We want Fraser to leave the US confident that the 
American-Australian relationship remains a solidly based partnership, and that we will 
consult Australia on policy initiatives that may directly affect it.”91   Surprisingly the 
Indian Ocean was not discussed during the general meeting between American and 
Australian delegations at the White House, though it might have been discussed during an 
earlier private meeting between Carter and Fraser.92  However, Fraser did use the 
opportunity to voice concern about the credibility of America’s commitment to Asia 
within the context of Carter’s Korea policy.93   
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  Fraser’s visit to Washington coincided with the opening of Indian Ocean arms 
control negotiations in Moscow and the one clear change to emerge from the Prime 
Minister’s trip was a renewed effort by Washington to keep Canberra informed about 
affairs in the Indian Ocean.94  In addition to regularly discussing the subject through 
ANZUS meetings, the U.S. also developed additional mechanisms for more regular 
consultations with the Australians.95  For example, Vance met with Peacock on the 
sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in September 1977 in order to discuss the 
Indian Ocean negotiations in greater detail.  In addition to these high level talks, a more 
regular channel for consultations was established between the Australian Ambassador in 
Washington Alan Renouf, and the Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs, Leslie H. Gelb.  As the negotiations with the Soviets progressed, Renouf 
and Gelb met frequently so that Australia could be kept abreast of the talks with the 
Soviets.96  The meetings served to both keep Australia informed as well as provide a 
platform to reiterate its concern that any agreement with the Soviets not undermine 
Australian security.   
 Throughout the negotiations with the Soviets, Australia’s principle point of 
concern for Australia was that the delineation of the eastern boundary of the Indian 
Ocean not include the west coast of Australia.  Peacock used his meeting with Vance in 
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September to emphasize this point. Peacock warned that “if this line included the West 
Coast of Australia, the agreement would be seen in Australia as restricting the ability of 
the U.S. to protect Australia’s security.”  Any such question would give the Australian 
government “serious political problems,” and Peacock argued that it was important “to 
work this out together so that the talks do not involve any threat to Australian security.”97  
After speaking with Peacock again in November, Deputy National Security Advisor 
David Aaron relayed that the Australian: 
Would very much appreciate (Peacock shied just short, but only barely, of saying 
‘Australia would expect’) concrete assurances, preferably in a formal exchange of 
letters which could be made public, saying no Indian Ocean arms limitation 
agreement covering an area that extended up to Australia’s west coast would in 
any way derogate from our ANZUS commitments.98 
 
From the exchange it was clear that though the Australian government did not want to 
interfere in the negotiations, “it expects, as a minimum, firm publishable assurances that 
nothing we agree to with the Soviets concerning the Indian Ocean area will detract in any 
way from the security commitments we have with Australia.”99  
 In response to prodding from Australia and a letter from Peacock, on 7 December 
1977, a letter from Vance was delivered to Peacock concerning the Indian Ocean talks 
which offered reassurances about American commitment to Australian defense.100  The 
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substance of this letter remain classified.  Peacock, however, subsequently made 
reference to the contents of this letter committing the U.S. “not to derogate [its] 
obligations under ANZUS and to continue th-[sic] pattern of close defense 
cooperation.”101  Indeed, during fourth rounds of talks with the Soviets in February 1978 
the U.S. “put [the] case clearly to the USSR that [the] area to be covered would have to 
be decided on political grounds rather than [a] geographers’ definition of [the] Indian 
Ocean.”  Adding that the U.S. “wanted, and were obliged, to take into account the views 
of our Australian allies who were concerned about any limitation on our ability to fulfil 
our commitments to them.”102 
Following the Vance letter, close consultations continued but largely centered on 
pragmatic issues such as the future of joint U.S.-Australian exercises in the Indian 
Ocean.103 The American embassy in Canberra reported that the Australian government 
was “pleased with what appears to them a perceptibly greater effort by both this embassy 
and the State Department to enhance the level and quantity of consultations.”  
Furthermore the embassy asserted that it was “determined to ensure that Canberra is 
                                                 
101 The letter was dispatched on December 5 but not delivered until December because Peacock was away 
from Canberra campaigning.  As a result, in some instances the same letter is referred to either as the 
December 5 letter or the December 7 letter.  Telegram from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
(State) to Canberra, No. 150057, “Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks,” 13 June 1978; CFPF, NARA: 
accessed via AAD; Telegram from Vance (State) to Canberra, No. 273374, “Status Report: Australia, New 
Zealand Affairs,” 27 October 1978: CFPF, NARA: accessed via AAD. 
102Telegram from Vance (State) to Canberra, No. 055375, “Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks,” 3 March 
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consulted in advance on all important initiatives that may affect [U.S.-Australian] 
relations.”104  In line with this objective, the State Department offered to host a team of 
Australian experts for technical consultations about the Indian Ocean which the 
Australian government heartily accepted.105   
The details and instructions for the Australian delegation sent to Washington were 
actually passed to American diplomats in Australia prior to the beginning of technical 
consultations.  They showed that though Canberra was prepared to follow the United 
States’ in negotiations with the Soviets, Australia remained deeply wary of détente in the 
Indian Ocean and doubtful of its ultimate value.106 Although the discussions eased some 
of these apprehensions and American forthrightness was appreciated, several senior 
members of the Australian government remained skeptical of the entire enterprise.107  To 
help assuage lingering concerns, the technical consultations recommended additional 
joint exercises off of Australia’s West Coast as a means of highlighting America’s 
continued commitment.  The exercises were approved by Carter and announced during 
Vice President Walter Mondale’s visit to Australia in May 1978.  Mondale told Fraser 
that such exercises “might make sea nations aware of the tangible nature of our 
commitment,” adding that “we would be seeking to reaffirm and in a tangible way to 
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demonstrate clearly to all our firm interest.”108  Fraser supported the idea and stated that 
“he was encouraged by the Vice President’s point of view that actions not merely 
statements were necessary,” and that “it was the substance that the United States 
displayed that was most important.”109 
Australian trepidations about talks with the Soviets proved prescient as the fourth 
round of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in February 1978 turned out to be the last.  
During the summer of 1978, a doubling of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean tied 
to its involvement in the Ogaden War led the U.S. to freeze all further talks.110 The U.S. 
informed Australia of the suspension and continued bilateral consultations on the issue in 
order to keep Canberra informed of America’s evolving stance.111  The United States also 
remained committed to demonstrating its continued interest in the region and pushed 
through with a series of exercises with ANZUS and ship visits.  Notably the exercise 
announced during the Mondale visit, Sandgroper 1978, was carried out off Australia’s 
west coast late in the year and were judged to have successfully demonstrated ANZUS’s 
role in the Indian Ocean.112   
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President’s Trip,” 31 January 1979: NLC-133-19-3-7-3, JCPL.  
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 This process repeated itself in 1979 following the outbreak of the third Indochina 
War.  Fraser and his government were deeply alarmed by the rapid breakdown of order in 
Southeast Asia and its potential to imperil the entire region.113  Of special concern was 
that the Soviet Union would directly intervene in the Sino-Vietnamese War and greatly 
escalate the conflict.  This prospect gained considerable substance following the visit by 
three Soviet warships to the former American naval facility at Cam Rahn Bay.114  In 
response the U.S. moved quickly to revitalize high-level discussions with Australian 
officials to develop a common approach to the crisis.115  Indeed, one of the key initiatives 
of the United States at the time was to actually broaden the U.S.-Australia strategic dialog 
to include Japan in order to coordinate a Western response under a trilateral 
arrangement.116  
To counter increased Soviet military activity in the Indian Ocean, Washington and 
Canberra again looked to increase their own defense activities in the area.  For example, 
the U.S. Army Golden Knights parachute team participated in a military tattoo in Perth to 
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celebrate the 150th anniversary of the founding of the state of Western Australia.  More 
substantively, regular B-52 exercises began to be held in Australia.117  The centerpiece of 
American defense engagement was Kangaroo III which was held off Australia’s 
northeast coast throughout October 1979.118   Including 27 ships, 120 aircraft and an 
estimated 17,000 personnel, Kangaroo III was among the largest ANZUS exercise ever 
undertaken.119  Designed to simulate a rapidly escalating conflict, Kangaroo III was more 
than just a test of how well ANZUS militaries could coordinate.  It was a potent 
demonstration of how the allies could cooperate politically and militarily to defeat a 
threat to their common interests and uphold the integrity of the alliance.120 
Conclusion: 
 
 When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan it appeared to confirm Fraser’s 
worst suspicions about détente.  Fortunately, the mechanisms for how the U.S.-Australian 
alliance would respond were already in place.  According to Vance, Fraser’s response to 
Carter’s appeal for united action to counter the Soviet invasion was “virtually 
instantaneous.”121  At the end of January, Fraser and Carter met in DC to discuss the 
situation and the surging of military assets into the Indian Ocean to demonstrate Western 
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resolve and preempt any future Soviet aggression.122  Fraser announced Australia’s plan 
to increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and dispatched its only aircraft carrier 
as part of the Western naval buildup.123  As part of this coordinated response, Australia 
opened its facilities and territory to transiting American forces and even offered to 
develop a naval base in Western Australia so it could become the homeport for an 
American aircraft carrier within the Indian Ocean.124 Even amid the global response to 
the Soviet invasion, Australia’s response and high degree of coordination with the United 
States merited particular acclaim in Washington.125   
Australia’s resolute response to the invasion of Afghanistan reflected both the 
fervor of Prime Minister Fraser as well as the dedicated work which had gone into 
revitalizing the U.S.-Australian defense relationship since he assumed office.  While the 
totality of activity in early 1980 was impressive, taken individually, each facet of the 
coordinated U.S.-Australian response had been previously planned and practiced as part 
of the alliance’s defense diplomacy agenda.  As much as the overwhelming response to 
the invasion of Afghanistan reflected shared concern over Soviet aggression, it also 
demonstrated the rejuvenation of the U.S.-Australian alliance following the discord over 
Vietnam. 
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Though less antagonistic than his predecessor, Fraser presented a more enduring 
challenge to American preconceptions about the bilateral relationship.  With Whitlam, 
Washington could dismiss the fracture in Australian-American affairs as a simple 
byproduct of a single quarrelsome Prime Minister.  However, when Fraser sustained this 
autonomous streak it signaled a lasting change in the relationship between the two 
countries rather than a temporary disruption.  The experience of the Vietnam War and 
prospect of America’s withdrawal from the region had painfully underscored the folly of 
simply following Washington’s lead in world affairs.  Instead, as the United States 
reevaluated its future in Asia, Australia recognized the necessity of being the primary 
guarantor of its own security as encapsulated by the 1976 White Paper.  The challenge for 
supporters of the transpacific partnership, including Fraser himself, was developing a 
means for Australia to achieve greater responsibility for its defense within the framework 
of the alliance. 
The triumph of the bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the Vietnam War was 
that it evolved into a bilateral partnership.  Instead of trying to stifle Australia’s ambitions 
for a greater role within the alliance, Washington not only responded positively to 
Canberra’s aspirations but showed itself to be a willing partner in this endeavor.  
Kissinger described this new dynamic succinctly when plotting with Andrew Peacock 
how best to handle China.  Noted Kissinger “we should mesh our resources” and 
“concentrate on the areas that each of us does best.”126   
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To accommodate Australia’s greater autonomy within the alliance the U.S. 
adopted a two pronged approach of consultation and cooperation.  No longer willing to 
unquestioningly follow American polices, prominent consultation on issue of shared 
concern were essential to demonstrating that Australian opinions were both heard and 
valued.  Indeed, the lowest point in the post-Vietnam relationship came when Jimmy 
Carter violated this new norm by announcing his desire for a demilitarized Indian Ocean 
without first conferring with Canberra.   
This coordination between government officials was paired with substantive 
cooperation in the form of a robust defense diplomacy program.  Washington recognized 
in Australia’s desire for greater military self-reliance an opportunity.  Though training 
programs, exchanges and large exercises like Kangaroo and Sandgroper, Washington 
gained a means of aiding Australian military development whilst substantively enhancing 
the functionality of the alliance.  Episodes like the successful staging of U.S.-Australian 
P-3 surveillance flights through Singapore illustrated how the United States could 
effectively use collaborative endeavors with Australia to advance its own security as 
well. 
The result of this evolution in U.S.-Australian relations was evident when Soviet 
naval forces flooded into the Indian Ocean amid the upheaval of 1979.   Instead of 
finding the tattered remnants of America’s Cold War alliances shattered by the trauma of 
Vietnam, the Soviets instead confronted a revitalized partnership.  Whereas ANZUS and 
the U.S.-Australia alliance in particular could have wither and died as SEATO had, the 
dedicated actions of policymakers in both countries had prevented this fate.  By 
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embracing collaboration as the centerpiece of the alliance, Washington and Canberra 
succeeded preserving a critical pillar of Western security in the South Pacific and finding 
an approach which would sustain the relationship throughout the Cold War and into the 































THE SUSTAINABLE WAR ON TERRORISM: 
 








The War on Terrorism in the Philippines did not begin on September 11, 2001.  
Beset by a decades old insurgency by Muslims living in the archipelago’s southerner 
region of Mindanao, the Philippines was already familiar with the grim cocktail of 
resentment, alienation, dogma and violence that has come to define modern terrorism.  
During the 1990s, the longstanding Moro insurgency had assumed new and frightening 
dimensions.  The weakness of the Philippine national government combined with the 
country’s seemingly intractable internal conflicts to provide an incubator for extremism.  
Militants like Abdurajak Janjalani returned to Mindanao from fighting alongside the 
Mujahadeen during the Soviet-Afghan War, having embraced the radical ideology of 
Osama bin Laden and intent on erecting an Islamic State in the southern Philippines.  
From the fragments of larger Moro groups, Janjalani founded Abu Sayyaf as a Philippine 
offshoot of the nascent al-Qaeda network.  Abu Sayyaf emerged as one of al-Qaeda’s 
most violent affiliates as it waged a protracted campaign of terror against foreigners and 
Filipinos alike.  Though ties with its parent organizations withered after Janjalani’s death 
in 1998, Abu Sayyaf leaders like Abu Sabaya continued to view their actions through the 
lens of global jihad.  Notably, Abu Sabaya insisted on being identified as “the bin Laden 
group” after completing a daring raid on a tourist resort in May 2001 that netted 20 
captives including 3 Americans.1  While the events of 9/11 were shocking, for the 
                                                 




Philippines the Global War on Terrorism merely provided a new name for a conflict that 
had already become too familiar.   
Though a war against terrorism in itself possessed little novelty for the 
Philippines, the effect of the September 11th attacks on American foreign policy had 
immense importance for the archipelago.  Al-Qaeda’s historic links to the Philippines and 
the continued plight of American hostages held captive by Abu Sayyaf galvanized 
Washington’s attention in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.  Labelled a “frontline state” 
in the fight against violent extremists, the Philippines emerged as a priority for the Bush 
administration during the early weeks of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The 
Philippines would be the site of the largest U.S. military operations outside of 
Afghanistan and characterized as the “second front” in the War on Terror.  Though 
overshadowed by events in Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq, American activities in the 
Philippines constitute an important chapter in the global effort to defeat violent 
extremism.  A rare success story in the War on Terror, the lack of public resonance which 
Operation Enduring Freedom –Philippines (OEF-P) now belies both the important gains 
which it achieved and its salience for our widening understanding of the global struggle 
against terrorism and the means used to combat it.  
September 11th did not occur in a geopolitical vacuum.  As the Bush 
administration crafted its response to the attacks on New York and Washington DC, it 
could not wholly escape the realities of international affairs.  In the Philippines, this 
meant confronting America’s own checkered past in the archipelago as imperial ruler and 




would simply vanish amid the early fervor of the War on Terror.  Rather, after the 
Marcos regime was overthrown, popular antipathy towards the American military had led 
the Philippines to adopt a new constitution placing strict conditions on any foreign 
military presence inside the country.  Furthermore, amid the still smoldering resentment 
over Washington’s backing for Marcos, the Philippine Senate in 1991 voted against a 
renewal of its base agreement with Washington.  This vote ejected the U.S. military from 
its Clarke Air Field and Subic Bay facilities which had previously been two of America’s 
largest bases and central to its military presence in the Western Pacific.  While the U.S.-
Philippine alliance remained intact, it could not escape its history or the myriad of 
political opponents wary of any type of American involvement in the internal affairs of 
the Philippines.  Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines was a two front war fought as 
much against the specter of America’s past actions as the disciples of Abu Sayyaf.  To 
succeed in this struggle the United States needed to triumph in the political arena of 
Manila as well as the jungles of Mindanao. 
Owing to the unique dimensions of the U.S.-Philippine relationship, Operation 
Enduring Freedom - Philippines evolved in a manner distinct from any other theater in 
the Global War on Terror.  Forbidden by the Philippine constitution from conducting 
combat operations, the United States military needed to develop alternative means of 
combatting terrorism in the country.  The solution was defense diplomacy.  Instead of 
directly fighting Abu Sayyaf itself, the United States would work “by, with and through” 
its partners in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to achieve its objectives.  




intelligence sharing and operational planning, the United States would cultivate within 
the AFP the capabilities needed to defeat Abu Sayyaf.   
The use of defense diplomacy as America’s primary method of fighting the War 
on Terrorism in the Philippines represents the ideal marriage between the unique 
challenges of the Philippines and the means to overcoming them.  Though at times a 
frustrating departure from the kinetic heavy approach employed by Washington in the 
wider Middle East, the indirect approach applied in Mindanao yielded significant 
benefits.  By focusing on institutional development within the Philippine Security Forces 
(PSF) and the underlying problems in Mindanao, the United States succeeded in 
mitigating the conditions that first fueled the rise of extremism in the Philippines as well 
as eliminating the terrorists themselves.  Not only did Operation Enduring Freedom –
Philippines diminish the threat posed by Abu Sayyaf, it also rectified many of the 
permissive conditions in the Southern Philippines that first made the country a convenient 
outpost for international terrorists.   
Furthermore, the unique characteristics of defense diplomacy provided a way of 
achieving these objectives whilst navigating the political pitfalls in Manila.  In 
emphasizing cooperation between Philippine and American forces over unilateral actions, 
Washington managed to both achieve its GWOT objectives and remain within the legal 
confines of the Philippine constitution.  Perhaps even more significantly, defense 
diplomacy’s mantra of collaboration helped dispel some of the lingering ghosts of 
America’s past missteps by demonstrating a new mode of US-Philippine defense 




Enduring Freedom-Philippines stands as a testament of both defense diplomacy’s uses as 
a tool of statecraft and as a sustainable means of combatting violent extremism. 
Literature Review: 
 
 The Philippines has not enjoyed the notoriety of other arenas in the War on 
Terrorism, but it has attracted the attention of several scholars.  These works cover a 
broad range of issues and reflect the diverse lines of inquiry which underpin the conflict.  
Despite this variety, the existing literature can be divided into four crude categories based 
on which face of the conflict the author chooses to highlight. 
 The Global Jihad School of scholarship seeks to highlight the links between the 
Philippines and al-Qaeda and emphasizes the role of the country as a hub of transnational 
terrorism.  Central to this body of scholarship are the 9/11 Commission Report as well as 
Simon Reeve’s book on Ramzi Yousef and the origins of al-Qaeda.2  Both works discuss 
in detail the situation in the Philippines during the 1990s and describe Yousef’s sojourn 
in the Philippines after the failed 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  There, he and his 
uncle Khalid Sheik Muhammed hatched the Bojinka Plot, which though initially foiled 
would eventually provide the basis for the 9/11 attacks.  The prominence of these links in 
the 1990s served as beacons for scholars writing after September 11th to investigate the 
wider presence of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia in general and within the Philippines in 
particular.  Rohan Gunaratna continues this line of inquiry after 9/11 as he attempts to 
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map al-Qaeda’s global presence with Southeast Asia being identified as a critical area of 
militant activity.3 
Zachary Abuza of the National Defense University has written the foundational 
works in this approach.  Based on extensive fieldwork and government contacts, Abuza 
traces the constellation of terrorist networks in Southeast Asia and the alliances which 
have been formed between otherwise distinct groups.  Abuza is particularly disparaging 
of the mainstream Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s (MILF) claims to have severed its ties 
with extremist groups.  Instead, Abuza charges that the MILF provided sanctuary for 
groups like Jemaah Islamyiah and allowed them to open training camps on Philippine 
territory under its control.4  Similarly Maria Ressa and former U.S. Senator Christopher 
Bond each wrote books depicting Southeast Asia as a new epicenter for international 
terrorism.  Each believe that American efforts to eliminate terrorist safe havens in the 
Middle East would only increase the relative importance of places like the Philippines for 
al-Qaeda.5  
 These efforts to link the Philippines to transnational terrorism merited a severe 
rebuke from the second school, the Local Conflict School, who instead focused on the 
                                                 
3 Rohan Gunaratna. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. 1st Berkley trade paperback ed. (New 
York, NY: Berkley Books, 2003). 
4 Zachary Abuza. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: crucible of terror. (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2003); Zachary Abuza. "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al 
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya." Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic 
Affairs 25(2) (2003), 169-199; Zachary Abuza.  “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian 
network.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(3) (2002): 427-467;  Zachary Abuza. Balik-Terrorism: The 
Return of the Abu Sayyaf.  (Philadelphia: DIANE Publishing, 2005); Zachary Abuza. "The Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28(6) (2005): 453-479. 
5 Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An eyewitness account of Al-Qaeda's newest center of operations in 
Southeast Asia. (New York: Free Press, 2003); Christopher Bond, and Lewis M. Simons. The Next Front: 




actual dynamic of the Philippine’s internal conflict.  While not dismissing the presence of 
international terrorists, such elements are of secondary significance to the indigenous 
Moro struggle and its dimensions.  The terrorism situation in Mindanao was not a central 
Asian import, but the byproduct of a long festering conflict which had evolved over 
centuries of discord.  As such, the War on Terrorism in the Philippines constituted the 
application of an overly simplified paradigm to a far more intricate conflict.  Key to this 
body of scholarship is an effort to dispel such illusions by rejecting easy characterizations 
and examining the individual Moro groups and causes.  Natasha Hamilton-Heart and 
David Wright-Neville each are leading voices in this vein and urged scholars to recognize 
local dimensions in the Philippines as being essential ingredients to understanding the 
nature of terrorism in the region.6  Eduardo Ugarte offers an important contribution to 
this perspective by examining the rise of Abu Sayyaf not through the lens of al-Qaeda, 
but as an extension of the traditional Tausug alliance system.7  Bob East of the University 
of Southern Queensland conducted extensive field work on Jolo in order to better grasp 
Abu Sayyaf’s origins.  Though censuring Abu Sayyaf for its distortion of Islam, East 
characterizes the group as less of an organization than a loose alliance of criminal gangs.  
East charges that the terminology of terrorism has been exploited by the government in 
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Manila, especially President Gloria Macapalga Arroyo, to discredit opponents, enhance 
its own powers and gain financial as well as economic patronage from the United States.8   
Jennifer Marie Keister adopted a decidedly different tact in her impressive 
dissertation examining how rebel groups actually govern.  Keister employs a comparative 
approach to analyze how the MILF, MNLF and Abu Sayyaf each approaches the task of 
governing.  She identifies distinct differences in how each group oversees the territory it 
controls.  Notably, unlike the other two groups, Abu Sayyaf employs an exploitative 
approach which seeks to extract resources from its population without providing social 
services.9   
Despite their differences, both of the first two subsets of scholarship examine the 
nature of the problem of terrorism in the Philippines.  By way of contrast, the second two 
schools each focus their analysis on the response to this challenge and the policies of both 
the United States and the Philippines.  Here again the literature can be bifurcated into two 
camps: those scholars who focus on the military operations and those interested in the 
wider policy dynamic.  The military camp is largely populated by current and former 
military officers from both countries who mine OEF-P for larger lessons about 
counterterrorism operations.10  Foremost of these studies is one published in 2016 by the 
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Rand Corporation.  Written by Linda Robinson, Patrick Johnston and Gillian Oak, the 
Rand study constitutes the only comprehensive overview of American Special Forces in 
the Philippines from 2001 until 2014.  The report widely lauds American efforts.  It 
denotes their success at reducing the threat of terrorism in the Philippines as well as 
revitalizing defense ties between Washington and Manila.11  Most other military based 
studies of OEF-P focus on Balikatan 02-1 which was the first major counterterrorism 
operation in the Philippines that actively included American assistance.  In September 
2004, Special Warfare, the professional bulletin of John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 
Center, published an entire issue on Balikatan 02-1.  The articles were primarily written 
by C.H. Briscoe and Cherilyn Walley and discuss in detail such issues as operations, 
terrain, communications and public diplomacy.12  A particularly important piece was 
written by Colonel David Maxwell for Military Review.  Maxwell commanded U.S. 
Forces on Basilan during Balikatan 02-1 and later assumed command for the Special 
Operations Task Force in the Philippines.  Maxwell’s work is unique both for the distinct 
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perspective that he can offer, but also for his criticism.  Most works on Balikatan 02-1 
offer decidedly positive assessments.  Though Maxwell does provide considerable praise 
for certain elements, he also offers pointed criticism on the politically motivated limits 
placed on American forces, an overall failure to adapt to an evolving situation and 
particularly the inability to respond to cooperation between different insurgent factions.13  
Instead of the minutia of operations, the scholars of the Defense Policy School 
have attempted to take broader perspective on policy issues and how governments 
responded to the War on Terrorism in the Philippines.  Rommel S. Banaloi has written 
several works to this effect.  He particularly offers keen insights into the development of 
the Philippine national security apparatus and its evolution after September 11th.14  
Renato Cruz de Castro of De La Salle University, has authored numerous works on 
Philippine foreign policy.  Although his works provide valuable insights on numerous 
issues, regarding the War on Terrorism he delivers particularly strong analysis on how 
the conflict fits within the broader narrative of US-Philippine defense cooperation.  De 
Castro posits that joint counterterrorism cooperation provides a valuable step in 
rebuilding the bilateral relationship after the discordant 1990s.  Furthermore, this 
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cooperation has both strengthened the alliance and greatly helped advance Philippine 
military capabilities.15  Whereas de Castro focuses on affairs between Washington and 
Manila, Patricio Abinales looks into the unique ties between the Moros and the United 
States.  Owing to their generally positive experience under American colonialism, 
Abinales suggests that the Moros may be far more receptive to American intervention 
than other populations in the Philippines.16  Though other studies have looked at the 
uniqueness of Moro-American relations, Abinales asserts that this history both influences 
attitudes today and could be beneficial for counterterrorism efforts.  As heavily as history 
weighs over the entirety of U.S.-Philippine affairs, Abinales offers an important reminder 
that this history is not monolithic or perceived identically by all parties. 
Overview: 
 
Whereas past studies have sought to disentangle events in Mindanao from the 
wider bilateral relationship, I hold that this approach is not only futile, but 
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counterproductive.  Not only is it impossible to disaggregate the military and political 
dimensions of the conflict, in trying to do so one misses the overarching achievement of 
Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.  From its onset, OEF-P was shaped by acute 
political forces in both Washington and Manila.  Though politics initially empowered the 
mission with pledges of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, joint counterterrorism efforts 
could not long avoid the engrained volatility of U.S.-Philippine affairs.  Episodes like the 
disastrous mishandling of Balikatan 03-1 caused significant harm to U.S.-Philippine 
relations and undercut the ostensible unity of joint operations. As such, the greatest 
obstacles to Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines came not from the schemes of Abu 
Sayyaf, but the perilous nature of the bilateral relationship.   
Defense diplomacy emerged as an effective strategy precisely because it proved 
equally attune to navigating the political pitfalls of bilateral affairs as the military aspects 
in Mindanao.  The transnational links established and bolstered by cooperative activities 
provided a vital link between the two countries.  These ties anchored and guided the 
relationship through periods of open disagreement.  During times of discord between the 
two governments, such as after the Philippine withdrawal from Iraq, defense diplomacy 
helped to shield defense relations from the worst of the fallout and restore the health of 
the bilateral dynamic once the storm over a particular dispute had passed.  The 
advantages of defense diplomacy were also evident in counterterrorism operations 
themselves.  American training programs established strong institutional links with the 
AFP which allowed for the rapid diffusion of specialized skills, tactics and philosophies.  




Cold War to an effective counterterrorism force.  Furthermore, American defense 
diplomacy helped change how the AFP conceived of counterinsurgency by emphasizing 
civic engagement and the importance of winning the support of the local population. In 
the War on Terror, success in the Philippines grew not from the barrel of a gun, but rather 
from the collaborative pathways cultivated by defense diplomacy. 
This manuscript examines the War on Terrorism in the Philippines from its 
origins in the 1990s until the downfall of Abu Sayyaf’s senior leadership group during 
the winter of 2006-2007.  It explores both the intricacies of U.S.-Philippine diplomacy 
during this period as well as the actual undertakings in Mindanao. To achieve this end, I 
draw on a diverse array of sources including media reports, government documents, 
academic research, archival material and interviews with individuals directly involved in 
the conduct of US-Philippine relations.  This work also is the first of its kind to employ 
the State Department Telegrams released by Wikileaks to explore American diplomacy in 
the Philippines during this period.  Though much of the material concerning OEF-P 
remains classified, the combination of this diverse range of sources allows for a sturdy 
analysis of the mission as well as the diplomacy surrounding it.   
The expanded scope of this work, delving into the period prior to the War on 
Terrorism, is essential to the overall examination of defense diplomacy as a tool of 
international statecraft.  By beginning in the 1990s, we are afforded a window both into 
the growth of radical terrorism in the Philippines and the difficult task of rebuilding US-
RP defense relationships after the closure of America’s bases in the country in 1992.  




cooperation in the late 1990s, the mechanisms and relationships developed during this 
period provided the foundation for counterterrorism cooperation in the aftermath of 9/11.  
As such, I offer a detailed analysis of the central role defense diplomacy plays in 
sustaining the bilateral alliance as well as fighting terrorism. 
The work progresses in chronological order as a means of following the distinct 
phases of the conflict and tracing how past experiences informed subsequent events.  
Chapter one provides the context of OEF-P by examining both the nature of the terrorist 
problem in the Philippines as well as the uncertain state of U.S.-Philippine defense 
relations immediately prior to the War on Terror.  This chapter delves into the tumultuous 
1990s in order to illustrate the ascendance of terrorism in the archipelago even as 
relations with the United States soured following the closure of the American bases.  It 
concludes with the September 11th attacks and the revitalization of the bilateral relations 
in their immediate aftermath. 
Chapter two discusses Balikatan 02-1 which was the first major U.S. military 
undertaking in the Philippines as part of the War on Terror.  At the time, Balikatan 02-1 
constituted the largest U.S. operation outside of Afghanistan and the first major 
expansion of GWOT outside of Central Asia.  A hybrid operation combining a major 
offensive by the AFP on the island of Basilan with an American “advise and assist” 
mission, Balikatan 02-1 was a trial of how the two forces could cooperate amid an active 
campaign.  It also provided the first major test of American abilities to adapt to a non-
combat role in the fight against violent extremism.  Though Balikatan achieved some 




such as the AFPs limited capabilities which would come to plague joint counterterrorism 
efforts. 
The initial cracks in bilateral cooperation exposed during Balikatan fractured 
during the subsequent events I discuss in chapter three.  Initial assurances about the AFPs 
capabilities proved to be unfounded as American forces came to recognize the severe 
limitations of their partner.  Yet, attempts to expand the role of the American military in 
the Philippines were firmly rebuffed amid a public outcry in Manila and questions about 
the legality of such actions.  A series of controversies soon followed including the 
Oakwood Mutiny and the Iraq War which plunged bilateral affairs to their nadir.  Even as 
relations curdled, the emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah in Mindanao and resurgence of 
Abu Sayyaf served to further highlight the importance of resolving the Mindanao 
situation as part to the Global War on Terror. 
Chapter four details the recovery of U.S.-Philippine relations and the ultimate 
success of defense diplomacy in the Philippines.  Aided by the assent of Alveino Cruz as 
Secretary of National Defense, the United States and Philippine government embraced a 
new approach to the security cooperation known as the Kapit Bisig framework.  
Together, the two countries worked to rectify the underlying conditions which had first 
made the country a haven for terrorism.  This included a bold effort to reform the AFP 
and to improve the situation in Mindanao for local residents.  This formula yielded 
immediate results.  Engaging with the mainstream Moro factions led to the expulsion of 
extremists from Mindanao and a subsequent offensive on Jolo resulted in death of Abu 




improvements in the AFP’s capabilities stemming from American training as well as a 
more holistic approach to counterinsurgency which prioritized the wellbeing of the local 
population.  I conclude by analyzing the achievements of Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines as an outlier within the Global War on Terrorism and its broader salience for 








On the evening of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush solemnly 
vowed to find those individuals responsible for that day’s tragic events no matter where 
they hid and bring them to justice.1  Though the American President left no question as to 
his resolve to respond to the attacks, where this response would actually occur remained 
unknown.  Al-Qaeda’s base in Afghanistan gave the United States an initial focus, but the 
international nature of the al-Qaeda network meant that this effort would not long be 
contained to the rugged hills of Central Asia.  As the investigation into the 9/11 attacks 
revealed al-Qaeda’s web of affiliates, American attention was drawn to the southern 
Philippines and the long simmering conflict in Mindanao. 2  The struggle by the 
archipelago’s Muslim minority, collectively known as Moros, for an independent 
homeland had festered for decades yet had taken on frightening dimensions in the 1990s.  
During that decade individuals like Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, his uncle Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Osama Bin Laden’s 
brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa had each used the Philippines as a base of 
operation.  Of even greater concern was the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
– a notorious band of Islamic extremists with historic ties to al-Qaeda.  After its founding 
in 1991, ASG rapidly gained a reputation for brutality during a wave of attacks that 
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targeted Filipinos and foreigners alike.  ASG had beheaded an American captive three 
months before 9/11 and was still holding another two American missionaries hostage at 
the time of the attacks.  Even as the wreckage the World Trade Center smoldered, the 
situation in the Philippines garnered special attention from the Bush administration.  The 
Philippines was dubbed a “frontline state” in the battle against al-Qaeda and described as 
a “second front” in the nascent Global War on Terror (GWOT).   
However, the War on Terror in the Philippines developed in a manner distinct 
from that of any other theater of operations.  A staunch ally of the United States, 
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pledged to support American actions in 
Afghanistan and was the first leader in Asia to voice support for GWOT.3  However, the 
unambiguous nature of President Arroyo’s backing for American actions in Afghanistan 
stood in stark contrast to the rather more nuanced challenge of redressing terrorism 
within the borders of her own country.  As a direct result of past American meddling in 
the internal affairs of the Philippines, the country’s constitution placed strict constraints 
on the presence of foreign soldiers within the archipelago.  Barred from directly 
confronting the Abu Sayyaf with its own combat forces, the United States instead 
embraced defense diplomacy as its primary means of fighting Abu Sayyaf and defusing 
the conditions which first fueled its rise. 
The reliance on defense diplomacy to combat terrorism in the Philippines stands 
as a critical case for the practice and its use as a tool of statecraft.  While the long history 
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between the Washington and Manila fostered close political ties between the two 
countries, it also erected severe obstacles that complicated every stage of the undertaking.  
Notable historic American missteps and abuses had engendered a deep skepticism of 
American motives throughout much of the Filipino society and yielded an engrained 
hostility towards the presence of American soldiers. What institutional affinity existed as 
a result of past cooperation was equally matched by an antagonistic political climate and 
general wariness toward any form of American intervention.   
This chapter examines the rise of Abu Sayyaf within the Philippines and the 
controversial revitalization of U.S-Philippine defense cooperation in the 1990s.  These 
separate trends converged in the weeks following the September 11th attacks as defense 
engagement programs were repurposed to serve as the primary conduit for 
counterterrorism assistance.  Championed by both capitals as the renewal of the U.S.-
Philippine alliance after nearly a decade of acrimony, the initial enthusiasm that 
characterized bilateral affairs in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was sorely misplaced.  
While counterterrorism operations unquestionably breathed new life into the partnership, 
this vigor was based on an overly optimistic assessment by both administrations of how 
the War on Terror in the Philippines would unfold.  Though far from the only instance of 
overconfidence during the Global War on Terror, Operation Enduring Freedom-
Philippines (OEF-P) was distinct in that the brunt of failed expectations would be borne 
by transnational ties built through defense diplomacy activities which would successfully 
preserve the relationship through periods of discord and ultimately yield a positive 




Figure 5: Map of the Philippines 4 
 
 
                                                 





A Garden of Woe: Terrorism in the Philippines: 
 
The Moro Conflict: 
Traders from the Persian Gulf first brought Islam to the Philippines in the 1300s.  
The religion spread throughout the archipelago, but remained particularly concentrated in 
southern regions of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.5  In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan 
landed in the Philippines amid his attempt to circumnavigate the globe and claimed the 
islands on behalf of Spain.  A violent encounter with a local chieftain near Cebu led to 
Magellan’s death but his claim to the islands endured.  Over the following centuries, 
successive waves of Spanish expeditions reached the archipelago which were christened 
the Philippines after King Philipp II of Spain.   
The arrival of the Spanish inaugurated the two defining conflicts of the Southern 
Philippines.  Familiar with Islam from its own history, the Spanish were nevertheless 
surprised to find Muslims living in seemingly so distant a place as the Philippines.  Under 
the Spanish, the native Muslim population of the Philippines became known as Moros 
after the Moors of North Africa.  Yet, the term Moro was an artificial construct collective 
applied to the all adherents of Islam in the Philippines.  In truth, the Muslim population is 
composed of a diverse array of linguistically and culturally distinct groups.6  The deep 
                                                 
5 Jan Stark. "Muslims in the Philippines." Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23 (1)(2003): 195-209; Cesar 
Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973). 
6 There are three major (Tausug, Maguindano & Marano) and ten minor ethnolinguistic subgroupings 
within the wider Moro population). Thomas M. McKenna. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday politics 
and armed separatism in the southern Philippines. (Berkley CA: University of California Press, 1998); 
Malcom Cook and Christopher Collier. Mindanao: a gamble worth taking. Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, 2006; Bob East. "Redefining domestic counterinsurgency post-2001: Sulu Province, Republic of 
Philippines." PhD diss., University of Southern Queensland, 2010; Eduardo Ugarte and Mark Macdonald 




cleavages within the Moro population and the internal struggles engendered by these 
divides has been an essential feature of political life in the southern Philippines and a key 
factor in the evolution of the Moro conflict.  
With the Spanish also came the arrival of the first Catholic missionaries.  Their 
aggressive proselytization spread Catholicism rapidly throughout the Philippines and 
largely confined Islam to the western portion of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.  
These regions would remain a bastion of the Islamic faith and a frequent irritant to 
Spanish rule.  Wars between the Spanish colonial government in Manila and Muslim 
sultanates were frequent and bloody throughout the colonial period.7  Spain never fully 
established effective dominion over the southern Philippines until the 1850s and 60s, 
mere decades before the islands were wrested from Madrid’s control as a result of the 
Spanish-American War.  Yet, the Spanish period provided the Moros with their key 
source of external conflict as neither the tensions between Muslims and Christians nor the 
divide between a national government in Manila and local authorities in Mindanao would 
be extinguished with the passing of Spanish rule.   
 When the United States assumed control of the Philippines in 1898 it heralded a 
time of extremes in Mindanao.  As noted by the anthropologist Thomas McKenna, “early 
rule by Americans in the Muslim Philippines followed a pattern quite similar to their 
governance of the rest of the colony - pious paternalism punctuated by often brutal 
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pacification operations.”8 Initially, American rule offered a reprieve for the Muslim south 
which was labelled “Moroland.”  The United States enacted a policy of indirect rule 
whereby native authorities and powerbrokers in the south were given considerable 
autonomy over local affairs in exchange for accepting American sovereignty over the 
Philippines.  This dynamic was codified in the 1899 Bates Treaty between the United 
States and the Sultan of Sulu, with subsequent agreements signed by other Muslim 
leaders.9  Unfortunately, this arrangment did not last and in 1904 President Theodore 
Roosevelt unilaterally abrogated the Bates Treaty and like agreements in a bid to 
establish direct control over Moroland.  The ensuing attempt to subjugate the Moro 
islands would last until 1913 and be notable for its brutality even by the grim standard of 
colonial warfare.  Of particular infamy was the battle of Bud Dajo on the island of Jolo 
where an estimated 600-1,000 Moro men, women and children were killed by American 
soldiers inside the crater of a volcano.10 
Yet, the violence of the Moro War belies a deeper link between the United States 
and the Moro people.  Even after the war’s end, the decentralized nature of American 
colonial rule afforded Muslim rulers a high degree of autonomy.11  Of even greater 
significance was the instrumental role that the United States played in fashioning a 
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distinct Moro identity.  McKenna argues that confronted with the fractious and divided 
population of the southern Philippines, the United States turned to Islam as a unifying 
factor.  Colonial policies promoted religion as the basis of a united Moro identity which 
the United States hoped would erode the sharp divides within the Muslim population and 
serve as an engine for economic development.12  Although the memories of America’s 
violent pacification campaigns certainly endure, the relatively conciliatory nature of 
American governance and the instrumental role of colonial era policies in cultivating a 
sense of Moro consciousness fostered a bond between Filipino-Muslims and the United 
States that ultimately survived the end of American rule. 
 Philippine independence in 1946 posed a unique challenge to the Moros.  
Whereas the American preference for decentralized governance had benefited the Moros, 
there was no guarantee that the newly independent government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP or RP) would embrace this approach.  These anxieties proved 
warranted as Philippine government policies prompted a mass influx of Christian 
migrants to Mindanao, triggering a dramatic shift in the region’s demographics and 
exacerbating the underlying ethno-religious tensions.  Beginning in the 1930s, Christian 
farmers began to migrate from the crowded northern islands such as Luzon to the less 
densely populated south.  This trend grew rapidly after independence as simply resettling 
Christian migrants in the South provided a convenient means of circumventing difficult 
questions about land reform and ownership.13  In the 1950s, as part of a peace agreement 
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with the communist Hukbalahap or Huk movement, the government of President Ramon 
Magsaysay enacted a program to resettle thousands of landless peasants to new plots in 
Mindanao.  Zachary Abuza characterized this policy: “whereby [the Philippine 
government] solved one insurgency, it unwittingly sowed the seeds of a new one.”14 
From merely being a minority within the Philippines, the Moros started to become 
minorities within areas that had historically been their homeland.15  
Sectarian tensions in Mindanao stoked by Christian migration smoldered 
continuously but did not erupt into open insurrection until the late 1960s.16  The 
triggering event was the Jabidah Massacre on March 18, 1968 when several Moro 
soldiers serving in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were executed on 
Corregidor Island by other army troops. 17 While the exact details of the incident remain 
contested, there is no question of its symbolic significance.  The betrayal and summary 
execution of Muslim soldiers by their AFP compatriots was seen as emblematic of the 
national government’s disdain for their Moro countrymen and disregard for their welfare.  
Two months after the Jabidah Massacre, Datu Udtog Matalam, a former governor of 
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Cotabato created the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) and issued a manifesto 
calling for the creation of an independent Moro state in the southern Philippines.18  
The short-lived MIM was immediately succeeded by the larger Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF).  Founded in 1969 by Dr. Nur Misuari, a former university 
professor, the MNLF was dedicated to establishing a secular, independent Moro 
homeland in the southern Philippines.  Over three years, Misuari gathered support for his 
movement from abroad, particularly Malaysia and Libya.  In 1972, following the 
institution of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos, the MNLF launched an armed 
uprising against the central government.19  Well-armed and able to field a force of over 
30,000 soldiers, the ensuing conflict between the MNLF and the AFP was characterized 
by bitter fighting and high casualties on both sides.20  The severity of the fighting 
eventually led both sides to seek an accord.  Negotiated by Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, 
the Tripoli Agreement was signed in December 1976.  The agreement devolved 
considerable authority over regional and religious affairs to local institutions and 
promised a future referendum on autonomy for all thirteen provinces in the Moro region.  
Unfortunately, the concessions made by the Marco’s government proved to be a sham 
and the MNLF would resume fighting within a year, though the conflict would not reach 
the severity that it had in the mid-1970s.21 
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Though the Tripoli Agreement floundered as a peace process it served as a 
catalyst for the fracturing of the Moro independence movement.  Disenchantment with 
Misauri’s leadership, ideology, tactics and management had been steadily swelling within 
the movement.  These frustrations were ultimately galvanized by the 1976 agreement.  At 
the MNLF central committee meeting in 1977, Misauri faced a leadership challenge from 
his erstwhile deputy Hashim Salamat.  After failing to wrest control of the MNLF from 
Misauri, Salamat led a breakaway faction of 57 MNLF officials known as “The New 
Leadership” or “The New MNLF.”  In 1984, after relocating its operations first to Egypt 
and then to Lahore Pakistan, Salamat rechristened his organization the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front or MILF.22 
The Tripoli Agreement was only the proximate cause for the splintering of the 
Moro independence movement.  Rather, the true genesis for the break lay in intrinsic 
differences in ideology and identity.  For Salamat and his followers, Misauri’s adherence 
to secular nationalism as the root ideology of the Moro independence movement 
neglected the critical role of Islam in that identity.  The MILF embraced a more 
conservative version of Islam and called not just for the creation of an independent 
homeland for the Moros, but one whose government used Islamic law as its basis.23  Of 
perhaps even greater significance than the role of political Islam in the rupturing of the 
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Moro Liberation Movement was the ethnic divides within the Moro people.  Misuari, a 
member of the Tausug ethnic group which is based in the Sulu archipelago and Tawi – 
Tawi islands, favored his own ethnic group within the MNLF hierarchy.  Salamat’s break 
with MNLF was as much driven by frustration with this ethnic bias as any deep 
ideological divide.24  The new MILF was molded not just from a more religious 
perspective on Moro identity, but also Salamat’s own Maguindanao ethnic group who are 
based in southwestern portions of main island of Mindanao.  
 In Pakistan, Salamat and his young MILF forged a relationship with the 
Mujahedeen who were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.  Several hundred MILF 
fighters were dispatched to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training and to participate in the 
Afghan-Soviet War.  This contribution to the Mujahedeen cause was driven more by 
pragmatism on the part of the MILF than by Islamic solidarity.  Specifically, MILF saw 
in the Mujahedeen an important training opportunity for its own fighters to gain new 
skills and techniques which could be brought back to Mindanao and employed against the 
Philippine government.25  It was during this period that the MILF came in contact with 
the future leaders of al-Qaeda and began an association which would prove mutually 
beneficial during subsequent decades.   
 With the ousting of Marcos in 1986 and the restoration of democracy in the 
Philippines, a window opened for reconciliation between Manila and the Moro 
insurgents.  The primary threat to the Philippine government during this period stemmed 
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not from the restive South but rather the resurgent New People’s Army (NPA), the armed 
wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and ideological heirs of the Huk 
movement.  To focus on the communist threat, the administration of both Corazon 
Aquino and Fidel Ramos made peace overtures to the two main Moro separatist groups.  
The MNLF proved receptive to these advances and moderated its stance to seeking 
autonomy rather than full independence.  In 1996, the MNLF signed a peace agreement 
and Nur Misuari was elected as the regional governor of the Autonomous Region in 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) the same year.26 
 However, the MILF reaffirmed its commitment to the cause of full Moro 
independence and continued its campaign against the Philippine government.  
Throughout the 1990s, the MILF gained strength, particularly as the MNLF’s power 
waned following the signing of its peace agreement.27  After gaining control of 
significant amount of territory on Mindanao, the MILF agreed to a ceasefire with the 
national government in 1997 to negotiate a peace treaty while possessing a position of 
strength in negotiations.28  Displeased with the lack of progress made by the peace 
initiatives and reported violations of the ceasefire, President Joseph Estrada ordered a 
renewal of hostilities against the MILF in 2000.  The AFP offensive captured much of 
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MILF territory including Camp Abubakar, which had been the largest of the MILF’s 
camps and had served as the MILF’s headquarters.  Yet, the AFP success was not without 
costs as tens of thousands of civilians were affected by the fighting and became internally 
displaced refugees.29  Perhaps of even greater concern was that the assault did not defeat 
the MILF but merely weakened its central authority.  As a result of the AFP offensive, 
individual MILF commanders assumed greater control over their own operations and 
began to act with greater independence.   
Rather than resolving the challenge posed by the MILF, President Estrada’s decision to 
seek a military solution only succeeded in further complicating the situation in Mindanao 
as actions of autonomous MILF commanders would prove to be a major obstacle to both 
GWOT and future peace initiatives.   
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Figure 6: Map of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 30 
 
 
Al-Qaeda in the Philippines: 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, terrorism thrived within the Philippines not 
out of a particular sense of malice towards Manila, but rather as a result of the extreme 
weakness of the Philippine state itself.31  The corrupt and authoritarian Marcos regime 
had hollowed out many government institutions during its long tenure and turned the 
Philippines into what Zachary Abuza labelled a “country of convenience.”32  Endemic 
corruption, poor law enforcement, a moribund judiciary and porous borders allowed both 
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foreign and domestic militants to operate with virtual impunity throughout the 
archipelago.  While al-Qaeda is notable for taking advantage of this opportunity, it was 
far from the only foreign organization to operate within the Philippines.  At various 
points, Abu Nidal, the Tamil Tigers, Hamas and Iraqi intelligence each had cells active in 
the Philippines either planning attacks or otherwise pursuing their own agendas.33 
 The harbinger of al-Qaeda’s interest in the Philippines was the arrival of 
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa in 1988.  Khalifa had been dispatched by his brother-in-law, 
Osama bin Laden, to the Philippines to recruit fighters from amidst the country’s 5 
million Muslims to join the Mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  
Once in the Philippines, Khalifa began to establish his own network of charitable and 
commercial enterprises which doubled as both his cover and means of funneling aid to 
allied groups.  He also married a local Moro woman who helped Khalifa establish ties 
with the MILF through her family connections.34 
 After a brief reprieve, Khalifa returned to the Philippines in 1991 with the goal of 
establishing a more permanent al-Qaeda presence.  As the regional director of the 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), a Saudi Arabian based charity, Khalifa 
dispersed millions of dollars in aid to militant organizations like the MILF and seed 
money for the budding Abu Sayyaf group.  Khalifa denied any wrongdoing during this 
period, but his benefactors from this period have been less reticent in discussing his role.  
MILF leaders have openly discussed accepting Khalifa’s patronage and an Abu Sayyaf 
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defector described the IIRO as only sponsoring construction and livelihood projects “in 
areas penetrated, highly influenced, and controlled by the rebel group, Abu Sayyaf.”35  
Former Philippine National Security Advisor (NSA) Roilo Golez has said of Khalifa that 
he “built up the good will of the community through charity and then turned segments of 
the population into agents.”36 
 Arguably the most important of Khalifa’s activities in the Philippines was 
cultivating links with the MILF.  Despite its historic ties to the Mujahedeen, in the 1990s 
the MILF had no interest in terrorism or global jihad.37  Rather it was exclusively 
preoccupied with own struggle against the Philippine government and maintaining the 
territory that it held in Mindanao.38  Yet, it was precisely the MILF’s control of territory 
that made the group such an attractive subject for al-Qaeda’s advances.  The combination 
of the permissive state of law enforcement in the Philippines and the MILF’s territorial 
holdings made Mindanao the ideal location for a regional training hub for al-Qaeda and 
its allies.  Such a facility would have the distinct advantage of being far easier for foreign 
fighters to reach than the established al-Qaeda camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border.  
This was particularly true for militants from nearby Malaysia and Indonesia who could 
easily cross to Mindanao via the permissive maritime border.39   
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 Although the MILF did not subscribe to al-Qaeda’s worldview, the bonds formed 
in the Mujahadeen camps during the MILF’s own infancy and the benefits of a tactical 
partnership were enough to persuade the MILF leadership to open its own camps to al-
Qaeda trainers.40  Not only did Mohammad Jamal Khalifa direct funds to MILF territories 
through his various charitable organizations as compensation, but al-Qaeda trainers also 
provided instruction to MILF fighters in order to sharpen their own skills.  Throughout 
the 1990s, al-Qaeda trainers were welcomed into the main MILF military headquarters, 
Camp Abu Bakar, and also had their own dedicated facility within the base, known as 
Camp Hudaibie, which was reportedly committed to the training of foreign fighters.41  
There are even unconfirmed reports that Osama bin Laden himself made a brief visit to 
Mindanao in the early 1990s.42  
 One of the instructors active in the Philippines during this period was Ramzi 
Yousef.  Born in Kuwait to Pakistani parents, Yousef studied electrical engineering in the 
United Kingdom.  After earning his degree, Yousef returned to Pakistan where he 
became active in the training camps in Peshawar and earned the moniker of “the 
chemist,” a nod to his skills as a bomb maker. Yousef was not a formal member of al-
Qaeda, but an associate of the organization and forerunner of what the group would 
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ultimately seek to become.43  It was in these camps that Yousef first came into contact 
with Moro fighters from the Philippines and where he befriended Abdurajak Janjalani, 
the eventual founder of Abu Sayyaf. 44 In December 1991, Yousef travelled to the 
Philippines where he spent several months as a trainer in the Mindanao camps and 
particularly on Basilan where he instructed ASG recruits in the craft of bomb making.45  
When Janjalani introduced his deputy, Edwin Angeles, to Yousef he called the young 
bomb maker “an emissary from bin Laden.”46 
 In May 1992, Yousef left the Philippines for Pakistan before ultimately travelling 
to the United States that September.  Once in the United States, Yousef organized his 
own cell by drawing on support from the Blind Sheik, Omar Abdel-Rahman, a radical 
cleric then active in the United States and based in the area around New York City.  Over 
succeeding months, Yousef masterminded and carried out the first World Trade Center 
bombing on February 26, 1993.  While many of his co-conspirators were arrested 
following the attack, Yousef managed to escape to Pakistan.47   
 Yousef returned to the Philippines in mid-1994.  Unlike his previous visit, Yousef 
did not base his operations in Mindanao, but rather took up residence in the Doña Josefa 
apartments on Quirino Avenue in Manila and began to organize his own cell.  Aiding 
Yousef was Wali Khan Amin Shah and Khalifa, who provided the financing.  Wali Khan 
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was another close associate of Osama bin Laden who specialized in logistics and 
affiliated with IIRO.48 Also occasionally joining Yousef in the Philippines was his 
maternal uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who would become the head of operations for 
al-Qaeda and the architect of the 9/11 attack.  When not availing themselves of the 
Philippines’ famous scuba diving and red light districts, Yousef and his colleagues began 
to plan a particularly spectacular series of attacks known as the Bojinka Plot.49    
 The Bojinka Plot was conceived as being three waves of attacks which would be 
conducted over a forty-eight hour period.  The first attack would be the assassination of 
the Pope during his visit to Manila in January 1995 for World Youth Day.  This attack 
would be followed by the near simultaneous detonation of bombs on 11 trans-Pacific 
airliners while in flight.  It was hoped that the midair bombings would kill upwards of 
4,000 people and shutdown global air traffic.  The third and final wave would be the 
acquisition of a small aircraft (either through theft, hijacking or purchase) which would 
be packed with explosives and crashed into CIA headquarters in Langley Virginia.50  It is 
this final phase of the Bojinka Plot which Khalid Sheik Mohammed would seize upon 
and use as the basis of the 9/11 attacks.51 
 In Manilla, Yousef with the help of some new recruits began to design and build 
the explosive devices which would be used during the attacks.  Throughout December 
1994 the group conducted a series of test detonations throughout the Philippines which 
injured several people.  On December 10, 1994, Yousef himself planted a miniature 
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device under the seat of a Philippine Airline flight between Manila and Tokyo which 
made a brief stop in Cebu en route.  Yousef disembarked in Cebu, and the device 
detonated mid-flight killing one passenger and injuring several others.  The Flight 434 
bombing was a dry run for the Bojinka Plot and proved that Yousef’s bombs would work 
successfully while on an aircraft in flight.   
 On the night of January 6, 1995, mere days before the Pope’s planned arrival, an 
accident derailed the plot.  A fire broke out in Yousef’s apartment while mixing 
chemicals for the bombs.  Unable to extinguish the blaze and chocking on the noxious 
chemical smoke, Yousef and his colleague Abdul Hakim Murad fled the scene.  
Firefighters responding to the incident were shocked to find the apartment full of 
dangerous materials and bomb making equipment.  Police arrested Murad, who had 
returned to the apartment to retrieve a laptop computer that had unwittingly been left 
behind, and soon uncovered the details of the Bojinka Plot.  The information on the 
laptop led police to a second apartment used by Wali Khan who was arrested on January 
11.52  However, Ramzi Yousef had already escaped, but would never again return to the 
Philippines.  On February 7, 1995, just over a month after fleeing Manila, Yousef was 
arrested in Pakistan and subsequently extradited to the United States to stand trial for the 
World Trade Center bombing.53  He is presently serving two life sentences at the 
Supermax prison complex in Florence, Colorado. 
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 The foiling of the Bojinka Plot and the disruption of the Ramzi Yousef cell 
illustrated the inadequacies of counterterrorism efforts in the Philippines instead of its 
strengths.  Not only had Yousef, one of the FBI’s Most Wanted, operated with impunity 
in Manila for months, he had only been prevented from carrying out a brazen series of 
attacks by a freak accident rather than judicious police work.  Within three days of his 
arrest, Wali Khan managed to escape from police custody only to be apprehended in 
Malaysia the following month and eventually extradited to the United States.54  Despite 
uncovering evidence linking the cell to Khalifa and the IIRO, police were unable to take 
serious action against either.  The government did successfully deny Khalifa’s subsequent 
attempts to reenter the country, but significant pressure from Saudi Arabia prevented the 
Philippines from taking any stronger action against the IIRO which remained active in 
the country.55  Perhaps most glaring of all is that Abu Sayyaf, the native terrorist 
organization that Ramzi Yousef had encouraged, nurtured, and at times depended on, 
remained an enduring threat to Philippine security.   
The Abu Sayyaf:  
 Abdurajak Janjalani was born on Basilan as the son of a local ulama (Islamic 
scholar).  After undertaking his own religious studies in Libya and Saudi Arabia, 
Janjalani travelled to Afghanistan in 1987 where he emerged as a leader of the Filipino 
faction of the Mujahedeen.56  Janajalani and his two younger brothers, Khaddafy and 
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Hector, underwent training in the al-Qaeda training camps in Khost where he first met 
Osama bin Laden.57  It was also during this period that Janjalani befriended Ramzi 
Yousef.   
 Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Janjalani’s focus 
shifted to the struggle in his own homeland and the prospect of waging jihad in the 
Philippines.  Both bin Laden and Yousef encouraged Janajalani in this endeavor and 
offered their support.  Given the MILF’s hesitancy towards terrorist operations at the 
time, a native organization in the Philippines more closely aligned with the ideology of 
al-Qaeda would be a boon for the network and a key means of expanding its influence.58  
Janajalani began to make frequent trips from Peshawar to Basilan where he had family 
connections and standing within the religious community.  In 1991, Janjalani officially 
formed his own organization which he called Al Harakat Al Islamiyya.  However, he 
soon changed the name of his new group the Abu Sayyaf which is typically translated to 
mean “bearer of the sword.”59 
 Abu Sayyaf was deeply inspired by the Salafist School of Muslim thought then 
gaining strengthen in the wider Middle East that advocated a strict adherence to a 
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puritanical version of Islam.60  ASG’s fundamentalist approach to Islam stood in contrast 
to the less austere variety of the religion popular in Mindanao and espoused by the 
group’s MNLF and MILF rivals.  ASG’s also adopted a hardline approach to the political 
future of Mindanao.  Even as both MILF and especially the MNLF were shifting towards 
accepting the creation of an autonomous Muslim state within the Philippines, ASG 
remained unequivocally committed to the idea of secession and the creation of an 
independent Moro state governed by Islamic law.  ASG’s philosophy was encapsulated in 
a manifesto written by Janjalani and known as the “Four Basic Truths” of Abu Sayyaf. 
1: Not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle, but to serve as a bridge 
and balance between the MNLF and MILF, whose revolutionary roles and 
leadership cannot be ignored or usurped 
  
2: Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government whose 
“nature, meaning, emblem and objective” are basic to peace. 
 
3: Its advocacy of war is a necessity for as long as there exist oppression, 
injustice, capricious ambitions, and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims. 
 
4: It believes that “the war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and 
real objective of humanity – the establishment of justice and righteousness for all 
under the law of noble Quran and the purified Sunnah.”61 
 
 Janjalani envisioned ASG as a highly centralized organization with a defined 
structure and clear areas of responsibility between subsidiary organs.62  From its 
inception, ASG was strongest on the island of Basilan – where Janjalani had family 
connections – and throughout the Sulu archipelago.  ASG largely drew its personnel from 
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the Tausug, the ethnic group to which Janjalani belonged.63  Of particular importance to 
the young organization was Janjalani’s ability to attract disgruntled MNLF commanders 
who had grown disillusioned with Nur Misuari’s leadership and rejected the peace 
process with the Philippine government.64 Persistent accusations, notably from journalists 
Marites Dañguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria, assert that during its early days the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (or at least factions therein) abetted the growth of ASG as a 
means of weakening the larger Moro factions and serving as an agent provocateur for 
their own ends.65  Beyond what role the AFP may have had in ASG’s growth, throughout 
this period Janjalani also received considerable help from the friends he had made in 
Pakistan.  Osama bin Laden became a patron of the ASG via Khalifa and the IIRO while 
Ramzi Yousef trained ASG operatives in bomb making during his 1992 sojourn in the 
Philippines.66  
 Abu Sayyaf’s strategy centered on waging a violent guerilla campaign against the 
Christians in Mindanao with the goal of using terror to drive them from the region.67  The 
first attack attributed to Abu Sayyaf occurred in April 4, 1991 when a grenade killed two 
American missionaries in Zamboanga City.68  This attack was followed by a similar 
grenade attack in the port of Zamboanga aboard the MV Doulos, a floating Christian 
                                                 
63 For insightful examination on the nexus between ASG and traditional Tausug alliance networks see 
Ugarte, Alliance System.  Also Thomas Kiefer’s examination of the Tausug in general.  Thomas Kiefer. The 
Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society. (New York, NY: Waveland Press, Inc., 1972). 
64 Janjalani’s past association with the MNLF undoubtedly helped in this process. Abuza, Balik Terror, 3-5; 
Banlaoi, Banditry to Terrorism, 248. 
65 Speculated benefits for the AFP include the using the ASG to justify continued budget expenditures as 
well as overlapping criminal networks – particularly in smuggling and the black market for hard wood – 
with corrupt officers.  Vitug, Crescent Moon, 200-17l;  Banalaoi, Banditry to Terrorism, 247-248. 
66 Abuza Balik Terror, 3-4; Abuza, Militant Islam, 100; Banlaoi, Banditry to Terrorism, 247-249. 
67 East, Terror Truncated.   




library operated by a German charity.  Eight people were killed in the attack on the 
Doulos and over 30 were injured.69  Bombings of Christian institutions and communities 
emerged as a hallmark of the ASG including a grenade attack on a cathedral in Davao on 
Boxing Day 1993 and a series of bombings in Zamboanga on June 10, 1994 which killed 
over 71 people.70   
 Abu Sayyaf’s operations were not confined to its partiality for explosions. Under 
the leadership of Janajalani the group first developed its predilection for kidnappings and 
at times abducted nuns, priests and missionaries.  The ASG’s most brazen operation 
occurred on April 4, 1995 when its operatives sacked the western Mindanao town of Ipil.  
In addition to looting and burning much of the predominantly Christian town, ASG killed 
53 residents and wounded another 48.71 According to Abuza, “between 1991and 1996, 
the Abu Sayyaf Group was responsible for 67 terrorist attacks, more than half of which 
were indiscriminant bombing.”72 
 When Ramzi Yousef returned to the Philippines in 1994, his Manila based cell 
operated independently of Abu Sayyaf.  However, ASG did play a supporting role in 
Yousef’s undertaking, such as accepting responsibility for the Flight 434 test detonation, 
and likely would have been tapped to carry out the plan had the Bojinka plot moved 
forward.73  Even though ASG was not intimately involved in the Bojinka plot, the 
unravelling of the Ramzi Yousef cell was still a major blow to the organization.  Yousef 
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had constituted the ASG’s clearest line to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and his loss 
was irreplaceable.  Though ASG had other foreign sponsors, such as Libya and 
Hezbollah, most of its financial support had come from the IIRO.74  While the 
organization remained active in the Philippines, its funds were primarily directed towards 
the MILF to the detriment of the ASG.  Attempts to reconcile the two groups during the 
1990s floundered owing to their mutual antipathy.75  Absent their largest financial patron, 
ASG would turn to criminality rather than jihad as an alternative means of funding itself. 
 A second major blow befell ASG in December 1998 when Janjalani died during a 
shootout with police.  This setback was compounded the following month when Edwin 
Angeles, who had served as Janjalani’s deputy since ASG’s inception, was arrested by 
police and immediately became an informant.76  Though the ASG had never obtained the 
degree of centralization that Janjalani had envisioned, he had been instrumental in 
holding the organization together.  More importantly, it had been Janjalani’s commitment 
to Islamic fundamentalism that had provided the group with its ideological 
underpinnings.77  With his death, the group would undergo a metamorphosis away from 
the potent vanguard of Jihad in Southeast Asia that Janjalani had conceived and towards 
an altogether more amorphous entity.  Yet, the changes in Abu Sayyaf following 
Janjalani’s death would alter neither the group’s gumption nor its lethality. 
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Figure 7: Major Militant Groups in the Philippines: 2000-2008 
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individuals involved in specific groups from entering the United States. 
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MNLF Largely secular, nationalist 
movement seeking autonomy for 
Muslim areas in Mindanao. Signed 
a peace agreement with the 






MILF Moderate Islamist group that broke 
from MNLF in the 1980s.  Has 
historically sought an independent 
Islamic state in southern 
Philippines, but has since moved 
towards accepting autonomy.   
No78 
Abu Sayyaf ASG Islamist group inspired by al-Qaeda 
that seeks an independent Muslim 
state governed by strict adherence 
to Islamic law.  Both centralization 
and religiosity vary throughout its 







NPA Armed wing of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and 
remains the largest armed group in 
the country.  It maintains a country-
wide presence, but is particularly 






JI Al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast 
Asia.  Focused on Indonesia but 





PG Non-political criminal organization 








Scenes from a Marriage: The Death and Rebirth of US-RP Defense Relations  
 
Base Disagreement: 
 The rise of Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines coincided with the nadir in US-RP 
defense relations.  Since Admiral George Dewey first steamed into Manila Bay to 
confront the Spanish fleet in May 1898, the United States had maintained a near constant 
military presence in the Philippines.81  The physical presence of American forces in the 
Philippines had served as the defining characteristic of the defense relationship and the 
primary means of defense engagement. Central to this dynamic were the two massive 
military bases which the United States operated in the Philippines.  The Subic Bay Naval 
Station, located in Olongapoa on western Luzon, served as the forward base of the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet and was a sprawling facility that itself was roughly the size of Singapore.82  
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MBG Breakaway MNLF faction loyal to 
Nur Misuari.  Rebelled in 2001 
after Misuari refused to stepdown 
as ARMM governor. 





RSM Radical Filipino converts who seek 
to spread Islam throughout the 
archipelago and return the 






Further north in Central Luzon was Clark Air Base which at its height housed over 
30,000 people and was physically the largest overseas U.S. military facility.83 Though 
both bases were founded during American colonial rule, the United States maintained 
access to the facilities after Philippine independence under the generous terms of the 
1947 Military Base Agreement.  The Agreement afforded the United States the use of 
vast tracks of land rent-free for the period of 99 years.  In 1966, the terms of the 
agreement were refined which amongst other changes limited the term of the agreement 
to 25 years which moved the termination date forward to 1991 though with the possibility 
of renewal at that time. 84 
Throughout the Cold War, the two bases anchored the America’s military 
presence in Southeast Asia and functioned as regional bulwarks amid the effort to contain 
the spread of communism in Asia.  Not only did the bases underpin American strategy 
and prove invaluable during the conflict in Vietnam, but they also served as the primary 
means for fulfilling America’s obligation to the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT).  Signed in 1951 and ratified the following year, the MDT is the 
bedrock of the US-RP alliance and commits both countries aiding in their mutual defense 
in the event that either party is attacked.85  In practice, the MDT manifest in a division of 
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responsibilities in the Philippines whereby the United States, via its forces at Clark and 
Subic Bay, assumed responsibility for the external defense of the Philippines while the 
AFP was responsible for internal security and combatting the various domestic 
insurgencies that plagued the Philippines.86   
By 1991, when the base agreement was set to expire, cracks within this 
arrangement were becoming apparent.  A 1988 Pentagon review, reconsidering the 
importance of the bases and the overall waning of the Soviet threat in the Pacific, led 
American defense planners to downgrade the importance of both Clark and Subic Bay.87  
This shift in American strategic thinking was matched by a similar changes within the 
Philippines.  Whereas the threat from external sources was seemingly becoming more 
benign, the challenges posed by insurgencies within the Philippines were steadily 
mounting.  These domestic issues gradually came to dominate strategic thinking in 
Manila and were issues that the U.S. military presence within the country could not 
resolve.88  
Yet, the changes in the strategic environment of Southeast Asia paled in 
comparison to the political transformation in Manila.  The ousting of Ferdinand Marcos 
in 1986 restored democracy to the Philippines and ushered in a new political era less 
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friendly to the American military.  While in power, Ferdinand Marcos had largely 
enjoyed the backing of the United States and particularly the military establishment who 
supported Marcos both as a means of protecting its military bases in the Philippines and 
advancing the wider anti-communist cause in the region.89  Following the People Power 
revolution that removed Marcos, there was a need to also purge the vestiges of his rule 
and infrastructure that had sustained him in power.  Noted Assistant Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs for American Affairs, Maria Andrelita Austria, noted “part of this process, the 
cleansing and catharsis, was getting rid of all of that baggage that went with the Marcos 
regime and to many the presence of the U.S. bases were a reminder – especially on the 
political far left – of the belief that US was still pulling the strings.”90   
This Philippine backlash against the American military presence and past 
interloping was codified in Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Philippine constitution 
which holds: 
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the 
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign 
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except 
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so 
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national 
referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other 
contracting State.91 
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For the United States to renew its base agreement with the Philippines, Washington first 
needed to overcome the suspicions of the Filipino people and the skepticism of an often 
hostile Philippine Senate.   
 These challenges were further compounded by the ill-timed eruption of Mount 
Pinatubo.  The eruption, the second largest volcanic eruption of the 20th century, 
significantly damaged facilities at both Clark and Subic Bay which were located near the 
volcano.  Clark in particular sustained significant damage and the destruction forced 
Washington to reconsider both the value of the two bases and the negotiating terms for 
their renewal.92  Despite this unexpected complication, an accord was reached to extend 
the American presence at Subic Bay for another decade for which the Philippines would 
receive $203 million as compensation.  Yet, the new agreement still needed to pass 
muster with the Philippine Senate.  What ensued was a protracted and impassioned 
debate during which the terms of the new pact were sharply critiqued.  On September 16, 
1991 with a vote of 11 in favor and 12 against, the senate rejected the agreement 
scrapping both 11 months of negotiations and removing any hope of keeping the bases 
open.93  President Corazon Aquino offered a three year period for America’s phased 
withdrawal from the archipelago, but this proposition was rejected by President George 
H.W. Bush who instead enacted a much faster withdrawal period of one year.  On 
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November 24, 1992 Subic Bay was officially handed over to the Philippine government 
ending nearly a century of American military presence in the Philippines.   
 
The Death of Defense Cooperation: 
After the closure of the American bases, Assistant Secretary Austria described a 
sense of euphoria amongst Filipinos and a pride at “showing the world that we could 
stand on our own.”94  However, this sentiment was tempered by the gravity of the 
decision that had been made and the uncertainties which lay ahead. “We also had to face 
the hard facts of whether our military was prepared.  Did we have enough internal 
domestic capabilities for the challenges at the time?”95  The decision to reject the base 
agreement with the United States had been an emotional one fueled by past American 
transgressions and a desire to affirm Philippine sovereignty.  Justified though such 
sentiments were, the termination of the American base agreement revealed difficult truths 
about the AFP and the overall state of Philippine defense capabilities. 
Dating back to the colonial period, the AFP and the U.S. military had always 
maintained a close relationship which Director Carlos Sorretta of the Foreign Service 
Institute describes “as being almost incestuous.”96  However, the proximity of the 
relationship masked the significant and often deleterious impact of this arrangement on 
the AFP as a military institution. Specifically, with the United States assuming primary 
responsibility for the Philippines’ external defense, the AFP’s own capacity to defend the 
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archipelago had remained stunted and underdeveloped.  Notably, the AFP’s equipment 
was painfully obsolete with the Philippine Air Force’s combat assets consisting of F-5 
fighters that were over 30 years old and a Navy whose vessels typically dated to World 
War II.97 Aware of its own limitations and the importance of the U.S. military to 
Philippine security, AFP leaders had lobbied on behalf of renewing the base agreement.  
Failing that, the AFP sought to delay the departure of U.S. forces as long as possible in 
order to have time to develop their own capacities and avoid creating a security 
vacuum.98 “We had some radars and some ships and some fighters, but that was not 
enough because our own inventory only just complimented the security umbrella the U.S. 
had provided to us.”99  Adding to the AFP’s woes was a derelict support structure that 
had atrophied under American patronage.  While entrenched at Clark and Subic, the 
United States had helped the Filipinos with basic military services like procurement 
assistance, supply chain management, logistics and routine maintenance. The departure 
of American forces removed these key organizational pillars, forcing the AFP to rapidly 
assume responsibility for these areas and often develop these capacities from scratch.100  
The sad result was that what independent capabilities the AFP possessed were further 
sapped by poor maintenance and lack of upkeep. In 1999 Secretary of National Defense 
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Orlando Mercado grimly quipped that the Philippines had, “a navy that cannot go out to 
sea and an air force that cannot fly.”101 
Despite the damage to the bilateral relationship wrought by the rejection of the 
base agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty remained in place and both Washington and 
Manila strove to find a new equilibrium for the defense relationship.  With the ending of 
the physical American presence in the Philippines, the tenor of defense cooperation 
shifted from one of direct engagement to defense diplomacy.  Defense diplomacy had 
always been a critical component of the US-RP defense relationship dating to the 
establishment of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in 1947 to 
aid the recently independent Philippines develop its military institutions.102  The 
importance of defense diplomacy is codified in Article II of the MDT which dictates that 
both parties, “separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”103  The American 
bases had greatly facilitated joint training efforts with AFP forces regularly training with 
their American counterparts stationed in the Philippines.104  Of particular importance 
were the Balikatan exercise which translates to “Shoulder-to-Shoulder.”  Starting in 1981 
and held on an annual basis, Balikatan was a comprehensive joint training program 
involving thousands of soldiers designed to strengthen interoperability and cooperation 
between US and RP forces.105  Similarly, the AFP had enthusiastically embraced 
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initiatives like the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program which 
allowed foreign officers to undergo specialized training in the United Sates.  Between 
1970 and 1992, an average of 426 AFP officers participated in IMET each year 
accounting for one of the program’s largest contingents (See Figure 4).106  Finding a way 
to sustain this level of cooperation in the absence of the American bases became the 
primary focus of both U.S. and Philippine strategic planners. 
 
 
Figure 8: AFP Participation in IMET  107 
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A key driver behind continued defense engagement was President Fidel Ramos 
who was elected president in 1992.  Ramos, a graduate of both West Point and the 
University of Illinois, recognized the necessity of continued defense cooperation and 
strove to keep undertakings like Balikatan alive even after the base closures.  Working 
closely with JUSMAG, Ramos crafted a program of ship visits and exercises (including 
Balikatan) designed to both sustain the benefits of defense engagement and signal 
America’s continued commitment to the Philippines.108  Despite the best of intentions 
even this modest extension of defense cooperation could not escape the fallout from the 
base issue and lingering hostility towards the American military involvement.  An 
unintended consequence of the scrapping of the base treaty was that no other agreement 
existed between the United States and the Philippines governing the status of American 
forces within the archipelago.  Rather, all elements of defense engagement including the 
legal standing of American soldiers and the authorization for stationing equipment within 
the archipelago were equally voided when the base agreement expired.109  This placed the 
continuation of joint training exercises in the Philippines after 1992 on tenuous legal 
ground.  Neither Ramos nor the opponents of the American military were ignorant of this 
fact and each endeavored to resolve the issue.  Via an executive order, Ramos asserted 
that the Status of Forces Agreement contained within the base treaty remained in effect 
even though the wider agreement had lapsed.  The United States and Ramos further 
sought to bolster this stance in 1994 with an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
                                                 





designed to mitigate the AFP’s logistical woes.110 However, the antagonism that had first 
scuttled the base agreement had yet to dissipate in Manila.  The Cross-Service Agreement 
was rejected by the Senate in a bruising defeat, which left the Ramos administration 
scarred and reluctant to more forcefully pursue a formal Status of Forces Agreement.111  
Furthermore, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that Ramos’ executive order on the 
Status of Forces had been unconstitutional and abrogated the order.  As a result, 
American forces lost what legal standing they had in the Philippines and in 1996 the 
decision was made to suspend all joint exercises between the U.S. and the Philippines.112 
Manila was not alone in driving the breakdown in defense cooperation as 
Washington too was culpable for the collapse.  Stung by the rejection of the base 
agreement and the abrupt expulsion of American forces, Congress and the Clinton 
administration looked to their aid budget as a means of retribution.  Following the base 
closures both American support for Philippine participation in the IMET program and aid 
to the AFP dropped sharply (Figure 1).  Nowhere was this shift more evident than in 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) which is the primary means through which the United 
States financially supports allied forces.  From its peak of $185.5 million in 1991, FMF 
assistance to the Philippines dropped precipitously to $0 by 1994 (Figure 2).113  After the 
1996 Supreme Court ruling stripping American soldiers of their legal protection, the 
Clinton Administration and Pentagon effectively barred U.S. military personnel from 
                                                 
110 De Castro, “Revitalized,” 977. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid.; For a critical view consult George Baylon Radics. “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan 
exercises in the Philippines and the US ‘War against Terrorism’.” Stanford Journal of East Asian 
Affairs 4(2) (2004): 115-127. 




entering the Philippines.114  The only American military presence in the Philippines were 
a handful of officers attached to the U.S. Embassy who advised their AFP counterparts 
and occasionally took part in tabletop exercises.115  While the Philippine Senate may have 
merely wished to shutter the facilities at Clark and Subic Bay the effects of its actions 
went far beyond this aim.  Rather than simply ending the American bases in the 
Philippines, the rejection of the base agreement and the political maelstrom that followed 




Figure 9: FMF Aid to Philippines 116 
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The Visiting Force Agreement: 
 With the closure of its bases, the Pentagon informed the Philippines that 
Washington could no longer guarantee the external defense of the Philippines.117  
Lacking the ability to provide for its own external defense, the Philippines instead turned 
to regional engagement as a means of ensuring its safety amid the security vacuum 
created by the American departure.  In particular, the Philippines aimed to use the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Regional Forum to 
promote its security through preventative diplomacy.118  Through proactive engagement, 
Manila hoped to forestall any threat from abroad while affording the AFP the time it 
required to modernize its capabilities and quell the ongoing domestic insurgencies. 
 However, limits of this strategy were exposed by People Republic of China’s 
(PRC or China) as Beijing began to aggressively press its claim to the South China Sea.  
In February 1995, it was discovered that the Chinese military had built three structures on 
Mischief Reef, a large shoal located just 135 miles off the Philippine coast which had 
been claimed by Manila as part of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone under the 
Law of the Sea Treaty.119  The Philippines attempted to resolve the crisis through 
multilateral diplomacy without success.  While ASEAN members shared Manila’s 
concern about the PRC’s actions, their efforts to redress the grievance were ineffectual.  
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Nor was Mischief Reef an isolated incident, but rather the forerunner of a series of 
encroachments by China into areas of the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines.  
Repeated incidents at Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef highlighted the inability of 
multilateral action through ASEAN to successfully constrain Chinese assertiveness.120  
Worse, the frequent episodes illustrated that the Philippines could neither ignore threats 
to its external security nor rely on the AFP to successfully provide for its defense.  Even 
as the domestic insurgencies seethed, it was the actions by China and the need for a 
legitimate means of external defense that provided the impetus to revitalize the US-RP 
alliance.   
 The incident at Mischief Reef was a rude awakening for both Manila and 
Washington.  Despite the acrimony over the base closures, the two allies shared key 
strategic and political interests that had been ill served by their mutual recalcitrance.  The 
decision to reinvigorate defense ties was not a capitulation by either party, but rather a 
shared recognition of the alliance’s continued importance.  
 Washington’s frustrations at the rejection of the 1991 base agreement did not 
negate either the continued importance of the Philippines to the United States’ posture as 
a Pacific power or the importance of its former facilities within the archipelago.  As it 
had been the fading dangers of the Cold War that had first led the United States to 
reevaluate the continued utility of its facilities on Luzon, the emergence of China as a 
peer-competitor and Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea reinforced their strategic 
                                                 




significance.121  The standoffs at Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal underscored these 
considerations.  As long as the Mutual Defense Treaty remained in effect, the United 
States needed a realistic means of fulfilling its obligations to protect the Philippines.122  
Cutting military aid to the AFP and forgoing broader engagement had been contrary to 
this goal.  Furthermore, in allowing the bilateral relationship to wither, the United States 
stood the risk of losing its influence within the Philippines.  Confronted by a burgeoning 
China, Washington worried that leaders in Manila would find it easier to ally with the 
growing regional power rather than resist its expansion.123  The United States hoped that 
rekindling defense ties would both serve as a means of anchoring the alliance and provide 
an avenue for a wider improvement in relations between the two disjointed partners. 
Whilst the American motives for reengagement were shaped by geopolitical 
calculus, the process within the Philippines followed a more introspective path.  The 
decision to reject the base agreement had been an emotional one that had not been 
grounded in strategic considerations.  Clark and Subic had been intimately associated 
with the coddling of the Marcos regime by the United States and their removal had been a 
necessary act of liberation from the legacies of his rule and the neocolonial policies that 
perpetuated his time in office.124  Yet, having successfully removed these bastions of 
historical repression, the Philippines confronted mounting internal and external threats as 
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well as the insufficiency of its own military to redress these problems.  In an effort to 
grasp the scale of the problem, the Philippine government undertook a comprehensive 
survey of its defense infrastructure in 1995.  Former Undersecretary for National Defense 
Antonio Santos wryly remarked, “after the Americans left we conducted a review of our 
military capabilities and realized that we didn’t have any.”125 The review was sweeping 
in both its criticism and its conclusions.  While calling for the AFP to develop its own 
capacity for external defense and operating independently of the United States, the 
review also concluded that the Philippines only had a limited ability to generate these 
new capabilities on its own.126  Ironically, the 15 year AFP modernization plan resulting 
from the review was repeatedly delayed because of political inaction and plagued by 
budget shortfalls.127  For the Philippines, reviving defense relations with the United States 
constituted both the best method of guaranteeing its security and a necessary means of 
expediting its own military development.  
 The solution to the quandaries faced by both Washington and Manila was not a 
restoration of America’s bases, but a reactivation of the defense diplomacy programs that 
had expired amid the tumult of the base closures.  In 1996, negotiations began on the 
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).  The VFA was not a rehashing of the discarded 1991 
agreement or a prescriptive treaty on how the alliance would function.  Rather the VFA 
provided a legal framework governing the status and privileges of American forces while 
in the Philippines.  In effect the VFA functioned as a replacement for the Status of Forces 
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agreement that had lapsed with the base agreement and allowed for the temporary 
deployment of U.S. forces to the Philippines for the purpose of fulfilling the MDT’s 
requirement for joint training and support.128  “It was a convergence of interests,” 
recalled Undersecretary Eduardo S.L Oban Jr. who formerly served as AFP Chief of Staff 
and the Executive Director of the Presidential Commission on the Visiting Forces 
Agreement which oversees the implementation of the VFA. “Both parties realized that to 
implement the Mutual Defense Treaty we needed to continue exercising and joint 
training, and so we did.  But we have to define how we’re going to treat American forces 
when they’re on Philippine soil and that’s what the VFA was.”129 
 Contained within the diplomacy surrounding the VFA was a broader re-
envisioning of the US-RP alliance and how it would function.  Admiral Dennis Blair, 
then Commander U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), addressed the issue of the VFA 
during a Congressional Hearing in 2000.  Blair labelled the VFA, “a good step in 
reestablishing basic workmen-like relations between the armed forces of the Philippines 
and our armed forces.”  However, he conceded that “the military operational relationship 
is going to be different in the future from what it was in the past,” when it had “relied on 
big bases of the United States in the Philippines and very little military activity by the 
Philippines themselves.”  Instead, in this new chapter in the defense relationship, “the 
Philippines assume more of an operational role in this relationship, not simply the base 
support relationship, which was there in the past.”130   
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 Echoing Blair on the need for defense engagement, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security, Franklin Kramer at the same hearing urged the 
improving of IMET and FMF programs with the Philippines 
“There is nothing that we do, period, from a military point of view that is more 
valuable internationally than the IMET and the [FMF] training that we do.  If this 
Committee could do one single thing to enhance that IMET capability and to 
provide that ability to work with these countries through the use of funding, it 
would be terrifically valuable.”131 
 
The message from both Blair and Kramer was unequivocal.  Instead of returning to the 
security dynamic of the Cold War, under the VFA the United States would rely on an 
expansive defense diplomacy agenda to bolster the capacity of the AFP and ensure that it 
would function as a partner in regional security rather than as an auxiliary. 
 After difficult negotiations which spanned over a year and had been complicated 
by the intricacies of the Philippine constitution and the political sensitivities of both 
countries, the VFA was signed by both countries on February 10, 1998.  The signing of 
the agreement marked a triumph for bilateral relations, but the VFA still needed to pass 
through the crucible of the Philippine Senate which needed to ratify the accord.  Within 
the Philippines, the VFA faced a familiar chorus of critics including the communist NPA 
who cited the proposed agreement as a justification for ending peace talks with the 
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government and resuming attacks.132  “The problem is political,” notes Deputy Director 
of the Foreign Service Institute Julio Amador III.  “There is a kneejerk reaction to 
anything that is pro-American ever since the bases,” with “left wing-groups, nationalists 
of all stripes and politicians looking to score political points.”133   
When pressed to categorize the nature of opposition to the VFA within the 
Philippines, Assistant Secretary Austria stated that while the U.S. and RP were natural 
partners, there was still baggage from the colonial era.  
There is always at the back of our mind this idea that we are no longer a colony, 
that the relationship should be more equitable.  There is this degree of 
consciousness about Philippine sovereignty, the need to protect Philippine 
sovereignty and a need to be perceived as equal in a way that may not be present 
in other defense relationships.134  
 
 The criticism levelled at the VFA and fears of a permanent U.S. military presence 
in the Philippines paralleled the debate from 1991.135 However, the context surrounding 
the deliberations on the VFA were strikingly different.  While protectiveness over 
Philippine sovereignty remained potent, China had emerged as a direct threat to this 
autonomy with the AFP showing itself to be woefully unprepared for the task of external 
defense.  These conditions could neither be wished away nor easily ignored.  Emblematic 
of how the dynamic had shifted were the actions of President Joseph Estrada and 
Secretary of National Defense Mercado.  As Senators, both Estrada and Mercado had 
opposed the 1991 Base Agreement, but now joined the AFP in vigorously lobbying their 
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former colleagues on behalf of the VFA.136  With a vote of 18-5 the Senate voted to ratify 
the VFA on May 27, 1999.  Opponents of the VFA would repeatedly challenge the 
constitutionality of the VFA, but the Philippine Supreme Court would consistently 
uphold its legality. 
The VFA restored legal status to U.S. soldiers in the Philippines.  Joint training 
programs resumed in January 2000 with a new round of Balikatan exercises commencing 
that February.  In October 2000, the Pentagon announced an exchange of defense experts 
with the Philippines for the express purpose of evaluating the needs of the AFP and 
developing a program for sustained American assistance to promote the AFP’s 
institutional development.  As much as the VFA rekindled defense relations between 
Washington and Manila it also enshrined defense diplomacy as the bedrock of the 
alliance.   
How to Succeed in Infamy:  The New ASG 
 
After Abdurajak: 
 As the US-RP alliance adapted to a new age in bilateral affairs, Abu Sayyaf was 
undergoing its own transformation.  After the death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, 
titular command of the organization passed to his younger brother Khaddafi Janjalani.  
Possessing neither the stature nor renown of his older brother, Khaddafi in essence 
became a figurehead.   Effective control of ASG was assumed by Khaddafi’s 
subordinates Aldam Tilao (aka Abu Sabaya) & Galib Andang (aka Commander 
                                                 




Robot).137  Though maintaining Abu Sayyaf’s rhetorical commitment to Islamic 
fundamentalism and Moro independence, both were motivated more by criminality than 
jihadi fervor. Incidentally, in the years following Abdurajak Janjalani’s death Abu Sayyaf 
witnessed an ascendance in its size and notoriety even as both its central structure and 
doctrine paled.138 
 Abdurajak Janjalai’s attempts to organize ASG’s operations under a central 
authority died along with him.  In the aftermath of his death, the group he had founded 
would be defined by its splintering rather than its unity.  The group would primarily be 
divided between two wings: one centered in the Sulu Archipelago (especially Jolo) under 
the leadership of Commander Robot and a second faction based on Basilan and 
commanded by Khaddafi Janjalani but actually run by Abu Sabaya.  Yet, these lines of 
demarcation are insufficient to encompass ASG which increasingly was composed of 
autonomous sub-factions which operated independently of any single command 
authority.139  Gerdes, Ringler, and Autin contend that it is difficult to characterize ASG as 
a terrorist organization owing to its effective lack of organization.  Specifically, its lack 
of formal structure, resulted in a limited ability to pass on knowledge and skills.  ASG 
was “less of a group/organization than a ‘loosely coupled network’ in which no party can 
                                                 
137 Andang adopted the nom de guerre of Commander Robot because he reportedly could dance like 
Michael Jackson. Gutierrez, “Moro Conflict,” 50. 
138 East, Truncated, 3. 
139 Banlaoi, “Banditry to Terrorism,” 252-253; Abuza, Militant Islam, 112;  East, Truncated; Ugarte, 






make a binding decision for the others.”140  Rather than mirroring the institutional 
structure of groups like al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf increasingly came to resemble, and in 
many ways merge with, the traditional Tausug alliance system that was already in place 
and which encompassed much of its membership.141 
 The decentralization of Abu Sayyaf paralleled a shift in its mode of operations.  
With the loss of support from Khalifa and the IIRO, Abu Sayyaf turned to criminal 
enterprises as a means of funding its operations.  While the organization had always been 
involved in illicit networks (notably extortion, smuggling, marijuana cultivation and 
trafficking in hardwoods), these ventures into organized crime became ends in 
themselves.142  ASG’s transition towards criminal pursuits was most evident in the rapid 
growth of the kidnap-for-ransom episodes which became the hallmark of the 
organization.  The practice entailed Abu Sayyaf (or more accurately a faction thereof) 
abducting individuals and holding them hostage until a ransom was paid.  If a ransom or 
other negotiated solution was not forthcoming, the kidnapped victim was often executed 
via a beheading.   
The prevalence of kidnappings during this period speaks to the distinct relations 
between ASG and the wider population in Mindanao. Whereas both the MNLF and the 
MILF endeavored to form functioning quasi-governments in areas under their authority 
                                                 
140 Luke Gerdes,, Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin. “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strategic and 
Learning Capacities.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37(3) (2014), 287. 
141 Ugarte also argues the moniker “Abu Sayyaf” was liberally and often inappropriately applied to all 
criminal gangs operating in the area by outside factions like the AFP in an attempt to shape media 
narratives about the ongoing situation in Mindanao.  Ugarte, “Wilderness of Mirrors”; Ugarte, “Labels 
shape reality.” 




and provide some social services to the citizenry Abu Sayyaf had no such ambition.  
Rather, Abu Sayyaf adopted exploitative approach towards the population in areas where 
it held sway.  Relying on coercion as a means of control, the organization resorted to 
extortion and kidnappings as a means of income.  In the absence of any natural resource 
that could be exploited, Abu Sayyaf used kidnappings to create its own lootable good in 
the form of hostages.143 
The majority of Abu Sayyaf’s kidnapping victims were Filipinos, however 
foreigners were also frequent targets. In one daring raid on April 23, 2000 Commander 
Robot led a group of ASG fighters in a raid on a diving resort on the Malaysian island of 
Sipadan.  Abu Sayyaf captured twenty-one hostages, composed of eleven Malaysian 
workers and ten tourists who were primarily from Europe.  The captives were taken to 
Jolo where they were held in difficult conditions for several months before negotiations 
brokered by Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi secure their gradual release.  It has been reported 
that Abu Sayyaf secured from Libya a bounty of $1 million for the release of each 
hostage.144    
On August 30, 2000 a hapless twenty-four year old American named Jeffrey 
Craig Schilling was abducted by Abu Sayyaf.  Schilling, who had been living in the 
Southern Philippines for months, had expressed an interest in Abu Sayyaf and was 
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subsequently lured to Jolo where he was taken captive.145  The worsening hostage crisis 
prompted President Estrada to end a visit to the United States early in order to oversee 
efforts to recover the captives.146  Despite numerous attempts at rescue and negotiations, 
Schilling would remain in captivity until April 2001 when he was freed by a successful 
AFP raid on an ASG camp on Jolo.147 
Abu Sayyaf’s transformation became a self-reinforcing cycle.  With each ransom 
paid, Abu Sayyaf gained resources as well as notoriety.  According to National Security 
Advisor Roilo Golez, in the year 2000, “the Abu Sayyaf got more in ransom payments 
than the entire equipment outlay for the Armed Forces of the Philippines that year.”148  In 
the economically depressed and radically underdeveloped regions of Mindanao, Abu 
Sayyaf’s kidnapping-fueled windfall constituted a rare growth industry.  Abu Sayyaf 
wielded its bounty effectively.  It acquired modern arms and equipment that often 
exceeded that of the AFP.  Notably, it acquired speed boats that were faster than any 
Philippine Navy vessel and afforded ASG near immunity at sea.149   
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More importantly, Abu Sayyaf’s financial success allowed it to bolster its ranks 
with a multitude of new recruits.  Noted the Philippine Star, “the allure of easy money 
and adventure is a powerful incentive in Basilan and the other depressed Muslim 
regions,” where “at least half of all households [live] below the poverty threshold.”150  
Drawing on the funds it received through ransom payments, Abu Sayyaf was able to 
appeal to recruits’ financial needs with a steady wage and their desire for adventure.151  
From approximately a hundred individuals under the leadership of Abdurajak Janjalani, 
ASG’s membership swelled to approximately 1,200 fighters in 2001.152  Yet, these 
burgeoning ranks reinforced and perpetuated the group’s descent into banditry.  These 
new members were defined not by their Islamic faith or nationalist zeal, but rather simple 
economic needs and a willingness to embrace criminality as a means of achieving 
prosperity.  The more Abu Sayyaf grew in both size and standing, the less it resembled 
the militant group that Abdurajak Janjalani had founded to wage holy war in the 
Philippines. 
The Dos Palmas Raid: 
The new Abu Sayyaf was best encapsulated in the person of Aldam Tilao whose 
nom de guerre Abu Sabaya roughly translates to “keeper of the captives,” and whose 
ascent within the organization heralded the shift from militancy to banditry.  The 
journalist Mark Bowden described Sabaya as a criminal for whom “Islam was just the 
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latest cover for a lifetime of increasingly violent thuggery.”153  Khaddafi Janjalani 
remained the overarching leader of the Basilan faction of ASG, but was marginalized by 
Abu Sabaya who acted as the group’s spokesperson and operational head.  Brash and 
charismatic, Sabaya would routinely call into local radio stations to boast of his exploits 
and taunt his pursuers.  Sabaya actively cultivated the persona of roguish outlaw whose 
omnipresent Oakley sunglasses became the defining feature of his public image.154  
Within ASG, Sabaya was the major catalyst behind the group’s kidnap-for-ransom 
industry and masterminded several major kidnaping operations including one on the 
towns of Sumisip and Tuburan (both on Basilan) on March 30, 2000.  During the raid, 
over 50 individuals were abducted, the majority of whom were school children.155 
It was Abu Sabaya who orchestrated the boldest kidnapping operation in Abu 
Sayyaf’s history.  On the night of May 26, 2001, Sabaya helmed a supped-up speedboat 
across the 500 kilometer Sulu Sea to the island of Palawan which is a popular tourist 
destination.  Finally reaching Palawan near dawn on the morning of the 27th, Sabaya and 
his followers raided the Dos Palmas Resort off of Palawan’s coast.  There they abducted 
20 hostages who they ushered onto their speedboat for the return trip to Basilan.  Most of 
the captives were Filipinos, but the group also contained three Americans who were 
Sabaya’s prized captives.  The Americans consisted of Guillermo Sobero from California 
who was at the resort for his birthday with a Filipina girlfriend.  As well as Martin and 
Gracia Burnham, married missionaries from Wichita Kansas who had been celebrating 
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their anniversary.  During the long boat ride back to Basilan, Abu Sabaya had Martin 
Burnham contact the media via satellite phone to claim responsibility.  Sabaya not only 
wanted to ensure that Abu Sayyaf received credit, but expressly wanted the group to be 
identified by its link to Osama bin Laden.156 
The audacity of the Dos Palmas raid spoke to Abu Sayyaf’s potency, but the 
incursion and its aftermath served to illustrate the inadequacies of the AFP.  Though 
some AFP attempts to rescue captives were successful, such as the one that freed Jeffery 
Schilling, these triumphs were rare exceptions.  In 2000, the New York Times 
characterized the AFP offensive on Jolo against rogue elements of the MNLF which 
displaced over 200,000 people as appearing “to have accomplished little besides leveling 
several villages.”157  Able to take advantage of rugged terrain and a pliable population, 
Abu Sayyaf managed to stay well ahead of its pursuers.  After the Dos Palmas raid “Abu 
Sayyaf was tying the Philippine armed forces in knots,” writes Bowden.  “The army 
conducted raids all over Basilan but was always one step behind,” with ASG only 
pausing occasionally so that Abu Sabaya could “give cocky, even cheerful, radio 
interviews,” often from the middle of a firefight.158  
A particularly infamous example of the AFP’s struggles occurred in the days 
immediately after Sabaya returned to Basilan with the Dos Palmas abductees.  On the 
night of June 1, 2001, ASG with eighteen hostages in tow attacked the St. Peter’s Church 
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and the adjoining Don Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan.  The group was 
subsequently encircled by over 1,000 AFP soldiers and local militia.  Despite being 
surrounded, the ASG group managed to escape the military cordon the following day 
when a segment of the ringing force inexplicably pulled back from the siege.  Abu Sayyaf 
took advantage of this opening and slipped through the breach with most of their hostages 
including the three Americans and a few new captives taken from the hospital.  
Subsequent investigations alleged that the trapped Abu Sayyaf leaders had merely 
negotiated a sizable bribe to the local commanders in order to secure their escape.  An 
inquiry accused high ranking officials in the AFP and Department of National Defense of 
complicity in the escape as well as the local commander, though the matter remains 
unresolved.159 
 During one of his frequent radio interviews on June 12, Abu Sabaya sought to 
further underscore the impotence of the Philippine government and mock his pursuers.  
“As a gift to the country on its Independence Day, we have released unconditionally 
Guillermo Sobero,” announced Sabaya. “But we have released him without his head. It’s 
up to you to find Sobero’s head … but the dogs may beat you to it.”160 
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 The Dos Palmas raid and Abu Sabaya’s subsequent execution of Sobero were 
shocking events, but were themselves only the most recent steps in Washington’s 
escalating concern about events in the Southern Philippines.  In a July 2000 hearing 
before the House Committee on International Relations on terrorism in South Asia, 
Ambassador-at-Large and U.S. coordinator for counterterrorism Michael Sheehan, 
specifically identified the Philippines as being home to a new and particularly dangerous 
breed of terrorist group that was both loosely organized and capable of financially 
sustaining itself through acts like kidnappings.161  American concern had been echoed in 
official meetings throughout the burgeoning kidnapping campaign with growing urgency.  
Following Sobero’s murder, Secretary of State Colin Powell directly expressed American 
apprehension to Vice President Teofisto Guingona at the ASEAN regional forum in 
Vietnam and urged the Philippines to do more to free the Burnhams who remained in 
captivity.162 
 Although increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea was the primary 
catalyst for renewed defense cooperation, the focus quickly shifted to the internal threat 
posed by the NPA, MILF and Abu Sayyaf.163  As much as the AFP’s inability to thwart 
Abu Sayyaf had exposed its limitations, it was believed that strengthening the armed 
forces’ overall capabilities would bear fruit for both internal and external security.164  
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Admiral Blair had espoused this philosophy during his 2000 testimony on the VFA and 
was given a chance to implement the agenda that fall.  In September 2000, soon after the 
Schilling abduction, Blair and officers from the Special Operations Command, Pacific 
(SOCPAC), traveled to Manila to brief Philippine leaders “on the concept of a mobile 
training team (MTT) designed to train and equip a company-sized unit to respond to the 
escalating terrorist threat.”165  Unfortunately, President Estrada was not impressed and 
rejected the offer of American assistance. 
 However, after Estrada was removed from office in January 2001, his successor 
as President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, promptly reversed his decision and welcomed the 
American assistance.  That March, a battalion of the American 1st Special Forces Group 
deployed from Okinawa to the Philippines where it began training a Light Reaction 
Company (LRC) which would be specially taught hostage rescue tactics and could be 
used as a professional counterterrorism force.166  This training program, which was 
conducted at the AFP headquarter in Camp Aguinaldo on Luzon, provided the first 
sustained interaction between American trainers and their Philippine pupils.167  
According to one assessment, “despite their students' improvements, the [Special Forces] 
trainers assessed the AFP's tactical capabilities as weak, and their equipment as poor,” 
adding that “it was obvious why terrorist groups were enjoying success against the 
AFP.”168 
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 The need for sustained military engagement and defense diplomacy to achieve 
meaningful improvements in the AFP was already a prominent topic in early September 
2001.  During his visit to Manila on September 4, 2001 U.S. Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly repeatedly endorsed the need for increased U.S. 
military assistance to Philippines to help the AFP develop its material and institutional 
capabilities.169  Similarly, Brigadier General Donald Wurster, commander of SOCPAC, 
and Colonel David Fridovich, who commanded the 1st Special Forces Group scheduled a 
meeting with AFP officials for September 11, to discuss incorporating a terrorist 
coordination and assistance visit into the upcoming Balikatan 2002 exercises.170   
However, it is important to keep American interest in the Abu Sayyaf in 
perspective.  Even after the beheading of Sobero, ASG was a nuisance rather than a 
national priority.  Though distressing, the Burnhams continued captivity was a matter to 
be resolved by Philippine authorities.  American assistance remained at a limited level 
with counterterrorism being included as one of many goals for the rejuvenated defense 
diplomacy program.  Writes Bowden, in this pre–9/11 era, “the matter was regarded as a 
typical Third World outrage, the kind of nightmare often faced by missionaries in 
dangerous places.”171 This mild approach changed dramatically with the September 11th 
attacks.  The ongoing imprisonment of the Burnhams and Abu Sayyaf’s history of 
violence would focus American attention and propel the Philippines into the forefront of 
the Global War on Terror.  
                                                 
169 Roel Pareño, “US vows support in Sayyaf crisis,” Philippine Star 4 September 2001. 
170 Robinsion, Special Operations Forces, 15-16; Brisco, “Spearheaded” 




A Second Front?  The Philippines after 9/11 
 
The Shock and Horror of all Humanity: 
 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s response to the September 11th attacks was 
immediate and unequivocal.  In an early morning address, Arroyo described the “shock 
and horror of all humanity in the face of the unimaginable acts of terror inflicted on the 
United States,” adding that, “all mankind is diminished by the extreme evil we saw 
unleashed on your cities.” 172  The horror of the attacks was matched by an equal resolve 
to take action against the individuals responsible for the attacks.  Quoting a letter she had 
sent directly to President Bush, Arroyo promised to secure American facilities in the 
Philippines and provide any help she could “to crush those responsible for this barbaric 
act.”173  Following President Bush’s call for an international coalition to combat the 
scourge of global terrorism, President Arroyo became the first head of state in Asia to 
declare her full support for the endeavor and committed the Philippines to backing the 
United States in the War on Terror.174 
 The precise nature of Philippine assistance would evolve over the coming weeks.  
Hours after the 9/11, Arroyo granted an American request to use facilities in the 
Philippines, notably Clark and Subic Bay, for “emergency transit of civilians and goods 
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from American bases in Asia-Pacific.”175  Her announcement of support for the War on 
Terror was tempered slightly by NSA Golez and Vice President Teofisto Guingona Jr 
(who was also Secretary of Foreign Affairs).  Both specified that while Philippine 
backing was unambiguous, any actions taken by the Philippines would be in line with its 
capabilities, laws and constitution.176   
As the United States prepared for war in Afghanistan, the questions surrounding 
the nature of the Philippine constitution became more immediate.  AFP Chief of Staff 
Diomedio Villanueva stated that the AFP was prepared to send troops to fight in 
Afghanistan, but would need logistical help for the deployment.177  President Arroyo 
espoused a willingness to send forces to Afghanistan, but specified that any such action 
would require congressional approval.178  While there would continue to be ongoing 
discussions about sending volunteer support staff to help in Afghanistan, such as doctors, 
nurses and engineers, the prospect of dispatching combat forces was ruled out in light of 
their more pressing need within the Philippines.179  
 With sending combat forces to Afghanistan being a nonstarter, the Philippines 
looked for alternative means of aiding the United States.  A former navy captain and 
graduate of the Naval Academy in Annapolis, NSA Golez emerged as a major advocate 
for a meaningful Philippine contribution to the war in Afghanistan.  Golez argued, “there 
will be more consequences for us if we do not take action. We will be among the few 
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notorious countries, like Iraq, that are not helping.”180  It had been Golez who in the 
hours after 9/11 had transmitted the request for emergency transit rights and who would 
serve as a key intermediary between Washington and Manila during the early weeks of 
the War on Terror.181  Unable to commit its forces to Afghanistan, the Philippines would 
instead reprise its past role as a key logistical node in America’s global defense posture.  
Specifically, the Philippines would grant transiting American aircraft and ships access to 
AFP installations including the airfield at Clark and Subic Bay naval facilities.182  As 
specified by Vice President and Foreign Affairs Secretary Teofisto Guingona, “the 
National Security Council (NSC) authorized Malacañang to issue the necessary permits 
for US military air and sea craft to land, refuel and fly over Philippine airspace.”183   
 This arrangement was solidified during a meeting between NSA Golez and 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Thomas Fargo on September 25.  Golez 
and Fargo had been classmates at Annapolis and had a preexisting relationship.  The two 
met aboard presidential yacht, BRP Ang Pangulo, in Subic Bay where Fargo briefed 
Golez on the pending American campaign in Afghanistan, which Fargo expected to last 
up to two years, and its implications for the Philippines.  Explicitly, Golez was informed 
of “US military assets, especially aircraft, expected to enter the Philippine air space in the 
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coming days, as well as those expected to use the former military bases in Subic and 
Clark and other facilities.”  While there would be no American soldiers permanently 
stationed in the Philippines, “some may be needed to ‘oversee transit and 
transshipment.’”184   
 The decision to allow American forces to use Philippine facilities while in route 
to Afghanistan met with general approval and was seen as an apt fulfillment of the RP’s 
treaty obligations to the United States.  There were some critics such as Senator Gringo 
Honasan who argued that the move was unconstitutional and would make the Philippines 
a target for terrorist attacks.185  However, the greatest concern was precisely what the 
arrangement did not cover.  Whereas aiding American crafts transiting the Philippines 
served as a means for Manilla to contribute to the Global War on Terror, it did not 
address how GWOT would manifest within the archipelago itself. 
A Frontline State: 
Following the September 11th attacks the United States faced a decision between 
whether to focus its response to the specific perpetrators of the events in the form of al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan or purse a more sweeping global agenda against the very concept 
of international terrorism.  National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice detailed the 
thinking of the Bush administration in her memoir: 
In the end we held to a more expansive view, focusing on terrorists with global 
reach who threated our way of life and that of our friends and allies.  The 
President decided after much deliberation that only a broader global definition 
would enlist the international community in establishing the worldwide dragnet 
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that we needed to stabilize the international system and secure the United States 
and its allies.  How could we tell others to help us but not help them fend off 
terrorist attacks?  The decision reflected the need both to establish an international 
norm against terrorism in order to delegitimize it as a tactic and to paint vividly an 




In some cases, that led us to become involved in distant struggles that were in fact 
linked only loosely to al Qaeda.  This was the case with Jemaah Islamiyah in 
Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines.  Though organizationally 
distinct from Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, they sometimes collaborated 
with al Qaeda to launch attacks.186 
 
 Even amongst the Bush administration’s wider envisioning of a Global War on 
Terror, the Philippines attracted specific focus.  As intelligence agencies and media 
outlets raced to uncover the roots of the 9/11 attacks, the past activities of Khalid Sheik 
Muhammed, the IIRO and especially the Bojinka plot painted the Philippines as being 
particularly prone to infiltration by al-Qaeda.187  Further underscoring this concern were 
reports that several of the 9/11 hijackers had passed through the Philippines as late as 
2000.188   
Sensing the geopolitical shift wrought by 9/11 and that their past links to al-Qaeda 
were a liability, the MILF adopted a proactive approach.  In a public appeal, the MILF’s 
leadership condemned the September 11th attacks and formally rejected calls by Osama 
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bin Laden for a Holy War against the United States.189  By way of contrast Abu Sayyaf 
actually sought to promote its historic links to al-Qaeda even though the ties had largely 
been dormant since the 1990s.  During one of his radio interview Abu Sabaya confirmed 
ASG’s links to Bin Laden and even espoused a desire to conduct new attacks in response 
to military strikes in Afghanistan.190  “After 9/11, everything changed. No longer was 
Abu Sayyaf just an obscure group of kidnappers; it was now a regional arm of the 
international Islamist menace.”191 
The Bush administration’s interest in extending the War on Terror to the 
Philippines was evident in the days immediately following 9/11.  At the Camp David 
Summit the weekend of September 15, where the administration officials first discussed 
the plan for America’s military response to the attacks, White House Chief of Staff 
Andrew Card identified the Philippines as one of several countries that could be included 
in simultaneous Navy SEAL raids on terrorist targets around the world.192  Nearly two 
weeks later on September 28, as the Bush administration contemplated when to begin 
bombing Afghanistan, the National Security Council also considered how to encourage 
Indonesia and the Philippines to be more proactive in their counterterrorism efforts.193  
With the start of military operations in Afghanistan in early October, the 
administration began to consider a more direct role for American forces in the 
Philippines.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was particularly insistent on this 
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point at an NSC meeting on October 9.  After being queried by Vice President Cheney 
about what would happen in December and January when Bin Laden was still at large 
and poor weather slowed operations in Afghanistan, Bob Woodward recounts: 
“We’re trying to get something going in other parts of the world against al Qaeda,” 
said Rumsfeld again.  He still thought that if the anti-terrorism campaign stalled in 
Afghanistan, they could always do something elsewhere.  It would be in keeping with 
the global nature of the president’s war on terror.  At the top of the list for expanding 
anti-terror actions were the Philippines, Yemen and Indonesia.  In the 
Philippines…Muslim insurgents had rooted in the south, most notably the terrorist 
group Abu Sayyaf, which had suspected ties to Al Qaeda.   
 
When President Bush attempted to return the meeting’s focus to Afghanistan:  
 
“Look, pressure works,” Rumsfeld said, trying to steer the discussion back to 
terrorist groups worldwide.  “Let’s get something started against them elsewhere 
in the world.  The focus cannot only be Afghanistan.”194 
 
 President Arroyo’s vocal and enthusiastic support of GWOT had been well 
received in Washington and as much as the Philippines constituted an ally in this new 
struggle it also represented a potential theater of operations.  A perception dramatically 
reinforced by the continued captivity of the Burnhams by a group wantonly advertising 
its ties to Osama bin Laden and who had only months earlier decapitated another 
American citizen.195  Dubbed a “frontline state” in the War on Terror, American 
involvement within the Philippines to combat Abu Sayyaf served both pragmatic as well 
as symbolic ends.  Not only could the United States defeat a violent group that had 
repeatedly targeted American citizens, but the entire undertaking would be “a proving 
ground for an emerging facet of the Bush Administration’s counter-terrorism strategy – 
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supplying military hardware and training to countries trying to bring domestic insurgents 
to heel.”196  The Philippines would serve as a model for how the United States would 
wage the Global War on Terror outside of Afghanistan.   
Arroyo and the War on Terror: 
 The extension of America’s War on Terror into the Philippines posed a dilemma 
for President Arroyo and her administration.  Whereas, her support for operations in 
Afghanistan was unambiguous and resolute, the prospect of GWOT being waged within 
her own country was a more tenuous proposition.  Arroyo firmly believed that Abu 
Sayyaf and the other insurgent groups that plagued the Philippines needed to be dealt 
with to ensure the country’s long-term prosperity.  In this regards, GWOT represented an 
important opportunity for her administration.  After nearly a decade of decay, generous 
military aid from Washington would jumpstart the AFP’s modernization and bolster its 
ability to defeat ASG.  However, as GWOT raised the prospect of a windfall in American 
assistance, it also came with the danger of a direct military intervention by American 
forces.  The psychological wounds stemming from past American intercessions in the 
archipelago had not been forgotten and any involvement of American forces in Philippine 
internal security affairs risked significant political backlash.  Indeed, ten years after the 
base closures, the very presence of any American forces within the country remained 
highly controversial.  The task for President Arroyo was to walk the narrowest of 
political lines with the War on Terror.  While actively promoting the importance of the 
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fight against Abu Sayyaf as a means of maximizing aid from the United States, Arroyo 
simultaneously needed to alleviate Washington’s anxieties about insecurity in the 
Philippines. These concerns, if unchecked, could prompt the Bush administration to seek 
a more active role for U.S. forces against ASG and produce political upheaval throughout 
the Philippines. 
 After assuming office, President Arroyo had made the Philippine economy the 
primary focus of her administration and quickly identified internal insecurity as a 
prominent obstacle to economic prosperity. She correctly reasoned that the multiple 
insurgencies that beset her country had paralyzed development, particularly in the south, 
and were a key driver of the Philippine’s chronic underdevelopment an endemic poverty.  
As such, resolving these disputes was an essential step to spurring sustained economic 
growth in the Philippines.197  With the MILF, Arroyo ended the hardline military 
approach employed by President Estrada and endeavored to resolve the conflict through 
negotiations.  By way of contrast, Arroyo relied on a stronger military response by the 
AFP to counter ASG and the resurgent NPA.  Arroyo’s approach was to use military 
forces to push back militants in order to create safe areas where other government 
agencies could operate and promote development.198  However, this strategy had been 
consistently undermined by the AFP’s technical limitations and institutional failings.199 
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 Following September 11th, Arroyo reoriented her administration to bring internal 
security to the forefront of the government’s agenda.  She unmasked a new National 
Internal Security Plan (NISP) with a 14 point counterterrorism agenda.  Likewise, a new 
Inter-Agency Task Force on international terrorism was formed on September 24, to 
facilitate counterterrorism cooperation between different government agencies.200   The 
change in tact was particularly evident with regards to how ASG was portrayed by the 
Philippine government. While still derided as bandits and criminals, the group assumed 
the mantel of a national scourge and defeating it became a government imperative.201  
Yet a shift in government priorities did not address the underlying problem of the AFP’s 
fundamental inability to militarily vanquish the ASG.  GWOT would provide a 
convenient answer to this quandary. 
GWOT offered the potential to not just restore defense ties (as the VFA did), but 
also for the return of significant American military assistance: “9/11 allowed the 
Philippines to get into the good graces of the United States- to strengthen those ties and 
an opportunity to get something from U.S. policy.”202  In addition to President Arroyo’s 
genuine support for the War on Terror, she undertook to link Washington’s global 
counterterrorism efforts to the internal struggles which the Philippines had faced for 
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decades.  Notably, in explaining her willingness to “go every step of the way” with the 
United States after 9/11, Arroyo stressed the beneficial impact that GWOT would have in 
the Philippines.  “We have our own home grown terrorism and to the extent that we can 
obliterate terrorism all over the world, then our own terrorism will be much easier to 
neutralize.”203  After the first American advisers arrived in the Philippines, Arroyo 
welcomed them and expressed her gratitude that the War on Terror was “no longer a 
lonely fight just in our own country.”  Whilst Abu Sayyaf’s own actions alone were 
sufficient to attract American interests in the wake of 9/11, this attention was actively 
solicited and nurtured by President Arroyo.204   
The subject of increased American military assistance to the Philippines was 
broached during the meeting between Golez and Fargo onboard the BRP Ang Pangulo.  
Golez had queried his guest about the possible transfer of excess U.S. military equipment 
to the AFP in order to help the fight against Abu Sayyaf.205  At Pacific Command 
(PACOM) Admiral Blair solicited plans of action for how the United States could 
militarily address the situation in Mindanao.  The initial plan called for an aggressive 
operation by U.S. forces on Basilan to clear the island of terrorists and rescue the 
hostages.  This option was expected to rapidly return short term success, but was deemed 
unfeasible given the political situation in the Philippines and strong aversion to American 
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combat operations inside the archipelago.  Instead, Blair opted for a much softer 
approach which minimized the potential for controversy.206 
Early American assistance took the form of an acceleration and expansion of the 
plans that had been discussed over the previous summer to specially train certain AFP 
units in counterterrorism tactics.  The first wave of American advisers arrived in mid-
October where they met with AFP counterparts in Basilan and Zamboanga to discuss the 
details of a training program and the overall effort to rescue the Burnhams from ASG.207  
They were followed by a smaller contingent who arrived on October 24 at Edwin 
Andrews Air Force Base in Zamboanga City.  Described as “advance party” the five man 
team included “experts in different fields ranging from civil-military and psychological 
operations.”  According to AFP spokesman Brigadier Gen. Edilberto Adan, their purpose 
was “to study our planning, operations and equipment in our counterterrorism campaign,” 
and to “determine what form of assistance can be given to the Philippine government in 
terms of training, advice on doctrines and equipment.”208  This advanced party was soon 
also joined by approximately 30 U.S. advisors who were dispatched to Basilan to begin 
offering advice and training to AFP forces attempting to recover the Burnhams.209 
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 In early November, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved the Pacific 
Commands plans for wider counterterrorism operations in its area of responsibility.210  
According to The Washington Post, “the Pacific plan is extensive and varied, with a 
concern for regional sensitivities. In discussing the Philippines, it calls for a heavy 
emphasis on training that nation's military in hostage rescue techniques and counter-
insurgency.”  The Post also revealed that the Philippines were “the initial focus of the 
Pacific Command's plan,” and after the visit of the initial assessment team, “the U.S. 
government plans to announce a new package of counter-insurgency aid to Manila that 
will include training, equipment and intelligence support.”211  After gauging the AFP’s 
limitation, the United States would surge military aid into the Philippines.  Through 
training, intelligence sharing and equipment, the U.S. forces aimed to patch the AFP’s 
deficiencies with its own capabilities and enable the AFP to finally rescue the Burnhams 
and defeat Abu Sayyaf.   
 Yet, while the PACOM plan seemed like an ideal answer to the AFP’s struggles, 
there was a counterweight to this triumph.  Accompanying the Philippines inclusion in 
GWOT were several pressing questions about whether the situation actually warranted 
this designation.  Abu Sayyaf’s ties to al-Qaeda were clear in the 1990s, but these links 
had faded and there had not been any notable interactions between the two groups for 
several years.212  Detestable though its actions surely were, it was questionable whether it 
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was appropriate to still label ASG an international terrorist organization let alone an al-
Qaeda affiliate.  
 There was also concern in Manila about the portrayal of the Philippines as a 
haven for terrorists.  Arroyo especially worried about the depiction of the Philippines as 
being an integral part of al-Qaeda’s operations and uniquely plagued by terrorists.  “You 
have 60 countries in the world with a terrorist problem.  That’s two thirds of the world. 
We have this group in Basilan which is a small island in the far south of the Philippines 
and the island itself has a population of - what? – 300,000.”213  Fear of how the War on 
Terror would harm impressions of the Philippines became particularly acute when the 
State Department and other governments began to issue travel advisories warning their 
citizens about the risk of terrorism in the Philippines and especially in Mindanao.  When 
the State Department issued a travel advisory for Mindanao in early October, the 
Philippine government issued a vocal objection and the American ambassador was 
summoned by President Arroyo so that she could personally express her disapproval.214 
A Philippine congressman from the region complained of the advisory that, “it is as if 
Osama bin Laden has sent two jets and crashed them in Davao City.”215 
 The greatest reservations of all concerned the nature of the American presence 
itself. Though the majority of Filipinos joined President Arroyo in welcoming American 
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assistance, the specter of the colonial relationship and past interference endured.216  As 
the fear of communism had been used to justify the long American military presence 
during the Cold War, would the War on Terror lead to another perpetual American troop 
presence or even a return of the American bases?217  More specifically, what was the 
exact nature of the American role in the southern Philippines and was it legal under the 
Philippine constitution?  Concerns like those voiced by Senator Defensor-Santiago and 
Vice President Guingona about the threat to Philippine sovereignty posed by the return of 
American forces to the archipelago signaled that the sentiments that had led to the base 
closures remained a palpable force in Philippine politics.218   
President Arroyo, AFP Chief of Staff Villanueva, Golez and others continuously 
reassured their colleagues in Manila that the American involvement was temporary and 
merely advisory.  U.S. forces would not conduct combat operations against Abu Sayyaf 
or act independently of the AFP.219  However, apprehensions about the verifiability and 
viability of this arrangement would haunt the entirety of the American involvement in the 
Philippines.  These questions also defined President Arroyo’s paradoxical relationship 
with the Global War on Terror.  President Arroyo was trapped between an incentives to 
maximize the amount of aid from the United States while simultaneously minimizing the 
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direct involvement of American forces.  As a result, she endeavored to deftly navigate 
this new era in world affairs and find a middle ground that neither alienated her skeptical 
domestic constituencies nor her anxious patrons in Washington.   
Mrs. Arroyo goes to Washington: 
 The dilemma which faced President Arroyo came to a head in mid-November, 
when she made an official visit to the United States to mark the 50th anniversary of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty.  There she promoted the Philippines as a critical ally who 
required American help to triumph in its own fight against militant groups.  Yet, she also 
needed to reassure the White House of her government’s competence and not just its 
resolve.  It was essential that Washington continued to regard the Philippines as a partner 
in the Global War on Terror rather than a potential target.  
To underscore this point, Arroyo and her entourage of political and military 
leaders stopped in Hawaii en route to Washington.  There she met with Admiral Blair and 
discussed PACOM’s plans for the Philippines.  Blair pledged to help “finish off” Abu 
Sayyaf and outlined measures which the United States could undertake to help the AFP 
with this mission.220 
After making a side visit to New York to survey the wreckage of the World Trade 
Center, President Arroyo travelled to Washington to meet with President Bush.  The 
night before her White House meeting, Arroyo gave a speech at Georgetown University - 
her alma mater.  Throughout her speech, Arroyo seamlessly interwove the narrative of 
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the Philippines’ own internal struggles with that of the wider War on Terror.  “These are 
not attacks against one country, but on the world community. Therefore, we must respond 
as a community. In these difficult times, international cooperation is more important that 
[sic] ever.”221  Affirming her solidarity with the United States in this struggle, she again 
repeated her willingness “to go every step of the way” with Washington.  On Abu 
Sayyaf, Arroyo was categorical in her condemnation.  She derided ASG as simply evil 
and should be demolished, adding that “it is our belief that evil should not be allowed to 
rule even one inch of the earth.”222   
As unflinching as President Arroyo’s comments were with regards to both the 
struggle against terrorism internationally and within the Philippines, she went beyond the 
purely military focus of GWOT to the underlying issues.  In a refrain which she would 
repeat the following day at the White House, Arroyo stressed the need to address the 
underlying conditions which first fueled the rise of terrorists groups.  According to 
Arroyo, poverty was “the spawning ground,” and while military action was essential to 
counter the terrorist threat, the word could not ignore the socio-economic failings that had 
first prompted their rise.223  
 Though overshadowed by subsequent events, the Georgetown speech 
unknowingly represents an important point in the evolution of US-RP counterterrorism 
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cooperation.  While not containing any policy announcements or striking shifts in 
positions, it constituted the last moment of unconditional support between Washington 
and Manila.  In both her rhetoric and backing for the United States, President Arroyo was 
absolute and unwavering.  That this resolve could not endure reflected not any chicanery 
on the part of President Arroyo, but the novelty of the War on Terror itself.  That evening 
at Georgetown, the prospect of America’s involvement in the Philippines was still largely 
theoretical. It had not yet manifested to the point of exacting meaningful consequences or 
engendering political controversies.  It is only amid such an environment of boundless 
possibilities and nonexistent costs that the unconditional solidarity espoused by President 
Arroyo could survive.  This illusion and the absence of equivocation that it evoked would 
cease to exist the following day at the White House.  
 The meeting between Presidents Arroyo and Bush was affable and productive.  
President Arroyo’s steadfast support for the United States since 9/11 had been well 
received within the White House and the American administration was effusive in its 
praise for Arroyo.  The Philippines had come to symbolize the model GWOT partner for 
Washington.  Manila was an ally who heartily supported American international 
initiatives against terrorism, especially within Southeast Asia, and had not shied away 
from the challenge of combatting the terrorist threat within its own borders.  As such, the 
Bush administration was eager to reward Arroyo for her leadership and offer American 




 On the economic front, Arroyo and Bush agreed that “the war against terrorism 
should be fought in parallel with the war against poverty.”224  This included a pledge to 
help the Philippines with debt relief and to further open American markets to Philippine 
goods like fish, fruit and textiles.225  President Bush also vowed to work with Congress to 
increase direct development assistance to Mindanao as part of the peace process with the 
MILF designed to help the economic transition of former combatants.  Bush would more 
than double U.S. assistance to Mindanao with the 2002 package totaling over $38 
million.226 
 Additionally, Bush also pledged a considerable amount of military aid in order to 
bolster the AFP in its fight with Abu Sayyaf.  This included a tenfold increase in Foreign 
Military Financing from $1.9 million to over $19 million.  Furthermore, the United States 
would furnish the AFP with a bounty of new equipment including a C-130 transport 
plane, 8 Huey helicopters, a naval patrol boat and thirty-thousand M-16 rifles with 
ammunition.  The total security assistance package for fiscal year 2001-2002 alone 
totaled roughly $100 million and encompassed specialized training, services and 
equipment.227  Yet, the willingness of the United States to dramatically increase its 
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assistance to the AFP did not answer the fundamental question of how the Global War on 
Terrorism would be prosecuted in the Philippines and by whom.  
 During their meeting, President Bush explicitly offered American combat troops 
to directly fight Abu Sayyaf and rescue the Burnhams.  President Arroyo politely but 
firmly declined the proposal.  She stated that American assistance was needed, but 
fighting Abu Sayyaf was a task for Filipinos and she was confident in the ability of her 
military to handle this mission.228 Noted Bush later when asked about sending combat 
forces to the Philippines, “"It’s up to [President Arroyo] to make those decisions. I’ve 
asked her pointblank, what help do you need. She says she’s got a great military, a 
competent military. She’s confident that her military can deal with the Abu Sayyaf.”229 
 Rather than fight Abu Sayyaf, the United States would help the Philippine 
government help itself.  The two presidents “affirmed that they would continue to work 
on a vigorous, integrated plan to strengthen the Philippine security forces’ capacity to 
combat terror and protect Philippine sovereignty.”230  In effect, they made defense 
diplomacy the vanguard of American efforts in the Philippines through an integrated plan 
of robust training, equipment and overall institutional engagement to enhance the AFP’s 
overall capabilities. 
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Neither President Arroyo nor Bush was aware at the time, but an important 
threshold had been crossed.  Rather than being unconditional, President Arroyo’s 
steadfast support for GWOT came with the significant caveat that U.S. forces would not 
be permitted to undertake combat operations within the Philippines.  This position was 
not only accepted by the Bush administration but embraced.  Faced with one major 
military commitment already in Afghanistan, President Arroyo’s insistence on solving a 
Filipino problem with primarily Filipino forces offered a welcome alternative to another 
protracted deployment of American combat forces.   
However, the understanding reached in Washington was predicated solely on the 
ability of the AFP to successfully defeat Abu Sayyaf.  Arroyo had insisted that with some 
assistance from the U.S. on issues like logistics, equipment and intelligence, the job of 
defeating ASG and rescuing the Burnhams was within the means of her own military.  It 
was these assurances of the AFP’s competence which Washington had accepted and 
which made the eschewing of American combat forces tenable.  Yet, the reality of the 
AFP’s patent inability to actually achieve this objective would become unavoidable as the 
conflict progressed and emerge as a major source of tension between Washington and 
Manila.  As much as the bonhomie of the meeting between Bush and Arroyo symbolized 
the genuine partnership between their two countries, it also reflected the shared delusion 
of both leaders that they would be able to painlessly accomplish their goals for the War 
on Terror in the Philippines.  For President Arroyo, the bounty of aid and military 
assistance resulting from her visit to Washington signaled a return of the benefits which 




forgoing the controversial bases or a divisive intervention by American forces into the 
country’s internal affairs.231  Similarly, the Bush administration saw in Arroyo’s 
determination to use her own forces an important model for GWOT.  Not only did the 
Philippines promise a relatively easy victory against an infamous terrorist organization 
linked to al-Qaeda, it would be achieved with a minimal outlay of American manpower.  
The Philippines would become as an example to other governments around the world of 
how the combination of local initiative and American assistance could swiftly defeat 
terrorism.232  Despite the best intentions, the optimism of both Manila and Washington 
proved to be unjustified.  
Conclusion: 
 
Intended to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
President Arroyo’s November trip to Washington marked not the continuation of the US-
RP alliance but its reincarnation.  Founded ostensibly to preserve the historic ties between 
the two countries and contain the spread of communism in Asia, the alliance had 
outlasted its purpose and found itself on the shoals throughout the 1990s.  Though 
concern for Philippine sovereignty and American past misdeeds in the Philippines 
spurred the closing of Clark and Subic Bay, their shuttering was as much a product of the 
easing geopolitical climate following the end of the Cold War as political angst.  For its 
part, the Philippine Senate’s rejection of the base agreement and its subsequent efforts 
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stifle residual defense cooperation illustrated that while the bases were clearly not wanted 
- the entire alliance itself might not have been needed.  Nor was Manila alone in 
devaluing the relationship as Washington’s vindictive culling of defense aid to the 
Philippines indicated a petulant disregard for bilateral ties that ultimately served the 
interests of neither country. 
China’s actions provided the incentive to rekindle defense cooperation, but 9/11 
gave the alliance its raison d'etre. Whilst the alliance had atrophied amid reduced fears 
about external defense, it had allowed internal insecurity to fester.  The continuation of 
the bases would not have forestalled the rise of Abu Sayyaf, but their sudden closing and 
consequent degradation of the AFP’s capabilities created a security vacuum that allowed 
the group to thrive.  As terrorism evolved from an international annoyance in the 1990s to 
a geopolitical priority after 9/11, both governments recognized that their estranged 
security dynamic was a liability and actively moved towards reengagement.   
However, it is a mistake to label the defense cooperation that followed September 
11th as a simple return to dynamic characteristic of the Cold War.  Not only would the 
American bases not be returning, but the tenor and function of the alliance would change.  
Historically the alliance had been externally oriented with the AFP effectively 
functioning as a supplement to the American forces located in the Philippines.  After 
9/11, the mission would be internally oriented, and the impetus placed on using defense 
diplomacy to help the AFP develop its own capabilities rather than relying on American 
forces.  The alliance which Arroyo and Bush toasted in November was not the one that 




partnership reflected the challenge posed by a Global War on Terrorism and a desire to 
amend the failings of the previous bilateral dynamic.  However, while it was easy to 
identify the past errors in how the US-RP alliance had been handled in retrospect, this 
new approach would come with its own hazards.  At its onset both Washington and 
Manila possessed incentives to make joint counterterrorism cooperation the new bedrock 
of their security relationship.  As illustrated by the Bush administration’s conversations in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Philippines represented an arena where Washington 
could easily expand the Global War on Terror outside of Afghanistan and achieve an easy 
victory over Al-Qaeda through the aid of an allied government.  For her part, President 
Arroyo saw ready participation in GWOT as the gateway to American economic 
assistance and combatting her country’s development woes.   
The enthusiasm which colored the heady early days of the War on Terrorism in 
the Philippines had little basis in reality.  The Bush administration’s desires to rescue the 
Burnhams and smash a voluble Al-Qaeda ally led the United States to commit itself to a 
conflict whose complexities it did not fully comprehend and whose rigors would only 
reveal themselves amid an unexpectedly prolonged struggle in Mindanao.  Furthermore, 
although President Arroyo’s support for GWOT succeeded in opening the floodgates of 
American economic and military assistance, but this aid carried its own price. Arroyo’s 
leveraging of the War on Terror to further her internal development aims would bring her 
country closer to the flame of American military intervention than she ever intended and 








The meeting between Arroyo and Bush in November encapsulated the 
fundamental change that September 11th had on U.S.-Philippine relations.  The 
recriminations of the recent past had been supplanted by a shared resolve to redress the 
threat of terrorism.  In Asia, the United States would find no more vocal advocate for the 
Global War in Terror than President Arroyo who enthusiastically embraced the struggle 
against violent extremism.  Working together, the two presidents pledged to stand united 
to defeat terrorism both within the Philippines and around the world.  
Whereas the Oval office meeting symbolized the reorientation of the alliance 
towards counterterrorism, Balikatan 02-1 became its physical manifestation.  Launched in 
February 2002, Balikatan 02-1 was not a rehashing of the routine joint exercises, but a 
focused counterterrorism operation designed specifically to aid AFP efforts against Abu 
Sayyaf.  Under Balikatan the United States would dispatch a contingent of American 
forces to Mindanao where they would provide direct support to the AFP forces hunting 
ASG.  In addition to on-the-spot training, the U.S. contingent would also use its own 
support capabilities to assist with the AFP’s ongoing operations on Basilan.  This 
infusion of specific American support services, such as logistics and intelligence 
assistance, served as a force multiplier for the AFP by transplanting American resources 
into areas where the Filipino force had struggled to develop its own capabilities.  In line 
with President Arroyo’s desire that the War on Terror be waged in conjunction with the 




engagement programs on Basilan designed to provide immediate assistance to the local 
population.  These projects helped alleviate the difficult living conditions on Basilan, 
while simultaneously helping to win support from the island’s civilians as part of the ever 
important battle for hearts and minds.  In 2002, the American mission to the Philippines 
was the largest U.S. deployment outside of Afghanistan and christened “the second front 
in the War on Terror.”  
The design of Balikatan 02-1 reflected the implicit understanding reached 
between Arroyo and Bush whereby the United States would provide military assistance to 
the Philippines, but the Filipino forces alone would be responsible for fighting Abu 
Sayyaf.  As such, Balikatan 02-1 was more than just a joint effort to defeat a band of 
militants, but a prototype for how defense diplomacy could be adapted to the War on 
Terror.  While American soldiers would be present in the Philippines, they would operate 
“by, with and through” the AFP in order to defeat ASG and rescue the Burnhams.1  If 
successful, Balikatan 02-1 could serve as a model for how limited engagement by U.S. 
forces could prosecute the War on Terror by enhancing local forces whilst forgoing the 
need to commit American soldiers to combat operations.   
Since 2002, Balikatan 02-1 has been hailed as a rare GWOT success story that 
offers a template for how terrorism can be effectively fought through a mix of military 
assistance and civic-engagement.  The progress on Basilan resulting from the operation is 
notable, as Balikatan drove Abu Sayyaf from the island and provided a basis for long 
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term development.  However, this sanguine assessment of Balikatan neglects the more 
nuanced reality of the operation.  While the gains against ASG on Basilan were real, 
Balikatan 02-1 exposed the true extent of the problems in Mindanao including the 
tenuous political situation and the unreliability of the AFP. Instead of resolving these 
underlying issues, Balikatan attempted to temporarily paper them over with an influx of 
American assistance.  Instead of swiftly defeating Abu Sayyaf, Balikatan 02-1 merely 
illuminated the true magnitude of challenges present in the Southern Philippines and the 
fantasy of an easy victory in the War on Terror.   
GWOT Comes to the Philippines: 
 
The Second Front: 
The reorientation of the US-RP alliance towards counterterrorism operations was 
immediately evident upon Arroyo’s return from Washington.  Director Soretta recalls, 
“there were existing programs, but after 9/11 everything became sharper and more 
focused.”2  Soon after Arroyo’s return, the promised equipment from the United States 
began to arrive.  This included a C-130 transport plane which even had a christening 
ceremony where President Arroyo broke a bottle of Champaign on the aircraft’s nose.3  
More substantively, President Arroyo also initiated moves on several key fronts to 
facilitate defense cooperation with the United States and improve the RP’s 
counterterrorism capabilities.  Of particular importance were early efforts by the 
Malacañang Palace to revive the discarded Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement 
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(MLSA) and pass a new anti-Terror Law.  The MLSA constituted an executive 
agreement between Washington and Manilla that would permit the U.S. military to store 
equipment at Philippine facilities which could be used to support operations and provide 
maintenance assistance.4  Conversely, the goal of a new anti-Terror Law, which was 
endorsed by both the AFP and U.S., was to strengthen the judicial mechanisms for 
prosecuting terrorists within the Philippines and increase the powers afforded to law 
enforcement.5   
 Washington’s strategic planning for the Philippines evolved in conjunction with 
its overall approach to GWOT.  Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz outlined this 
process and its implications for the Philippines in early January 2002.  After Afghanistan, 
the United States would turn its attention to “lawless spaces,” ungoverned areas where 
weak central authorities allowed terrorists to thrive outside the rule of law.6  In these 
areas, the United States would work to diffuse the threat by cooperating with friendly 
governments to strengthen local capacity and dilodge terrorists from their bases in these 
lawless zones.  Along with Somalia, Yemen and Indonesia, the Philippines was 
specifically identified as a country of concern.  Stated Wolfowitz, “there’s no question 
that we believe that if they could clear the Abu Sayyaf group out of Basilan Island that 
would be a small blow against the extended Al Qaeda network.” However, Wolfowitz 
added that Manila was “very anxious to do it themselves,” and “that’s the crucial 
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standard for them.  They’re very willing to take help within the framework of helping 
them help themselves.”7   
 Initial American planning for operations on Basilan had centered on a maritime 
Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct U.S. combat operations on the island with Delta Force 
being employed to rescue the Burnhams.8  However, this plan had been scrapped amid 
President Arroyo’s adherence to the constitution’s strict prohibition on foreign combat 
forces operating in the Philippines.  Instead the United States dramatically scaled up its 
ongoing assistance programs and adopted an indirect approach whereby it would fight 
Abu Sayyaf by enhancing the effectiveness of the AFP’s own campaign.  Existing 
training and assistance initiatives which had been restarted under the Visiting Forces 
Agreement provided the basis for this enhanced engagement as well as its legal footing.  
The goal of representing this new endeavor as merely a continuation of existing activities 
was even reflected in the naming of the operation.  Initially, American activities in 
Mindanao were to be called Operation Freedom Eagle, but this was changed to Balikatan 
02-1 in order to tie the mission to the program of annual joint exercises which dated back 
to 1980s.9  Explained George Baylon Radics, a critic of American involvement in the 
Philippines:  
As part of ongoing military-to-military relations between the United States and 
the Philippines, the Balikatan Exercises served as a perfect opportunity to evade 
potential controversy that would have been associated with launching an all-out 
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war in the region, while allowing the US to enter the Philippines militarily under 
the guise of a yearly, legally substantiated operation.10 
 
 However, the similarities between Balikatan 02-1 and the existing program of 
annual exercises ended with the name.  Prior to 9/11 all training exercises had been held 
away from conflict areas and had been limited to a period of only a few weeks.  Balikatan 
02-1 would take place in Mindanao (specifically Zamboanga and Basilan) and extend 
over a six-month period.  Moving the exercise location to a conflict area was designed to 
yield immediate operational benefits for the AFP.  Whether the lessons concerned small 
unit tactics, night fighting or battlefield communications, AFP forces would be able to 
immediately take the skills imparted by American instructors and apply them to ongoing 
operations against Abu Sayyaf.11  Of particular importance would be the training of a 
second and potentially third Light Reaction Companies within the AFP that would 
specialize in counterterrorism missions and could be used as a hostage rescue force.12 
Training would not be confined to the classroom alone as American trainers 
would be integrated within AFP units and deployed to Basilan where they could provide 
on-the-spot advice and assistance.  Under the initial operational plan, American trainers 
would be embedded with AFP troops at the company level where they would accompany 
their Filipino counterparts on patrol.  American soldiers would be armed, but only 
allowed to fire their weapons in self-defense.13  Allowing American trainers to observe 
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the Filipino soldiers in the field would allow the trainers to get a better sense of how AFP 
units were performing as well as the specific challenges on Basilan.  Such observations 
would allow the U.S. forces to refine their training programs to emphasize points of 
concern.14  The U.S. Special Forces soldiers would also provide support to the AFP 
commanders such as help with operational planning, integrating intelligence into 
missions, as well as critical logistical and communication help.  Noted The Philippine 
Star of Balikatan, “it’s just a joint military exercise between the Philippines and the 
United States. But the battleground is Basilan, the troops will use live ammunition, and if 
Abu Sayyaf Islamist terrorists happen to be in the line of fire, they’ll find themselves live 
targets.”15 
The first set of American Special Forces arrived in October 2001 to begin the 
process of assessing the institutional and operational needs of the AFP.16  A second set 
arrived in Zamboanga in early December 2001 where they began advising the AFP and 
worked on establishing a training facility at Camp Arturo Enrile outside of Zamboanga 
City.17 These groups were overseen by Air Force Brigadier General Donald Wurster who 
at the time was the Commander of Special Operations Command, Pacific.  The inclusion 
of Wurster, an experienced Special Forces commander, and his subsequent appointment 
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to command U.S. forces in Mindanao signaled the seriousness with which the Pentagon 
viewed the fight against Abu Sayyaf.18  More U.S. soldiers would arrive over the 
following weeks and eventually total roughly 660 composed of approximately 160 
Special Forces soldiers and 500 command and support personnel.  The New York Times 
in a cover story termed the force, “the first major expansion of the war on terrorism,” 
adding that it marked “the largest single deployment of American military might outside 
Afghanistan to fight terrorists since the Sept. 11 attacks. And it is a further sign that the 
Philippines may well become the site of the war’s next phase.”19   
Of Critics and Constitutionality: 
 The resurrection of close US-RP defense cooperation, and particularly the return 
of American soldiers to Philippine soil, met with a barrage of criticism from across the 
spectrum of Philippine politics.  Immediately upon her return from the United States in 
November, Arroyo faced calls to divulge the terms of the arrangement that she struck in 
Washington and its implications for the Philippines.  House Minority Leader Carlos 
Padilla, then of the opposition Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino Party (LDP), demanded 
to know the precise nature of the agreement and its salience for the MLSA.  “The 
President should immediately explain to the Filipino people the costs and benefits 
accruing from the economic and military assistance package relative to the proposed 
[MLSA],” adding that it was Arroyo’s responsibility to explain “whether it is a free meal 
                                                 
18 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. and Philippines Setting Up Joint Operations to Fight Terror,” New York Times, 16 
January 2002: A1;  Rajiv Chandrasekaran. “Terrorism War’s New Front: U.S. Aiding Philippine Fight 
Against Rebels,” Washington Post, 22 December 2001, A1;  Roel Pareño, “US general, soldiers arrive in 
Zamboanga,” Philippine Star, 15 December 2001. 
19 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. and Philippines Setting Up Joint Operations to Fight Terror,” New York Times, 16 




or there are strings attached on it.”20  Former Senator Francisco “Kit” Tatad, a former 
member of the Marcos regime and supporter of ex-President Estrada, even led calls for 
Arroyo’s impeachment over the Balikatan exercises which he characterized as  “one 
deceptive and treasonous move in making the Philippines a virtual extension of 
Afghanistan.”21 
 In Manila, criticism of increased defense cooperation with the United States and 
especially Balikatan 02-1 followed two main lines of argument.  Whether motivated by 
political opportunism or ideology, opponents tended to either focus on the threat that the 
American forces posed to Philippine sovereignty or the ambiguous nature of their 
activities in Mindanao.  Amongst nationalists and left-leaning political factions, the 
debate over Balikatan 02-1 was a rehashing of the Base Agreement from a decade earlier 
with purported American machinations in the Philippines constituting an assault on the 
nation’s sovereignty.  Balikatan was seen as not as joint counterterrorism effort, but a 
premeditated attempt to undermine Philippine independence or even resurrect the 
American bases.22  Even backers of defense engagement lamented the implications of the 
exercise.  Senator Blas Ople bemoaned that the inclusion of U.S. forces would rob the 
AFP of the “honor and glory” of defeating Abu Sayyyaf.  Ople declared, “it is a matter of 
national honor that the AFP, not the US military, crushes the Abu Sayyaf.”23   
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Dr. Patricio Abinales, who specializes in U.S. colonial policy in the Philippines, 
characterized the efforts to tie Balikatan 02-1 to past American involvement in the 
Philippines thusly: 
This particular argument aimed to link the exercises to history: Balikatan 02-1 as 
the early twentieth-century reiteration of a process beginning a century ago with 
the “Moro-American wars.”  Historicizing the deployment was a powerful 
propaganda tool; it struck a sensitive nerve in the never-ending debate over 
Filipino nationhood and the country’s purported “neo-colonial” relationship with 
the United States.24 
 
Whereas the nationalist objection to Balikatan 02-1 centered on abstract concept 
of sovereignty, the second line of argument concentrated on pragmatic concerns over 
what precisely American forces would be doing whilst in the Philippines and whether 
such actions were legal under the Philippine constitution.  Despite repeated insistence 
from the Pentagon, the White House and the Malacañang Palace that Balikatan 02-1 was 
just an exercise, critics alleged that the term “exercise” was a ruse to allow American 
forces to actively participate in combat operations against Abu Sayyaf.  “Using the VFA 
as an excuse will not wash because under the terms of the VFA, the presence of US 
troops is for instructional purposes and not for combat or for operations,” argued Senator 
Joker Arroyo.25  A particularly challenging opponent for President Arroyo emerged from 
within her own administration in the form of Teofisto Guingona, who served as both her 
Vice President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs.26  Guingona alleged that he had been 
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kept “out of the loop” on the planning of the military exercises and urged the Senate to 
examine their constitutionality.27   
Particular anxiety surrounded the continued detention of Martin and Gracia 
Burnham by Abu Sayyaf and whether the United States would independently launch a 
rescue operation with its own forces.  Such an undertaking would clearly be in violation 
of the Philippine constitution.  President Arroyo unreservedly declared that no rescue 
operation by U.S. forces would be taken.28  However speculation persisted, fueled by 
comments from American soldiers and noises from Washington.  Notably, President 
Bush’s remarks during the State of the Union that the United States was prepared to act 
unilaterally to defeat terrorism were poorly received in Manila.  Some in Manila saw in 
Bush’s comments a threat that if Washington grew frustrated with counterterrorism 
efforts in the Philippines, President Bush would endorse direct military action by 
American forces against terrorist targets in Mindanao regardless of Manila’s wishes.29  
However, amid the furor in Manila, both Secretary of State Powell and President Bush 
called President Arroyo to make certain that she was comfortable with the military 
program.30 
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Criticism of Balikatan 02-1 was not confined to the Philippines as a host of 
objections to the planned operation also emerged in the United States.  In Foreign Affairs, 
John Gershman categorized the growing fears about terrorism in Southeast Asia as 
reflecting the “somewhat hysterical tone adopted by many recent policy and press reports 
about the strength and scope of the terrorist threat there.”  Like other critics, Gershman 
questioned whether Abu Sayyaf actually warranted inclusion as a GWOT target given its 
lack of active links to al-Qaeda and proclivity for criminality rather than holy war.31  
Indeed, even the State Department in its annual review of Global Terrorism echoed this 
point in noting that “distinguishing between political and criminal motivation for many of 
the terrorist-related activities in the Philippines continued to be problematic, most notably 
in numerous cases of kidnapping for ransom in the Southern Philippines.”32  Gerhman 
concluded his critique by warning that the reliance on a military response in the form of 
Balikatan 02-1 would actually exacerbate the problems in Mindanao while wholly 
ignoring the deeper institutional issues within the Philippines that actually fueled the 
situation.33   
A biting editorial in the New York Times took the Bush administration to task for 
failing to actually explain to the American people or Congress what exactly U.S. soldiers 
would be doing in the Philippines.  “So far, the administration has provided only vague 
and conflicting descriptions about the American role, suggesting that officials either have 
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not thought through the plan or are being deceptive about it.”34  Drawing an implicit link 
to the Vietnam conflict, the Times noted the Pentagon’s “long and ignoble history of 
announcing that it is dispatching American forces abroad as ‘advisers,’ when they are 
really meant to be combatants,” adding that the American deployment “sounds like the 
kind of loosely designed operation that has led the United States into costly military 
blunders in the past decades.”35  Although the paper acknowledged that the mission to the 
Philippines might be a worthwhile endeavor, it first required greater clarity and a distinct 
understanding of what the American role was. 
Op-Ed columnist, Nicholas Kristof, travelled to Mindanao in February 2002 amid 
the early days of Balikatan 02-1 and wrote a series of scathing articles for the New York 
Time.  Kristof contended that ASG was not an Islamic terrorist group, but “simply a gang 
of about 60 brutal thugs,” with the American deployment to the Philippines seemingly 
“little more than a propaganda ploy” which said “less about terrorism than about politics 
in Manila and Washington.”  According to Kristof, Balikatan was not a counterterrorism 
operation but a means for President Arroyo to stabilize her presidency and a safe place 
for the Bush administration to continue the War on Terror.36  In a subsequent column, 
Kristof labelled the conflict on Basilan a “Dirty War” and charged the Philippine 
government with backing death squads which targeted local Muslims.37  Of the Bush 
administration, Kristof asserts that the American president had offered aid to Philippines 
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“before his aides knew where Basilan was,” and that the real aim of the American 
mission was political.  Specifically, “to demonstrate momentum in the war on terror, 
deploy troops in a country where they are welcome, show the flag in Southeast Asia, and 
find an enemy that can be quickly beaten.”38 
Not all of the critics were opposed to American military involvement in the 
Philippines as several voices actually called for an expanded role for U.S. force in 
Mindanao including combat operations.  The most vocal of these appeals originated from 
the Kansas Congressional Delegation and concerned the lot of the Burnhams who were 
from Wichita.  While in Manila, Congressman Todd Tiahrt who represented Wichita, 
pressed President Arroyo to allow U.S forces to participate in combat operations and 
rescue the Burnhams.39  Tiahrt’s Senate colleague, Sam Brownback, triggered a minor 
spat a few weeks later when he suggested that the Philippines was going to be the next 
target for the War on Terror after Afghanistan.40  This comment earned Brownback a 
sharp rebuke from President Arroyo, “what does [Brownback] mean by that? Actually, 
we’re not the next because we’ve been fighting terrorists even before.” Arroyo added 
glibly that “it was the Americans who joined us,” in fighting terrorism.41 
In Manila, the months of December and January were defined by a persistent 
campaign by the Arroyo administration to rebuff the critics of Balikatan 02-1 and to win 
over converts to its side.  President Arroyo’s arguments in defense of Balikatan built 
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upon three key points, each designed to refute the concerns of her critics.  The first point 
of emphasis was to highlight Abu Sayyaf as the target of Balikatan 02-1.  Stated Arroyo, 
“Our enemies are the Abu Sayyaf.  They are international terrorists.  They are no longer 
internal threats only.  They are international threats.”  Adding that she was willing to 
weather the political criticism regarding the exercises if they “help us get rid of brutal 
terrorist kidnappers and to allow all of us to live in peace.”42  Arroyo’s emphasis on ASG 
as the unwavering target of Balikatan represented an important rhetorical counter to her 
critics. Whereas opponents attempted to make Balikatan about past disputes with the 
United States such as the bases controversies, Arroyo insisted that such portrayals were 
asinine.  Though the United States could do nothing to change its history in the 
archipelago, dredging up that legacy did nothing to actually resolve immediate threats 
posed by Abu Sayyaf.  Balikatan 02-1 was about defeating terrorism in the Philippines 
and alleviating an immediate challenge to peace in the country – not American 
colonialism. 
 Beyond framing Balikatan as an exercise in counterterrorism rather than 
American neo-imperialism, Arroyo sought to reassure opponents that the American 
involvement was legal and would not include combat. In a boon to Arroyo’s effort, the 
Philippine Department of Justice issued a legal opinion reasserting the constitutionality of 
joint training exercises under the MDT and the VFA.43  Furthermore, her administration 
continuously insisted that the Americans would not be involved in combat and would 
                                                 





only operate under Filipino supervision.44  On the non-combatant nature of the American 
mission, Arroyo received critical assists from Washington as several ranking members of 
the Bush administration, including Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell, publicly stated that 
the focus of Balikatan was training and that it would not be a repeat of the Vietnam 
conflict.45  Furthermore, NSA Golez promised that a special memorandum of 
understanding would be reached with Washington that would outline in detail the terms 
of the American deployment and the limits placed on them.  This memorandum would be 
negotiated by Vice President Guigado  in his capacity as Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
and Undersecretary of State for East Asia James Kelly and eventually constitute the 
Terms of Reference (ToR) governing American participation in Balikatan 02-1.46  
 Lastly, Arroyo made the case that while qualms were understandable, the 
overwhelming majority of Filipinos backed increased assistance from the United States.  
Specifically, Arroyo cited a nationwide survey that found that an overwhelming 84% of 
Filipinos supported U.S. assistance against Abu Sayyaf.47  Though critics were quick to 
respond that the survey only asked about “assistance” rather than actual troops, the signs 
of popular support for Balikatan were undeniable.48   
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 Lobbying efforts on the part of the Arroyo government soon began to bear fruit.  
In mid-January following an emergency meeting of the National Security Council, Vice 
President Guigado dropped his opposition to the exercises and accepted their legality.49  
With Congress, the Arroyo administration pursued a policy of trying to divide and isolate 
its opponents.  In particular, it attempted to separate the center-left congressmen 
concerned about sovereignty from those communist members on the far left who opposed 
any American involvement in the Philippines.  Through a combination of persuasion and 
the promise of job appointments, the administration was able to convince a significant 
number of center-left individuals to support Balikatan.50  The AFP also played an 
important role as a major champion of Balikatan’s importance.  “We knew what the 
challenges were and when asked by politicians to give our opinions, we told them that it 
mattered.  That it was what was needed to beat [Abu Sayyaf].”51  Throughout the entirety 
of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, the AFP and Department of National 
Defense would emerge as key advocates for American involvement and often push for a 
greater role for U.S. forces in counterterrorism operations short of engaging in actual 
combat.52  
 The public concurrence between Washington and Manila regarding Balikatan 02-
1 masked private uncertainty about how the operation would actually be conducted.  
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Doubts centered on the Terms of Reference which would govern American activities 
during Balikatan.  While both sides agreed that American troops would not undertake 
combat operations and only fire their weapons if fired upon, there were still unresolved 
issues regarding operating procedures and the rules of engagement.  These questions 
grew in significance throughout the month of January as President Arroyo responded to 
critics by making several statements regarding the exercises that the Pentagon did not 
endorse.  President Bush had sought to resolve the issue in a phone call with Arroyo 
where they discussed the terms as well as the important political considerations that 
needed to be taken into account.53  The American concerns are evident in a memorandum 
sent by Rumsfeld to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, 
asking for a review of the situation in the Philippines.  States Rumsfeld, “I keep reading 
cables and statements by the President of the Philippines with the result that I am 
becoming worried about the Rules of Engagement.”  Rumsfeld quickly traced the 
problem to the political posturing in Manila:   
I have the growing impression that [Arroyo] and her associates feel they are so 
buffeted politically that they are starting to meddle in the way an operation is 
going to be conducted, which could result in putting the operation in jeopardy and 
in the process, putting US force in jeopardy unnecessarily.54 
 
The primary points of concern centered on who would actually be in command of 
American forces and the inclusion of American trainers on patrols in combat areas.  In 
addition to a longstanding reluctance in the United States to placing its soldiers under 
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foreign command, the Pentagon worried that if American troops were placed under the 
charge of Filipino officers, as suggested at times by members of the Arroyo 
administration, they could be improperly ordered into combat or another compromising 
situation.  While emphasizing that American soldiers would “take operational 
instructions from Filipino commanders,” proper language describing the obligations of 
U.S. forces serving with the AFP was difficult to agree upon.55  Likewise, it was feared 
that without clear Rules of Engagement, participation in patrols with the AFP would 
needlessly expose American soldiers to considerable danger.56   
Uncertainty over the Rules of Engagement delayed the official start of Balikatan 
02-1 by a full day and the actual Terms of Reference were not signed until mid-February, 
two weeks after the exercise had begun.57  Both sides sought to play down the matter as a 
minor procedural issue, but the disagreement was an ill omen for Balikatan.58  
Worryingly the differences between Washington and Manilla were not cosmetic, but 
rather early indications that the two countries envisioned the War on Terror in the 
Philippines progressing in strikingly different ways.   
Shoulder-to-Shoulder in the War on Terror: Balikatan 02-1 
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The Basilan Model: 
In early February, as Balikatan 02-1 was just beginning, Secretary of State Powell 
appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to defend the foreign affairs 
budget for the coming year.  Senator Joe Biden of Delaware queried the Secretary on the 
nature of America’s involvement in the Philippines and its ramifications.  Powell 
responded in writing: 
The purpose of the deployment of U.S, forces is to help the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) defeat international terrorism in the Philippines, which affects 
both U.S. and Philippine interests.  Training will continue to be at the core of our 
counterterrorism cooperation with the Philippines.  U.S. force will work closely 
with their AFP counterparts in activities focused on planning: gathering and 
disseminating intelligence: command: control and communications and assessing 
AFP capabilities and neds [sic]59 
 
Colonel David S. Maxwell, who commanded U.S. Special Forces on Basilan 
during Balikatan 02-1, described his mission thusly: “to conduct unconventional warfare 
operations in the Southern Philippines through, by, and with the AFP to help the 
Philippine government separate the population from and to destroy terrorist 
organizations.”60  Maxwell identified five key tasks for the Special Forces: 
 
  Denying the ASG sanctuary. 
 Surveilling, controlling, and denying ASG routes. 
 Surveilling supporting villages and key personnel. 
  Conducting local training to overcome AFP weaknesses and sustain AFP 
strengths. 
 Supporting operations by the AFP “strike force” (LRC) in the area of 
responsibility (AOR). 
 Conducting and supporting civil affairs operations in the AOR 61   
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Powell and Maxwell’s comments reflect the mantra that came to define Balikatan 02-1.  
Abu Sayyaf’s defeat constituted the ultimate, and undeniable objective of the exercise.  
However, American forces would achieve this aim only “by, with and through” the AFP 
instead of its own independent initiatives.62  
 The AFP’s operational primacy was codified in Terms of Reference which were 
finally accepted by both parties in mid-February.  Balikatan 02-1 would last for six 
months, with authorization expiring on July 31, and be under the overall command 
authority of AFP Chief of Staff, General Diomedio Villanueva.  The exercises themselves 
would be supervised by Filipino and American co-directors; Brigadier General 
Emmanuel Teodosio and Brigadier General Donald Wurster respectively.  The Terms of 
Reference explicitly forbade American forces from operating independently within the 
Philippines and only permitted U.S. soldiers to fire their weapons in self-defense.  
However, small teams of U.S. Special Forces would be forward deployed with Filipino 
field commanders on Basilan.63  These restrictions “kept U.S. forces from a ‘trigger-
puller’” role and  “guidance was given that U.S. troops had to be at least ‘one hill’ 
removed from locations where contact with the enemy could be anticipated.”64 
 To prosecute the war against Abu Sayyaf within the boundaries established by the 
Terms of Reference, the United States adopted what was known as the “indirect 
approach” based on Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model for counterinsurgency..65  
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The Diamond model depicts how an external actor can help a government against an 
insurgent faction through indirect means such as using diplomacy to positively influence 
the government’s policy while also attacking an insurgent group’s external support 
network.  
  
Figure 10: The McCormick Diamond Model for Counterinsurgency 66 
 
In the Philippines, the United States adapted this model to the unique environment and 
political challenges in Mindanao.  Instead of combatting Abu Sayyaf with its own forces, 
                                                 




a direct form of counter insurgency, the United States would defeat ASG by aiding the 
AFP and the common people.  With the AFP, the U.S. concentrated on bolstering its 
indigenous counterterrorism capacity through training, equipment and assistance.  The 
underlying purpose of this was to use American assistance to supplement the AFP and 
empower it to successfully combat ASG by itself.  Yet, this military component would be 
complemented by another avenue whereby the United States sought to undermine Abu 
Sayyaf’s popular support by appealing directly to the population of Basilan.  Through 
development projects and civic engagement (also known as civil-military operations or 
CMOs), the United States endeavored to improve the lives of the island’s general 
population and alleviate the conditions which had allowed Abu Sayyaf to thrive.  By 
separating Abu Sayyaf from the population, the United States hoped to cutoff the means 
of concealment within Basilan and sever the group’s support network.  In the years after 
Balikatan 02-1 this combination of defense cooperation and civic-engagement became 





Figure 11: The Basilan Model 
 
By, With and Through: 
 The American contribution to Balikatan 02-1 was Joint Task Force 510 (JTF 
510), Special Operation Command Pacific’s rapid response force which was drawn 
primarily from the 1st Special Forces Group, but would be supported by elements of other 
units including the aircraft of Company E, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment 
and the 351st Special Operations Wing.67  JTF 510 was commanded by Donald Wurster 
and 1st SFG(A) Commander Colonel David Fridovich.  It totaled roughly 660 
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individuals, including 160 Special Forces soldiers.68 Primarily based in Zamboanga, 
principally Camp Navarro, JTF 510 would also establish a military camp across the 
narrow strait on Basilan Island proper.69  Interestingly, though the Philippine front was a 
clear priority for the United States, competition for resources stemming from the war in 
Afghanistan often meant that JTF 510 lacked key pieces of equipment including current 
maps of the region.70  
American activities during Balikatan 02-1 can generally be separated into the 
categories of training and assistance.  Training activities consisted of American soldiers 
providing detailed instruction in battlefield techniques and strategies to AFP personnel.  
By way of contrast, assistance activities were operationally oriented and centered on 
American efforts to directly aid specific anti-ASG operations.  Assistance encompassed 
such elements as intelligence sharing, operational planning, strategic communications 
and logistical support. 
 The primary initiative of the training component was the forming of two new 
Light Reaction Companies which could be aggressively used in counterterrorism 
operations.  This emphasis reflected a systemic problem which earlier American advisors 
had observed.  “One of the weaknesses of the Philippine army has been too much reliance 
on conventional war tactics…including the use of artillery and infantry in dense forest 
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situations.”71  Whereas the AFP primarily emphasized the need for new equipment, 
American trainers focused on shifting the mindset of the AFP away from conventional 
assaults and towards smaller, intelligence driven operations.  Training of the first LRC 
had begun at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City prior to 9/11, but under Balikatan 02-1 this 
program would be expanded to two additional LRCs.72  Specially trained in such small 
unit tactics and jungle fighting, the LRCs would form the vanguard of this new strategic 
posture.   
 Conducted primarily in the military camps around Zamboanga, the training 
provided to AFP units centered on specific functional areas.  “Detachment commanders, 
team sergeants and intelligence sergeants would focus on teaching the military decision-
making process; the planning and execution of basic joint operations; the simple fusion of 
various sources of intelligence in planning future operations; and the method for 
exploiting emerging situations.”73  The rest of the Special Forces team members would 
teach basic soldiering skills like marksmanship, equipment maintenance, land navigation 
and combat-lifesaving skills.  In particular, the lessons on basic battlefield medical 
treatments were credited with boosting morale among the AFP.74  The bulk of the 
training was carried out by Special Forces non-commissioned officers which itself was a 
boon as it provided a model for empowered leadership amongst even the lower military 
ranks.75 
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 Filipino participants in these training programs were described as enthusiastic and 
receptive.76  After years of operating in Mindanao, the AFP troops knew what they 
needed from the training and were eager to learn.  This process was greatly facilitated by 
the long history of defense diplomacy between the United States and Philippines.  Several 
of the AFP officers had previously participated in exchanges like the IMET program and 
had even received some special forces training at Fort Bragg.77  These officers provided a 
critical link between the American advisors and their charges as they helped to 
communicate the significance of the training and generally smooth the friction inherent in 
such close cooperation.78  Importantly, in addition to Balikatan 02-1 the regular schedule 
of joint US-RP training exercises continued apace including the traditional Balikatan 02 
exercise which was held in Luzon.  The continuation of these exercises meant that even 
those AFP units not stationed in Mindanao benefited from added training and 
counterterrorism drills.  Likewise they ensured that the social links between US-RP 
officers which were proving so beneficial in Mindanao, continued to be cultivated 
through an active defense diplomacy regimen.79 
Although the AFP soldiers were responsive trainees, American trainers “assessed 
the AFP's tactical capabilities as weak, and their equipment as poor.”80  Maintenance in 
particular emerged as a key concern for the Americans.  It was discovered that a large 
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number of the  rifles used by Filipino soldiers, often dating back to the Vietnam era, were 
so old and poorly maintained that the rifling within the barrels had actually worn away 
causing the bullets to veer randomly when fired.81  The poor maintenance of Filipino 
weapons reflected a broader institutional failing as the AFP prioritized property control 
over upkeep and did not provide basic cleaning materials.82  Maintenance issues came to 
symbolize a broader truth about the AFP.  The failings were not with the Filipino soldiers 
themselves, but indicative of wider institutional negligence within the AFP.  Indeed, the 
issue was not that AFP soldiers were unfamiliar with the basics of riffle maintenance, but 
rather that they could not afford the fluids needed to clean their weapons.83 
 In mid-February, American advisers deployed to Basilan where they were 
attached to AFP battalions.  There, they were afforded a useful window into how the AFP 
performed during operations and the challenges posed by Basilan’s geography.  Basilan’s 
combination of rugged terrain, poor infrastructure and dense jungle made the island 
particularly unwelcoming to military operations.84  Problems with communications and 
logistics in particular were observed to be a major concern stemming from the conditions 
on Basilan.85  As unfavorable as the terrain appeared, American assessments of their 
Filipino counterparts were not much brighter.  According to one advisor, they “found the 
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Philippine units in disarray and lacking in basic infantry skills and initiative.”  Adding 
that the situation, “had degraded to the point that the AFP no longer aggressively pursued 
the insurgents. The combination of neglect and lack of military initiative had created 
circumstances that contributed not only to the continuing presence and even growth of 
insurgent groups, but to the genesis of new terrorist and criminal organizations.”86  
 Once aware of the distinct difficulties on Basilan, American trainers began to 
provide specialized training to counter the obstacles that they observed.  The advisors 
focused on the critical areas that would yield immediate benefits in the fight against ASG 
including night vision and tactical communication. The AFP’s lack of modern night-
vision capabilities was identified as a critical deficiency by the American advisors as it 
not only significantly limited AFP operations to daylight hours, but also deprived them of 
a key advantage over Abu Sayyaf.87  Remedying this issue was not simply a matter of 
providing AFP troops with new night-vision goggles, but also instructing them on the 
intricacies of night-fighting.  American assistance in allowing the AFP to conduct 
nighttime operations has consistently been cited as one of the key achievements of 
Balikatan 02-1 and emblematic of how melding direct training with new equipment could 
rapidly enhance the AFP counterterrorism capabilities.88 
 Tactical communications were an undervalued American contribution to 
Balikatan 02-1.  Prior to the American arrival, the AFP had struggled mightily to stay in 
contact with its units when they were in the field.  Often communications were 
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unencrypted broadcasts that could be easily intercepted by opposing forces.89  
Conversely, because of poor communications, commanders often lost track of where their 
units were and what they were doing.  American communications equipment and training 
were essential in remedying these deficiencies and allowing the AFP to both monitor and 
coordinate the movements of its own forces on Basilan.90 
 Both Manila and Washington classified Balikatan 02-1 as an exercise and actively 
avoided the term “joint operations” for political reasons.  However, American support 
was not confined to training as U.S. forces provided direct assistance to ongoing AFP 
operations targeting Abu Sayyaf.  While strictly adhering to the moratorium on 
participating in combat, American forces used their own capabilities to compensate for 
specific AFP’s shortfalls and significantly increased the efficacy of the counterterrorism 
campaign on Basilan. 
 The principle point of American assistance came in the realm of intelligence 
fusion and operational planning.  A priority for American advisors on Basilan was to shift 
the AFP away from conventional assaults and jungle patrols to targeted, intelligence 
driven missions.  Whereas Philippine forces had strong human intelligence capabilities, 
the United States was able to employ surveillance aircraft capable of yielding operational 
intelligence.  P-3 Orions and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) flying over Basilan 
were capable of identifying potential ASG camps and served to focus counterterrorism 
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operations.91  The American embassy in Manila had even hosted a demonstration of 
small, hand-held drones for Philippine officials including President Arroyo in order to 
illustrate the operational benefits that such surveillance drones could provide.92  
Importantly, U.S. advisors embedded with AFP battalion commands on Basilan 
were able to rapidly relay this intelligence to their hosts and immediately craft 
operational plans.  This “intelligence fusion,” significantly reduced the lag time between 
when intelligence was collected and when it was acted upon.93  However, it is important 
to note that there were also significant legal restrictions placed on what intelligence the 
Americans could share with their Filipino colleagues, meaning that often the most 
valuable pieces of information were withheld.94  Nevertheless, the intelligence fusion 
teams were credited with significantly increasing the aggressiveness of AFP patrols 
resulting in more frequent contact with enemy units and significant losses for Abu 
Sayyaf. 95  
 The second major form of American operational assistance came from the use of 
its helicopter force.  In general, American advisors had been impressed by the skills of 
Filipino helicopter pilots to navigate Basilan’s difficult terrain.  However, the advisors 
had been dismayed to learn that the Filipino pilots lacked the ability to fly at night.  In 
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addition to providing strategic lift and other logistical support, American helicopters and 
pilots assumed responsibility for nighttime air operations.96  Training Filipino pilots in 
night flying would become a point of emphasis for JTF 510, but American pilots 
provided a convenient bridge to this deficit over the interim.  American night flights, 
allowed the AFP to maintain a key tactical advantage over ASG as it negated the group’s 
ability to find refuge after sundown.  Beyond flying at night, American helicopters also 
provided medical evacuations (medevac) for injured AFP troops.  Like the earlier 
medical training, the prospect of a helicopter medevac was a significant morale boost for 
Filipino soldiers who now could be confident of receiving critical medical care if they 
were wounded.97  Unfortunately, despite the numerous advantages stemming from the 
use of American helicopters in support of AFP operations on Basilan, this initiative was 
not without costs.  On the morning of February 21, an American Chinook helicopter 
transiting from Basilan to Cebu crashed off the coast of Negros killing the 10 servicemen 
onboard.  The crash would be the largest loss of American lives in the Philippines during 
the entire duration of OEF-P.98 
The Moro Front: 
 The greatest uncertainty of Balikatan 02-1 was how the population in Mindanao, 
especially Zamboanga and Basilan, would react to the presence of American forces.  
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Decades of conflict and governmental neglect had left Mindanao the victim of chronic 
underdevelopment and endemic poverty.  Incessant hostilities between various insurgent 
groups and the government had not only derailed economic progress but had also taken a 
significant toll on the people.  For example, during the 2000 offensive against the MILF, 
over 100,000 civilians had been displaced by the fighting and become internally 
displaced refugees.99 At the time of Balikatan 02-1, the population of the region was not 
merely economically depressed, but war-weary and desperate for peace and stability.100  
Winning over this crestfallen citizenry and leveraging their support against ASG 
constituted a key tenet of American strategy in the Philippines and perhaps its greatest 
challenge. 
 At its heart, the question of popular reactions to American involvement in 
Mindanao pivoted on events nearly a century in the past.  In particular, American efforts 
were predicated on whether the brutality of American pacification campaigns during the 
colonial period resonated more powerfully than the special relationship that had 
subsequently developed between the Moros and the United States.  Prior to the 
deployment, many commentators speculated that that the long memory of past abuses at 
the hands of the GIs, would further enflame the conflict and be a rallying cry for Abu 
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Sayyaf.101  “The arrival of U.S. troops plays into the anti-American sentiment of a lot of 
ideologues,” warned Philippine journalist Glenda Gloria.  “These are Muslims who have 
been very opposed to the Abu Sayyaf. But if the American soldiers get into combat, 
there's a risk the political landscape could change.”102 Instead of winning over the 
population, the American intervention would be self-defeating as the U.S. troops would 
further alienate the Moros and offer succor to ASG. 
 These fears largely proved unfounded.  The distinct colonial experience of 
Mindanao and the historic affinity between Moros and the United States appeared more 
important than past misdeeds.  Neither the United States as a country nor American 
soldiers in particular were seen as enemies of the Moro people and the population 
welcomed their arrival in Mindanao.103  Interviews at the time with residents of 
Zamboanga (both Muslims and Christians) showed clear support for the American 
trainers and believed that their presence would enhance the prospect of peace rather than 
more conflict.104 In the Philippine Congress, the Mindanao Bloc adopted a resolution 
welcoming U.S. troops provided they refrained from combat.105  Furthermore, in 
February, there were sizable demonstrations in Zamboanga in support of the American 
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presence and in March Lieutenant Colonel David Maxwell, who commanded U.S. forces 
on Basilan, was officially adopted as a “son of Basilan,” by the island’s provincial 
government.106 
 However, popular support for the American forces was neither universal nor 
without reservation.  A group of Mindanao based lawyers challenged the constitutionality 
of the exercises in the Supreme Court which solidly ruled in favor of Balikatan, but 
stressed the prohibition on U.S. participation in combat missions.107  More importantly, 
while the population welcomed the American forces, they remained deeply wary of the 
AFP.  Whereas abuses by American armed forces were well in the past, those perpetrated 
by the AFP remained fresh and ongoing.  Amongst the Muslims of Mindanao, the largely 
Christian AFP was viewed as a neocolonial army whose neglect and mistreatment of the 
population had first birthed Abu Sayyaf and whose corrupt officers had in turn profited 
from the militant group’s rise.108  American advisors had been quick to identify the 
AFP’s unpopularity with the local population as a major point of concern.  The TCAV 
team which had arrived in October observed that AFP units “generally had poor or 
limited relations with the population and thus had little access to ASG and JI areas 
without resorting to using heavy force to gain it.” 109  Whilst the arrival of the Americans 
did not trigger a popular backlash, their partnership with the unloved AFP did foster the 
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growth of anti-American sentiment and provided ample fodder for Abu Sayyaf’s 
propaganda efforts.110  One local reverend warned the Washington Post, that the 
Americans, “have to worry about the enemy, but they will have to keep an eye on their 
partners too.”111 
 American difficulties navigating Mindanao’s complex political dynamic became 
most evident in the handling of the MILF.  After 9/11, the MILF leadership had been 
vocal in its denunciation of the attacks and attempted to disavow any link with 
international terrorism.112  However, the prospect of Global War on Terror being brought 
to the MILF’s doorstep in Mindanao dramatically complicated how the MILF viewed the 
issue.  Despite its efforts to publically distance itself from al-Qaeda, MILF leaders 
worried about being labelled a terrorist organization by the State Department which 
would hurt its legitimacy.  Furthermore, while the new skills and equipment imparted by 
the United States to the AFP were intended to fight Abu Sayyaf, such capabilities could 
readily be turned against the MILF.  Worse, the MILF itself could become the target of 
American counterterrorism operations.113  Stated high-ranking MILF official Sharif 
Muhsin Julabbi “the American soldiers are not our enemies. But we would like them to 
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stay as far away as possible from the places we have troops.  Otherwise, there will be a 
confrontation, a clash between the U.S soldiers and ours.”114 
 For its part, the United States endeavored to divorce the war against Abu Sayyaf 
from Mindanao’s other conflicts and actively avoided confrontations with the much 
larger MILF.  During Balikatan an understanding was reached whereby US-AFP forces 
would not enter into MILF areas while pursuing Abu Sayyaf targets.  It was feared that 
any such incursion into MILF territories could result in an unintentional clash between 
the two sides which in turn would scupper ongoing GRP-MILF peace talks.115  Yet, the 
tenability of this arrangement was almost immediately brought into question as the peace 
process faltered in March 2002 and hostilities between the AFP and MILF temporarily 
resumed.116  Washington’s belief that it could focus solely on Abu Sayyaf whilst 
eschewing the region’s wider political conflicts proved to not only be fanciful, but 
detrimental to the objectives it sought to achieve through Balikatan 02-1.  
Winning Hearts & Minds: 
 Acceptance of the American troop presence in Mindanao provided JTF 510 a 
useful toehold with the population, but was insufficient to fulfill the second leg of the 
Basilan model.  To be successful against Abu Sayyaf, US-RP forces would need to 
engage with the population and win over their support against ASG.  Efforts to attract 
public support for the war against ASG had been absent from past AFP offensives against 
the group and constituted a major strategic component of the American mission.  
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American military leaders, including Admiral Blair, fully embraced President Arroyo’s 
emphasis on waging the war on poverty in concert with the war on terror and fashioned 
Balikatan 02-1 around this idea.117  In conjunction with its cooperation with the AFP, JTF 
510 undertook a robust civic-military program designed to alleviate the impoverished 
living conditions on Basilan and appeal directly to the people for their support against 
Abu Sayyaf. 
 The earlier TCAV team discovered that “the Philippine government had never 
asked the majority of the population about its basic needs.”118  Though a telling 
illustration of the fraught relationship between the national government and the local 
population, the absence of a robust program to meet the basic needs of Basilan’s citizens 
presented an opportunity for American civil-military operations.  To identify priorities for 
American assistance, the Task Force spent weeks administering a 70 question survey 
across Basilan. The questionnaire, which had a sample population of 60,000 out of a 
population of roughly 350,000, revealed the state of decay in Basilan.  According to the 
survey, no non-governmental organization (NGO) had been active on the island since 
1999, and insurgents had driven away schoolteachers and health workers leaving the 
island’s population with inadequate education and medical services.119  After increased 
access to potable water, which was the highest priority, improving medical care and 
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restoring educational opportunities were identified as points of emphasis by 
respondents.120 
 Armed with this detailed understanding of popular needs, U.S. engineers began an 
aggressive campaign to improve basic infrastructure on Basilan.  This included drilling 
dozens of new water wells, building miles of new roads, revitalizing a decrepit airfield 
and improving harbor facilities.  Furthermore, the U.S. forces also built new schools, 
community facilities and helped to repaired mosques.121  These building programs, 
especially the infrastructure projects were seen to be essential for both revitalizing 
Basilan’s economy and providing immediate improvements to the standard of living.  As 
much as the new infrastructure helped the population it also greatly facilitated the 
ongoing military operations on the island – a fact which was seized upon by both 
Balikatan’s supporters and critics alike.122  So popular was the building program that in 
April 2001, President Arroyo and PACOM agreed to expand the initiative and add an 
addition 340 American naval construction engineers (Seabees) and their marine guards to 
the forces operating on Basilan.  This brought the total American contingent in Mindanao 
to between 1,000 and 1,200 soldiers.123  Interestingly, the infrastructure program also 
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produced the only instance of American soldiers engaging opposition forces that is 
presently known when on June 17, a construction crew was attacked and American 
marines returned fire in self-defense as permitted by the Terms of Reference.124 
 Complementing the building program was a humanitarian outreach campaign 
designed to engage the people of Basilan and win over their support.  American forces 
would arrange movie nights for local children (complete with popcorn), distribute 
sporting equipment and generally attempt to interact with local people on a human 
level.125  The most important of these undertakings were the Medical Civil Action 
Programs (MEDCAP) and Dental Civil Action Programs (DENTCAP), programs where 
American medical personnel would open temporary clinics in villages and provide basic 
healthcare for the populations.  On Basilan, individual MEDCAPs would often treat 
several hundred Filipinos in a single day. 126  These activities provided an important way 
to help the local population and win their trust.  Importantly, the U.S. forces were making 
sure that the AFP remained the face of these programs as a critical means of enhancing 
the Philippine government’s legitimacy and curtailing the passive support for groups like 
Abu Sayyaf.127  “The use of civil-military operations helped to communicate the message 
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that the AFP was opposing only the ASG, with the goal of protecting the population.”128  
As General Wurster explained, “our strategy is to enhance the Philippine government’s 
legitimacy. We want to eliminate the seed ground for the next generation of terrorists.”129 
Nor was this dynamic one-sided, as the American emphasis on civic engagement 
during Balikatan 02-1 was key to instilling this philosophy within the AFP and 
highlighting the significance of noncombat missions within counterinsurgency.130  The 
civil action program yielded immediate results as the budding relationship and the 
opportunities resulting from interactions with locals allowed US-AFP forces to “tap into 
the ‘bamboo telegraph,’ the indigenous information network.”131  Thanks to frequent 
interactions residents began to openly share information about the local situation and Abu 
Sayyaf.  In at least one case, villagers provided warning of impending ASG strikes 
because they feared the attacks would lead to a withdrawal of US-RP troops and halting 
of the humanitarian assistance program.132 During the six months of Balikatan 02-1, US-
RP units on Basilan built 80 kilometers of road, four bridges, two piers, five water 
projects and treated over 20,000 patients.133 
 Whereas civil action programs constituted a war for the hearts and minds of 
Basilan, the United States also adopted a more direct approach which targeted Abu 
Sayyaf and the extremist ideology that it espoused.  Working with USAID and the State 
Department, moderate imams were brought to the island to preach tolerance and mollify 
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more radical voices within the Muslim community.  A particularly effective program was 
implemented to bring young leaders and teachers from Basilan to the United States.  
These individuals received some training in education techniques and development.  
However, the primary purpose was to expose these community leaders to the outside 
world and return them to Basilan with a broader worldview and new perspective on the 
island’s future.134  JTF 510 also operated a small psychological operations (PSYOPs) 
department staffed by the 4th Psychological Warfare Group and based in Zamboanga.   
The PSYOP mission has become a frequent target of opponents of American 
involvement in the Philippines and has been cited as evidence of the offensive nature of 
the American mission.135  However, described as “a skeleton operation” with extremely 
limited capabilities, the PSYOP group’s primary focus was disseminating basic 
information about ongoing activities and attempting to counter a “decidedly anti-
American bias” among some segments of the Philippine media.  A critical advantage in 
this undertaking was that American PSYOP personnel had pre-existing relationships with 
their counterparts in the AFP thanks to previous interactions during past joint 
exercises.136  The utility of these established ties between PSYOP personnel during 
Balikatan 02-1 was emblematic of the familiarity cultivated during past US-RP defense 
diplomacy and indicative of the operational benefits derived from these activities.  
 The most significant contribution of the PSYOPs team was to advertise the 
Rewards for Justice program.  Run by the U.S. Department of Justice, the United States 
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offered sizable bounties of up to $5 million, for information leading to the arrest of top 
ASG leaders like Abu Sabaya and Khadafi Janjalani.  The PSYOPs team was responsible 
for dispersing posters and flyers with the information.  Immediately, officials were 
flooded with wannabe informants hoping to claim part of the reward money being 
offered.137  To show that psychological warfare was not the purview of the United States 
alone, Abu Sabaya called into a Zamboanga radio station the day after the bounties were 
announced to mock the $5 million reward placed on his own head.  On the bounty Sabaya 
boasted that it was “a good sign,” adding that “it means that we have importance, that we 
are important to the Americans.”138  
Hunting Abu Sayyaf: 
 
Progress and Frustrations: 
 The infusion of American equipment, training and assistance had a clear and 
immediate impact on AFP operations against Abu Sayyaf.  With American guidance, the 
AFP conducted a campaign of aggressive patrolling.  These patrols were not random 
forays into the jungle, but were based on intelligence collected by the United States and 
targeted at areas were ASG was known to be operating.  Clashes with ASG occurred with 
increasing regularity throughout Balikatan 02-1, placing the group under extreme 
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pressure.139  Instead of being able to retreat into the jungle and regroup, the group’s 
fighters were constantly on the run.  “The hiding places of the Abu Sayyaf are being 
reduced because troops reach them faster,” explained AFP spokesman Brigadier General 
Edilberto Adan who credited American assistance with communications and operational 
planning.140   
More importantly, the rapid operational tempo and the success of U.S. led civic-
engagement proved effective at severing ASG’s traditional support networks.  Forced 
into an ever smaller area, ASG fighters increasingly found it difficult to sustain itself.  
Notably in mid-April, the mere promise of a good meal was sufficient to coax nearly 20 
ASG fighters to come out of the jungle and surrender to authorities.141  Under increasing 
pressure, Abu Sayyaf fighters first dispersed into ever smaller bands before ultimately 
opting to flee Basilan altogether.  Reports of a mass exodus of ASG members from 
Basilan began to surface in March with small groups seeking to cross the narrow straits to 
Mindanao or find sanctuary further south in the Sulu archipelago.142  The flight from 
Basilan posed its own perils as many ASG members were intercepted in-transit or 
arrested soon after landing on Mindanao.  This included Satar Yacub, who was described 
as the 4th highest ranking member of ASG.143  The progress against Abu Sayyaf garnered 
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significant acclaim from the United States.  In his speech marking the 6 month 
anniversary of 9/11, President Bush singled out the Philippines and President Arroyo for 
particular praise.144  When Admiral Fargo, who had recently been promoted to 
Commander-in-Chief of the US forces in the Pacific, visited Basilan in May, he 
expressed his satisfaction with the gains being made against ASG.145  Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, called Balikatan a “great success.”146 
Yet, the visible progress and public adulations masked a cauldron of frustrations 
beneath the surface.  Balikatan 02-1 and the entirety of American strategy in the 
Philippines had been predicated on President Arroyo’s assurances that given proper 
support the AFP was capable of successfully defeating Abu Sayyaf.  After months of 
closely observing the AFP, American officials realized that this simply was not true.  
Relates Briscoe, “despite the fact that Basilan had been a live-fire situation for more than 
a decade, the Philippine soldiers and marines stationed there were not proficient jungle 
fighters,” and “they were certainly no match tactically for the guerrilla forces.”147  
Whereas American advice and assistance could direct AFP force towards ASG camps it 
could not remedy the AFP deficiencies when it actually made contact with the enemy.  
Notoriously poor marksmanship meant that AFP soldiers were often felled by friendly 
fire.148  Once AFP patrols encountered ASG elements, they were unable to sustain the 
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engagement and had to break contact, allowing the guerrillas to retreat.149  The move by 
Abu Sayyaf to abandon Basilan also exposed the limitations of the Philippine Navy.  
While the AFP did interdict several boats, the dilapidated state of the naval vessels meant 
that they were too slow to catch the quick ASG speedboats which nimbly slipped through 
a ragged maritime cordon and allowed many ASG members (including most of its 
leadership) to escape Basilan.150  Nor were the deficiencies confined to the field, as 
rivalries between the different Filipino services and the internal politics of the military 
were repeatedly cited by American advisers as actively hindering counterterrorism 
operations.151  After 9/11, Washington had looked to the AFP as its champion in 
combating terrorism in the Philippines.  Amid the hills of Basilan, American officials 
were coming to not only recognize the substantial limitations of the Philippine military 
but also the extent to which their trust in the AFP as an institution had been misplaced. 
Confronted by the inadequacies of the AFP in its efforts against ASG, the 
immediate reaction amongst proponents of GWOT in the Philippines was to call for U.S. 
forces to play an increased role in Balikatan 02-1.  In the Wall Street Journal, Brett 
Decker penned a blistering article labelling Balikatan a failure attributable to American 
adherence to “nonsensical rules of engagement,” which prevented offensive action by 
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U.S. force so that President Arroyo could “save face.”152  After questioning the 
usefulness of American backed construction projects, Decker concluded that “building a 
few roads in the southern Philippine islands doesn't hurt but giving U.S. forces a more 
active role in the fighting would be a far more certain way to defeat the Muslim 
rebels.”153  Congressman Tiahrt used a hearing on Defense Department appropriations to 
air his own grievances against the Philippine government for their inability to rescue the 
Burnhams: 
 
I don’t understand why the people of the Philippines cannot see the cancer in their 
country that has eaten away the southern part of the Philippines, their economy. 
They don’t [have] the political will to take care of their problem, and I wish we 
could turn our people loose because I think they would do a fine job of helping 
them. 
 
Tiahrt revisited this point later in the hearing: 
 
I just think if we had the political will we would have [the Burnhams] out within a 
week.  I just think we have been holding back and we ought to get in there and get 
out and finish our training mission and let them – it is really a peasant army.  The 
Philippine Army is a peasant army, and they need the training.154 
 
The practical focus of Tiahrt and his compatriots was to shift the level at which 
American trainers were embedded with their Filipino counterparts.  Although the initial 
plan had been for American advisers to be attached to AFP companies where they would 
join their hosts on combat patrols, this had not come to fruition.  Months into Balikatan, 
U.S. forces were only attached to AFP battalion commands and remained largely 
confined to the battalion headquarters instead of in the field.  U.S. military officials, 
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including Fargo, Blair and the Joint Chiefs had recommended that U.S. advisors be 
deployed down to the company level where they would be able to provide on-the-spot 
training and advice.155  Backers for the company-level training gained an important 
advocate in Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz who stopped in the Philippines 
in early June amid a larger tour of the region.  Along with meeting government officials 
in Manila, Wolfowitz travelled to Basilan where he could assess Balikatan’s progress. In 
Manila, Wolfowitz discussed an expansion of the U.S. role in the Philippines with 
President Arroyo, Secretary for National Defense Reyes and NSA Golez.  This included 
support for training at the company level and potentially extending an American military 
presence beyond Balikatan’s expiration date of July 31.  Wolfowitz stated that he came 
away from his visit as “more of an advocate for engagement in the Philippines.”156 
Company level training had been included in the Terms of Reference and 
accepted by Philippine leaders as part of Balikatan.  Yet, the absence of any such training 
four months into Balikatan’s tenure sprang not from a peculiarity of Filipino politics, but 
the personal reluctance of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  Rumsfeld’s 
discomfort sprang from uncertainty about the benefits of company-level training and 
more importantly what the cost would be.  Specifically, Rumsfeld was hesitant to expose 
U.S. soldiers to the dangers of combat patrols with the AFP and endure the likely 
increase in American casualties.  Lest there be any confusion that the danger came from 
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Abu Sayyaf alone, when Rumsfeld eventually approved company-level training in late 
June when it came with the caveat that American advisors would only patrol with AFP 
companies once the Philippine unit had been certified as “trained and ready to go.”157  
Noted Congresses’ in-house think tank and policy analysis organization, the 
Congressional Research Service, “Rumsfeld and other officials… may have had 
continued doubts about this kind of arrangement.  Relatedly, the uneven and sometimes 
poor quality of AFP units may have added to these doubts.”158  This stance reflected 
Rumsfeld’s wider ambivalence about Balikatan and especially the performance of the 
AFP.  Rumsfeld acknowledging that the mission had preceded as intended, garnering 
goodwill and generally going as planned, but his evaluation was far from glowing.  “You 
can improve the situation in one place by your presence, but unless you get the terrorists, 
you have not improved the situation net in the world…and there has been very little of 
getting terrorists in the Philippines thus far.”159  
Rescuing the Hostages:  
Washington’s budding frustrations in the Philippines were punctuated by the 
continued captivity of Martin and Gracie Burnham whose time as Abu Sayyaf’s hostages 
reached its one year anniversary during Balikatan 02-1.  Although American officials 
publicly insisted that Balikatan’s aimed to defeat Abu Sayyaf, privately they admitted 
that rescuing the Burnhams and their fellow captive Ediborah Yap was the true purpose 
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of American involvement.160  Every week that Balikatan proceed without the recovery of 
the captives served as a reminder of the high expectations which had accompanied the 
exercise’s inauguration and disappointment at its lack of success. 
Even before Balikatan began, President Arroyo had set the deadline of December 
31, 2001 for the AFP to rescue the Burnhams.  When that deadline passed without 
attaining its objective, Arroyo had defended her military noting that even the United 
States military had yet to capture Osama Bin Laden.161 As a result, the Burnham’s 
experienced Balikatan 02-1 from the perspective of Abu Sayyaf.  Months were spent 
constantly on the move through the jungles of Basilan in a desperate attempt by ASG to 
stay ahead of the AFP.  Throughout this dangerous game of cat and mouse, the captives 
suffered the deprivation, exhaustion and illness.  These hardships were not constant 
though as Gracia reports in her autobiography that corrupt elements within the AFP 
actively colluded with Abu Sabaya - providing food and sanctuary, in exchange for a 
promised cut of the expected ransom money.162  Under the onslaught of AFP pressure 
from Balikatan, Abu Sabaya abandoned Basilan with his hostages in tow.  They 
decamped from Basilan in late March eventually crossing to Mindanao and the jungled 
hills of Zamboanga del Norte north of Zamboanga City.163  
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Incidentally, the major obstacle to liberating the Burnhams had never been an 
inability to locate them.  Filipino human intelligence sources, run via their Marine Corps, 
combined with American electronic surveillance combined to give the US-RP forces an 
effective means of tracking Abu Sabaya’s movements.  Philippine Marine Intelligence 
had successfully coopted one of Sabaya’s supply curriers meaning that when Sabaya 
requested a new backpack, it arrived with a hidden transponder sown into its lining which 
provided his location.  Likewise, the satellite phone Sabaya used to mock his pursuers 
had also been provided by the CIA and broadcasted his location as well as his taunts.164  
The problem was not locating the Burnhams, but doubts that the AFP could 
guarantee their safety during a rescue operation.  In early May, Rumsfeld even raised the 
issue during a lunch meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney and NSA Condoleezza 
Rice.  Rumsfeld informed his White House colleagues of the risk that Philippines were 
“going to ineptly try to save the Burnhams.”165  Washington had earlier offered the use of 
its Delta Force for a rescue operation, however, this offer had been rebuffed by President 
Arroyo who continued to decline any direct role for U.S. forces.166  Likewise, a peaceful 
attempt by the FBI to free the Burnhams flopped when a ransom of over $300,000 was 
paid to ASG intermediaries, but failed to win their release.167  
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Efforts to launch a rescue operation foundered on the bureaucratic politics of both 
Washington and Manila.  Although the CIA was able to accurately track the movements 
of Abu Sabaya, they were prevented from actually providing this detailed information to 
the AFP because of a prohibition on providing information likely to lead to a subject’s 
death to outside parties. Instead the CIA provided the AFP with a five mile radius where 
Sabaya was located rather than his specific location.168  On the Filipino side, the effort 
suffered from a bitter rivalry between the Philippine Marine Corps and the Army.  
Marine Corps Intelligence played a critical role in tracking Sabaya’s movements and 
believed that its own soldiers, thought to be better trained, should be responsible for the 
rescue operation.  However, the Marines were confined to maritime operations as their 
area of responsibility and the Army, who had prerogative over land operations, refused 
repeated requests to allow the Marines to operate on land.  Instead, “the lumbering 
Philippine army insisted on doing the work itself, sometimes sending whole battalions 
after the nimble guerrillas.169   
The costs of both these approaches was exposed on June 7, 2002.  On that day, 
heavy rain had forced Abu Sabaya’s party and captives to halt their march through the 
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jungle near Sibuco.  This delay allowed a force of AFP Scout Rangers to reach their 
camp.170  The Scout Rangers had received a significant amount of American training and 
were regarded by the American officials as “the most combative and least corrupt of the 
Philippine troops”171  However, unlike the Light Reaction Companies, the Rangers had 
not received specialized training in hostage rescue.  The Rangers surrounded the ASG 
camp before launching their assault which caught the guerrillas by surprise.  During the 
ensuing battle Martin Burnham and Ediborah Yap were killed in the crossfire.  Gracia 
Burnham survived the battle, but was wounded in the leg.  She received first aid from the 
AFP soldiers, using methods taught to them by American trainers and was evacuated 
from the area on an American helicopter.172  Not only had two of the three hostages been 
killed amid the rescue attempt, Abu Sabaya and the bulk of his band managed to escape 
the encounter.173  
 The New York Times, labelled the incident as a “botched ending to one chapter of 
American effort against terrorism,” adding that it illustrated “the painful trade-offs 
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required to keep important allies in the global campaign against terrorism.”174  
Congressman Tiahrt led the charge in Washington.  He unreservedly argued that the 
outcome would have been different if American forces had been allowed to conduct the 
rescue operation and asked the Pentagon to investigate the Scout Rangers training.175  
Biting questions about the AFP’s well established deficiencies and corruption became 
commonplace in the operation’s aftermath as critics sought to understand why a force 
with so many known problems could be left responsible for such a delicate mission.  
These questions echoed in Manila where the bungled rescue attempt compounded 
burgeoning doubts about the AFP’s ability to actually defeat Abu Sayyaf.176 
 Amid the tumult that followed the rescue attempt, the Bush administration stood 
like a bulwark in support of its Philippine allies.  The administration, “bent over 
backward…to praise the efforts of the Philippine military and President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo.”177  Secretary Powell insisted that the tragedy occurred despite the 
best efforts of the Philippine government and that the United States would continue to 
stand with President Arroyo in the fight against terrorism in the Philippines.178  In 
Manila, the U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone was adamant in his support for the 
AFP:  
It is very clear to us, there is no moral ambiguity here. No one should try to 
suggest that this was a bungled or botched in any way.  These guys were heroes 
and they were brave and skillful179 
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Even Donald Rumsfeld, a known critic of the AFP, declined to publicly criticize the 
operation, “you can be sure the people trying to do it cared deeply, and wanted to do it 
and wanted it to succeed.”180  President Bush even called President Arroyo to assure her 
of America’s ongoing support. Arroyo promised that Abu Sayyaf would be held 
accountable for the fate of the hostages and that “justice would be done.”181 
Hunting Abu Sabaya: 
 As leaders in Washington and Manila struggled to portray the rescue operation as 
a success, it did yield one distinct advantage of depriving Abu Sayyaf, and Abu Sabaya in 
particular, of a human shield.  Prior to the operation, both U.S. and Filipino forces had 
hesitated from conducting aggressive combat operations out of fear that the hostages 
would be harmed.  Following the recovery of Gracia Burnham and the death of her two 
fellow captives, this was no longer a concern.  “Without the hostages, the rules of the 
game have changed drastically,” noted Roilo Golez.  “We can go all out against them, but 
still subject to the rules of engagement, within the bound of the law.”182  AFP forces 
would no longer need to temper their operations against Abu Sayyaf, but were free to 
pursue an all-out campaign to destroy Abu Sayaf.183  The United States enthusiastically 
endorsed this more aggressive approach and after weeks of dithering the Pentagon 
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endorsed the deployment of U.S. trainers with AFP companies provided that Filipino 
units met set training standards.184 
Abu Sabaya, the Burnham’s gaoler and the hectoring face of ASG was the clear 
target of this new offensive.  Unfortunately, Sabaya had abandoned the backpack with 
imbedded tracking device when he fled the June 7 skirmish, depriving the US-RP forces 
of their primary means of tracking his movements.  However, the human intelligence 
sources cultivated by the Philippine Marines remained active and were able to ascertain 
Sabaya’s location.  They learned that Abu Sabaya was seeking a way off of Mindanao 
and a boat to carry him back to the islands south of Zamboanga.185   
Armed with this information, the Philippine Marines and their U.S. backers set a 
trap.  Since the operation would occur on water, it fell within the purview of the Marine 
Corps and thus sidestepped the inter-service rivalries within the AFP that had plagued the 
early operations. The plan called for a boat to pick up Abu Sabaya at a beach location a 
few miles north of Zamboanga City.  The boat would be the Kingfisher, which the 
Marines had purchased and used to supply Sabaya as part of his currier network.  Once 
the Kingfisher was sufficiently offshore, the Marines wound interdict the craft and 
apprehend Sabaya and the other ASG members with him.  It was important for the 
Marines to wait for the Kingfisher to be well away from land to prevent any of the 
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suspects from jumping overboard and escaping by swimming to land.  To intercept the 
Kingfisher, the Marines would use the Mapun, the very same boat which had carried Abu 
Sabaya across the Sulu Sea in May 2001 to raid the Dos Palmas resort.  The Mapun had 
been acquired by the AFP months earlier and pressed into service owing to its legendary 
speed.186  Trailing the Mapun would be two inflatable boats carrying American Navy 
SEALs who would lend assistance if needed.  Additionally, American aircraft would be 
overhead to oversee the mission.187 
The plan unfolded as anticipated and in the early hours of June 21, Abu Sabaya 
and four of his associates met the Kingfisher at the appointed spot and set out for sea.  
After waiting for the ASG vessel to get some distance from land, the Mapun moved 
closer to intercept.  As the Marine vessel drew closer, the Marine commander decided to 
ram the smaller Kingfisher in order to sink the craft and prevent any chance of escape.  
The impact threw most of the Kingfisher’s passengers overboard and a brief fire fight 
occurred between the ASG members and the Marines.  During the engagement, the 
nearby SEALs raised their weapons to a firing position, but were told to lower their guns 
by a supervising AFP officer.188  The AFP plucked four Abu Sayyaf fighters from the 
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water and a fifth was killed while trying to swim away.  All of the captives confirmed 
that the man who had been shot trying to escape had been Abu Sabaya.189 
Conclusion: Assessing Balikatan 02-1 
 
 Coming on the heels of the slipshod rescue operation, the death of Abu Sabaya 
marked a triumph for the AFP.  President Arroyo praised her military for its dramatic 
success and claimed that Sabaya’s death was proof that her counterterrorism policies 
were working. “From acting like kings, the Abu Sayyaf are now like rats running back to 
their holes.”190  President Bush called to congratulate Arroyo and noted publicly that Abu 
Sabaya had “met his maker.”191  The loss of Abu Sabaya did not finish Abu Sayyaf, but 
constituted a major blow to the group.  Beyond ending his own insidious influence within 
the group, Abu Sabaya’s death cost ASG its public face and greatest propaganda weapon.  
The removal of its most iconic member has been identified as a key factor in dramatic fall 
in ASG recruitment after 2002 and the overall shrinking of the organization’s size.192   
 The operation which felled Abu Sabaya also constituted the pinnacle of Balikatan 
02-1.  Though unquestionably pushing the limits of the Terms of Reference, to the 
displeasure of some in the Philippine government, the operation reflected the focused, 
intelligence guided missions that the U.S. had sought to promote within the AFP.193  
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More importantly, the entire episode was the culmination of Balikatan’s mission and 
illustrated the effectiveness of the indirect approach to counterterrorism.  Abu Sabaya had 
been forced to flee Basilan as a result of mounting pressure from AFP patrols and 
American civic-engagement programs.  This departure cut Sabaya off from his traditional 
support network on Basilan and onto Mindanao where he did not enjoy similar support 
from the population.  As a result, Abu Sabaya became reliant on a skeleton system for 
supplies on Zamboanga which had already been compromised by US-RP intelligence 
agencies and which led directly to his downfall.  Abu Sabaya’s death resulted from 
neither happenstance nor coincidence, but a series of difficult dilemmas thrust upon him 
by Balikatan’s design and which gradually forced Sabaya into unfavorable circumstances 
from which he could not escape.  As much as Abu Sabaya’s demise exemplified the 
proficiency of joint US-RP operations it also reflected the successful process during 
Balikatan that  had compelled him to that point. 
 As for Balikatan 02-1 itself, despite persistent speculation that the exercise would 
be extended beyond its six-month limit, it came to a quiet end as intended on July 31, 
2001.  The controversial company-level training actually proved to be anticlimactic.  
When official approval from the Pentagon arrived on July 1, General Wurster judged that 
the limited gains that could be achieved through this training in Balikatan’s remaining 
four weeks did not justify the added risk to American soldiers.  Consequently, Wurster 
decided to continue to forgo company-level training for the duration of the exercise.194  
As Balikatan 02-1 came to an end, plans to replicate the mission in Sulu were already 
                                                 




fermenting and talks were beginning on the next round of Balikatan exercises.195  For its 
part, the Pentagon hoped that with the immediate question of the Burnhams resolved, the 
two countries could reorient their defense cooperation away from the immediacy of 
Balikatan 02-1 and towards a sustained program of defense cooperation characterized by 
frequent joint exercises and ongoing training programs.  Indeed, regularly scheduled joint 
exercise, like the standard Balikatan and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT), had continued concurrently with Balikatan 02-1 and would receive increased 
significance after its conclusion.196 
 Yet did Balikatan 02-1 warrant this mantel of success?  At the time, officials were 
gushing in their praise of the operation and the outcomes it produced.  Even beyond the 
death of Abu Sabaya, ASG had suffered significant losses and was viewed as being in 
disarray.197  Though stressing that the underlying conditions which first produced Abu 
Sayyaf still remained, Ambassador Ricciardone deemed the group “a spent force.”198  
Furthermore, ASG had successfully been driven off of Basilan which would remain 
largely at peace over the next five years even as neighboring regions would be engulfed 
in renewed conflict.199  Likewise, Balikatan 02-1 produced appreciable improvements in 
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the capabilities of the AFP.  Wurster judged that ASG would have to “think twice about 
what they do and where they do it” because the AFP was “now better and they can move 
faster.”200  Outside the Philippines, the Pentagon seized on Balikatan as the basis for its 
operations in Yemen and the model for renewing defense cooperation with Indonesia.201   
This positive assessment has resonated amongst commentators who have heralded 
Balikatan 02-1 as a rare GWOT success story and an example of how the War on Terror 
can effectively be won.202  Particularly among military officers, the “indirect model” or 
“the Basilan model” has been championed as an effective means of combatting militant 
extremist groups while avoiding the pitfalls evident in both Afghanistan and Iraq.203  A 
key theme in this school is that Balikatan 02-1 succeeded precisely because of the 
constraints on American military power.  For example, Jonathan Hastings and 
Krishnamuri Mortela argued that because of JTF 510’s lack of resources it was able to 
develop and implement a less intrusive strategy of strengthening the legitimacy of the 
Philippine government rather than pursuing a direct confrontation with Abu Sayyaf.204  
Likewise, the Rand Corporation argued that Balikatan succeeded because it focused on a 
qualitative rather than quantitative advantage.  Stephen Watts and his co-authors hold that  
the limitations placed on the U.S. forces led to an emphasis on effectively using a modest 
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number of highly trained Special Forces instead of a larger conventional force. The high 
quality of this force proved critical as it appropriately matched the challenge posed by 
ASG and allowed for the rapid enhancement of the AFP’s own operational quality.205  
Others like Hy Rothstein and Eric Ramos have echoed the importance of this “economy 
of force” approach as well as highlighting the significance of civil-military operations in 
winning the support of the general population.206 
While evaluations of Balikatan 02-1 have largely been positive, particularly from 
American commentators, a few voices of dissent have emerged.  These contrarians 
include established critics of the operation like Radics who deemed Balikatan “an ill-
disguised attack on Philippine sovereignty” which served only to promote American 
militaristic aims in the region and constituted the continuation of Washington’s neo-
colonial relations with Manila at the expense of innocent civilians.207  Others have voiced 
concerns similar to that of Ricciardone that Balikatan 02-1, while effective, did not 
redress the underlying circumstances which fueled the conflict.  Though acknowledging 
the advances made during Balikatan 02-1, Mark Munson, Roger Steven and Jonathan 
Adams argue that US-RP forces were too quick to judge the situation on Basilan resolved 
and withdrew prematurely.  Consequently, the gains made during Balikatan proved 
transitory and fleeting.  Rather than settling the festering instability of the Southern 
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Philippines, Balikatan provided merely a brief interlude before the region’s endemic 
problems reasserted themselves and fueled a renewed wave of terrorism and militancy.208 
One of the soberest critiques of Balikatan 02-1 came from Colonel David 
Maxwell who commanded U.S. forces on Basilan.  Maxwell took his leadership to task 
for the significant constraints placed on U.S. forces, especially the limit on company-
level training.  Maxwell argued, “U.S. leaders at the highest levels did not understand this 
unconventional war. The belief that U.S. soldiers would be safe at a battalion 
headquarters implied the existence of front lines and a rear area, which is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of counterinsurgency and counterterrorist conditions.”209  Rather than 
protecting American soldiers, all that the restrictions accomplished was preventing 
American Special Forces from providing effective assistance as painfully illustrated by 
the botched attempt to rescue the Burnhams.  Beyond advocating for a larger combat role 
for U.S. forces in the Philippines, Maxwell skewered the political considerations which 
hindered where operations could take place and who they could target.  Specifically, the 
decision to not impinge on areas controlled by MILF and only attack Abu Sayyaf created 
de facto safe havens for ASG where they could retreat without fear of pursuit.  Maxwell 
describes the decision to focus solely on Abu Sayyaf as “a strategic error.” 
Sustained operations on Basilan eventually drove the ASG off the island because 
of combat losses and the loss of bases and popular support, but the ASG ‘lived to 
fight another day’ with help from the JI and MILF. The ASG is now reorganizing 
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on the southern islands of Jolo and Tawi Tawi, where U.S. forces have not been 
allowed to help the AFP.210 
 
 Maxwell’s indictment of Balikatan 02-1 signals a deep philosophical divide on 
whether the operation constituted the entirety of the War on Terror in the Philippines or 
merely its beginning.  Viewed in isolation, and possessing only narrow objectives, 
Balikatan 02-1 offers considerable grounds for favorable evaluations.  Unfortunate as the 
failed rescue attempt had been, the Abu Sayyaf suffered significant losses during the 
course of Balikatan - including its most prominent leader.  Furthermore, Basilan was at 
least temporarily pacified without enduring the extreme hardships and mass civilian 
casualties that had defined so many military operations in Mindanao over the preceding 
centuries.  These achievements were real and under the limited aim of modestly 
expanding the Global War on Terror to address a specific irritant - the Burnham’s 
captivity by Abu Sayyaf - Balikatan 02-1 can be viewed as a success. 
 However, this positive review is attainable only by virtue of ignoring the wider 
conflict in Mindanao and its broader salience to the Global War on Terror.  American 
strategy for the War on Terror in the Philippines had been built on two core assumptions: 
given proper support the AFP was capable of successfully defeating Abu Sayyaf and that 
ASG could be isolated and defeated independently of the larger insurgencies in 
Mindanao.  Balikatan 02-1 succeeded only in proving that both of these assumptions 
were false.   
                                                 




While American trainers praised the individual bravery and conduct of their 
Filipino counterparts, their assessment of the AFP as an institution and its martial 
capabilities were withering and negative.  Years of neglect, corruption, political meddling 
and general ineptitude had gutted the AFP as a military organization.  Shoddily equipped 
and poorly trained, American advisors were incredulous about the AFP’s capabilities and 
scornful of its ability to defeat Abu Sayyaf.211  Balikatan 02-1 did not resolve this 
fundamental issue but rather sought to sidestep it.  In areas where the AFP was found 
wanting such as air mobility and communications, the United States endeavored to 
substitute its own forces and cobble together an effective fighting force.  This grafting of 
foreign capabilities into the AFP led to some successes, such as the operation that killed 
Abu Sabaya, but was at best a temporary solution which did nothing to resolve the AFP’s 
inadequacies or alter its inability to provide a lasting solution to the problem of terrorism 
in Mindanao. 
Whereas the overestimation of the AFP’s capabilities reflects a failure in 
Washington to understand its ally, the mistaken belief that Abu Sayyaf could be 
addressed individually while sidestepping the larger Moro conflict constituted a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the situation in the Southern Philippines.  Neither the 
MILF’s attempts to publicly distance itself from al-Qaeda nor its historic antipathy 
towards Abu Sayyaf absolved the organization of its longstanding dispute with the 
Philippine government or meant that it would remain wholly uninvolved during Balikatan 
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02-1.  As Abu Sayyaf’s leaders fled from the AFP on Basilan, they found sanctuary 
further south in the Sulu archipelago and within the territory controlled by the MILF.212  
Sheltered by the MILF, ASG’s leaders were free from AFP harassment and afforded the 
safe haven needed to reconstitute their force.  Abu Sabaya’s death marked the end of 
ASG’s most prominent leader but not the organization itself.  Having successfully 
escaped from Basilan, the bulk of the group’s leadership remained at-large and safely 
under the protection of other Moro factions where they were free to resume their 
activities.213   
Thus looking at Balikatan 02-1, its greatest contribution was in dispelling the 
delusions that had previously colored American thinking about the War on Terror in the 
Philippines.  Balikatan 02-1 exposed the true nature of the challenge in Mindanao and the 
paucity of the AFP’s ability to successfully redress these problems.  Yet, in confronting 
the stark realities of GWOT in the Philippines, the United States would unravel the unity 
that had defined US-RP relations since September 11th and test the political limits of the 
alliance.  
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The most dangerous byproduct of Balikatan 02-1’s qualified success was 
opportunity.   Prior to the mission, the Burnhams and the subsequent hunt for Abu 
Sabaya had given the US-RP military partnership a clear focus and sense of purpose.  
With these issues resolved and the crush of immediacy removed, it afforded both 
governments the time and space needed to assess the overall situation and identify what 
each actually wanted from Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.  This opportunity 
was a trap as the underlying differences between the two countries about their 
expectations and agendas could no longer be overlooked. 
Fissures between Washington and Manila had already emerged over the Terms of 
Reference for Balikatan and the AFP’s effectiveness.  During Balikatan, this friction 
could simply be dismissed as the chafing inherent in any type of joint operation or simply 
ignored given the primacy of rescuing the Burnhams.  In truth, these early disputes were 
not minor quarrels but inklings of deep policy differences between the two allies over the 
Global War on Terror and particularly its manifestation in the Philippines.  The 
September 11th attacks had a profound effect on the Bush administration and how it 
conceived of American security.  From a previously reserved stance on national defense, 
the White House embraced a preventative approach which centered on countering 
potential threats to the United States before they could harm America or its citizens.1  
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While the 2003 invasion of Iraq encapsulated this active defense strategy, it also 
influenced how the United States viewed the Philippines.   
Though a demonstrative GWOT ally, the failings and foibles of the Philippine 
state made it a vulnerability in the fight against international terrorism.  In 2001, 
President Arroyo had assured her American counterpart that the AFP was capable of 
defeating Abu Sayyaf with minimal assistance. These guarantees had formed the basis of 
US-RP strategy.  Yet, instead of ending the threat of terrorism in the Philippines, 
Balikatan 02-1 had exposed the deep gulf that existed between Manila’s rhetorical 
support of GWOT and its actual abilities to redress the threat of terrorism within its own 
borders.  Apprehension about the AFP’s inadequacies emerged as a common theme 
throughout Balikatan 02-1 which would grow into a chorus of doubts in subsequent 
months as public scandals rocked the AFP.  Instead of being the vanguard of the War on 
Terror in the Philippines, the AFP emerged as one of its greatest liabilities.  
American concern about its Pacific partner after Balikatan 02-1 was further 
compounded by a bourgeoning recognition of precisely how grave the threat of terrorism 
in the Philippines actually was.  Abu Sabaya and the Burnhams constituted not the 
pinnacle of terrorism in the Philippines, but rather the tip of an iceberg of festering 
instability which made Mindanao a haven of regional terrorists.  Washington’s conviction 
that it could combat Abu Sayyaf whilst sidestepping the larger conflict in the Southern 
Philippines had always been the merest of fig leafs and was ultimately exposed as the 
most dangerous of delusions.   Driving ASG from Basilan had neither extinguished the 




organization to take refuge on the island of Mindanao where it was afforded the 
opportunity to again recreate itself while under the protection of the MILF.  There, it 
joined a burgeoning network of militant groups which included the al-Qaeda affiliate 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the radical converts of the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM) and 
the MILF itself.  In Mindanao, ASG returned to its ideological roots.  Shedding its history 
of banditry and empowered by its new allies, ASG again embraced fundamentalist Islam 
and re-emerged as the terrorist group that it had long been feared to be.   
As the afterglow of Balikatan 02-1 receded, it exposed the grim truths of the War 
on Terror in the Philippines. The partnership between Washington and Manila had 
thrived after 9/11 precisely because both parties saw an opportunity to achieve their 
objectives without making significant sacrifices.  However, as both countries increasingly 
confronted difficult decision over Mindanao, the AFP and the alliance itself, relations fell 
victim to ever greater strain.  Trapped between demands from Washington, the 
limitations of her own military and acute domestic pressures, President Arroyo was left to 
navigate a minefield of competing interests from which there was no escape.  As much as 
the Global War on Terror had revitalized the US-RP alliance, its pitfalls would consume 
the partnership and erode bilateral relations to their lowest point since the base closures 
of the early 1990s. 
After Balikatan:  Halcyon Days 
 
The MLSA: 
 The immediate aftermath of Balikatan 02-1 constituted a honeymoon in the U.S.-




Sabaya and overall improvements on Basilan marked progress in the war against ASG.  
In Manila, government officials openly talked about ASG as a spent force and advocated 
the need to shift attention to other threats like the NPA.2   Prior to Balikatan 02-1’s 
conclusion, there had been rumors of it being extended beyond its six-month timeframe.  
Even though this extension did not come to fruition, there was persistent speculation 
about where the next Balikatan would be held- with both Jolo in Sulu and mainland 
Mindanao emerging as popular options.3  Open discussions about where future Balikatans 
might be held were far more important for their symbolism than their substance.  The 
trepidations and caution that had characterized the mood in Manila prior to Balikatan 02-
1 had seemingly abated when so few of the fears about renewed American involvement 
in the Philippines had failed to manifest.  Balikatan had ultimately not been a secret 
means of restoring American bases or a reprisal of General Pershing’s pacification 
mission.  U.S. forces had abided by the terms of reference and undertaken neither 
offensive nor independent operations.  This is not to suggest that Balikatan 02-1 absolved 
the U.S. military of the apprehensions that it still inspired within some Filipinos, but 
rather that Balikatan empower supporters of the revived US-RP alliance who argued that 
past mistakes need not prohibit future cooperation. 
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 As Balikatan was a boon to advocates of increased defense cooperation with the 
United States, it was a bane to its opponents.  In mid-July 2001, amid ongoing differences 
with President Arroyo over the relationship with Washington and the implementation of 
the Visiting Forces Agreement, Vice President Teofisto Guingona lost his second 
portfolio as Secretary of Foreign Affairs.4  Guingona remained as Vice President, but was 
replaced at the Department of Foreign Affairs by Senator Blas Ople whose foreign policy 
views more closely aligned with Arroyo’s.5  Ople, was a vocal supporter of the American 
alliance and as Secretary of Foreign Affairs he cleared the way for progress on the stalled 
Mutual Support and Logistics Agreement (MLSA).    
Opponents, such as Guingona, insisted that the MLSA undermined the 
constitutional prohibition against foreign military bases in the Philippines and at the very 
least should be approved by the Philippine Senate.6  Others went further arguing that the 
MLSA was a secret means of restoring the American bases.  Congresswoman Imee 
Marcos (Ferdinand’s eldest daughter) labelled the deal “a Trojan Horse,” that would lead 
to the permanent return of American forces.7  
After Balikatan 02-1, backers of the agreement, including the AFP and Ople, 
insisted that the MLSA was merely a standard means of implementing the VFA by 
reducing bureaucratic red tape which otherwise hindered bilateral training exercises like 
                                                 
4 Guingona, Fight for Filipino, 292-293; Paolo Romero, “RP, US see sustained security cooperation,” 
Philippine Star, 2 July 2002; Marichu Villanueva, “GMA assumes DFA post, Tito’s criticism welcomed,” 
Philippine Star, 14 July 2002. 
5 Blas Ople was a controversial pick given his ties to the Marcos regime and former President Estrada.  
Efren Danao, “Ople vows closer RP-US ties,” Philippine Star, 27 July 2002.  
 
6 Guingona, Fight for Filipino, 305-506; Radics, “Balikatan exercises, 119-121. 




Balikatan..8   Secretary of State Colin Powell echoed this position when he visited Manila 
in August.  Powell, who had been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 
original base closures, offered assurances that the United States was not looking for bases 
or a permanent presence.  Washington merely wanted a “more normal kind of military-to-
military relationship,” and the MLSA was a standard administrative agreement.   After 
nearly a year of negotiations, a five year MLSA was signed by both countries in 
November 2002.9  At the time, U.S. officials, including Ambassador Ricciardone, 
continued to play down the significance of the agreement and noted that the United States 
had similar agreements with over 50 other countries including non-allies.10   
This effort to gloss over the MLSA’s importance however misses the large 
context of the agreement.  Although it is true that an MLSA is a common administrative 
accord which the United States has with dozens of countries, in the context of U.S.-
Philippine relations this normality was itself an achievement.   Even as opponents voiced 
the common fear of American bases that accompanied any advancement in US-RP 
defense cooperation, the MLSA signaled that defense relations between Washington and 
Manila were finally beginning to normalize following decades of upheaval.  After the 
long shadow of colonialism and the acrimony of the base closures, US-RP defense 
relations were finally beginning to resemble the dynamic that existed between any other 
two allied states.   
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A Return to Normalcy: 
The Pentagon’s planning for US-RP defense cooperation post-Balikatan 02-1 also 
reflected the desire for a normalized relations that Powell had mentioned.  In mid-August 
2002, Secretary of National Defense Angelo Reyes travelled to Washington DC to meet 
with his American counterpart.  In addition to discussing the recently completed 
Balikatan 02-1 and the still ongoing MLSA negotiations, Reyes and Secretary Rumsfeld 
began to discuss the next phase of defense cooperation.  Prior to the meeting, the US-RP 
Mutual Defense Board (MDB), which oversees the implementation of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty, had produced a five-year working plan that called for sustained security 
cooperation to bolster the AFP’s abilities and interoperability between their two 
countries.  Central to this plan was an extended training regimen in the Philippines and 
regular joint-exercises to better develop the AFP’s overall capacity.11  In their meeting, 
Reyes and Rumsfeld agreed to create a Defense Policy Board (DPB) to oversee the 
enhanced cooperation called for in the five-year plan.12  Reflecting the need to adapt the 
50 year old MDT to the age of transnational threats like terrorism, the DPB would,  
“enable civilian officials from both countries to deal with issues of politically managing 
the alliance and addressing common security concerns,”  specifically “to help Manila 
develop its defense industries, and the AFP in the maintenance of its military equipment.  
Furthermore, the board was “given the responsibility to create the policy situation ideal 
for a robust defense relationship, and to explore avenues of defense cooperation for a 
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more stable regional security environment.”13  As with the MLSA, the purpose of the 
DPB was not to radically alter defense relations between the United States and the 
Philippines, but to create the institutional and policy framework needed to place the 
relationship on a sustainable path.   
As military aid and defense diplomacy were the centerpieces of American 
counterterrorism efforts in the Philippines, they also became the primary instruments for 
the future of the US-RP defense relationship.  Continuing with the trend which began 
immediately after 9/11, the United States continued to supply ample amounts of military 
financing to aid the AFP’s modernization effort.  In addition to Foreign Military 
Financing and other forms of assistance, in 2002, President Bush also requested an 
addition $10 million for the Philippines in emergency counterterrorism funds.14  During 
the Global War on Terror the Philippines would emerge as the largest recipient of U.S. 
military aid in East Asia and one of the largest overall in the world.15 
 
                                                 
13 Cruz de Castro, “Managing an Allaince,”114; also see Banlaoi Philippine Security for details on the 
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14 It is interesting to note that even with the uptick in aid, American assistance never reaches the point 
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Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of Emergency Military Counterterrorism Assistance to the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines,”  28 June 2002. 
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Figure 12: FMF to the Philippines 16 
 
 
Supplementing the infusion of funding was a sustained program of training exercises.  
Even as American forces in the Philippines were being withdrawn following Balikatan 
02-1’s conclusion, another 600 U.S. Marines was sent to Luzon in October 2002 for the 
annual Talon Vision ground-air exercises.17  An expansive slate of 17 joint US-RP 
exercises were planned for 2003 alone and all focused on developing AFP capabilities 
and interoperability.18  These planned exercises, many of which were to occur on an 
annual basis, were not conducted in conflict zones like Balikatan 02-1 had been.  Instead 
they were purely focused on developing military capacity rather than enabling concurrent 
                                                 
16 It is important to note that this chart that this chart only includes the Foreign Military Financing and no 
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technology/equipment transfers as well as funds provided under special counter terrorism assistance.  
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales And 
Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts as of 30 September 2013. 
[http://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/historical_facts_book_-_30_september_2013.pdf] 
17 Ding Cervantes, “600 US troops due for ‘Talon-Vision,’” Philippine Star, 18 September 2002.  






























combat operations.  Additionally, the Philippines participated in multilateral exercises 
such as the annual Cobra Gold War games with the U.S. and regional allies like Thailand 
and Singapore.19  
 Lastly, the United States transitioned its temporary training presence in the 
Philippines during Balikatan 02-1 to a sustained operation.  Although JSOTF 510 was 
withdrawn from the Philippines at the end of Balikatan 02-1.  A small contingent 
remained in place in Zamboanga and Basilan to continue ongoing training programs and 
civic engagement projects.20   In late 2002 it was rechristened as Joint Special Operations 
Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P).  This scaled down force which fluctuated in size 
(typically between 200-300 U.S. personnel) relocated to Manila in order to continue its 
training activities, but maintained a small presence in Zamboanga to continue the work 
started during Balikatan.21  In addition to training additional Light Reaction Companies, 
JSOTF-P also continued the civic engagement programs and began a more generalized 
training program for AFP units.22  As with the joint exercises, JSOTF-P’s primary 
mission was the advancement of the AFP in line with the five-year development plan.  
Having American trainers on the ground allowed for extended training programs not 
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22 Light Infantry Battalions were a primary focus of the training mission as they, in addition to the Light 
Reaction Companies, would form the heart of the Rapid Deployment Force.  Paolo Romero, “Joint RP-US 
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possible during limited exercise windows and would also permit a considerable number 
of AFP soldiers to receive advanced instruction in specialized techniques.23 
 The MLSA and planning for post-Balikatan defense cooperation both evidenced a 
clear desire to stabilize defense relations between the Washington and Manila.  While 
9/11 and shared concerns over international terrorism had provided the initial impetus for 
the revitalized relationship, the perceived success of Balikatan 02-1 allowed both 
governments to look beyond the immediacy of the Global War on Terror and to the 
overall health of the alliance.  Yet, while improvements on Basilan were sufficient for 
defense planners to entertain thoughts of long term plans and sustained cooperation, it did 
not excuse them from redressing the ongoing challenge of terrorism in the Philippines.  
As much as the modernization and development of the AFP was a critical goal for the 
United States, it was not an end in itself.  Rather, having observed the operational 
limitations of the AFP during Balikatan 02-1, Washington recognized that the AFP as it 
existed, was simply incapable of meeting Washington’s expectations for victory in the 
southern Philippines.   As such, every element of the new aid and training program had 
fostered effective counterterrorism abilities within the AFP as its key objective.24  
However, there was a dilemma inherent in this proposition.  In time, the defense 
diplomacy programs employed by the Pentagon would eventually strengthen the AFPs 
capabilities and allow it to successfully provide for its own internal security.  But what 
about the interim?  As the limits of Balikatan 02-1’s success became increasingly 
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apparent, bridging the gap between the demands of the Global War on Terror and the 
AFP’s limits would place ever greater strain on the relationship between Washington and 
Manila.   
War on the Jolo Front: Balikatan 03-1  
 
Abu Sayyaf Strikes Back: 
 As Balikitan 02-1 concluded, officials were quick to champion the mission’s 
success against Abu Sayyaf.   Ambassador Ricciardone labelled ASG as a spent force 
who had lost much of its organization and membership.25  AFP Chief of Staff Roy 
Cimatu stated that after the exercise, “the Abu Sayyaf’s backbone is broken.”26  In the 
exercise’s aftermath, the AFP withdrew some of its forces from Basilan and attention 
shifted to other challenges like the resurgent communist NPA who had taken advantage 
of the AFP’s preoccupation with ASG to advance its own conflict.27  Unfortunately, these 
assessments of ASG’s defeat proved to be premature in the extreme. 
 The death of Abu Sabaya and its expulsion from Basilan were major blows to 
ASG which deprived the group of its most visible member and a base of operations 
respectively.  However, neither loss was a mortal wound to the organization whose 
fluidity and amorphic nature had always befuddled observers.  Not only had key ASG 
leaders like Khaddafy Janjalani managed to escape Basilan, but other fighters had 
managed to flee to Mindanao where they found sanctuary in MILF controlled territory.  
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More importantly, the Jolo based wing of ASG headed by Commander Robot had been 
largely unaffected by events on Basilan and remained free to operate.28 
It was on Jolo, where Abu Sayyaf first began to reassert itself in the wake of 
Balikatan 02-1.  In August 2002, the group kidnapped six Jehovah’s Witnesses.  ASG 
promptly decapitated the two male hostages in the group and left their heads in a public 
market with notes denouncing them as infidels.29  The brutal episode served as a vivid 
reminder of ASG’s continued presence and predilection for violence.   
Abu Sayyaf’s resurgence became more apparent in October 2002 when a series of 
bomb attacks struck Mindanao and particularly targeted Zamboanga City.  In late 
September, ASG released a public declaration vowing to attack the enemies of Islam and 
specifically mentioned plans to target civilian and military facilities associated with the 
American presence in the Philippines.  The first incident fit this profile as ASG bombed a 
karaoke bar in Zamboanga City on October 2, which killed three individuals and 
wounded over twenty others.  Among the dead was Sergeant First Class Mark W. 
Jackson.  An American Green Beret who had been participating in the ongoing training 
mission, Jackson and another American soldier wounded in the attack had been the 
intended targets.  Jackson’s death marked the first U.S. fatality during Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines that came as a result of enemy action.30   The attack was 
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Abu Sayyaf’s first bombing since 1994 and had reportedly been overseen by Khadaffy 
Janjalani himself.31   
Over the following weeks, major bombings occurred with a disturbing regularity.  
This included the coordinated bombing of two department stores on October 12 which 
injured over 140 people (see Figure 2).  The October bombing campaign led to the 
removal of the AFP’s Southern Commander who was responsible for security in 
Mindanao and showed that ASG was very much alive.32  Of even greater significances 
was the nature of the attacks themselves which evidenced an expertise and technical 
sophistication which had been largely absent from ASG operations since the 1990s.33  
Though far from conclusive, the October campaign offered the first indications that 




Figure 13: October 2002 Bombing Campaign 34 
Date Location  Dead   Wounded  Description 
October 2 Zamboanga 
City 
3 24 Bombing of karaoke bar and 
restaurant frequented by U.S. 
soldiers.  One American killed 
and another wounded.  
October 3 Zamboanga 
City 
0 0 Bomb explodes near Iglesia ni 
Kristo Church 
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October 10 Kidapawan 
City 
8 19 Bombing of a bus terminal.  
Attributed to ASG and NPA. 
October 11 Zamboanga 
City 
0 0 Homemade bomb found near 
U.S. Armed Southern Forces 
Command Headquarters. 
October 12 Zamboanga 
City 
7 144 Two bombs explode 30 
minutes apart in two 
department stores in 
Zamboanga and are similar in 
design to the October 2 bomb. 
October 20 Zamboanga 
City 
1 13  Bike Bomb near a Roman 
Catholic Shrine 
 
 Following the abduction and beheadings of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in August, 
Jolo became the locus of counterterrorism efforts in the Philippines.  The relationship 
between Jolo and Abu Sayyaf had always been unclear and distinct from the group’s ties 
to Basilan.  Dating back to the 1990s, ASG on Jolo had been less ideological than its 
Basilan counterpart and more akin to bandits than Islamic militants.  Despite its leanings 
toward criminality rather than scripture, the Jolo faction embraced its association with 
ASG as a means of bolstering the group’s credibility and signaling an agenda larger than 
mere personal enrichment.35  Though the ideological and organizational bonds between 
Abu Sayyaf on Basilan and on Jolo were not ironclad, they nevertheless did exist.  
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Following the advances on Basilan, this made Jolo a prime subject for the next phase of 
counterterrorism operations.36 
At the end of August 2002, President Arroyo ordered a major offensive against 
ASG on Jolo known as Operation Endgame.  The goal of the operation was to free the 
remaining hostages held by ASG as well as eliminating or capturing those ASG leaders 
like Janjalani who had fled from Basilan during Balikatan 02-1.  Operation (or Oplan) 
Endgame sought to use the tools developed during Balikatan, including the Light 
Reaction Companies, to finally end Abu Sayyaf.37   However, absent the same level of 
American involvement, the AFP’s lack of mobility and other problems again led to 
disappointing results.  Of Operation Endgame, The New York Times bluntly stated that, 
“without the American advisers and support, the Philippine forces in Sulu Province…are 
struggling to track down and destroy Abu Sayyaf guerrillas hiding in the mountainous 
jungle.38   For its part, the United States applauded the AFP’s initiative on Jolo and 
offered to continue its surveillance flights in order to provide intelligence.39  Though 
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clashes with militants occurred frequently, these encounters were often indecisive and the 
operation slowly ground to a stalemate.40  
Balikatan 03-1: 
 Talk of attempting to replicate the Basilan model on Jolo via a new iteration of 
the Balikatan exercises first surfaced in July 2002 during the waning days of Balikatan 
02-1.  This sentiment actually sparked a nasty public dispute between President Arroyo 
and General Wurster with Wurster initially denying any American interest in a new 
Balikatan on Jolo.  Arroyo rebuked the officer stating that the discussions about Jolo 
were “way above his head.”41   Rumblings of a larger American involvement in 
operations in Sulu grew throughout the fall as ASG bombs plagued Zamboanga and 
Operation Endgame stalled.42  The New York Times and Washington Post both discussed 
the evolution of American thinking about Jolo in December articles which relied on 
administration sources to detail the situation on Jolo and how American thinking had 
change since Balikatan 02-1 had ended.43  The Times identified the Pentagon’s “growing 
concern that that militant Islamic networks pose an increasing threat to American 
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interests in Southeast Asia, and that Balikatan 02-1 had “failed to quell Muslim guerrilla 
movements.”44  According to the reports, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had personally 
requested plans to be drawn up for a Balikatan style mission to take place in Sulu.  
Presidents Bush and Arroyo had previously discussed the issues of terrorism and Jolo in 
phone conversations and on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) summit in Mexico.  As had been the case in July, the Philippine leader had 
endorsed the idea of a Balikatan in Sulu, but interestingly the New York Times notes that 
it was the Americans who had been hesitant.  Specifically, American officials had given 
higher priorities to other areas of the War on Terror like Yemen and the pending war with 
Iraq, but had changed this stance following the October 2 bombing in Zamboanga which 
had killed SFC Jackson.45  
 Even as American interest in Jolo grew, Philippine doubts about a larger U.S. 
military presence were mounting.  This hesitance stemmed not from any diminished 
concern about Jolo, but rather uncertainty about the course that the Global War on Terror 
was taking in general.  For example, in November 2002 the United States used a drone in 
Yemen to kill Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harethi, a known al-Qaeda figure linked to the 2000 
bombing of the USS Cole.  Among the first drone strikes of its kind, the Philippine 
government worried that United States might seek to undertake similar missions in the 
archipelago and expressly forbid such undertakings within its borders.46   
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Of even greater concern for the Philippines and other regional governments was 
how the logic of preemptive warfare used by Washington to make the case for war with 
Iraq might be applied in Southeast Asia.  Dating back to President Bush’s State of the 
Union address in January 2002, the assertion that the United States possessed the right to 
take unilateral military action against any potential threat to its security had stoked fears 
throughout the capitals of Southeast Asia.  Not only did the unilateralism of the Bush 
Doctrine and its engrained disregard for state sovereignty contravene the core tenets of 
regional diplomacy known as the ASEAN Way, but an aggressively interventionist 
America could also pose a direct threat to several countries including the Philippines.47  
Given the presence of local terrorists groups as well as transnational organizations eager 
to use countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines as countries of convenience, 
what was to prevent the United States from unilaterally intervening to attack these 
groups?   
Such trepidations were further provoked in December 2002, when Australian 
Prime Minister John Howard claimed a right to launch pre-emptive strikes against 
terrorists in neighboring Asian states.48  Howard’s comments incited a diplomatic 
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firestorm throughout Southeast Asia with numerous governments, including the 
Philippines, flatly rejecting Australia’s proclamation of its own preemptive rights.49  Nor 
was the matter assuaged by the United States.  Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage insisted that regional governments should do better at policing themselves in 
order to avoid preemptive action from abroad.50  Even in the Philippines, a bona fide 
GWOT ally and supporter of the Iraq War, worries that lack of progress in Mindanao 
might cause Washington to lose patience and launch its own military intervention began 
to percolate.  After directly voicing this concern, President Arroyo received assurances 
that the United States would not take any preemptive military actions against terrorist 
targets in the Philippines without Manila’s approval.51  However, even this guarantee of 
consultation only further underscored the narrow line which the Philippines straddled 
between a GWOT ally and a potential target.  That the United States might even entertain 
taking some form of military action in the archipelago illustrated that Washington’s faith 
in Philippine security forces was not as robust as it had been a year prior during the Oval 
Office meeting between Bush and Arroyo. 
Both Manila’s anxieties about the future of GWOT in the Philippines and 
America’s desire for results were evident in how the allies addressed Jolo.  The operation 
was labelled Balikatan 03-1 and again used the “-1” designation to distinguish the 
mission from the regular Balikatan exercises which continued to occur on an annual 
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basis. Balikatan 03-1 would replicate its predecessor on Basilan and combine an AFP 
offensive on Jolo with a concurrent American training and support mission.   The 
American contingent would consist of approximately 1,700 servicemen including 300-
350 Special Forces soldiers on Jolo, 400 support troops in Zamboanga and an additional 
1,000 marines stationed on U.S. naval vessels of the coast.  As with Basilan, Balikatan 
03-1 would include civic-military operations to engage with the wider public on Jolo.52  
Details for the mission were discussed throughout the winter of 2002-2003 and on 
February 4, 2003, President Arroyo was briefed by senior U.S. officials on the strategy 
for Balikatan 03-1 and reportedly approved of the outlined plan.53 
Arroyo’s final approval of Balikatan 03-1 came on February 18 and was released 
to the press.  Comments by Presidential Spokesman Ignacio Bunye emphasized that this 
new undertaking was an extension of the previous year’s operation on Basilan.  
Categorizing Balikatan 03-1 as “the second phase of the joint RP-US military exercises,” 
the mission on Jolo would again rely on American training, advice and assistance as well 
as humanitarian operations to defeat Abu Sayyaf.54  Bunye made frequent reference to 
Basilan throughout his description and portrayed Balikatan 03-1 as merely a repetition of 
the joint exercise model applied there.  Such sentiment may have reflected how 
Malacañang Palace understood Balikatan 03-1 or at least sought to portray it.  However 
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this envisioning of the next phase of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines was not 
shared in Washington.   
On February 20, the Pentagon released the first information about the pending 
deployment to the Philippines.  In contrast to the description voiced by President 
Arroyo’s administration, the Pentagon emphasized that Balikatan 03-1 would be 
markedly different from the mission to Basilan.  According to the Pentagon, American 
forces would not be limited to an advisory role, but would engage in combat operations to 
“disrupt and destroy” Abu Sayyaf.55  Philippine forces would remain in the lead, but 
American troops under American command would accompany them into the field and 
“actively participate.”56  The Congressional Research Service (CRS) outlined the 
Pentagon’s plan for Balikatan 03-1 in an April 2003 report:   
According to the Pentagon description of the plan, U.S. troops would be in a 
combat role.  This and subsequent statements indicated that the SOF on Jolo 
would participate in AFP offensive operations against Abu Sayyaf and that the 
SOF would not be limited to using their weapons for self-defense.  The U.S. 
Marines were described as a “quick reaction force,” undoubtedly meaning that 
they could be sent on to Jolo to reinforce AFP units.  The Cobra helicopters and 
Harrier jets would give AFP commanders the option of requesting U.S. air strikes 
in support of AFP operations. 
 
These rules of engagement went beyond the U.S. role on Basilan in 2002.  There 
was no comparable Marine and naval air capability off Basilan.  The plan for SOF 
to go on patrol with AFP units restricted U.S. troops to use their weapons only for 
self –defense.  That plan was never implemented on Basilan.  Moreover, the 
Basilan Operation contained a deadline of July 1[sic], 2002, whereas Pentagon 
officials asserted that the Jolo Operation would have no time limit.   
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President Arroyo and AFP commanders reportedly had agreed to the plan in a 
meeting on February 4, 2003.57  
 
Not only did the Pentagon’s plan for Balikatan 03-1 include a combat role for American 
soldiers in a radical departure from the mission to Basilan, but U.S. officials insisted that 
President Arroyo had been briefed on this enhancement and had consented to it.  
Furthermore, American officials believed that Bunye had “mischaracterized” the 
operation in his comments which was why the Pentagon had taken it upon itself to inform 
the press of Balikatan 03-1’s true design.58 
 The Pentagon’s comments landed like a bomb in Manila.  Palace spokesman 
Ignacio Bunye, Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas Ople and Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes 
headed a chorus of Arroyo officials insisting that the operation would only be an exercise 
and there would be no combat role for U.S. forces.59   Though noting that new Terms of 
Reference would be negotiated for Sulu, Ople reaffirmed that the operation, “is a 
continuation of Balikatan exercise held in Basilan, except now it is in Sulu,” which was 
“still basically a training exercise between two forces under the VFA.”60  For his part, 
Reyes branded the comments from Washington as “leaks” which he was unwilling to 
discuss while negotiations were ongoing over the design of Balikatan 03-1.  However, 
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Reyes declared, “I am categorically saying that anything that they say that contradicts the 
Constitution and the laws will not materialize.”61   
Even as the Arroyo administration scrambled to depict the reports out of 
Washington as mistakes, critics in the Philippine Congress were already gaining strength.  
Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., alleged that if Reyes conceded to American combat troops 
he would be committing treason and would be guilty of converting “the country, not as a 
direct colony of the US, but as a virtual colony of the US.”62  Hearings were held by the 
Senate in which Reyes again was “emphatic that the Americans will not be allowed to 
participate in actual combat operations.”  Yet, the contrasting statements from 
Washington and Manila merely led Senator Rodolfo Biazon, himself a former AFP Chief 
of Staff, to muse whether “Philippine officials were ‘playing games’ with the Senate and 
the public or that Washington is imposing its antiterrorism war in the country.63  Senators 
Manuel Villar and Ramon Magsaysay Jr., who chaired the Senate committees on Foreign 
Affairs and National Defense and Security respectively, planned an inquiry “to make sure 
that US forces will not violate a constitutional prohibition on foreign troops fighting on 
local soil.”64  Vice President Guingona, who continued to oppose President Arroyo’s 
handling of relations with the U.S. charged that “if US forces will be involved in combat 
operations and possibly kill Filipinos they will be violating our sovereignty.”65  Similarly, 
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while many local leaders in Sulu and the ARMM had been receptive to the possibility of 
American assistance, U.S. forces would only be welcomed in a noncombat role.66 
To quell the furor, Foreign Affairs Secretary Ople contended that “these reports 
emanate from junior officials who don’t know what they’re talking about.” 67  Senator 
Pimentel provoked a response from the American embassy when he categorized any 
American deployment to Jolo as “an invasion by foreign troops,” akin to “Vietnam 
reincarnated in Sulu.”  Ambassador Ricciardone retorted “you are our allies for heaven’s 
sake…we will not come in as alien invaders.” 68 Meanwhile in a pre-planned visit, Reyes 
left Manila for Hawaii to meet with Admiral Fargo at Pacific Command before heading 
to Washington for a week-long visit with Pentagon officials.  Initially intended to finalize 
the Terms of Reference for Balikatan 03-1, the trip would now be dominated by the 
rancorous backlash unfolding the Philippines.69 
Criticism of a potential American intervention in Sulu was not confined to the 
Philippines.  In an editorial, the Washington Post blasted the Bush administration for 
failing to adequately explain to either the American people or the Congress why 
American forces would be deployed on a combat mission to Jolo.  The paper was alarmed 
that a potential combat mission could be handled in such a cavalier manner.70  Senator 
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Robert Byrd of West Virginia echoed this concern and raised the issue with Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld.  Byrd queried Rumsfeld how an American combat deployment to the 
Philippines would even be legal without Congressional approval.71  Additionally, both 
the Post and the New York Times higlighted the troubled history of the United States in 
Jolo dating back to General Pershing’s brutal pacification mission in the early 20th 
century.  Each questioned the advisability of again committing American forces in such a 
hostile location.72  Though not as severe as the situation in the Philippines, the 
combination of uproar in Manila and uncertainty in Washington painted a particularly 
negative picture of how poorly Balikatan 03-1 had been handled.   
The meeting between Reyes and Rumsfeld occurred on February 28 and was not a 
success.  Secretary Ople had dismissed the initial comments about a combat role for U.S. 
forces as being made by a junior official speaking out of turn and who had no idea what 
he was talking about.  In truth, the press reports accurately reflected the position of the 
Pentagon who not only remained committed to the expanded role for U.S. forces but 
unflinchingly reiterated that this position had been submitted to and approved by 
President Arroyo on February 4.73  Given the Pentagon’s resolve on this matter, the talks 
with Reyes quickly hit an impasse and foundered.  The New York Times described the 
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affair as “an embarrassing setback to the Pentagon,” whereby an operation depicted as a 
fait accompli had evaporated amidst a very public feud between the two allies.74  At a 
press conference, which Reyes did not attend, Rumsfeld describe the task going forward 
as simply finding “an approach where we can provide the maximum benefit to them and 
do it in a way that is not inconsistent with their circumstance.”75  Of the conflicting 
descriptions of Balikatan 03-1, Rumsfeld defended the Pentagon’s portrayal as being 
more accurate and stemming from a desire to not mislead Congress about the role of U.S. 
forces.  Rumsfeld stated, “We can do training.  We can do exercises. We can do 
operations. But whatever it is we do, we describe in language that is consistent with how 
we do things.  And we do not tend to train people in combat, if you will.”76  Despite 
optimistic statements by both Reyes and Rumsfeld that a solution to the terminology 
issue could be found, Balikatan 03-1 was shelved for the foreseeable future.77  In mid-
March, President Arroyo ordered Reyes to drop Sulu as a potential location for any 
Balikatan exercise.78  For its part, the United States continued to plan on holding 
Balikatan 03-1 in Sulu until early May.79 
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Postmortem on Balikatan 03-1: 
 Despite a fiercely critical Wall Street Journal editorial which derided the AFP’s 
ability to defeat ASG and labelled President Arroyo an “unreliable friend,” the 
controversy surrounding Balikatan 03-1 was quickly overshadowed by the invasion of 
Iraq.80  As with Afghanistan, President Arroyo backed the American intervention and 
contributed a small support force to the war effort as a founding member of the Coalition 
of the Willing.81  In May, Arroyo travelled to Washington where she was feted as a 
stalwart ally in the War on Terror and honored with a State Dinner at the White House.  
Plans were also unveiled to designate the Philippines a Major non-Nato Ally, a rare 
distinction reserved for America’s closest allies which entitled the country to a bevy of 
military and financial benefits.   
Yet, the pageantry and patronage of the Arroyo visit did not negate the reality that 
a serious fault had emerged between Washington and Manila over the future of the War 
on Terrorism in the Philippines.  Despite efforts in both capitals to play down the matter 
as a question of semantics rather than substance, a series of previously submerged rifts 
between the two partners were beginning to surface.   
The key to understanding why the breakdown over Balikatan 03-1 was so 
significant is to recognize that the different depictions of the mission voiced by the 
Pentagon and Malacañang Palace had not been a communications breakdown, but a pre-
planned strategy which had badly failed.  After the mission fizzled in March, the 
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Washington Post carried an extensive story trying to diagnose what had gone wrong.  
According to officials involved with Balikitan’s planning, both sides believed they had 
reached an agreement during the February 4 meeting on the mission’s design.  However, 
“the Filipinos knew that because of the risks soldiers would face, the United States had to 
call the undertaking an ‘operation.’ The Americans knew that because of political and 
constitutional constraints, the Filipinos had to cast it as ‘training’ and an ‘exercise.’”82  
According to one unnamed official, “it was understood that each country would not use 
exactly the same language to describe this,” with Manila emphasizing the training and 
exercise aspect. “It's not that the word 'operation' was verboten. It's just that it wouldn't 
feature as prominently in how it would be described there.”83 
This acceptance of differing language opened the window for differences in 
substance to also emerge.  Individuals alternatively assigned blame for the divergence in 
expectations for the mission to either “Philippine officials [who] had given unwarranted 
assurances to U.S. military planners, allowing them to proceed when they should have 
been more cautious,” or the Pentagon’s failure “to grasp the political and cultural 
sensitivities in the Philippines.”84  American officials believed that the Philippine 
government had consented to their more aggressive plan for Balikatan while Philippine 
officials believed that only activities that could reasonably be classified as exercises 
would be permitted.  When it later emerged that both sides were mistaken, the situation 
                                                 
82 Ellen Nakashima and Bradley Graham, “Missed Signals Forced Suspension of U.S.-Philippine Mission: 







spiraled out of control.85 Mixed signals and attempts to be overly clever with the public 
diplomacy surrounding Balikatan 03-1 could explain how the two allies arrived at the 
breakdown in late February- but not why.  The answer for that quandary lay in the 
decaying foundation of Philippine-American partnership in the War on Terror. 
All US-RP counterterrorism cooperation since 9/11 had been predicated on the 
Oval Office meeting in November 2001 where President Arroyo declined American 
combat forces and assured President Bush that with limited American assistance the AFP 
was capable of successfully defeating Abu Sayyaf.  Yet, by the spring of 2003, American 
confidence in the AFP’s abilities was fading.  Close cooperation with Philippine military 
during Balikatan 02-1 had laid bare the AFP’s dilapidated state and the questionable 
standing of its command and control.86  This dim opinion had been further strengthened 
by the underwhelming Operation Endgame which had seemingly accomplished little 
while also doing nothing to assuage doubts about whether the AFP could ever defeat Abu 
Sayyaf.87   
As assertions of the AFP’s proficiency had initially forestalled the deployment of 
American combat forces, the revelation of the AFP’s insufficiency again opened the door 
for a more robust role for American forces.  While Secretary Rumsfeld had been a 
reluctant backer of Balikatan 02-1, the expanded role for U.S. forces on Jolo constituted 
not a reversal of his position but a reaffirmation of his central objection.  If the situation 
in the Southern Philippines was of sufficient alarm to actually warrant American 
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intervention, then it was of sufficient concern to be resolved quickly.  Rumsfeld’s 
hesitance had not stemmed from OEF-P itself, but rather couched in the half-measured 
manner of American involvement.  For Rumsfeld, Balikatan 02-1 had unnecessarily 
exposed American soldiers like SFC Jackson to danger without actually holding much 
promise of resolving the situation.88  Indeed, the rescue of the Burhmans seemingly 
confirmed his wariness as the insistence on relying on Philippine forces had 
unintentionally resulted in the death of an American hostage.  The Pentagon’s plan for 
Balikatan 03-1 rectified that deficiency.  Even though the AFP would remain the 
operation’s primary force, the increased role for American soldiers on Jolo both provided 
added security for the American personnel and a realistic possibility of defeating Abu 
Sayyaf.  It also afforded Washington a means of demonstrating that the United States was 
capable of both continuing the War on Terror globally while also prosecuting the war 
with Iraq.89 
Whereas the Pentagon’s push for a larger role in Jolo resulted from its 
disillusionment with the AFP; the maelstrom in Manila emanated from Washington’s 
chronic underappreciation of the deep antipathy which greeted any American military 
presence inside the Philippines.  The smoothness with which Balikatan 02-1 had unfolded 
and the subsequent signing of the MLSA, led the United States to mistakenly conclude 
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that the acrimony of the previous decades had sufficiently faded. Freed from the 
historical baggage which had befuddled the relationship since the People Power 
Revolution in 1986, Balikatan 02-1 had been evidence that the defense relationship could 
be different from its past and that the two countries could work together in a mutually 
beneficial way.90  Yet, the eagerness with which the Pentagon believed to have turned the 
page on its own past in the Philippines stood in contrast to the continued potency of 
historical memory within the Philippines and the constitutional prohibition on foreign 
combat troops within the Philippines.  Even supporters of a closer relationship with 
Washington were distressed by the Pentagon’s plan for a combat role on Jolo and the 
misleading way in which the mission had been presented.91  General Wurster, who had 
yielded command of American forces in the Philippines in 2002, had observed 
Washington’s planning for Jolo with extreme skepticism having personally witnessed the 
bitter debate in Manila over Balikatan 02-1.92  Not only did the operation on Jolo violate 
the Philippine Constitution, but the Pentagon’s seemingly blasé attitude towards such 
considerations epitomized America’s historic disregard for Philippine sovereignty.   
The political fallout from such attitudes were heightened by the lead up to the Iraq 
War.  Amongst skeptics throughout the region, the controversy over Balikatan 03-1 
provided yet more proof of American unilateralism and desire to use combat forces 
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without regard for state sovereignty.93  Whereas the luster of Balikatan 02-1 had led the 
U.S. Military to erroneously neglect the toxicity of its own legacies in the Philippines, 
these memories remained an entrenched fact of Philippine political life which could not 
be wished away.  The angst and anger that greeted the Pentagon’s plan for Jolo was not 
simply a failure of public diplomacy, but the result of Washington’s willful ignorance of 
the political realities in Manila and the ramifications of history.  
Despite its own culpability in the muddle that was Balikatan 03-1, perhaps the 
most important consequence of the controversy was Washington’s diminishing 
assessment of President Arroyo.  In the aftermath of the breakdown, the Pentagon 
assigned blame for the failure solely to President Arroyo’s weakness and her 
susceptibility to domestic political pressure.  Washington had not been wholly oblivious 
to Philippine politics.  Indeed, genuine concern that political posturing prior to the 2004 
Philippine Presidential election would preclude a second Balikatan had served as one of 
the Pentagon’s key motives in pushing so strongly for Balikatan 03-1 to go forward.94  
Yet, amidst the storm following the plan’s announcement, Washington had been taken 
aback by Arroyo’s unwillingness to challenge the anti-Balikatan crowd within Philippine 
politics.  Arroyo’s absence from the debate during the melee in late February was notable 
with primary responsibility for quelling the controversy falling to her surrogates like 
Bunye, Ople and Reyes.  In early May when the Pentagon officially placed Balikatan 03-
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1 on “indefinite hold,” Rumsfeld was unambiguous about who he held responsible.  In a 
terse memo to Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld scoffed that: 
It is pretty clear that President Arroyo is not determined that something go 
forward, or else she would not be vacillating the way she is.  Her domestic 
problems must be more difficult for her than not having Balikatan 03-01.95 
 
After 9/11, Arroyo had emerged as a vocal and stalwart ally in the War on Terror.  
However, there were limits to that steadfastness.  In addition to her known opposition to 
American combat forces in the Philippines, Arroyo’s perceived inability or unwillingness 
to resist domestic political pressure posed a mounting concern for the United States.  
Amid the bevy of challenges plaguing the Philippines, counterterrorism was not a major 
priority for the Philippine public “and hence not a priority for a poll-driven President.”96  
For the United States, Balikatan 03-1 encapsulated this personal deficiency.  From the 
Pentagon’s perch, Arroyo had endorsed their plan for a more robust American role only 
to hastily retreat from this stance in the face of escalating opposition.  Such realizations 
augured poorly for the United States who now had to assess the viability of Philippine 
cooperation based on its political expediency rather than only its effectiveness.  
 These emerging cracks in the state of US-RP defense relations could have been 
dismissed or at least overlooked were it not for the budding realization of Mindanao’s 
centrality to terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Evaluations of the Philippines at GWOT’s 
onset had been strikingly simplistic and overly sanguine about the prospect of an easy 
victory.  ASG’s resurgence after Balikatan 02-1 and the October bombing campaign had 
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dashed these delusions and indicated how truly difficult winning the war on terrorism in 
the Philippines would be.  The recognition that the Philippines was not merely a GWOT 
sideshow but a critical front in the battle against violent extremists was brutally 
reinforced even as plans for Balikatan 03-1 crumbled.   On March 4, a powerful bomb 
ripped through the Davao airport, killing 24 people and injuring approximately 100 
others.  The attack was among the largest ever in the Philippines.97  An American 
missionary, Reverend William P. Hyde, was killed in the attack and another two 
Americans were injured.  Along with Martin Burnham and SFC Jackson, Hyde became 
the third American killed as a result of terrorist actions in Mindanao within a year.  
Worryingly, authorities believed that responsibility for the attack lay not with Abu 
Sayyaf, but a partnership between the larger MILF and shadowy Jemaah Islamiyah.98  As 
much as the Davao airport bombing showed that the War on Terror in the Philippines 
would not be won easily, it also demonstrated that the problem of terrorism could not be 
addressed independent of the larger conflict in Mindanao. 
Mindanao: Terrorism’s Crossroads in Southeast Asia 
 
Jemaah Islamiyah: 
 Budding American concern about terrorism in Southeast Asia and the role of 
Mindanao in the region was linked to Washington’s growing awareness of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah organization (JI).  JI emerged from the conservative Islamic resistance to the 
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Suharto regime in Indonesia.  Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, two Salafist 
preachers from Indonesia, began to organize the movement in the 1980s while sheltering 
in Malaysia in order to escape imprisonment in Indonesia.  The anti-Suharto group 
quickly built ties with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and helped fuel the pipeline of 
foreign fighters from Southeast to Afghanistan.  Among the Indonesians to join the fight 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan was Riduan Isamuddin, known as Hambali, who 
would rapidly rise through the ranks of al-Qaeda and emerges as the key link between 
Osama bin Laden and JI.  JI was formally founded in the early 1990s as a regional 
affiliate of al-Qaeda following a meeting between Sungkar and bin Laden in Pakistan.  
Crucially, JI did not immediately seek to undertake operations, but rather focused its 
energie for the remainder of the decade on building its regional organization and training 
its membership. Whereas Abu Sayyaf had chased notoriety through a wave of 
unsophisticated attacks, JI instead focused first on cultivating a technical proficiency and 
a robust support network which spanned the porous borders of Southeast Asia.99  
Mindanao first gained importance to JI during the mid-1990s.  While JI recruited 
widely throughout Southeast Asia, including individuals from Indonesia, Singapore and 
Malaysia, the strong governments in these countries complicated the establishment of 
terrorist training centers.  This was not the case in the Philippines and especially 
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Mindanao where the weaknesses of the Philippine state created a sanctuary where JI 
could freely operate.  Owing to ties cultivated in the training camps along the Afghan-
Pakistan border and the intercession of al-Qaeda intermediaries, JI formed a partnership 
with the MILF during the 1990s under which JI members could be trained in MILF 
camps.  This was a boon for the organization who could build a strong and highly skilled 
membership core without dispatching each recruit to the training camps in Central Asia.  
For its part the MILF profited financially from the arrangement and also benefited from 
JI’s technical proficiency with JI trainers providing instruction for MILF units including 
the MILF’s Special Operation’s Group which specialized in unconventional warfare and 
terrorist tactics.100  Even after the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the relocation of JI’s 
leadership back to Indonesia, Mindanao remained a critical asset for the organization as a 
logistics hub and training base.101  
In 2000, JI undertook its first terrorist operations including the bombing of a 
Jakarta mall in July 2000 and a plot to bomb 30 churches throughout Indonesia.  In 
August 2000, JI attempted to assassinate the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia at his 
official residence in sympathy with the MILF’s struggle and the loss of Camp 
Abubakar.102  On 30 December, a national holiday in the Philippines celebrating the life 
of national hero José Rizal, JI and the MILF conducted a joint operation in Manilla and 
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detonated several bombs throughout the metro area.  Twenty-two people were killed in 
the Rizal Day bombings and over 120 wounded.103  
Despite its expansive network throughout the region and budding operational 
profile, governments and intelligence services were largely unaware of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s existence prior to 9/11.104  Information about a major al-Qaeda affiliate in 
Southeast Asia began to emerge during the early days of the War on Terror, but JI’s true 
extent was not revealed until December 2001 when Singapore foiled a plot to use massive 
truck bombs to attack several sites around the city-state including the American, British 
and Israeli Embassies as well as several office towers housing American firms.105  The 
foiling of the Singapore plot received considerable praise in the media and even earned 
particular acclaim in the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terror Report.106  More 
importantly, the intelligence gained from the arrests made in Singapore provided the first 
insights into JI’s existence and potential as a terrorist threat.    
One of the most important consequences of the foiled Singapore plot occurred on 
January 15, 2002 when the Philippine National Police (PNP), acting on information 
provided by Singapore (who also had a few agents assisting the PNP) arrested Fathur 
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Rahman al-Ghozi on his way to Manila’s airport.   Al-Ghozi was an Indonesian who had 
received training in an al-Qaeda camp in Central Asia and was a key JI leader.  Within 
Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Ghozi had served as the head of the organization’s cell in the 
Philippines and had been the key liaison with the MILF.  Additionally he was also a 
skilled bomb maker who had worked as a trainer inside the MILF camps.  Al-Ghozi was 
subsequently linked to the Rizal Day bombing, had been the operational planner for the 
Singapore Embassy Plot and had even scouted potential targets for the attack.107   
Following his arrest, al-Ghozi cooperated with authorities providing the first detailed 
overview of JI, its personnel and its operations throughout Southeast Asia.  He also 
provided the location of JI safe houses within the Philippines which led to further arrests 
and the discovery of large weapons caches.108   
The capture of al-Ghozi was a boon for counterterrorism efforts, but did not 
cripple Jemaah Islamiyah or its ability to conduct operations.  From its previous focus on 
attacking hardened political targets like embassies, JI shifted to economically oriented 
soft targets.  On the evening of October 12, 2002, Jemaah Islamiyah detonated a car 
bomb in the heart of Bali’s entertainment district which devastated the surrounding 
nightclubs and bars.  The blast killed 202 people and wounded over 300 others.  A 
majority of the victims were foreign tourists visiting Bali including 88 Australians killed 
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in the attack. The Bali Nightclub bombing was the largest attack ever in Southeast Asia 
and among the deadliest terrorist incidents in history.109 
The MILF Paradox: 
 The Bali Nightclub bombing was a turning point for counterterrorism operations 
in Indonesia.  From its previously reserved approach to militant Islamic movements 
within its borders, the government in Jakarta initiated a severe crackdown on JI and like 
organizations.  The government onslaught led to a slew of arrests throughout Indonesia 
and undermined JI’s ability to operate effectively within the country.  Reeling from its 
losses at the hands of Indonesian authorities, JI adopted a new posture which emphasized 
Mindanao as a central component of the organization’s operations.   Mindanao provided 
strategic depth for JI.  Whereas the trappings of Philippine state sovereignty protected JI 
from cross border counterterrorism efforts by Indonesian authorities, the MILF and 
weakness of the Philippine government meant that JI was largely free to function in 
Mindanao unabated.  Shielded as it was from international and domestic counterterrorism 
efforts, Mindanao afforded JI an important opportunity after the Bali bombing to 
replenish its ranks and regroup.110   
JI’s strategic disposition revolved around its relationship with the MILF.  With 
the emergence of JI as a major transnational network came a series of revelations about 
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its historic ties to the MILF and past role in Mindanao.  Of particular interests were 
attempts by al-Qaeda in the 1990s to spur wider MILF-JI cooperation as well as the 
opening of MILF camps to JI personell.111  Confronted by both JI’s existence and its use 
of the Philippines as a country of convenience, President Arroyo vowed to rid her country 
of this foreign menace.  In addition to ongoing counterterrorism efforts in Mindanao, 
Arroyo would also emerge as the lead advocate for broader regional counterterrorism 
cooperation throughout Southeast Asia in order to combat groups like JI which took 
advantage of the region’s porous borders.112  More ominously, JI forced both Washington 
and Manila to confront the MILF’s nebulous role in the War on Terrorism. 
Through the first year of the Global War on Terror, the MILF’s approach centered 
on avoiding the conflict as much as possible lest it become a target of American 
operations.  As mentioned earlier, the MILF vocally condemned the 9/11 attacks and 
renounced al-Qaeda in a direct appeal to the Bush administration designed to distinguish 
the MILF from other militant groups.  This appeal proved successful as the MILF 
avoided inclusion on the State Department’s list of terrorist organization and Washington 
actively promoted negotiations between the Philippine government and MILF as a means 
of resolving the dispute rather than military force.  The United States continued to adhere 
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to this approach throughout 2002 despite growing evidence of links between the MILF 
and JI.  According to CRS, the “U.S. view emphasized that the MILF was not in league 
with Abu Sayyaf and was not anti-U.S.”113  
Yet, the American approach to the MILF was undercut by the fatal flaw that it 
mistakenly treated the group as a unitary actor.  After the AFP assault in 2000 and the fall 
of Camp Abubakar, individual MILF field commanders increasingly bucked the central 
committee’s leadership and began to act with greater autonomy.  These commanders 
became known as “lost commands” who often operated autonomously of the MILF’s 
central committee. 114  The presence of the lost commands helps explain the duality of the 
MILF’s role in the War on Terror whereby it could both disavow al-Qaeda and yet still 
offer assistance to groups like JI.  As explained by the International Crisis Group (ICG):  
“What is uncertain is whether top [MILF] leaders are aware of the activity and unwilling 
to admit it, or whether members of JI and other like-minded jihadist groups have 
established their own personal ties to individual MILF commanders without the 
knowledge of the MILF leadership .”115  Confronted with growing evidence of JI’s 
involvement in Mindanao ICG speculated that there were three possible explanations for 
how such activities could be occurring even as the MILF attempted to distance itself from 
GWOT.  The MILF leadership was either being disingenuous in it renunciation of 
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terrorism, simply unware of the ongoing cooperation with JI or was genuine in its stance 
against terrorism but lacked the ability to rein in its rogue commanders.  Unfortunately, 
all three possible explanations indicated that if talks ever produced a peace agreement, 
the MILF central command might not actually have the ability to implement it.116 
Even the prospect of a partial peace seemed remote in February 2003 as the AFP-
MILF ceasefire - tenuous at the best of times - collapsed and hostilities resumed.  
Occurring simultaneously with talks on Balikatan 03-1, President Arroyo ordered a new 
offensive against the MILF on February 13 after MILF delegates failed to attend a 
meeting with government representatives concerning the ceasefire and peace talks.117  
The fighting centered on Pikit in North Cotabato (Central Mindanao) but quickly spread.  
Critically, after several days of hard fighting the AFP seized the Buliok complex near the 
Liguasan marsh, which was a major MILF base.118  Attempts by the MILF to recapture 
Buliok resulted in the most severe fighting on Mindanao since 2000.119  The AFP 
offensive helped explain the bombing of the Davao Airport as a combined MILF-JI 
operation.  Unable to withstand the conventional assault by the AFP, the MILF instead 
adopted guerrilla tactics to confront the larger force including ambushes and hit-and-run 
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attacks.  For the MILF, utilizing terrorism and particularly availing itself of JI’s expertise 
in explosives constituted a logical extension of this shift in strategy.120 
The MILF’s shift in tactics and growing record of attacks called into question the 
group’s fragile claim to not be a terrorist organization.  Al-Qaeda materials reportedly 
recovered from the home of MILF leader Hashim Salmat were cited by the Arroyo 
administration as proof of the group’s link to Osama Bin Laden.121 In the face of 
mounting evidence of the MILF’s connections to JI and role as a regional hub for terrorist 
groups, America’s decision to focus its counterterrorism efforts on Abu Sayyaf while 
eschewing the MILF became harder to defend.  An official from an allied third country 
characterized the American focus on ASG without addressing the MILF thusly: “to take 
out Abu Sayyaf makes everyone feel good, but it doesn’t remove a large chunk of the 
problem.”122  However, American officials countered that the only solution to ASG was a 
military one because the group had no real political objectives which could form the basis 
of negotiations.  By contrast, the MILF did have a legitimate political agenda and 
negotiations were possible.  As such, the Bush Administration committed U.S. diplomatic 
and financial resources to finding a negotiated solution to the GRP-MILF conflict.123  
That the United States preferred to resolve the MILF issue via negotiations neither 
meant that Washington was ignorant of the group’s terrorist activities nor that the MILF 
was insulated from the consequences of these actions.  Following the Davao airport blast, 
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the United States mulled adding the MILF to its list of terrorist organizations.  This move 
was backed by several senior administration officials and would have significant 
ramifications for the MILF.124  Besides compromising the legitimacy of the MILF, 
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization would specifically compromise the 
leadership group’s freedom of movement.  It would also significantly harm the group’s 
economic standing through asset seizures and by cutting its access to global financial 
network. It was precisely this designation which the MILF had hoped to avoid through a 
direct appeal to the Bush Administration in a personal letter in January 2003 from 
Chairman Salamat.125  Incidentally, the listing of the MILF as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization by the United States was only forestalled by a direct intercession by 
President Arroyo.  Arroyo’s administration feared that listing the MILF as a terrorist 
organization would preclude any potential peace process with the MILF.126  Washington 
acquiesced to Manila’s request and jointly employed a strategy whereby the threat of 
being labelled a terrorist organization was wielded like a cudgel to wring concessions 
from the MILF.127   Notably, Arroyo and Bush issued an ultimatum to the MILF to 
formally renounce terrorism as a prerequisite for both the resumption of talks and 
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potential American aid.  This gambit succeeded and in June 2003, MILF chief Hashim 
Salamat publicly renounced terrorism for the first time and denied any links with JI.128 
In July, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the MILF and the AFP to 
allow peace talks to resume.129  The negotiations would be hosted and mediated by 
Malaysia with the United States playing a supporting role.  In addition to trying to 
mediate some of the thornier issues in negotiations, specifically ancestral domain, 
Washington’s primary contribution to talks was offering a sizable economic development 
package to induce the MILF into reaching an accord.130 
Though certainly an improvement over war, RP-MILF peace negotiations created 
a paradox for the security situation in Mindanao whereby the talks constituted both the 
greatest prospect for a lasting peace and yet were also the greatest obstacle to achieving 
that end.  Whereas the MILF conflict could not be resolved without reaching a political 
settlement, counterterrorism efforts became a hostage to this process.  Despite evidence 
of JI and other terrorist groups taking root in Mindanao under the protection of “lost 
commands” neither the AFP nor the United States could actively counter this growing 
terrorist presence out of fear that any such offensive action in MILF territory would 
compromise the ceasefire and scuttle the peace talks.  As such, while the negotiations 
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held out the potential for an end to the RP-MILF struggle they also created a refuge in 
Mindanao where groups like JI and ASG could operate with minimal fear of reprisals.131 
Abu Sayyaf Reborn, Again: 
 In addition to Jemaah Islamiyah who retreated to Mindanao following Indonesia’s 
aggressive counterterrorism efforts, the organization that benefited the most from the 
reprieve provided by the RP-MILF ceasefire was the depleted Abu Sayyaf.  Although 
neither Balikatan 02-1 nor Oplan Endgame had been an unqualified successes, each had 
taken a substantial toll on ASG.  Basilan had been lost as a staging ground for the group 
and ongoing development programs were seen as having undercut the appeal of ASG to 
the island’s disillusioned inhabitants.132  Likewise, though ultimately abandoned, the 
reports of a joint US-RP operation on Jolo and Endgame were sufficient to scare ASG 
leaders into leaving the island.133  Yet, far from being vanquished the remnant of ASG 
also found asylum on Mindanao under the umbrella of the MILF. 
 Historically, relations between the MILF and Abu Sayyaf had been poor.  The 
MILF viewed ASG as a band of un-Islamic kidnappers whilst Abu Sayyaf considered the 
MILF an unreliable partner.134  Despite their known antipathy and philosophical 
incongruity, the International Crisis Group noted a budding, working-level relationship 
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between ASG and MILF’s special operations group around 1999-2000.  According to 
ICG these links were fueled by personal ties between members rather than an 
organizational imperative on either side.135  During Balikatan 02-1, circumstances added 
greater importance to these personal ties as the agreement between the US-RP forces to 
avoid MILF territory created “no-go” areas where ASG fighters could escape from the 
AFP without fear of pursuit.136  This dynamic only grew in significance as ASG forces 
regrouped on Mindanao.  
 In his monograph Balik-Terrorism: The Return of Abu Sayyaf, Zachary Abuza 
offers an interesting examination on the MILF’s motives for choosing to aid the ASG in 
the face of joint US-RP counterterrorism efforts.  Abuza identifies the following potential 
explanations: 
 
 A Distraction: ASG keeps the AFP spread thin and prevents the military from 
focusing exclusively on the MILF. 
 
 Plausible Deniability:  ASG provides hypothetical cover for the MILF when it 
choose to engage in terrorist attacks.  The MILF can also use ASG as a proxy to 
conduct attacks while still officially remaining committed to a peace process. 
 
 Shared Struggle: The MILF believed that AFP efforts against ASG could be 
used to target MILF units and areas.   
 
 A Means to Expand Influence: ASG affords the MILF a way to expand its 
influence into new areas, particularly in Sulu, where it had historically been weak.  
In particular, ASG offered MILF a means of taking advantage of fractures within 
the rival MNLF.137 
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In addition to these practical considerations, there was also an important ideological 
component facilitated by significant changes within Abu Sayyaf that made the 
organization a less loathsome partner.  Abu Sabaya’s death in June 2002 removed from 
ASG one of the driving influences within the group that had pushed ASG away from 
jihadist terrorism in the late 1990s and towards banditry.  Sabaya’s downfall was 
followed in December 2003, by the capture of Commander Robot (Galib Andang) who 
had been wounded in an encounter with the AFP.  Commander Robot, who had 
effectively headed ASG’s Jolo wing, had shared Abu Sabaya’s affinity for kidnap-for-
ransom operations and had a $5 million bounty placed on him by the United States under 
its rewards for justice program.138  The capture of Commander Robot constituted a 
success for Philippine counterterrorism operations, but had an even larger impact within 
Abu Sayyaf.  Freed from his two impudent and influential deputies, Khaddafi Janjalani 
reasserted control over Abu Sayyaf and consolidated the group under his authority.  
Whereas Sabaya and Robot had been more interested in booty than Islam, Khaddafi 
Janjilani reoriented the group back to its roots and the militant Islamic ideology that had 
been espoused by his older brother Abdurajak.139  Khaddafi Janjalani also shifted ASG’s 
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operations away from kidnapping and back towards true terrorist attacks like the bombing 
of public places.  The Congressional Research Service reported: 
Under the leadership of Khadaffy Janjalani, ASG reoriented its strategy and appears 
to have gained greater effectiveness as a terrorist organization.  Janjalani de-
emphasized kidnappings for ransom and instead emphasized developing capabilities 
for urban bombings.  He improved ties with key military factions of the MILF and 
established cooperation with JI.  He also reemphasized the Islamic nature of Abu 
Sayyaf.140 
 
CRS added that “even though Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength has fallen…..the threat 
from the organization may be growing.”141  Thus while OEF-P had reduced ASG’s ranks, 
it had also yielded a more experienced and battle-hardened core membership capable of 
undertaking brazen attacks against civilian and military targets.142  Most importantly, 
ASG’s rediscovery of both professionalism and religion paved the way for increased 
cooperation with Jemaah Islamiyah and the MILF.143  
The Mindanao Melting Pot: 
 By 2004, the belief that Abu Sayyaf could be addressed independent of the 
conflict with the MILF or the wider issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia had been 
exposed as the delusion that it had always been.  Instead of isolating terrorist groups from 
one another and defeating them piecemeal, counterterrorism campaigns like Balikatan 
02-1 and Indonesia’s crackdown after the Bali bombing had unintentionally sparked even 
greater cooperation among the region’s militant factions.  Mindanao became the 
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crossroads of regional terrorism where the MILF, JI and ASG forged closer ties in the 
face of shared hardship.144   
Though still remaining distinct organizations, a trilateral relationship rapidly 
emerged.  Each group brought its own distinct advantage to the nexus.  The MILF, or at 
least individual MILF commanders, would provide sanctuary for both JI and ASG 
fighters.145  JI possessed a technical expertise and resources which it could impart to its 
partners through training while simultaneously replenishing its own ranks.  And recently 
returned to the Islamist fold under the guidance of Khadaffi Janjalai,, ASG became an 
ideologically aligned partner with veteran personnel and operational experience.  These 
trilateral links, nurtured by circumstance and opportunity in Mindanao, produced a fluid 
pattern of alignments and realignments between militant groups.146  Each remained 
independent, but benefited from the strength of the others and could profitably engage in 
joint operations.147   
 Besides increasing the proficiency of existing organizations, new factions were 
also able to flourish.  Of particular concern was the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM), a 
radical fringe of the Balik-Islam (back to Islam) movement.  Founded by Filipino 
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Christians who had converted to Islam, typically while in the Middle East as Overseas 
Filipino Workers (OFWs), the Balik-Islam movement sought to spread Islam throughout 
the Philippines and return the archipelago to its pre-Spanish, Islamic tradition.  RSM 
formed as a radical offshoot of this wider movement and connived to use terrorist 
violence as a means of spreading Islam.  Though a fairly small group, RSM members 
often had the distinct advantage of being from areas of the Philippines outside of 
Mindanao.148  This afforded them the cultural familiarity and connections needed to 
operate comfortably in areas like Luzon where Moro groups were less familiar.  
However, in Mindanao RSM could cultivate ties with established groups like ASG and JI 
who provided valuable training in terrorist tactics.149 
 Rather than curtailing the threat of extremist violence, counterterrorism efforts 
and peace talks with the MILF had inadvertently created an incubator for militant groups 
to thrive.  The unfortunate and perhaps inevitable result of the conditions on Mindanao 
was the reemergence of terrorism in the Philippines.  Beginning in 2003, the Philippines 
suffered a wave of sophisticated and severe terrorist attacks which were traceable to the 
partnerships forged in Mindanao (See Figure 3 below).150  Nor were the effects confined 
to the Philippines alone as a revitalized JI resumed its own campaign in Indonesia in a 
series of devastating attacks including an attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 
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September 2004 and a Bali hotel the following year.  Mindanao served as a grim 
reminder that the Global War on Terror defied easy solutions as even aggressive 
counterterrorism campaigns were wasted in the face of ungoverned territories and 
complex political dynamics that abetted militancy.   For Washington and Manila, 
Mindanao’s emergence as the nucleus of terrorism in Southeast Asia served as a sharp 
rebuke to the futility of previous counterterrorism efforts and a harbinger of the extensive 
effort needed to defeat militant extremism in the region. 151  
                                                 




Figure 14: Major Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines 2003-2006 152 
Date Location  Responsi
bility 
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March 4,  
2003 
Davao City MILF-JI 24 >100 Bombing of Davao 
international 
airport  
April 2,  
2003 
Davao City MILF-JI 16 55 Bombing of Sasa 
wharf ferry 
terminal in the port 
of Davao City 







9 41 Bombing of 
agricultural supply 
store and satellite 







Unknown 14 87 Explosion in an 
assassination 









SuperFerry 14.  
Explosive 
detonation sparks 
several fires which 
engulf the ship.  
The worst terrorist 
attack in SE Asia 














17 70 Bombing of a 
public Market 
                                                 














ASG-JI 13 >140 Near simultaneous 
bombings of three 
locations on St. 
Valentine’s Day.  
Locations include a 
commuter bus 
terminal in Makati 
(business district of 
Manila), a pedi-cab 
stand near a mall in 
General Santos and 
a bus terminal in 






ASG 0 24 Near simultaneous 
bombing of a small 
hotel and a mini-
bus.  A third bomb 






























The Laws of Gravity: The Fall of US-Philippine Bonhomie 
 
Friends of Freedom: 
 On June 10, 2003 the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific Affairs held a hearing to discuss developments in Southeast Asia.  Catharine 
Dalpino, then a fellow at the Brookings Institution, was called to assess the state of U.S.-
Philippine relations.  Dalpino diagnosed an essential duality in the state of the 
relationship whereby on the surface, and particularly at the level of government elites, the 
bilateral dynamic was at its strongest point since the 1991 base closures.  The War on 
Terror had afforded Washington and Manila a common cause and a foundation on which 
to rebuild the relationship. Yet, like a crème brûlée, the strength of the alliance on the 
surface masked a more complicated and less concrete reality.  The tenuous peace process 
with the MILF, ASG’s resurgence and a growing cognizance of how significantly the rot 
within Philippine state institutions had spread all spoke to underlying challenges which 
threatened the stability of U.S.-Philippine cooperation.153  Episodes like the collapse of 
Balikatan 03-1 illustrated the deep cleavages which still divided the two countries despite 
their shared interest in defeating terrorism.  As strong as the US-RP dynamic appeared, 
signs of looming difficulties were hard to dismiss. 
 That the friction evident in the handling of Balikatan 03-1 had yet to metastasize 
throughout the relationship owed largely to the conduct of President Arroyo and her 
commitment to support Washington in GWOT.  Whereas political considerations 
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tempered Arroyo’s support of American operations within the Philippines, her backing 
for the United States’ efforts against violent extremism abroad remained unchecked.  As 
with Afghanistan, Arroyo endorsed the American efforts to disarm Iraq and emerged as 
Washington’s staunchest advocates in Southeast Asia.   Though notably reticent at the 
prospect of war, Arroyo placed the impetus for peace solely on the regime of Saddam 
Hussein and urged it to concede to international demands for the betterment of the 
world.154   Philippine participation in America’s Coalition of the Willing, reflected two 
central imperatives of Philippine foreign policy: the preeminence of the U.S. alliance and 
importance of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).  In backing the Bush administration, 
Arroyo framed her support as an approach driven not only by the crisis at hand, but a 
necessity of the US-RP alliance.  “This relationship is vital to our national security.  It 
bears a significance to this war and to our combined efforts to fight terrorism in the 
Philippines and the region.”155   Beyond the demands of the alliance with Washington, 
President Arroyo viewed the situation through the lens of the legion of OFWs employed 
throughout the Middle East who continued to be a key economic and social engine within 
the Philippines.  
Our policy on Iraq is based on our belief that a stable and pluralistic Iraq, at peace 
with its neighbors and the world, is an important key to the peace and stability of 
the Middle East, and thus critical to the safety and security of our one and a half 
million Filipinos there. Today we have the rare opportunity to be part of the future 
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of a new Iraq by helping the brave Iraqi people build a country free from the 
oppressive regime that ruled them for so long.156   
 
 Arroyo was prepared to offer moral and political support to Washington, but 
declined to send combat forces to participate in the invasion of Iraq.  However, as with 
Afghanistan, the Philippines opened its facilities and airspace to transiting U.S. forces.157  
The Malacañang Palace’s support for the American mission was not universal in Manila 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom faced significant criticism from within the Philippine 
Congress and the office of Vice President Guingona.158  This debate intensified following 
the end of major combat operations in Iraq.  With the fighting subsiding, Washington 
pressed Manila to dispatch a small force to aid the reconstruction of Iraq.159  After much 
internal debate, in June 203 President Arroyo opted not to send an armed military 
contingent, but rather a small humanitarian force consisting of 60 medical personnel, 25 
police, 50 soldiers, and 39 social workers.160  This deployment was hotly debated within 
the Philippine National Security Council but a strong consensus emerged in support of 
the measure.161  However, opponents maligned the mission as nothing more than a quid 
pro quo for American aid to the Philippines.162 
                                                 
156 Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, Relevance and Change: Foreign Policy Under the 
Administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Department of Foreign Affairs, February 2004.  
Tyner also offers an extensive overview on the relevance of OFW’s to the Iraq War and President Arroyo’s 
approach to foreign policy at large.  
157 Sorretta interview. 
158 Particular derision focused on the lack of authorization from the United Nation’s for the war.  Guingona, 
Fight for Filipino, 300-306l  Tynes, Will to War, 84-8. 
159  Washington was particularly keen for the Philippines to supply a contingent of Military Police.  Sorretta 
interview. 
160 Cruz de Castro, “Managing an Alliance,” 115;  Info on Philippine contingent see, Phil Zabriskie, “Life 
in the Danger Zone,” Time Magazine –Asia, 9 February 2004. 
161 Sorretta interview. 
162 Tynes, Will to War  84; Marichu Villanueva, “RP peacekeepers to star leaving for Iraq Next Week,” 




 The centrality of President Arroyo to the resurgent U.S.-Philippine alliance was 
on full display amid the pomp and pageantry of her State Visit to Washington in mid-
May.  The visit constituted a prominent statement of thanks by the Bush administration to 
Arroyo for her continued support throughout the War on Terror and especially on Iraq.  
Notably, Arroyo was treated to a State Dinner at the White House which was only the 3rd 
such event of the Bush presidency, the first for an Asian leader and made Arroyo only the 
second Filipino leader to ever receive such an honored treatment.163  Throughout the 
visit, Bush was effusive in his praise for his Philippine counterpart, labelling her “a friend 
of freedom.”    Bush added, “she’s tough when it comes to terror” and she “fully 
understands that in the face of terror, you’ve got to be strong, not weak.  You can’t talk 
with them; you can’t negotiate with them.  You’ve got to bring them to justice.”164 
 More than praise and spectacle, Arroyo’s visit yielded a bounty of agreements 
with the United State to benefit the Philippines.  The most important of these measure 
was a move to designate the Philippines “A Major Non-NATO Ally.”  This label 
constituted the highest echelon of American defense cooperation reserved only for those 
countries considered to be the closest American allies.  It would grant the Philippines 
greater access to American military equipment as well as financial services.165   
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Furthermore, Arroyo received a pledge of an additional $30 million in American military 
aid as well as 30 Huey helicopters.166  Outside of the military arena, Arroyo also signed 
seventeen trade and investment agreements which were estimated to be worth an added 
$3.2 billion in economic activity.167  This windfall was attributable to President Arroyo’s 
handling of the War on Terror.  As stated by President Bush, “Madame President, for all 
you have done to make our world safer, America thanks you.”168  
The Army That You Have169 
 Amidst the triumph of President Arroyo’s visit to Washington, talk of the War on 
Terror within the Philippines appeared strangely muted in public.  In their Joint 
Statement, the two presidents “reaffirmed their commitment to destroy the ASG once and 
for all,” and “agreed to hold another joint military activity in the near term, in which the 
United States will provide support to ongoing Armed Forces of the Philippines-led 
operations against the ASG.”170  During their joint press conference, Bush again avowed 
his willingness to dispatch American soldiers to the Philippines to help, but did not 
provide any details other than to specify “we will be involved to the extent that the 
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president invites us to be involved.”171   In line with these comments an attempt was 
made in early June to revive Balikatan 03-1 with Admiral Fargo visiting Manila to 
discuss the matter.  However, this effort was a disappointment as well as.  Specifically, 
before any exercise could begin, the Pentagon concluded that a six month delay would be 
necessary in order to resolve the thorny question of the terms of reference and to train 
hundreds of AFP soldiers in counterterrorism techniques.172   The New York Times 
termed this setback “the latest embarrassing detour,” in efforts to combat terrorism in the 
Philippines and a “a recognition that the Philippine military is not yet capable of 
effectively combating terrorists on its own, and that legal prohibitions against American 
or other foreign troops fighting on Philippine soil cannot be easily circumvented.”173   
 The delay also highlighted the fundamental divide between Washington and 
Manila in assessing where responsibility for the Philippine’s underwhelming 
counterterrorism performance lay.  President Arroyo, her government and the AFP’s 
position on this issue remained unchanged from the immediate aftermath of 9/11.  A 
paucity of resources plagued the AFP which manifest in an acute deficiency of equipment 
and left the military outgunned against better armed rebel groups.174  Simply redressing 
this equipment deficit through American aid and modernization would suffice to reverse 
the AFP’s fortunes and allow it to make meaningful gains against its domestic opponents.  
Philippine posturing prior to President Arroyo’s state visit to Washington epitomized this 
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philosophy.  Though denying that she possessed a “laundry list” of military equipment, 
President Arroyo talked openly of the need for added American assistance to buy arms 
and National Defense Secretary Reyes reportedly met with NSA Condoleezza to discuss 
a $1 billion loan from the United State to fund an AFP modernization program.175 
 In fairness to the perspective of the Philippine government, the AFP was 
strikingly ill-equipped by the standards of modern militaries.  American trainers had first 
noted the poor state of AFP riffles during Balikatan 02-1, but the decay went far beyond 
the common infantryman.  Much of the Philippine navy consisted of decommissioned 
American ships dating back to World War II including many which had been inherited 
from the disbanded South Vietnamese navy.  When columnist Nicholas Kristof visited a 
vessel in 2002, he noted that the ship was in such poor shape that he was “tempted to 
reach into my pocket and lend the crew $10 to buy oars.”176  While President Arroyo’s 
trip did not provide everything the AFP had wanted, the infusion of new helicopters 
reportedly saved the Philippine Air Force (PAF) from “perdition.”  According to Senator 
Ralph Recto, the “PAF is like the kiwi bird- flightless.  One in every four (PAF) aircraft 
is out of commission, rendering the country virtually without air cover.”  Recto 
bemoaned that “there are more Air Force Generals than fighter jets,” and that “the PAF 
has more colonels in its roster than choppers in its hangars.” 177 
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 The AFP equipment shortcomings were undeniable, but where Washington and 
Manila diverged was in diagnosing the source of this malady.  Whereas Manila viewed 
the military’s material inadequacies as a lack of resources, Washington identified a 
deeper illness. Secretary Rumsfeld addressed this matter directly in a memo coinciding 
with President Arroyo’s visit: 
The problem in the Philippines is maintenance. I think we need to put a major 
press on that and make sure we require them to do the job they ought to be doing 
on that. They have no C-130s that fly, and they only have about 9 of 30 
helicopters that fly.178 
 
Rumsfeld’s sentiment echoed that expressed earlier by the American teams sent to assess 
AFP capabilities.  In trying to identify the source of the AFP’s operational woes, the 
specialists found that the AFP’s mobility systems (helicopters, trucks and naval patrol 
craft) to be “under-supported, with repairs taking longer than they should have because of 
a lack of parts and know-how,” and that “the state of its mobility systems severely 
hampered the AFP's ability to conduct effective operations.”  The assessment team 
stipulated that any effort to upgrade AFP’s capabilities also needed to address engrained 
logistics and maintenance problems.179 
 Emphasizing the importance of upkeep was not the extent of Washington’s 
concern.  Rather the pervasive maintenance issues provided a window into the underlying 
flaws of the AFP as an institution.  Equipment deficiencies were not about lack of 
resources or even maintenance, but simply the surface manifestations of the corruption, 
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inefficiency and overall decay that riddled the Philippine military.  For example, a single 
general was found to have amassed a fortune of over $2 million despite having a salary of 
roughly $600 a month.180  While graft within the AFP had been a known problem, the 
extent of the issue, its deleterious effect on operations and the sluggishness of reform 
efforts proved striking.  In 2001, a Senate investigation uncovered evidence of AFP 
officers accepting large bribes from ASG in exchange for safe passage.  Senator Sergio 
Osmena charged that defense secretary Reyes and AFP chief of staff Villanueva had not 
only condoned ransom payments to ASG, but had personally profited from kickbacks.181   
These allegations dovetailed with reports from within the AFP concerning a 
permissive attitude within the military in general towards graft and a culture within the 
government that coddled crooks.182  Colonel Dencio Acop of the AFP Intelligence 
Service characterized this dynamic by arguing that the military’s involvement in internal 
development activities had “allowed the culture of graft and corruption to seep from its 
larger environment into the organization, compromising traditional military values of 
duty and honor.”  Furthermore, “the more that the external environment tolerates this 
negative culture, the more the influential members of the organization are encouraged to 
engage in it,” the result being that “AFP resources are lost to graft and corruption…until 
it is unable to perform its core functions with equal efficiency and effectiveness as 
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before.”183 Corruption within the AFP was so prevalent that it not only compromised the 
institution’s operational effectiveness, but also caused the civilian government to be 
extremely guarded over how the military budget was being utilized.184  Indeed, sources 
within the AFP alleged to investigators that large chunks of the money provided to the 
AFP by the United States for exercises like the Balikatan war games had simply been 
pocketed by high ranking officers and officials.185  
Corruption was not the only ill to afflict the AFP.  Since the People Power 
Revolution which overthrew Ferdinand Marcos, the 1987 Constitution had enshrined the 
AFP as “the protector of the people.”  This mantel had engendered a high degree of 
politicization within the ranks which over the subsequent decades had manifest in the 
form of numerous coup attempts, mutinies and rivalries between various political factions 
within the military.186 GWOT had not erased these conditions nor their consequences.  
Instead, at the highest levels, the AFP continued to be sharply divided between 
competing factions -particularly as it pertained to leadership positions.187  These 
problems were exacerbated by nearly constant changes at the top of the AFP.  When 
General Narciso Abaya assumed the post of AFP Chief of Staff in April 2003, he became 
the fifth man to hold the post within a year.188  The revolving door of AFP leadership not 
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only fueled further politicization and factionalism within the ranks but also undercut any 
meaningful effort to reform the organization. 
The AFP’s institutional failings directly contributed to its inability to make 
meaningful progress in defeating terrorism in the Philippines.  Instead of hunting Abu 
Sayyaf, individual AFP officers colluded with the group –accepting bribes and kickbacks 
in exchange for safe-passage and other forms of material support.  Notably, Gracia 
Burnham ignited a major controversy in Manila when she published a book recording her 
long captivity by Abu Sayyaf.  Burnham recalled instances during her detention when 
AFP officers had aided Abu Sayyaf in exchange for money or a promised portion of the 
demanded ransom.189 Elements within the AFP went even farther in aiding insurgent 
groups by furnishing arms to their alleged enemies.  Both the NPA and the MILF freely 
admitted buying weapons and especially ammunition from sources within the Philippine 
military.190  One MILF official even recalled that someone in the AFP had offered to sell 
the separatist group a tank.191  
Captain Robin Bowman of the U.S. Air Force argued that the Global War on 
Terror within the Philippines had actually had a perverse effect.  Instead of combatting 
militant groups, counterterrorism efforts had effectively been coopted by traditional 
political and patronage networks and leveraged for their own material benefit.  Rather 
than improving counterterrorism capabilities, GWOT and American policies had created 
                                                 
189 These allegations have been fiercely denied.  Burnham, My Enemies; “Burnham: AFP general wanted 
half of ransom,” Philippine Star, 8 May 2003; Paolo Romero, “Pichay: there was no collusion,” Philippine 
Star, 8 May 2003. 
190  “MILF admits buying AFP weapons,” Philippine Star, 31 July 2003; Ed Lingao.  “Arming the Enemy,” 





a “cyclical incentive structure,” whereby “actors within the government, military, and 
insurgency groups… profit politically and financially from US aid and the warlike 
conditions,” causing them to sustain or even perpetuate “a presence of conflict and 
terrorism in order to continue drawing future benefits.”    
The lack of oversight which allowed corruption to flourish also created 
permissive conditions for human rights abuses and the excessive use of force by AFP 
soldiers in Mindanao.  Primarily Catholics from other regions of the Philippines, AFP 
soldiers were viewed as a neo-colonial army by residents of Mindanao.  According to 
critics, the AFP wantonly used violence during their counterinsurgency operations and 
casually labelled any victim as being a member of Abu Sayyaf.192  Even Mark Bowden 
identified a degree of trigger happiness among the AFP forces hunting for the Burnhams 
and described the Philippine army as seemingly “more intent on killing guerillas than on 
rescuing hostages.”193  In 2007, Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, would be dispatched to the Philippines 
to investigate the high number of politically linked killings in the country.  His report 
sharply censured the AFP and the culture of impunity which pervaded both the military 
and President Arroyo’s administration.194  Such abuses not only contravened typical 
notions of military professionalism but also a fundamental tenet of counterinsurgency 
scholarship.  Instead of quelling guerilla forces, the arbitrary use of force against a 
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population has consistently served as a key accelerant for insurgent violence and further 
enflamed the conflicts.195  In the case of the Philippines, such abuses stood in stark 
contrast to the objective of separating Mindanao’s populations from the militant groups 
and the civil-military operations promoted by the United States. 
Furthermore, the disarray in the upper echelons of the AFP had a damaging effect 
on its overall performance in Mindanao by depriving the force of a consistent strategy.  
Colonel Eusaquito Manalo of the PAF wrote in 2004 about the overall approach of the 
Philippines to the problem of ASG.  Manalo described the Philippines’ response as 
“remaining ad hoc and reactive rather than decisive and strategic.”  Even after the early 
progress on Basilan, “the government failed to maintain the momentum generated by the 
success of ‘Balikatan 02-1’ due to a lack of unifying strategy.”196  Colonel Maxwell, who 
had overseen American forces in Basilan during Balikatan 02-1, drew similar conclusions 
in his evaluation.  According to Maxwell, “while the AFP could develop a tactically 
proficient counterterrorism force, the Armed Force of the Philippines, did not have a 
command and control structure to properly employ [it] or to integrate it with other forces 
and current operations.”197  This was particularly the case with the Light Reaction 
Company, which after receiving extensive, specialized training in counterterrorism tactics 
from U.S. trainers, had simply been deployed to Basilan as a standard unit and used it for 
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such conventional roles as securing a perimeter cordon rather than as a lead assault 
element.198 
 It had been this simmering disenchantment with the AFP that had motivated the 
Pentagon to push for an expanded role in Balikatan 03-1 and where the major rift with 
Arroyo occurred.  Despite mounting evidence of the AFP’s limitations, the Philippine 
President remained firmly committed to her armed forces and the constitution.  Even as 
deadlines for the proposed defeat of ASG passed without triumph, Arroyo continued to 
champion the progress made and insisted that the AFP was doing the best that it could.199    
Arroyo’s optimism became harder to maintain in July 2003 following two 
episodes which each grimly illustrated the limited nature of the Philippine government’s 
abilities to successfully combat terrorism.  The first incident occurred in the early hours 
of July 14, when Fathur al-Ghozi and two ASG members escaped from jail in Manila.  
Though prison breaks were disturbingly common occurrences in the Philippines, the 
escape of the Philippine’s prized terrorist catch who happened to be both a senior JI 
leader and one of the region’s leading bomb experts was particularly humiliating for the 
Philippine government.200  To add further insult, Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
was in Manila at the time of the escape to sign an agreement on counterterrorism-
assistance.  Howard called the escape a “serious setback” while the American Embassy 
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stated that it was deeply disturbed by the getaway.201  Manila offered a sizable bounty for 
information leading to al-Ghozi’s arrest and launched a nation-wide manhunt.  Despite 
these efforts, al-Ghozi would remain at-large within the Philippines for nearly three 
months. 
As embarrassing as al-Ghozi’s jailbreak appeared, a more gripping drama 
unfolded in the posh malls of Makati less than two weeks later.  One of the sixteen cities 
to form Metro Manila, Makati is the country’s commercial hub and home to numerous 
upscale mega-malls, restaurants and other venues.  Though far from the battlefields of 
Mindanao, on July 27, 2003 the country’s discordant military politics played out in 
Makati when a group of nearly 300 AFP soldiers, including 70 junior officers, mutinied 
and seized control of the Oakwood Premier Ayala Center.  Timed to coincide with 
President Arroyo’s State of the Nation Address on the 28th, the mutineers took control of 
the Hotel Intercontinental Manila, the Oakwood Premier apartments and the Glorietta 
mall in the early hours of the 27th.202  Among those individuals caught in the complex 
when it was taken over was the Australian ambassador and at least two Americans who 
were subsequently released with the other civilians without incident by mid-morning.203  
Though not taking hostages, the mutineers booby-trapped the buildings with explosives 
and vowed to resist any attempt to evict them from the Ayala Center.       
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Called the Magdalo Group, a reference to a revolutionary faction against Spanish 
colonial rule dating to 1896, the Oakwood Mutiny proved strikingly different from past 
military insurrections and coup attempts. The soldiers came from elite units throughout 
the AFP, many having participated in American training programs, and included 
representatives of the Army, Air Force and Navy.204  While the mutineers did call for 
President Arroyo and had strong ties to other political factions, notably former President 
Estrada, they also publicly aired their collective grievance against mismanagement within 
the AFP.  The litany of grievances voiced by the mutineers included corruption within the 
AFP procurement system, pitiable medical care for soldiers and their families, inadequate 
housing, lack of benefits for the families of soldiers who died in action, and obsolete 
equipment.  Going even further, the mutineers charged AFP officials with selling arms to 
domestic insurgent groups like the MILF and even being complicit in several bombings 
throughout Mindanao in an effort to sustain the conflict and elicit more aid from the 
United States.205  Worse, the corruption within the AFP stemmed not from a minority of 
wayward soldiers, but permeated throughout the organization and included top officials 
like National Defense Secretary Reyes.206  One of the group’s leaders stated that their 
purpose was to illustrate “the true state of the nation,” while another asserted that, “our 
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difference from the soldiers outside [the group] is that we have decided to make a stand 
for what is true and we are willing to lay down our lives.”207 
The crisis itself ended fairly quickly.  After wider support for the movement failed 
to manifest, government negotiators headed by former AFP Chief of Staff Roy Cimatu, 
convinced the mutineers to surrender without a fight.  After roughly twenty-two hours, 
the mutineers disarmed the explosives and vacated the Oakwood complex to return to 
their barracks.  President Arroyo claimed victory over the rebellious soldiers and was 
applauded by Washington for her handling of the situation.208  
Facing the prospect of courts martialed and jail, the leaders of the uprising 
nevertheless claimed a moral victory by raising public consciousness about the conditions 
within the AFP.209  These claims of a moral victory were not merely the bluster of a 
defeated movement.  In the immediate aftermath of the Oakwood Mutiny the Senate 
promised to probe corruption within the military and AFP Chief of Staff Abaya admitted 
that graft existed within the armed forces from the highest offices down to the company 
levels.210  Reyes would back an investigation into arms sales by AFP officers to rebels, 
but would himself resign from his post as National Defense Secretary in late August amid 
political fallout from the mutiny.211  Both Cimatu and a subsequent investigation into the 
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incident warned that not only were the complaints voiced by the mutineers valid, but that 
the government risked suffering either another coup or the implosion of the AFP if these 
grievances continued to be ignored.212   
The Weakest Link: 
 Occurring in rapid succession, al-Ghozi’s escape and the Oakwood Mutiny 
combined to reinforce doubts about Philippine government’s capabilities to combat 
terrorism.  Questions about the integrity of both the Philippine legal system and the AFP 
were not new.  However, the public manner in which these deficiencies had been exposed 
garnered added attention and exposure to qualms which had previously remained largely 
private.  The two events also served to underscore the limits of the existing approach to 
the War on Terrorism in the archipelago.  As bluntly asserted by the historian Alfred 
McCoy, the Oakwood mutiny against top AFP officials, “indicated a deep ‘institutional 
rot’ inside the military that could not be corrected by merely increasing foreign aid.”213 
 The increasing difficulty in reconciling public support for Manila and private 
misgivings was on full display on October 18, 2003, when President Bush made a state 
visit to the Philippines.  On its surface, the trip appeared to be yet another act in the 
rejuvenated U.S.-Philippine alliance and close relationship between the two presidents. In 
Manila, Bush became the first American President since Eisenhower to address a joint 
session of the Philippine Congress.  During his address, Bush celebrated the shared 
history between the two countries and described the U.S.-Philippine military alliance as 
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“a rock of stability in the Pacific.”  Though much of Bush’s remarks focused on the 
reconstruction of Iraq, even going as far as to cite the Philippines as a model for Iraq’s 
potential future, the American president also detailed how the War on Terror had 
proceeded within the Philippines. This included a vow that together “we will bring Abu 
Sayyaf to justice,” and pledged to work with regional allies “to dismantle Jemaah 
Islamiyah.”214 While endorsing the peace process with the MILF, he called on the Front 
to reject terrorism and warned that there could be no compromise with terror.  He also 
championed the need for AFP modernization and even briefly cited the failure of the 
Oakwood Mutiny as proof of the Filipino love of liberty.  Yet, if there was any 
equivocation in the American President’s thinking about the War on Terrorism in the 
Philippines, it was absent from the conclusion of his speech which consisted of a ringing 
endorsement of both the country and the strength of the alliances 
There is so much to be proud of in your beloved country: your commitments to 
democracy and peace, and your willingness to oppose terrorism and tyranny. The 
United States and the Philippines have a proud history. And we face the future 
bound by the strongest ties two nations can share. We stand for liberty, and we 
stand together.215 
 
The resolve of Bush’s words were matched by the substance of the visit.  In meetings 
with Arroyo at the Malacanag Palace, the Philippines was formally elevated to the status 
of Major Non-NATO Ally, as had been promised in May, and formalized a 5 year plan to 
modernize the AFP with American support.216  In 2003 alone, the Philippines received 
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over $100 million in American military aid and equipment including $47 million for 
Balikatan and $30 million in counterterrorism training.  Equipment from the U.S. 
included between 15,000 and 30,000 new M-16 riffles, over 30 trucks, a Cyclone patrol 
vessel as well as a bevy of special warfare boats.217 
Yet, the particularities of Bush’s visit suggest a caution not reflected in his 
rhetoric.  Though al-Ghozi was killed in a shootout in Mindanao on October 12, mere 
days before Bush’s arrival, his escape and three months at-large had unnerved the White 
House.  Initially, Bush’s trip was to span two days, but was subsequently changed to a 
mere eight hour stopover after al-Ghozi’s escape.218  Perhaps most embarrassingly of all, 
Bush’s ballyhooed address to the Philippine Congress almost didn’t happen.  Reportedly 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and the Secret Service became concerned 
about reports of hostile crowds along the route to the legislature and wanted to cancel the 
address entirely.  Rice purportedly only relented following a direct intercession from 
Philippine National Security Advisor Roilo Golez who warned of grave political 
consequences if Bush stood-up the Congress.  As it was, the hiccup delayed Bush’s 
address to the legislature by over an hour.219   
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Misgivings were also beginning to temper America enthusiasm for assistance to 
the AFP, which had been the keystone of Bush’s visit and bedrock of the relationship.  
Bush had been quick to denounce the July mutiny in his public remarks to the Congress, 
but “the mutiny revealed that the problems in the Philippine military [were] more than 
just technical or logistical and that further US military assistance to the AFP might just be 
a waste of American taxpayers’ money given the alleged level of corruption within the 
Philippine defense establishment.”220   Indeed, even as Bush met with Arroyo in Manila, 
conservative columnist Brett Decker forcefully made this charge in a New York Times 
column.  Decker championed ending American military aid to the Philippines which he 
asserted was either being embezzled or sold to Islamic militants anyway.  Instead, he 
renewed calls for American soldiers to be deployed to the Philippines for the purpose of 
directly combatting Abu Sayyaf.   
The trepidations evident in the Bush visit and apprehensions about the conditions 
in the Philippines increasingly bled into the public discourse.  This trend became most 
apparent in discussions over Jemaah Islamiyah’s growing presence in Mindanao.  
Immediately, prior to Bush’s arrival, the United States highlighted its apprehension about 
JI, but put the impetus squarely on the MILF who it accused of coddling JI.221  In Manila, 
encouraging President Arroyo to take stronger action against JI emerged as a major 
theme reiterated frequently by the American delegation.222  Prodding from Washington 
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produced numerous new initiatives and pronouncements from Manila, but 
underwhelming results.  Instead, the combination of ASG-JI and radical elements of 
MILF seemed to be gaining both strength and potency.  On the night of February 27, 
2004, a bomb detonated aboard SuperFerry14, a 10,192-ton ferry transiting from Manila 
to Mindanao with roughly 900 people onboard.  The blast and ensuing fire which 
consumed the ship killed 116 people with an unknown number injured in the second 
deadliest terrorist attack in Southeast Asia following only the 2002 Bali nightclub 
bombing.   Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the attack with the assistance of the 
RSM.   However, the Arroyo administration initially played down any link between the 
incident and terrorism and refused to concede that the SuperFerry bombing had been a 
terrorist attack until October.223 
The lack of arrests, prosecutions, adequate anti-terror laws or progress in 
Mindanao when paired with frequent jailbreaks progressively led to the Philippines being 
viewed as the region’s “weakest link in the War on Terror.”224  On the evening of March 
22, 2004, the United States warned the Philippine government that it was not doing 
enough to crackdown on terrorist groups within the country.  The reproach was delivered 
directly to President Arroyo at the Malacañang Palace by American chargé Joseph 
Mussomeli who was accompanied by diplomats from other concerned countries including 
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the United Kingdom and Australia.  According to one western diplomat, the Philippine 
government had been “in a state of denial” about terrorism within the country and that its 
“utter refusal to do anything about the ferry attack,” provided another impetus for the 
warning.225  Reportedly the United States had also furnished the Philippine government 
with Khaddafi Janjalani’s location on numerous occasions, but “either for a lack of will 
or means, the Philippine Army did not move to capture him.”226  The rebuking prompted 
a flurry of action from President Arroyo including a series of raids on suspected terrorist 
hideouts throughout Metro Manila leading to several arrests and the creation of a new 
anti-terrorism task force headed by National Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita.227 
When news of the diplomatic censure broke in mid-April, both the Arroyo 
government and American diplomats moved to play down the severity of the 
exchange.228  Yet, the March 22 meeting marked a turning point in how counterterrorism 
efforts in the Philippines were discussed.  Since 9/11, the United States had abundantly 
praised the Philippines for its War on Terrorism efforts in public whilst keeping its 
reservations muted and mostly private.  After the March 22, meeting criticism of 
Manila’s perceived failings would become more open and less restrained.   American 
conservatives in particular targeted the Philippines for its GWOT deficiencies.  Following 
a massive jailbreak in Basilan where over 50 inmates, including several ASG suspects 
escaped, the Washington Times wrote a blistering editorial lambasting the Philippine 
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government.  “The inability of the Philippine security apparatus to hold terrorists is 
embarrassing for a nation that the Bush administration has named a Major Non-NATO 
Ally,” adding that “an unreliable ally against terror is risky.”229  As with other 
commentators, the Times called for a lifting of the constitutional prohibition on foreign 
soldiers so that the United States military could directly fight terrorism in the Philippines.  
Similarly, writing in the National Review, Brett Decker denounced the MILF’s embrace 
of terrorist groups.  He called for President Arroyo to end the failed policy of negotiations 
and pursue a military solution.230   
Though it was possible to dismiss the invectives from conservative media outlets 
in Washington, a more critical tenor towards Manila’s conduct of the War on Terror 
began to seep into official discourse.  For example, in April after word of the March 22 
meeting leaked, the Foreign Minister of Australia and Deputy Prime Minister of 
Singapore each independently voiced concern about JI in the Philippines and warned that 
Mindanao had become a breeding ground for terrorism.231  Admiral Fargo visited the 
Philippines in late June to particularly highlight growing American concern about JI in 
Mindanao and how the issue could be addressed.  After the visit, Secretary Ermita noted 
that the United States was “very particular about how the Philippine government is 
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addressing terrorism.”232  In early July, Ambassador Ricciardone openly expressed 
concern about JI camps in Mindanao becoming hotbeds for regional terrorism and called 
upon the Philippine government to strengthen the rule of law within the country.  These 
remarks actually sparked a public row with the Malacañang Palace who did not 
appreciate the public airing of grievances.  Stated a spokesman, “we need not be told 
what to do about this because we have been engaged in fighting terror since day one.”233  
Both sides would move quickly to quell the controversy, but open discord between the 
Embassy and the Palace occurred with increasing regularity over the following months. 
The Angelo de la Cruz Affair and the Withdrawal from Iraq: 
Despite the evident differences between Washington and Manila about handling 
the situation in Mindanao, the fundamentals of the relationship remained strong.  Even 
with its limits, the Philippines remained a committed GWOT partner and stalwart 
American ally.  In 2004, President Bush even called President Arroyo to congratulate her 
on her reelection as well as thank her for her support throughout GWOT and particularly 
in Iraq.234   However, this last bastion of bonhomie would ultimately prove short-lived. 
 The Filipino contingent in Iraq, though at times disparaged as a mere token 
presence, had performed dutifully and earned considerable praise for its service.235  
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Beyond its immediate contribution to Iraqi reconstruction, the Philippine presence served 
as a potent symbol of the country’s support for the United States and commitment to the 
War on Terror.  President Arroyo had even renewed the commitment for an additional six 
months after the initial six-month deployment approached its conclusion.  After nearly a 
year in Iraq, the 51 member Philippine humanitarian force was slated to be withdrawn in 
August 2004.  However, the situation took a dramatic turn on July 7, 2004 when a 
Filipino truck driver was abducted by insurgents in Fallujah.  Angelo de la Cruz, an OFW 
and father of eight, had been taken captive by a faction of the Islamic Army of Iraq who 
threatened to behead him if the Philippine contingent were not immediately withdrawn 
from Iraq.236  
 Initially, the Malacañang Palace pronounced its resistance to blackmail and 
unwillingness to withdraw Filipino forces from Iraq prior to the scheduled departure date 
of August 20.237  Arroyo received ardent support from the United States with officials in 
Manila and Washington cheering her steadfastness in the face of terrorist demands.238  
These public statements of solidarity were accompanied by considerable pressure from 
Washington in private not to give in to the demands to prematurely withdraw forces.239   
However, on July 13, Arroyo abruptly announced that her government would accede to 
the demands and pull Filipino forces out of Iraq a month early. 240  
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Arroyo couched her decision in religious language.  She attributed her decision to 
divine guidance and a desire to save a human life.241  According to Arroyo, she simply 
“made a decision to bring our troops home a few days early in order to spare the life of 
Angelo,” adding that she did not regret that decision.242   In truth, it appears that it was 
her own political life which had guided President Arroyo’s decision making.  While 
Washington was content to portray the episode in the starkest of terms and a blatant 
retreat in the face of a terrorist threat, in the Philippines the dynamic was considerably 
more nuanced.  During the crisis Angelo de la Cruz came to symbolize the at least 4,000 
OFWs working in Iraq and the 1.5 million Filipinos employed throughout the Middle 
East.  Instead of being an anonymous victim of Iraq’s budding insurgency, de la Cruz 
was the Filipino everyman.243  He became a proxy for the millions of Filipinos who went 
abroad for work in order to support their families.  As much pressure as Washington 
placed on President’ Arroyo not to yield to the insurgents’ demands, she had to reconcile 
her actions with the sentiment of her population.  Amid the outpouring of affection for de 
la Cruz and his family, Arroyo believed - and not without justification - that her 
government would not survive the ensuing fallout if she allowed Angelo to be killed.  
According to Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs Austria, it became “a debate between 
policy and the life of a person and every Filipino has an overseas relative, a dad a son, a 
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brother who works as an overseas worker – a decision to put policy over the life would 
not have gone well.”  Deputy Director Amador asserted blankly that if de la Cruz had 
been beheaded, Arroyo’s government would have been toppled. “It was a political 
decision.  It was not a policy decision, because it was not good policy.”  De la Cruz was 
an [OFW] “and we are very sensitive to that.”244  
That President Arroyo’s decision could be justified on the grounds of a domestic 
political imperative as well as compassion did not shield her from Washington’s fury or 
that of the other coalition partners.  Ricciardone had been in close contact with the 
Malacañang Palace throughout the crisis but was called back to Washington for 
consultations following Arroyo’s decision.  He indicated that Arroyo had offered 
assurances that there would be no pullout of Philippine forces and had been quite 
surprised by the rapid policy reversal.245  The State Department described the withdrawal 
as sending the wrong signals on terrorism adding that “it is important for people to stand 
up to terrorists and not allow them to change our behavior.”246  Secretary of State Powell 
adopted the more passive aggressive approach of outwardly praising specific countries 
which had not caved to terrorist demands in similar situations.247  A caustic Donald 
Rumsfeld bemoaned the Philippines’ “weakness” which would “only invite future 
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terrorist actions.”248  Nor was the United States alone in denouncing President Arroyo’s 
actions.  In a rare instance of harmony between Rumsfeld and the editorial board of the 
New York Time, the paper ran an editorial expressing a similar view asserting that 
Arroyo’s actions had not only emboldened terrorists but that, “Manila’s retreat will only 
place all other foreign nationals in Iraq in greater peril.”249  The derision from the United 
States accompanied a chorus of like condemnation from other governments including 
Australia, Poland, Bulgaria and Singapore.250  Indeed, the day after de la Cruz was 
released, another six civilians from three countries were abducted and threatened with 
death if their governments did not leave Iraq.251 
In the immediate aftermath of the exit from Iraq, there was a clear effort on the 
part of President Arroyo to contain the damage to the bilateral relationship caused by her 
decision to withdraw forces early.  Arroyo publicly voiced her continued support for 
GWOT and throughout the summer endeavored to stress that the United States and the 
Philippines were still allies despite the disagreement.252   Notes scholar Renato Cruz de 
                                                 
248 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “U.S.-Philippine Relations after the Iraq Crisis,” Pacific Net (35), CSIS 
Pacific Forum, 19 August 2004. [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0435.pdf];  
“Rumsfeld says RP’s ‘weakness’ is provocative,” Philippine Star, 23 July 2004. 
249“A Filipino Retreat,” New York Times Editorial, 19 July 2004, A16. 
250 The criticism from Australia proved to be particularly pointed and escaladed to a significant diplomatic 
incident between the two countries.  Tynes, Will to War, 110-111; Pamela Constable, “Six More Taken 
Hostage in Iraq,” Washington Post, 22 July 2004, A14; “RP still committed to fighting terrorism,” 
Philippine Star, 23 July 2004; Marvin By, “Australia blames RP for new terror threat,” Philippine Star, 26 
July 2004. 
251 To be fair, the proximity of these abductions to the Philippine withdrawal does not mean that it was 
necessarily the cause of these particular kidnapping.  However, the timing was inauspicious.  Pamela 
Constable, “Six More Taken Hostage in Iraq,” Washington Post, 22 July 2004, A14; 
252 “RP still committed to fighting terrorism,” Philippine Star, 23 July 2004; Marichu Villanueva, “RP 
remains a strong anti-terror ally – Palace,” Philippine Star, 3 August 2004; Marvin By, “RP, US vow 





Castro “Manila was banking that its general support of the global war on terror through 
diplomatic measures and collaboration with the US military in containing terrorism 
elsewhere could deflect American criticism and assuage Washington's ire over the 
withdrawal.”253   
However, Arroyo’s decision damaged the relationship and cast a pall over 
bilateral affairs.  A noticeable chill leached into American diplomacy with Manila that 
went beyond the sniping of American officials.  A sense of betrayal in Washington fueled 
the backlash as an erstwhile ally had dramatically broken ranks with the White House and 
blatantly disregarded its wishes.  Assistant Secretary Austria reflects, “How could the 
Bush administration justify engagement with a partner that left them out there?”254  In 
early August, the State Department clarified that it no longer considered the Philippines a 
member of the Coalition of the Willing.255  Whereas the close personal ties between high-
ranking US-RP officials, particularly the two presidents, had been the clearest sign of the 
relationship’s strength; the sudden drop in high-level visits and communications 
following the Iraq withdrawal constituted the most visible demonstration of 
Washington’s unhappiness with Arroyo.256  At the time, it was unclear whether the 
cooling ties between the two capitals would dampen ongoing defense cooperation as it 
had frozen elite-level diplomacy.  Noted CRS, “the Pentagon has indicated that the 
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United States will continue to supply weapons to the AFP, but U.S. officials have 
indicated that other components of the security relationship could be affected by Arroyo’s 
decision.”257  For example, U.S. Navy vessels which had made frequent stops in Subic 
Bay were instead routed to Singapore in the wake of the Iraq pullout.258 
Conclusion: 
 
 Were it not for the tragic circumstances, there would be a perverse irony to the 
US-Philippine relationship foundering on a kidnapping.  As the Burnhams had galvanized 
bilateral relations and reinvigorated cooperation in 2001, the case of Angelo de la Cruz 
revealed just how fragile that harmony had been.   The Philippines was neither the first 
nor the last coalition partner to withdraw its forces from Iraq.  However, the manner of 
the Philippine withdrawal and apparent capitulation in the face of terrorist demands was 
portrayed as being particularly ignominious.259   
The situation was made toxic by how clearly the move contradicted President 
Arroyo’s past statements of solidarity with the United States.  Arroyo had highlighted her 
willingness “to go every step of the way” with Washington and had repeatedly stated the 
need to be resolute in the face of kidnappers like Abu Sayyaf.  Such sentiment proved to 
be strikingly shallow when confronted by a difficult political dilemma and a hostage 
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crisis that could not be assuaged with ransom payments.260   However, focusing solely on 
President Arroyo neglects the much larger elements at play.  
 The political calculus behind President Arroyo’s decision to withdraw early from 
Iraq was as simple as it was sound.  Her administration could endure the scolding of the 
Bush administration, but it might not survive the popular furor that would have followed 
de la Cruz’s beheading.  Arroyo decided it was preferable to weather Washington’s wrath 
than gamble the future of her presidency by enraging public sentiment.   In truth, Arroyo 
had not submitted to the demands of terrorists, but rather had caved under the growing 
weight of public pressure.  This concern of President Arroyo’s for her domestic political 
standing was not unique to the de la Cruz incident. Indeed, the primacy of domestic 
political calculations within Arroyo’s decision making process had been identified as 
responsible for the mishandling of Balikatan 03-1 and would emerge as a major theme 
throughout her tenure in office.261   
Attributing the outcome solely to Arroyo’s tendency towards political 
expediencies belies the far more significant phenomenon at work.  American sniping 
about Arroyo’s political opportunism neglects the more salient point that her decision 
was widely applauded in the Philippines and Angelo de la Cruz’s safe return was 
celebrated throughout the country.   Far from being a capitulation in the face of terrorists, 
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Arroyo’s willingness to disregard Washington’s wishes to protect the wellbeing of an 
OFW epitomized the Malacañang Palace’s prioritization of Filipino interests over those 
of the United States.  Arroyo defended her stance as the “Filipino first” policy, and both 
its existence and popularity spoke to the underlying problems which plagued US-RP 
counterterrorism cooperation well before Angelo de la Cruz drove his truck into Fallujah. 
Since 2001, it has become a cliché to assert that 9/11 changed everything.  The 
case of U.S.- Philippine relations would seemingly fit this description. Virtually 
overnight bilateral ties shifted from a decade in the doldrums to a dynamic example of 
bilateral partnership amid the War on Terror.  Through state visits, pledges of support and 
prominent operations like the Balikatan exercises, the US-RP alliance epitomized the 
post-9/11 mode of defense cooperation.  And yet three years into GWOT the most 
important realization was not how much the September 11th attacks had changed U.S.-
Philippine relations, but rather how little.  Overlooked during the Bush-Arroyo bonhomie 
were the underlying realities that had colored bilateral relations in the 1990s and had not 
disappear with the inauguration of the War on Terror.  From the early frustrations in 2002 
over attempts to rescue the Burnhams onwards, the prickly truthes of the bilateral 
relationship began to reassert themselves.  The 9/11 attacks had not reversed decades of 
decay within the AFP nor assuaged entrenched wariness about America’s often 
lackadaisical treatment of Philippine sovereignty.    
What made the events of 2003 and 2004 so striking was the force with which 
these underlying problems erupted into public view.  The disagreements during Balikatan 




official circles.  However, beginning with Balikatan 03-1 and the open difference over 
the use of American soldiers in combat areas, the fractures between Washington and 
Manila increasingly seeped into the public sphere.  This was also the case with the 
Oakwood Mutiny.  Whereas the institutional failings of the AFP had been a known 
problem since the 1990s, the siege in the heart of Manila aired the grievances of the 
average soldiers in a manner that could not be ignored.  Such events reverberated in the 
United States with the Oakwood Mutiny receiving prominent coverage in the American 
media.  
The Angelo de la Cruz affair constituted the culmination of this trend of 
underlying problems asserting themselves.  Whereas Catharine Dalpino had diagnosed a 
stark divide in US-RP relations between close cooperation on the surface and mounting 
troubles below, the de la Cruz affair shattered this faux duality.  Washington and the 
Bush administration viewed the situation solely through the lens of the post-9/11 world 
and could not cotton Arroyo’s capitulation in the face of terrorists demands.  Yet, as with 
the controversy surrounding the American base closures in the 1990s, the issue was more 
nuanced in Manila.  As controversial as Arroyo’s decision to withdraw from Iraq appears, 
it reflected the sentiment of the Filipino people as expressed through their elected 
president.  With over a million OFWs throughout the Middle East and roughly 10% of 
the Philippine economy based on remittances, Arroyo had a responsibility to safeguard 
her citizens abroad as well as her own political future.  Rather than a betrayal, the 
decision to prioritize OFWs over the War on Terror merely represented the reaffirmation 




It had been the unanimity between Washington and Manila after 9/11 that had 
been the outlier to the bilateral relationship not the de la Cruz affair.  The speed with 
which this miniature era of good feelings eroded in 2003 and 2004 indicated how fanciful 
the post-9/11 illusion of unqualified support for the War on Terror had truly been.  Yes, 
the United States and the Philippines were committed allies against the threat of 
terrorism, but they remained independent states with distinct interests, foibles and 
political imperatives.  These inherent differences which had come to define the 
relationship prior to GWOT could not long be papered over by state visits and willful 
ignorance.  Yet, as the tragic sinking of Supperferry 14 illustrated, the threat of terrorism 
in the Philippines was both real and growing.  For the alliance to make meaningful 
progress in the War on Terror in the Philippines policymakers in both capitals first 
needed to find a means of counterterrorism cooperation that actually accounted for the 








Neither the mishandling of Balkiatan 03-1 nor the Angelo de la Cruz affair 
scuttled the US-RP defense relationship.  Rather they freed GWOT cooperation from the 
onerous burden of false expectations born after 9/11 and stoked by the effusive comments 
by both Presidents.  American appraisals of President Arroyo would continue to 
deteriorate over subsequent years and the formerly close ties between Arroyo and Bush 
would not fully recover.  However, it was striking how little this falling out actually 
impacted the functional nature of the relationship.  As much as the state visits and 
dramatic declarations of mutual support had colored U.S.-Philippine affairs since 
September 11th, they had primarily been acts of stagecraft which had obscured the 
underlying workings of the partnership rather than illuminate them.  Whereas this 
pageantry had initially helped cloak the growing fractures between the two 
administrations, it had also masked the budding institutional ties which had been growing 
since the resumption of defense cooperation in 2000.  With the Angelo de la Cruz affair 
at least for a time putting an end to the pomp of U.S.-Philippine affairs, it fell to these 
underlying institutional factors to sustain the relationship and resolve the festering 
problem of terrorism in the Philippines.   
The period immediately following the de la Cruz affair constituted a triumph for 
defense diplomacy.  Following the waves of public recrimination and the cooling of 
presidential ties, transnational networks built since the restoration of defense cooperation 




relationships steered the defense relationship away from animosity back to productive 
collaboration.  Under the leadership of the newly appointed Secretary for National 
Defense Avelino J. Cruz Jr., the United States and the Philippines embarked on an 
ambitious new program called Kapit Bisig (linked/locked arms) to resolve the 
archipelago’s security problems in a comprehensive manner.  The framework combined 
the systemic reform of the Philippine defense institutions with civic engagement and 
operations to finally end the insurgencies which plagued the country.  While situations 
like that in Mindanao had never been lacking for grand designs intended to finally end 
the dispute, what made Kapit Bisig unique was its fundamental linking of internal 
security operations with defense reform.  As had been observed during Balikatan 02-1, 
Cruz and his compatriots recognized that the issue of terrorism in the Philippines could 
not successfully be addressed independent of the engrained problems within the AFP.  
Only by addressing these issues jointly could the Philippines ever make meaningful gains 
against terrorism and finally resolve its internal security problem. 
American defense diplomacy played a critical role at every stage of the Kapit 
Bisig framework.  Just as American training programs would instill professional norms 
and skills within the AFP’s rank and file, so to would new initiatives help reform the 
AFP’s bureaucracy.  American advisors would help the AFP adopt new techniques which 
would revolutionize how the institution addressed issues ranging from basic training and 
strategic planning to procurement.  More than just tweaking the procedures, American 
defense diplomacy would help reshape the very nature of these institutions and the 




assistance were not a fad.  They were embedded in the very heart of the AFP and its 
culture.  Thanks to these efforts, the AFP would begin the long process of modernization 
and finally break from its checkered history of corruption, political meddling and abuse. 
The progress made under Kapit Bisig to clean the Augean Stables of the AFP and 
DND was mirrored by improvement in the archipelago’s restive south.  Like defense 
reform, Cruz took a systemic view of the dispute and collectively viewed the Moro 
conflict, the resurgent NPA as well as the growth of radical groups like ASG and RSM as 
all sprouting from the same wellspring of underdevelopment and state failure. Through a 
combination of peace negotiations with the MILF, civic engagement and targeted 
operations, the AFP hoped to finally succeed in separating the irreconcilable militants 
from the general population and draining the reservoir of resentment which had allowed 
extremism to fester.  Here again American involvement played a crucial role in both 
midwifing the Malaysian led peace process between Manila and the MILF and 
underwriting development programs throughout Mindanao.  Engaging the MILF in a 
meaningful political process helped deprive ASG and JI of their sanctuaries in Mindanao 
and forced them to flee the larger island for the refuge of the Sulu archipelago.   
It was on Jolo in 2006, that the War on Terror in the Philippines reached its 
zenith.  There, a series of operations underscored by U.S.-Philippine defense diplomacy 
resulted in significant losses for Abu Sayyaf- including the death of Khadafi Janjalani. As 
with Basilan before it, the U.S. and Philippine forces worked in harmony to target ASG 
camps in a systematic campaign.  However, unlike on Basilan 4 years prior, the ongoing 




operational capabilities.  The result of this indirect approach and emphasis on 
competence over kinetics was a rare victory in the Global War on Terror.  Though not 
ending the conflict in the Philippines, ASG would never again exhibit either its past 
operational or ideological vigor and Mindanao would become increasingly hostile 
territory for groups like JI.  
From the Ashes:  Kapit Bisig 
 
The Highly Qualified Mr. Cruz: 
Following the withdrawal from Iraq, there was a palpable desire in Manila to 
move past the unpleasantness and return the US-RP relations their regular, 
companionable state of affairs.  Newly appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alberto 
Romulo signaled this most clearly during a major foreign policy address in September.  
Romulo stated that, “the clash was momentary, there was no disruption in our relations.”   
This is not to say there was no disagreement.  As friends, we voiced our dissent in 
words and ways that could place no doubt as to our respective principles.  But as 





The bonds of friendship between the Philippines and the United States are 
enduring and beyond temporary setbacks. Those bonds have been forged in the 
battlefields of freedom, in the foxholes of Bataan and Corregidor, by thousands of 
brave soldiers who fought and died together for their beliefs and ideals.1   
 
While President Arroyo’s decision to withdraw from Iraq early strained US-RP 
relations, it did not cripple defense cooperation in the way that the rejection of the 
American base agreement had over a decade earlier.  Unlike the base closures, the de la 
                                                 




Cruz affair had no noticeable impact on either Foreign Military Financing (FMF) levels 
from the United States or the number of Filipinos participating in the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program (see Figure 2 in previous chapter and 
Figure 1 below).  Throughout the second half of 2004, ongoing military exercises like 
PALAH 05-1, a joint naval exercise off the coast of Zamboanga, evidenced a rare 
normality amid the tumult.  
 A particularly notable illustration of the ongoing defense relationship and its 
benefits occurred in late 2004 when a series of typhoons struck Luzon leading to 
devastating landslides which displaced tens of thousands and killed over 1,800 people.  
Immediately in response to the crisis, the U.S. dispatched 900 personnel and assorted 
aircraft from Okinawa to conduct rescue and rehabilitation efforts.  This disaster response 
was greatly facilitated by the extensive experience of joint training between the U.S. and 
the AFP.  Ambassador Ricciardone explained, “the speed with which we were able to 
assemble this disaster relief operation and the smoothness of communication with our 
Philippine counterparts resulted directly from our combined exercises throughout the 
year.”2  American efforts proved critical to the rescue effort and particularly delivering 
aid to towns which had been cut off by landslides. 
As important as the typhoon relief effort in late 2004 was in illustrating the 
practical benefits of defense diplomacy, the most significant event during this period for 
US-RP relations was the appointment of Avelino J. Cruz Jr. as the new Secretary of 
National Defense.  Cruz’s ascent came in mid-August 2004 as Arroyo reshuffled her 
                                                 




cabinet following her reelection as president.  At the time, Cruz’s selection was met with 
a great deal of derision in Manila.  A prominent lawyer, Cruz had served as Arroyo’s 
legal advisor since the late 1990s and had been the President’s chief legal counsel for 
over three years.  Though a confidant of Arroyo, uniquely, Cruz did not come from a 
military background and would be only the third individual with no military background 
to oversee the DND since the Marcos era.  This lack of military experience and Cruz’s 
close ties to Arroyo became the central complaint against his nomination as it was 
unclear how the AFP would react to the oversight of a permanent civilian.  Furthermore, 
allegations swirled that Cruz’s appointment represented yet another example of Arroyo 
privileging political cronyism and personal loyalty over competence.3  Despite the 
naysayers, Cruz would emerge as an inspired selection whose dedication to defense 
reform endowed his tenure with purpose and resulted in substantial gains. 
What his initial critics failed to grasp was that though Cruz lacked the military 
record of his predecessors, his resume uniquely qualified him for the task of modernizing 
the Philippine defense apparatus.  Not only did his lack of military entanglements free 
him from the institutional malaise which had plagued previous reform efforts, but he also 
had direct experience in modernizing moribund institutions given his role overseeing the 
privatization of the Philippine telecommunications industry in the 1990s.4  Furthermore, 
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Cruz’s close ties to President Arroyo would prove a major boon for his efforts as the trust 
and access afforded to him by the President eclipsed that of his predecessors.5  Upon 
assuming the post of Secretary for National Defense, Cruz made his intentions to 
fundamentally reform the armed forces abundantly clear.  In a speech in early September 
at the Philippine Air Force headquarters, Cruz outlined his priorities as secretary.  These 
included winning the campaign against terrorism within the Philippines and committing 
to the 15-year modernization plan for the AFP.  What made Cruz’s approach distinct was 
that it focused “on the AFP as a whole entity and not choosing one component of the 
organization at a time.”6 
Whereas Cruz’s commitment to AFP modernization would be the hallmark of his 
time as Secretary, an underappreciated aspect of his appointment was how he would 
influence defense cooperation with the United States.  As an accomplished lawyer and 
constitutional expert, Cruz had previously been called upon by the Arroyo administration 
to help navigate the legal intricacies of the American military presence inside the 
Philippines.  He had provided sound counsel over the MLSA in 2002 and was repeatedly 
dispatched to the United States throughout 2003 to reach an agreeable formula for the 
Terms of Reference for Balikatan 03-1.7  Though these efforts had initially been in vain, 
they would prove invaluable during his time as secretary as he sought to rekindle the 
operational defense relationship with the United States that had characterized the first 
years of the War on Terror. 
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 In June 2003, during the waffling over Balikatan 03-1, Arroyo had sent Cruz to 
Washington with “a formula which he believes will conform with the provisions of the 
Philippine constitution and fall within the language of the US budget law.”8  Cruz’s 
expedition met with no joy in 2003, but as Secretary of National Defense, he endeavored 
to not only resurrect his model for active cooperation from 2003 but to make the United 
States a critical partner in his wider framework for Philippine security reform.  The initial 
move came on December 13, 2004 when Cruz met with Admiral Fargo to discuss the 
future of US-RP counterterrorism assistance in the Philippines.   
The success of this meeting was evident a month later when USPACOM held 
staff meetings with their AFP/DND counterparts in order to develop a clear set of 
maritime and land scenarios for U.S. counterterrorism assistance which would comport 
with the DND’s legal interpretation of the VFA. The DND held that “while prohibited 
from engaging in combat except in self-defense, U.S. forces in the Philippines could 
engage in a range of ‘combat-related activities,’ to include providing intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the AFP.”9  The purpose of the staff meetings 
was to determine what precisely was permitted under this umbrella. Admitted one DND 
legal expert, “What we are now trying to do…is push the envelope in respect to combat-
related activities.”10  Interestingly, the State Department telegram detailing these 
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meetings notes that the DND seemed to be outpacing its own military in its thinking as 
the AFP representatives demonstrated reluctance on numerous points and needed 
reassurance on the legalities of “combat-related activities.”  One AFP representative 
sagely cautioned that, “we can’t move too fast for our own good.”11  Though only an 
initial attempt to discuss potential scenarios, the progress during the staff meetings was 
palpable and Ambassador Ricciardone attributed this solely to Secretary Cruz.  “Cruz 
clearly has already focused his staff on exploring ways to broaden counterterrorism 
cooperation with the United States within the perceived limits of the Philippine 
constitution.”12 
 These initial staff meetings were followed by a roundtable meeting between 
Fargo, Cruz and AFP Chief of Staff Efren Abu as well as other officials on February 9.  
The meeting covered the gamut of defense issues including relations with China but the 
centerpiece was Secretary Cruz’s unveiling of his new framework for Philippine security.  
Cruz prefaced his policy by stating his overarching goal of bringing to an end the 
insurgencies and terrorism inside the Philippines within 6 to 10 years.  Cruz argued, “we 
need to get beyond the mindset that insurgency is inevitable, and set a timetable and 
allocate resources to eradicate it.”13  Kapit Bisig, which translates as “linking arms in 
support” or as “camaraderie”, would be a new comprehensive framework to direct US-
RP military cooperation to this end.  The framework rested on three pillars of 
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humanitarian outreach/civic-engagement, security assistance and operations which 
collectively “would allow the US and RP to work within their respective laws, yet still be 
effective.”14   
The humanitarian initiative centered on what Cruz labelled 500 priority barangays 
(townships) in vulnerable areas across all three regions of the Philippines.  In a 
comprehensive manner which would actively incorporate civilian as well as military 
agencies, the AFP would expand the civic engagement program seen on Basilan to these 
targeted townships.  By improving the lives of citizens through new construction and 
livelihood programs like MedCaps, Cruz hoped to “demonstrate the sharp contrast 
between what the government and insurgents can provide.”15 
 Kapit Bisig’s civic engagement component would be complemented by the more 
traditional facets of security assistance and targeted operations.  These elements of the 
new framework built on existing US-RP programs like the training of light infantry 
battalions and intelligence fusion.  The advantage of the new approach was that it 
afforded these activities a legal framework and overarching strategy.  In doing so, the 
U.S. embassy identified a desire by Cruz “to institutionalize and defend US-RP 
counterterrorism cooperation against potential domestic critics.”16  This initiative 
impressed the American diplomats who applauded the “innovative means he has 
developed to achieve his stated objective of ending the insurgent and terrorist threat 
within the Philippines.17 
                                                 







 What was especially notable about Cruz’s efforts was that they went well beyond 
the immediate theater of Mindanao and fed directly into the Philippine Defense Reform 
(PDR) initiative to overhaul and modernize the AFP.  The PDR reflected a legitimate 
desire to examine and fix the AFP as an institution.  It encompassed a vast array of issues 
including multi-year defense strategies, pension reform, fixed terms for senior officers 
like the Chief of Staff and updated training regimes for the entire military.  Cruz 
frequently raised the PDR with his American colleagues because not only would 
American defense diplomacy play an essential role in the undertaking, but the DND 
hoped to “ensure its full integration into the bilateral agenda.”18   
Kapit Bisig and PDR were not independent initiatives but mutually reinforcing 
tracts designed to finally put an end to the insecurity which had plagued the Philippines 
since its emergence as a country.  Whereas Kapit Bisig constituted the operational 
component needed to alleviate and eliminate the country’s insurgencies, the PDR was the 
institutional reform element required to make the AFP an effective tool of national 
security.  Taken together, both programs would put an end to the instability which 
continued to wrack the country and the permissive conditions which had allowed ills like 
terrorism to take root.  Yet, while Secretary Cruz provided the initiative to drive these 
endeavors, American defense diplomacy would provide the critical means need to ensure 
that they actually succeed. 
The Fifth Labor:  Reforming the AFP 
 





The Path to Reform: 
 When the United States revived its defense engagement with the Philippines in 
2000 after the signing of the VFA, the Congressional Research Service envisioned 
American aid as following either one of two tracks.  The first option centered on a 
targeted program to develop specific capabilities within the AFP, specifically in the air 
force and navy, to directly counter China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea.  
This plan would focus narrowly on cultivating a new and distinct force within the AFP.  
Option two was far more expansive.  It would constitute a “broader program aimed at a 
general improvement in all services of the AFP.”19  Mindanao would be the primary 
focus of this second approach and would require extensive aid from the U.S. in terms of 
both trainers and equipment to improve the AFP as a whole.   
GWOT had effectively supplanted China as the primary focus of defense reform, 
but not the underlying choice facing American policymakers on how to provide 
assistance to the AFP.  Throughout the early years of the War on Terror, the United 
States had focused on nurturing specific units and capabilities within the AFP to meet the 
task of counterterrorism rather than counter China.  This was evident in the emphasis on 
the Light Reaction Companies and skills like night flying.  However, the need for holistic 
improvements within the AFP had not abated.  Instead, as the War on Terror in Mindanao 
had unfolded it became evident that effective counterterrorism in the Philippines was 
impossible without a comprehensive reform of the AFP.  As noted by Dr. Renato Cruz de 
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Castro, Washington “realized that equipping the AFP with better counter-insurgency 
materiel [was] irrelevant when its top officers pocket scarce defense resources and 
receive large bribes from the rebels or terrorists.”20 
Even as the United States fretted about the fate of the Burnhams and ASG’s 
resurgence, it had not been idle in its efforts to reform the AFP.  In 1999, the U.S. and 
Philippines had signed the Joint Defense Agreement which committed the United States 
to aiding the DND in developing a comprehensive improvement program for the AFP 
and long term institutional-reform.21  The Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) was 
conducted from 1999-2003 and critically examined every facet of the Philippine defense 
apparatus.  It found systemic policy failures throughout the organization including a 
complete absence of multi-year planning, poor resource management and little oversight.  
A staggering amount of all defense expenditures - roughly 80% - went to personnel 
which left insufficient funds for operations, maintenance or capital expenditures.22  
Recalls Undersecretary Santos, “we conducted the assessment of the armed forces to 
identify some of our limitations.  We found out that we didn’t have any capabilities. You 
cannot fight a war with heart alone.”23 
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To address these ills the JDA proposed a sweeping set of remedies including the 
development of multi-year defense plans and a long-term modernization program. 
President Bush endorsed the JDA’s findings during his stop in Manila in 2003 and 
committed the Pentagon to working with the DND to implement the recommendations.  
This directly led to the creation of the PDR and the AFP’s 18 year Capabilities Upgrade 
Program (CUP) designed to improve its operational capabilities.24  Likewise, the 
Oakwood Mutiny played an important role in the reform effort within the Philippines.  
The AFP adopted several reforms advocated by the Feliciano commission that had been 
established to investigate the mutiny.  These reforms included changes like new term 
limits for officers involved in procurement.25   
Nevertheless, in 2005 the American Embassy concluded that in the fight against 
terrorism in the Philippines, many of the country’s key institutions continued to be 
broken. It warned that agencies like the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP), 
“are riddled with corruption, are poorly equipped and under-budgeted, have ineffective 
management systems and are often under weak leadership.”  While American assistance 
was helping, “without profound institutional fixes, there will be no enduring 
improvement in anti-terrorism capabilities.”26 
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The Centerpiece of his Tenure: 
 Avelino Cruz was not the first Secretary of National Defense to be concerned 
with reforming Philippine’s defense institutions.  What made Cruz unique was his 
dedication to making “the PDR as the centerpiece of his mandate as Defense Secretary, 
[with] its success (or failure) [being] the defining criterion of his own tenure.”27  More 
significantly he sought to institutionalize the reform processes within the culture of both 
the DND and AFP so that it would continue beyond the term of a single department 
secretary, president or chief of staff.  Cruz began with a series of meetings within the 
DND “to ensure the entire Department understands and is on board with PDR 
objectives.”28  Later, Cruz would actually express his frustration with the DND staff 
which he did not feel was “performing at a ‘professional level’” and would instead focus 
on creating “a pool of 30‐40 professionals who could serve as a catalyst for change.”29  
Aiding him in this endeavor was an all-civilian team of undersecretaries, many of whom 
had come directly from the private sector and had significant management experience.30  
Cruz’s Undersecretary for Policy Antonio Santos explained the distinction thusly, “the 
generals were very good politicians but had no strategic perspective or system of 
management.”  However, Santos and his colleagues, because of their education and 
experience with integration, understood these processes.  Santos noted that in particular 
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his exposure to the American system of defense planning and management proved useful 
for tasks like capability development and strategic management planning. “I know the 
American system, learned more about it at [The U.S. Army War College] and adapted it 
to the Philippines and it has now been adopted and is still in use.”31 
 Cruz’s tact with his department mirrored his engagement with the AFP.  He 
established a calendar of regular meetings with AFP Chief of Staff (CoS) Efren Abu and 
other major service commands to discuss issues.  For example, Cruz challenged Abu “to 
come up with a concrete list of the equipment he needs to combat the insurgencies,” 
under a “projected budget of 5 billion pesos (approximately USD 92.5 million) per year, 
but also instructed the Chief of Staff to come up with possible funding sources, e.g., new 
taxes or sale of excess military property.”32  
 The PDR itself centered on implementing the 10 major recommendations from 
the 2003 JDA: 
1. Multi-Year Defense Planning System (MYDPS)  
2. Improve Intelligence, Operations, and Training Capacities  
3. Improve Logistics Capacity 
4. Professional Development Program  
5. Improve Personnel Management System  
6. Multi-year Capabilities Upgrade Program (CUP)  
7. Optimization of Defense Budget and Improvement of Management Controls  
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8. Centrally Managed Defense Acquisition System Manned by a Professional 
Workforce  
 
9. Development of Strategic Communication Capability  
10. Information Management Development Program33 
Some elements of Cruz’s reform plan, like establishing a fixed 3-year term for the 
AFP Chief of Staff in order to end the revolving door at the military’s highest position, 
would eventually require legislative action, but were deemed central to changing the fate 
of the armed forces.34  Other elements like professional development could be handled 
under the auspices of the DND and AFP themselves.  A particular bane for Cruz was the 
handling of promotions and senior officer posts within the AFP.  He successfully shifted 
from a fixed ratio of general officers within the AFP to a position based system with each 
general officer position assigned to a specific job or post.  He also scrapped the lineal list 
promotion system where effectively “officers had to ‘wait for someone to die’ to get 
promoted.”35 
 Bringing sanity to the management of the AFP’s budget, especially reducing the 
amount consumed by personnel costs, represented a particular point of emphasis under 
the PDR.  The shift to multi-year budgeting was critical for the PDR and an essential 
                                                 
33The Secretary of Defense, “The U.S.–Philippines Joint Defense Assessment” (Washington DC: 
Department 
of Defense, 2001); “The U.S.–Philippines Joint Defense Assessment”  Updated 3 September  2003 
(Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2003); Charles Comer, “Philippine defense reform: Are we there 
yet.” Foreign Military Studies Office (2010); Telegram from Mussomeli (Manila) to State, No. 2335, 
“Defense Secretary makes Strong Public Case for PDR,” 20 May 2005. Accessed via, Wikileaks Public 
Library of US Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]. 
34 From April 2002 – April 2003 the AFP actually had five different Chiefs of Staff within a twelve month 
period. Telegram from Mussomeli (Manila) to State, No 1594, Admiral Fallon Visit to the Philippines,” 6 





element in moving away from the ad hoc approach to financing that had proved so 
deleterious to a strategic management model.  American assistance provided a vital 
contribution thanks to the help of American budget experts and knowhow.  Noted Santos, 
“US help was key” adding “a clear budget with a strategic outline and clear lines of what 
went where and the consequences of not funding [was] huge. It helped us get more 
money and long term budgets.”36  Cruz also cultivated new revenue streams for the AFP 
through such diverse means as selling off both land owned by the military as well as the 
AFP’s stakes in various private enterprises.   
 Addressing the deeply flawed procurement process which had seemingly 
privileged graft over military effectiveness constituted another chief area of the PDR.  
Cruz implemented an entirely new non-military oversight process for acquisitions 
whereby outside organizations like the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines 
and Makati Business Club were now involved in overseeing procurement.  Suppliers 
were also only allowed to talk about bids and awards in an open forum for the sake of 
transparency.37  After prodding from Cruz, President Arroyo also amended rules on 
government procurement to allow the DND to directly enter into negotiations with allied 
countries for both equipment and defense related consultancy services in order to speed 
modernization.38  However, this new authority did not represent a windfall for countries 
hoping to market high-priced military equipment to the Philippines.  Early in his tenure 
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with the DND, Cruz had reportedly disappointed the Canadian Ambassador who had 
hoped to sell the Philippines some expensive weaponry.  Cruz had informed the Canadian 
emissary that he was interested only in “boots and bullets.”39 
 As much as the PDR endeavored to get the armed forces’ managerial house in 
order, the ultimate objective was improving the Philippine’s military effectiveness.  The 
Capabilities Upgrade Program (CUP) addressed the traditional area of upgrading 
equipment. Improving mobility of the AFP was essential and consequently the CUP 
prioritized acquiring new trucks and helicopters.40  As much as the CUP aimed to 
improve the AFP’s hardware, the PDR also targeted the human component.  Cruz had 
found that some of the army battalions had not undergone routine training for up to 13 
years.  To correct this discrepancy, the AFP would establish a national training center 
based on the model used by the United States at Fort Irwin which would be capable of re-
training 14 battalions a year.41  Cruz expressly asked for U.S. assistance with establishing 
this new training center which the Embassy heartily endorsed.  In a clear nod to the 
efficacy of defense diplomacy, the Embassy argued that, “US active duty trainers could 
help remold the entire AFP into a mirror image force capable of defeating terrorist and 
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internal security threats, as well serving as a reliable coalition partner.”42  Key to this 
process was a realignment of the AFPs force structure.  Specifically to win 
counterinsurgency fights, Cruz argued that he needed “small unit leaders who can think.”  
He aimed to do this by both upgrading officer training and education throughout the 
military with the goal of adding 2,700 new junior officers.43  Furthermore, impressed by 
the standardized nature of American training during a visit to Parris Island and Fort 
Benning, Cruz hoped to revamp the AFP’s non-commission officer corps.  To that end, 
he took 15 AFP instructors who had just completed training at U.S. NCO Academy in 
Hawaii and employed them as the core staff of a new NCO academy. 44 
 Cruz’s initiative greatly impressed the American Embassy in Manila who not only 
applauded his efforts, but endeavored to provide what assistance it could.  Ambassador 
Ricciardone noted of Cruz that, “taking a leaf out of a MBA textbook, he has established 
an agenda and is now in the process of reorienting the leviathan and often hide‐bound 
Philippine military to his way of thinking.”  However the ambassador cautioned that, 
“while canny and articulate and with excellent access to his President, Cruz will also 
need some luck and strong support from us to see PDR through.”45  In a meeting of high 
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level defense officials from both the Philippines and the United States, Ricciardone 
reiterated “that [the] PDR is one of the most important elements of [American] 
engagement with the Philippine,” with “real resources from both governments devoted to 
the effort.”  The Ambassador added to Cruz, “count on us to be in your corner …but you 
must lead your own reforms.”46  
 Whilst the bulk of the funding for the PDR came from the Philippine government 
itself, the United States also contributed significant resources.  During fiscal year 2005, 
the U.S. contributed $11.1 million to the PDR and the majority of the $20 million in 
defense aid requested for 2006 would also be dedicated to the program.47 Yet, more than 
money and American military kit, the greatest aid that the U.S. furnished the DND was 
its knowledge and expertise.48  According to Cruz, the U.S. government’s “steady support 
had been invaluable in helping the PDR overcome some birth pains.”49  For example a 
team of nine American subject matter experts, who dealt with issues including budget 
management and policy planning, were dispatched to Mania to offer assistance with the 
PDR.  Three more experts, who were especially requested by Cruz, later joined the team 
to offer guidance on military education, enlisted development and operations as well as 
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training.50  Beyond the 15 NCO instructors trained in Hawaii, the Philippine IMET 
program was the largest in Asia and was briefly the second largest in the world.51  Added 
to this was the continued operations of Joint Special Operation Task Force – Philippines, 
whose ongoing training programs had yielded three Light Reaction Companies to be used 
in counterterror operations as well as significant improvements in the overall 
effectiveness of many other AFP units in the field.52   
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Figure 15: IMET Participation 53 
 
 
As impressive as the PDR appears on the surface, the most monumental of 
Secretary Cruz’s accomplishments was getting the AFP to commit to the reform process.  
The Philippine Armed Forces could not be fixed overnight and the entire reform process 
would require well over a decade to reach completion.  As much of a herculean task as it 
had been for Cruz to initiate the PDR, mismanagement by a successor or ambivalence 
from the AFP’s high command could easily unravel the entire scheme.  Thus getting the 
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AFP to embrace reform and altering its institutional culture would be essential for the 
PDR’s ultimate success. 
 In April 2005, as Cruz revealed his plans for the PDR, he also unveiled a plan to 
“sell” the PDR by “‘embedding’ DND/AFP advocates on legislative staffs and 
networking with the Cabinet and other key government institutions to gain support for the 
reform effort.”54  Within the DND itself, Cruz created new assistant secretary positions 
which were dedicated explicitly towards implementing the reform program.55  Cruz was 
fortunate as well in his military counterparts.  AFP Chief of Staff Efren Abu fully 
embraced the PDR and actively worked to its implementation.  His immediate successor, 
Lieutenant General Generosa Senga had benefited extensively from defense diplomacy 
initiatives having participated in programs at the US Army Infantry School at Fort Bragg, 
the US Defense Intelligence College, US Pacific Command and additional programs in 
both the United Kingdom and Israel.56 Senga quickly grasped the importance of the PDR 
and even offered to “take a personal hand in developing a professional cadre of mid-level 
intelligence officers focused on combating terrorism and insurgency,” based on his own 
background in intelligence.57 
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Even as Cruz worked to advance the PDR, past efforts to improve the AFP’s 
capabilities were beginning to yield appreciable results.  Starting in late 2004, the AFP 
launched a series of operations in Mindanao which targeted JI and ASG leadership 
personnel.  Though described as “near misses,” U.S. authorities observed a notable 
increase in the AFP’s operational abilities.  More importantly, the Americans identified 
the clear influence of their training and advice on how the AFP thought about its 
operations.  After each encounter, the “AFP conducted after-action reviews and 
attempted to apply lessons learned to subsequent operations.”  Furthermore, the Southern 
Command, “demonstrated a growing willingness to integrate [JSOTF-P] 
Operations/Intelligence fusion support into its operations.”58  
 In April 2005, the new Light Reaction Companies were deployed for the first 
time in a meaningful capacity.  The operation, which was also AFP’s first night 
movement and nighttime helicopter insertion, achieved strategic and operational surprise.  
Unfortunately, the targets managed to escape after nearly 24 hours of continuous combat 
when another AFP division commander hesitated in supplying reinforcements out fear of 
an MILF counterattack.59 Although the operation’s ultimate outcome was a 
disappointment, it illustrated a significant improvement in the AFP capabilities and the 
direct effect of American defense diplomacy.  Both the LRCs and the ability to conduct 
nighttime operations had been priorities for American trainers since arriving in the 
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Philippines and these efforts were now beginning to take effect.60 With the 
implementation of the PDR and its dedication to reforming the entire AFP, these 
advances would not long be the exception within the AFP but would soon be the standard 
expectation of effectiveness throughout the armed forces. 
Remaining in the Barracks: 
 Amidst Secretary Cruz’s efforts to reform the armed forces as an institution, the 
AFP was also undergoing its own evolution with regards to its place within Philippine 
politics.  Since the downfall of the Marcos regime, the state of civil-military affairs 
within the Philippines could be generously described as fraught.  The AFP had become a 
thoroughly politicized institution with deep internal cleavages between rival services and 
political factions.  Coup attempts and mutinies had become common in the decades since 
the People Power Revolution and for the AFP to mature as a military it needed to mend 
its ways and abstain from further interference in government affairs.  The AFP’s capacity 
to remain independent of domestic politics would come under increased scrutiny as 
President Arroyo’s political star waned.   
 Long plagued by charges of corruption which targeted both her and her family, 
President Arroyo’s political fortunes took a dramatic turn after her reelection in 2004.  
Arroyo had received 12,905,808 votes (39.99%) allowing her to best the nearest runner-
up, actor-cum-Senator Ferdinando Poe Jr. by the comfortable margin of 1,123,576 votes.  
Rumors of cheating and electoral fraud had swirled after the election, but blossomed into 
a firestorm during the summer of 2005 when Samuel Ong, a former Deputy Director of 





the National Bureau of Investigations, purported having an audio tape recording of 
Arroyo scheming with Virgilio Garcillano, a Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 
official to skew the result.  Known as the “Hello Graci” scandal, the tape was released in 
mid-June and contained Arroyo conspiring to win the election by at least a million 
votes.61   
The U.S. Embassy had actually received an alleged transcript of the tape, but not 
the tape itself, weeks earlier from opposition sources.  The American mission noted that 
the alleged transcript “appears to show discussions of electoral manipulation, but contains 
no ‘smoking gun’ as to purport Malacanang involvement.”62  As the controversy 
unfolded the Embassy voiced its “strong support for Philippine democracy and stability,” 
as well as “opposition to any extra-constitutional activities.”63 
 Attempting to quell the growing furor over the tape, Arroyo went on public 
television to apologize for what she termed a “lapse in judgement.”64  Over the following 
weeks tens of thousands of Filipinos repeatedly marched through Manila demanding 
Arroyo’s resignation.  Calls for her to step down also came from several notable leaders 
including former president Corazon Aquino, the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the 
Philippines and ten members of Arroyo’s own cabinet who had resigned in protest.65  
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However, throughout a turbulent few months, Arroyo weathered the public pressure and 
remained in power. She also successfully marshalled sufficient support from allies in 
Congress to stymie repeated attempts to impeach her. 
 Throughout the crisis, all sides had nervously watched to see what role the AFP 
might play.  The Washington Post related that “many in the junior ranks were angered 
when they heard portions of the secret tapes that apparently described how the Arroyo 
campaign had used senior military officers to manipulate vote counts.”66  Even as the first 
murmurs of a military plot sounded, Chief of Staff Abu struck to preempt any such move.  
The American Embassy relates: 
On July 8, AFP Chief of Staff General Efren Abu issued a widely publicized 
directive entitled “Conduct of the Armed Forces” to all “Major Service 
Commanders, Unified Commanders, Commanding Generals, Commanding 
Officers, and AFP support units.” Abu said the ongoing appeals for Arroyo's 
resignation are part of a political and constitutional and legal process, and it is the 
AFP's duty to ensure freedom of expression and not interfere in that process. Any 
AFP intervention would “betray the trust given to (it) by the State and would 
certainly put (its) understanding of military professionalism in the eyes of the 
world in doubt,” he declared in the directive. Abu also appealed for the AFP to 
“reestablish the noble tradition of military professionalism by insulating our 
officers and men from politics,” and for all commanders to “act swiftly against 
any behavior that challenges or breaks away from the chain of command.”67 
 
Abu’s broadside on the AFP’s duty to remain uninvolved in the crisis represented both a 
call for the armed forces to respect its assigned role in Philippine society and a sharp 
rebuke of its past interference.  The specific appeals to military professionalism also 
encapsulated the ideal which Abu, Cruz and the PDR all aspired for the AFP to achieve.  
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Cruz, who continued to support Arroyo, had previously issued directives to soldiers on 
the need to respect the sanctity of the political process.  As the controversy crested, Cruz 
said he was “extremely proud of the men and women of the [AFP] for taking a firm and 
uncompromising stand to insulate themselves from partisan politics.”68  
 The ongoing tumult of politics in Manila would soon offer the AFP another 
chance to test its new detachment from political affairs.  President Arroyo’s efforts to 
thwart impeachment proved successful, but augured poorly for the placidity of Philippine 
governance.  In November, amid “new waves of rumors that the President or her advisers 
are considering emergency rule or martial law, and that elements within the military are 
seeking to stage a coup,” senior Philippine government officials submitted an Aide 
Memoire to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Director of National Intelligence (and 
former U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines) John Negroponte and President Bush about 
the political situation in Manila.  The note hyperbolically warned that “political 
opportunists and destabilizers have forged an understanding with communists, terrorists 
and al-Qaeda linked terrorists to remove the president.”69  The American Embassy 
endeavored to make clear its firm opposition to emergency rule or martial law, but 
worried that Arroyo’s advisers would “be increasingly successful in convincing her that 
so-called plots by the opposition are now combined with CPP/NPA to ensure her 
downfall.”70   
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President Arroyo’s National Security Advisor, Norberto (Bert) Gonzales, even 
informed the Embassy directly of his desire to invoke a State of Emergency so that 
Arroyo could use the military and police to arrest opponents plotting to overthrow the 
government.71  He particularly worried about coordination between leftist opposition 
leaders and the NPA which could launch a coordinated effort to oust Arroyo.  At the time 
the Embassy unequivocally stated that the United States, “would not support emergency 
rule, that we did not share his analysis of the threat posed by the NPA, and that a 
campaign against the NPA would be rightly seen as detracting from the Philippines’ role 
in the war on terrorism.”72   
This stance would become a common lament for the American diplomats in 
Manila as they strove to advance a substantive agenda amid the political jockeying.  In a 
primer for Director of National Intelligence Negroponte prior to his visit to the 
Philippines in 2005, the embassy advised that “[Arroyo] continues to seek U.S. approval 
in her fight for political survival.  Focusing on our support for real substantive 
cooperation will ease her nerves, without identifying us too closely with a still troubled 
administration.”73 As Arroyo’s shadow boxing with political opponents and phantom 
conspiracies continued throughout the winter, the greatest concern of the American 
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delegation was not the fortunes of the Malacañang Palace, but insulating policy initiatives 
like the PDR, MILF-peace process and the War on Terror from the political slugfest 
unfolding in Manila.74  Indeed, a rare positive sign amid the commotion was that the 
political drama had not yet effected the AFP, and Secretary Cruz and CoS Senga 
continued to reinforce the importance of the AFP remaining separated from political 
affairs.75 
The Embassy’s fears came to pass on February 24, 2006, when Arroyo declared a 
State of Emergency during a public address.  Citing a conspiracy to overthrow the 
government hatched by a coalition of rightwing extremists in the military and leftist 
political opponents, Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 which declared a 
State of Emergency (SoE) and tasked the AFP with maintaining peace and stability.  The 
policing powers of the government were greatly increased under Emergency Rule 
including the suspension of all public demonstrations and allowing for individuals to be 
detained by authorities without warrants or a trial.76 Although there was evidence that a 
plot existed, Emergency Rule was also used to arrest political opponents, including 
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members of Congress, and to raid opposition newspapers and media outlets.77  After the 
crisis, the U.S. Embassy would conclude that there was sufficient evidence of some type 
of plot by some elements within the military, but “it is not clear that the plans were as 
well coordinated or potentially bloody as the [Arroyo government] suggests.”78  It also 
found little evidence of a broad conspiracy against the government and nothing 
substantial to the fabled alliance between the NPA and leading elements of the AFP.  
Rather the Embassy speculated, “it was perhaps this confluence of possible separate 
efforts to destabilize the government that triggered the President to declare a state of 
emergency,” adding that there was “no clear evidence that mainstream opposition 
members were involved in the strategy, although opposition leaders admit privately that 
they at least maintain contact with many in the AFP, including elements unhappy with 
President Arroyo’s leadership.”79 
 Uncertainty over how the AFP would respond to the SoE and the veracity of 
claims of a military plot were the central questions of the crisis.  Prior to the event, 
American diplomats speculated that emergency rule, martial law or a coup attempt would 
likely fracture the military into warring camps.80  These fears appeared to be unfounded.  
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During the SoE the AFP’s chain of command remained intact and loyal to the 
government.81  At the onset of the crisis, Brigadier General Danilo Lim, who headed the 
elite First Scout Ranger Regiment, was relieved of duty.  Lim, who had participated in 
past coup attempts, was reported to be the head of a plot to publicly withdraw support 
from the government.82  Likewise a group of disgruntled Marines seized control of the 
Marine Corps Headquarter in support for a former Marine Commander who had also 
been relieved of his post. However, even this limited mutiny fizzled when mass support 
for the Marines failed to manifest.83  Despite these isolated incidents, it appeared that no 
wide-reaching conspiracy against the government existed within the AFP.   
After a tumultuous week, and prodding from Washington, Arroyo officially ended 
emergency rule on March 3.84  Ultimately the State of Emergency was a bruising affair 
                                                 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]; Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 5166, “Assessment of 
Potential Threats to Democracy in the Philippines,” 6 November 2005.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public 
Library of US Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]. 
81 Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 889, “SITREP 14: GRP Files Sedition Charges; President 
Arroyo Lauds Economic Situation,” 27 February 2006.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US 
Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]; Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 914, “SITREP 
17: Senat Condemns GRP Actions,”  28 February 2006. Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US 
Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]. 
82 There is ample evidence that this alleged plot actually was true though its reach did not appear to extend 
much beyond the Scout Ranger Regiment.  Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 1179, “ ‘Clear and 
Present Danger’: The GRP Presents its Case on Proclamation 1017; Embassy Analysis,” 15 March 2006.  
Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]; Telegram 
from Ambassador Kristie Kenney (Manila) to State, No. 2831, “Possible Courts Martial for February 24 
‘Coup Plotters,’” 6 July 2006. Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/].   
83“Peaceful End to Standoff in Philippines,” New York Times, 27 February 2006, A4; Jaime Laude, 
“Standoff at Marine headquarters,” Philippine Star, 27 February 2006;  “Multi-awarded Marine battalion 
figured in standoff,” Philippine Star, 28 February 2006; Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 889, 
“SITREP 14: GRP Files Sedition Charges; President Arroyo Lauds Economic Situation,” 27 February 
2006.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/].  
84 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Christopher Hill had flown to Manila to 
meet with Arroyo and other officials on February 28.  Hill made clear that the State of Emergency was 
doing serious damage the Philippines reputation and that it should be lifted as soon as possible.  He also 
informed Arroyo that Washington would look closely into any political crackdown carried out by her 




which may have helped Arroyo stabilize her political footing, but came at the expense of 
her reputation and that of the Philippines.  An exasperated New York Times bemoaned 
that “the Philippines is at it again,” and described the entire affair as a “discouraging 
spectacle of national futility.”85 
Despite the convoluted politics of the SoE, the episode did serve to highlight 
some of the meaningful progress made within the AFP.  Contrary to earlier fears, that the 
AFP’s chain of command remained intact and firmly behind the civilian leaders signaled 
a professionalism within the organization that had historically been lacking.  This was 
particularly evident in the treatment of those elements of the AFP who broke with the 
government.  Mutineers and coup plotters had traditionally received light punishments 
and were “rehabilitated” back into the armed forces.  For example, the perpetrators of the 
failed 1986 Manila Hotel coup attempt infamously received a sentence of 30-50 push-ups 
each for their crime.86 This was not the case after the 2006 State of Emergency.  Colonel 
Ariel Querubin, who had led the brief Marine standoff, was promptly relieved of duty and 
later court-martialed and imprisoned for his actions.  General Lim and over two dozen of 
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his officers also shared this fate.87  Kristie Kenney, the new American Ambassador in 
Manila, approvingly noted that  “the apparently serious investigation into the February 24 
episode by the AFP and the recommendations for courts martial from the 
investigators…demonstrate that the DND and AFP will no longer treat coup plotters 
lightly, and are willing to seek punishment even for senior officers.”  Kenney concluded 
that with the prosecution of General Lim, “the strong signal is that this is a new, more 
professional and less politicized AFP.”88   
Secretary Cruz credited the PDR for this culture change in the AFP.  By focusing 
on immediate results, common soldiers and junior officers were beginning to see the 
practical benefits of PDR.  Importantly, “that mid‐level officers were beginning to see 
how they could contribute to and use the PDR process to bring about real change.”89  
Instead of coups or mutinies, the PDR provided restive officers with a productive outlet 
for their efforts which not only yielded meaningful changes, but also promised ongoing 
improvements.  Such changes were essential to taming the AFP’s history of political 
adventurism, but it remained unclear whether such reforms would return as substantive a 
result in Mindanao as they had in Manila.   
No Shelter Here: Resolving the Mindanao Dilemma  
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The New Afghanistan: 
 The ongoing muddle in Manila did little but detract and distract from the essential 
theater of the War on Terror in the Philippines which continued to be Mindanao.  Whilst 
mismanagement had certainly cost the Philippine war effort dearly, the conflict could not 
be resolved in the halls of government alone.  Rather, only by engaging with the problem 
of Mindanao and its complex layering of social, political and economic misfortunes could 
either the United States or the Philippine government hope to make any meaningful 
progress in the fight against violent extremists like Abu Sayyaf.  As important as the PDR 
and remedying the institutional ills of the AFP were, these constituted only the first 
essential steps towards the larger goal of ending the insurgencies which plagued the 
Philippines.  For the Kapit Bisig framework to have any merit it needed to leave the 
sanctuary of conference rooms and yield meaningful results in Mindanao. 
 For their part, neither Abu Sayyaf nor the other militant groups active in the 
Southern Philippines were content to remain idle whilst Manila got its administrative 
house in order. Despite ongoing military operations, including a spat of airstrike by the 
Philippine Airforce targeting MILF/JI positions in Mindanao during late 2004; ASG and 
JI continued to operate unimpeded in the Southern Philippines.90  A grim reminder that 
such groups could not be allowed to function indefinitely, occurred on February 14, 2005 
when three bombs detonated in a coordinated attack on a mall in General Santos (South 
Cotabato), a bus station in Davao City (Davao) and aboard a bus in Makati (Metro 
                                                 




Manila).  A total of 13 people were killed in the bombings and over 140 others were 
wounded according to the RAND Corporation.91 
 
Figure 16: Map of St. Valentine's Day Bombing 
 Abu Soliman, a key ASG commander, called a radio station to claim 
responsibility for the first two blasts in Mindanao and warned of “one more to come.”  
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Twenty minutes later the final explosion occurred in Makati.92  The Valentine’s Day 
bombings, as the attacks came to be known, epitomized Abu Sayyaf’s continued 
evolution and the benefits it reaped from melting pot of militancy that Mindanao had 
become.  Bombing had become an increasingly common mode of attack for ASG, but the 
nearly simultaneous detonation of three bombs in different locations throughout the 
country illustrated a sophistication that had previously been lacking in ASG’s operations.  
Authorities attributed Abu Sayyaf’s new refinement to the tutelage offered by Jemaah 
Islamiyah leaders taking refuge in Mindanao.93  As if to confirm this notion, on March 
22, the AFP announced the capture of a JI leader named Rohmat in Mindanao.  Rohmat, 
an Indonesian, had been serving as JI’s liaison with Abu Sayyaf.  Reportedly he had also 
been present during the planning of the February 14 attacks and had even helped make 
the cell phone triggers for the bombs.94  While Rohmat’s capture was an achievement, 
word soon spread that two prominent JI leaders, Dulmatin and Umar Patek, who were 
each linked to numerous bombings, were also operating in Mindanao.95  
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Furthermore, the bombing in Makati represented a particularly troubling 
development.  With the exception of the SuperFerry 14 bombing, Abu Sayyaf had 
historically struggled to conduct attacks outside of the Southern Philippines in general 
and within Metro Manila in particular.  The Valentine’s Day bombing shattered this 
norm.  Not only had the bombing occurred in the country’s upscale financial district, but 
it had evidenced an acute knowledge of the area.  The bomb had been placed aboard a 
bus travelling along the EDSA highway, the busiest thoroughfare in the capital, and 
detonated remotely as the bus arrived at an elevated train platform near a popular mall in 
order to maximize the carnage.  From being unable to operate in Manila to conducting a 
well-crafted attack based on local knowledge seemingly signaled a quantum leap in 
ASG’s abilities.  Yet, here again it was not necessarily Abu Sayyaf’s skills which were 
being demonstrated, but rather its capacity to benefit from the specialized knowledge of 
other groups operating in Mindanao.  In this case, whereas ASG had struggled to conduct 
operation in Metro Manila, the radicalized converts of RSM provided “a vehicle for more 
experienced terrorists groups to move into the country’s urban heartland.”96  The United 
States Embassy clearly saw RSM’s hand in both the Superferry  14 and Makati 
bombings, and urged that the organization be designated a foreign terrorist organization 
because of the aid it provided to other groups and its “irrefutable involvement in 
terrorism.”97 
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 The Valentine’s Day bombings and Abu Sayyaf’s resurgence in general were 
symptomatic of the wider problem that was Mindanao.  Captured JI operative Rohmat, 
described the southern Philippines as a “major terror training ground” where JI trained 
cadres of new fighters and freely assisted Abu Sayyaf.98  An illustration of this occurred 
on October 1, 2005 when three suicide bombers again attacked tourist locations in the 
Indonesian resort town of Bali.  At least 20 people were killed in the attacks and over 100 
were injured.  The bombings were attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah and had been 
masterminded by Dulmatin and Patek who were residing in Mindanao.99 
After Rohmat’s capture, Joseph Mussomeli, the American Deputy Chief of 
Mission, wrote a scathing depiction of the situation in Mindanao in his report to the State 
Department on the course of GWOT in the Philippines. 
Terrorism is a disturbingly ordinary, ongoing reality here. The southern 
Philippines lies along a strategic fault line in the global campaign against 
terrorism, with its porous borders, weak rule of law, long‐standing and 
unaddressed grievances of Muslim minorities, and high levels of poverty and 
corruption offering a fertile field for nurturing terrorist groups. Only Afghanistan 
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in the Nineties had a mix of elements more conducive to the spread of radical 
Islamic movements and the safeguarding of terrorists.100 
 
   Less than a week after submitting his report to DC, Mussomeli created an uproar 
in Manila. In an interview with Australian media, he again warned that Mindanao could 
become the next Afghanistan and a “Mecca of terrorism.”101  Days later, on instruction 
from Secretary Romulo, the Department of Foreign Affairs summoned Mussomeli and 
formally handed the American official a diplomatic note rebuking him for his comments.  
The note labelled Mussomeli’s comments as “grossly inaccurate, patently unfair, 
prejudicial and counterproductive to the overall effort of the Philippine government to 
fight terrorism and bring peace and development to Mindanao.”  It added that 
Mussomeli’s statements “are not to be expected from a representative of a close ally and 
friendly government and strategic ally.”102  Wounded as Philippine pride might have 
been, the hurt feelings over Mussomeli’s statement did not negate the fact that Mindanao 
had become a hub of militancy in Southeast Asia and hotbed of terrorist activities.   
Engaging the MILF: 
Ironically, the greatest challenge with Mindanao was precisely that it was not 
Afghanistan.  The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States identified the 
ungoverned territories created by failed or failing states as a major threat to international 
security since these lawless regions could be easily exploited by terrorist groups seeking 
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refuge.103  This had been the case of Afghanistan in the 1990s which Mussomeli had 
referenced and characterized the contemporary situation in places like Somalia.  
However, this did not accurately account for affairs in the Philippines.  As argued by Kit 
Collier, “unlike Afghanistan, the Philippines is not a failed state, but it encompasses 
impenetrable enclaves within which transnational terrorists continue to find sanctuary, 
weaving their cause into those of local insurgents with widespread support.”104 The 
problem for Washington and the Philippine government was not that Mindanao was 
ungoverned territory, but rather that the territories in question were governed by someone 
else.  Whereas the United States could attempt to impose the rule of law in a place like 
Afghanistan, in Mindanao putting an end to the militant safe havens meant resolving the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s nebulous role in the War on Terror.   
The War on Terrorism in the Philippines had stalled largely as a result of the 
MILF’s contradictory approach to terrorism.  In 2003, Chairman Salamat had publically 
rejected terrorism as a prerequisite to entering peace negotiations.  However, the MILF’s 
own rejection of terrorism did not forbid the group from aiding the likes of JI and ASG 
who continued to find shelter in enclaves controlled by the MILF.  The MILF thus played 
a double role.  It both rejected terrorism as an organizational mantra in order to purse a 
peace process with the Philippine government, while also providing the essential 
protection needed for other groups to continue their operations.  Ample evidence of 
ongoing terrorist activities, especially by the likes of JI and ASG, led to repeated calls for 
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the MILF to purge its ranks and territory of such individuals.105  For its part, the MILF 
rejected claims that it was protecting terrorists and denied that either group was active in 
its territory.106  
At its heart, the duality of the MILF’s handling of the terrorism question reflected 
the fragmented nature of both the organization itself and the wider Moro struggle.  It is 
convenient to discuss the MILF as a unitary actor with strong centralized authority.  
However, the group’s decentralized structure, especially following Chairman Salamat’s 
death in 2003, afforded individual MILF commanders a high degree of autonomy over 
areas they controlled.  This organizational characteristic helps account for the MILF’s 
seemingly schizophrenic stance on groups like JI.  As explained by the International 
Crisis Group, “What is uncertain is whether top leaders are aware of the activity and 
unwilling to admit it, or whether members of JI and other like-minded jihadist groups 
have established their own personal ties to individual MILF commanders without the 
knowledge of the MILF leadership.”107  Skepticism over both the preferences of certain 
MILF commanders and the limits of the group’s central committee, led observers like 
Zachary Abuza to doubt that the MILF would ever be able either to cut its ties to JI or 
agree to a peace deal with the government.108   
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The divisions within the MILF was not lost on government officials in Manila.  
During the conference with Admiral Fargo where Secretary Cruz introduced the Kapit 
Bisig framework, he also highlighted the ongoing peace talks with the MILF as an 
essential undertaking for the long-term future of the country.  Ambassador Ricciardone 
cautioned Cruz “not to regard the MILF as ‘good guys;’ [as] many are as bad as the JI.”  
Cruz concurred noting that “one motivation behind the peace process with the MILF was 
to distinguish between MILF commanders who supported peace and those who rejected 
it.” He also vowed “to ‘search out and destroy’ any faction that refused to make 
peace.”109 
 President Arroyo’s administration insisted that the ongoing ceasefire with the 
MILF did not guarantee JI safe havens within the Philippines and pledged that the 
government would continue to go after known terrorists even if they were located in 
MILF territory.110  However, counterterrorism operations on Mindanao were colored by 
the divergent imperatives of both maintaining the ceasefire with the MILF and 
prosecuting the war against ASG and JI.  This was particularly evident in late 2004 when 
increased American concern about Mindanao led to a series of airstrike by the Philippine 
Air Force (aided by U.S. operational planning) against targets in MILF territory near 
Maguindanao.  These strikes specifically targeted areas controlled by the MILF 
Commander Ameril Umbra (known as Commander Kato) who had resisted the leadership 
of the MILF central committee and been known to harbor terrorist leaders including 
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Dulmatin, Patek and Janjalani.111  In January 2005, the AFP again conducted a massive 
aerial and artillery strike against high-value targets within MILF territory.  Despite public 
protestations from the MILF, the group privately conceded that it knew that it was not 
being attacked and supported efforts at targeting terrorist groups and “factions operating 
independently of the central committee.”112 
These examples of decisive action by the AFP were balanced by a general 
reluctance to conduct any operation which might jeopardize the ceasefire.  Stated Colonel 
Charlie Holganza, the senior military advisor to Secretary Cruz, “we have to target 
terrorists in places where we can ensure there is no big backlash.”113 
 At times, the government in Manila seemed at a loss for how to resolve the 
problem of militancy in Mindanao.  In its 2004 report on the situation, the International 
Crisis Group cites a failure of public diplomacy by the government as a major problem in 
perpetuating the conflict. 
“There has been no sustained or coordinated effort to communicate the case 
against JI to a skeptical public, particularly opinion leader in Mindanao.  Instead, 
arrests based on inadequate detective work have too often been exploited for 
short-term political gain, only to be forgotten – or deeply resented –as the 
prosecutors’ case falls apart.  The terrorist issue is commonly dismissed as a 
government or military ploy to justify measures against the MILF, or even martial 
law.”114 
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 Similarly, mere weeks after Mussomeli’s comments comparing Mindanao to 
Afghanistan, National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales presented Ambassador 
Ricciardone with a report that he had written about the state of Islamic extremism and 
which he had also presented to the National Security Council.  Rather than a statement of 
government policy, the document constituted a personal “think piece” by Gonzales.  He 
depicted the situation in the Philippines as “bleak” with the conflict no longer being 
shaped by domestic factors, but rather a reflection of a global war within Islam between 
extremists and moderates who he calls “Muslim-infidels.”115  Gonzales particularly 
worried that following an eventual American success in Iraq, extremists would flee to 
other parts of the world like the Philippines and further enflame the Filipino-Muslim 
community.  While Ricciardone took heart that the Gonzales paper “shows that at least 
some in the [Philippine government] recognize and are trying to grapple seriously with 
existential challenges to Philippine democracy and security,” the Ambassador was 
nevertheless disillusioned “that so few plausible solutions apparently present themselves 
to [Philippine] policy‐makers.”  Specifically: 
He [Gonzales] calls upon the Philippines to “act decisively and hastily” (sic ‐‐ a 
Filipino‐ism for “urgently”), while offering concrete suggestions only to eliminate 
private armies at Mindanao State University, re‐launch an Islamic bank, and 
support Arabic teaching. He fails to raise more substantive goals of bringing 
economic development and better governance to Muslim Mindanao, meeting 
long‐standing demands from local Muslims for more significant autonomy in the 
“Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” improving counter‐terrorism 
capabilities by Philippine security forces, and addressing the real factors that 
attract Christian converts and local Muslims to the more radical versions of 
Islam.116 
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Manila’s quandary was not the result of a complete lack of imagination but an 
unenviable byproduct of the purgatorial state created by the peace talks underway in 
Malaysia.  Clouded by complex questions like Moro rights to ancestral domain (lands 
historically claimed by the Muslim population but since inhabited by subsequent 
migrants) and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by any Moro state, the talks were an 
exhaustive and laborious process.117 Yet, as difficult as these issues were, making 
meaningful progress towards resolving these matters was a boon for the peace processes 
in general and means of unclogging the path to more extensive counterterrorism 
operations. 
Foreign governments played a central role in propelling the peace process 
forward.  Malaysia played the central role during the talks.  Not only did Kuala Lampur 
host the meetings and serve as primary negotiator, but the Malaysian government also 
furnished a small peacekeeping force to Mindanao to serve as ceasefire observers.  
Whereas Malaysia took the lead in shepherding the peace process through its turbulence, 
the United States adapted to its role of supporting member who furnished aid, insight and 
moral support for the effort.  Notably, the State Department continued to be hesitant 
regarding the MILF’s peaceful bona fides and was initially reluctant to engage directly 
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with the group in negotiations.  Instead, it relied upon the independent (but still 
governmental) United States Institute for Peace (USIP) to serve as its primary 
intermediary with the peace process.  Though excluded from the negotiations, the USIP 
created the Philippine Facilitation Project (PFP) which worked as an advisory group and 
helped resolve thorny negotiating issues through seminars and workshops.118  These 
efforts yielded real results and in April 2005, significant progress was made in reaching 
an agreement on the ancestral domain question which had been a key divide between the 
two sides.119 
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 However, the most valuable assistance offered by the United States to the peace 
process came in Mindanao itself in the form of development aid.  Dating back to the early 
days of the Global War on Terror, President Bush had pledged American resources to 
alleviating the chronic poverty and underdevelopment in Mindanao which allowed 
extremist ideologies to flourish.120  The United States remained committed to this claim 
and President Bush had also reiterated his vow to financially support the peace-process in 
a letter to Chairman Salamat in 2003.121  Nearly a decade earlier, the United States had 
furnished livelihood assistance to over 25,000 MNLF fighters to help transition them 
from war to civilian life and Washington promised to offer a similar program for the 
MILF.122  Even as talks were ongoing, USAID pursued an ambitious development 
program in Mindanao designed to both improve living conditions and also thwart the 
spread of violent ideologies.  According to CRS, roughly 60% of all U.S. development 
assistance to the Philippines went to projects in Mindanao such as infrastructure and 
school construction.123  
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Figure 17: U.S. Development Assistance in Millions of U.S. Dollars 124 
As much as USAID’s programs endeavored to address the economic morose of 
Mindanao, it also sought to actively combat the spread of extremist ideologies by 
engaging with the population through guest speaker programs and education 
initiatives.125  A particularly prominent example was the Madrasah Teacher Training 
Project which brought 28 teachers from Mindanao to the United States to engage in 
educational training.  These teachers returned to Mindanao in order to spread the 
techniques and perspectives that they gained while abroad.126  FSI Director Sorretta 
credited projects like the Madrassah Teacher program and similar initiatives to bring 
young community leaders to the United States as one of the most effective weapons 
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against extremism.  More than the specific training, simply exposing these individuals to 
the outside world provided a bulwark against corrosive ideologies.127   
However, as essential as the peace process and USAID initiatives were in 
stemming the spread of militancy in Mindanao, they were not an answer to groups like 
ASG and JI that already existed. To not only prevent the future growth of extremism, but 
actively counter the terrorist threat that already existed, both the United States and the 
Philippine governments needed to alter how the MILF addressed the radical factions 
within its own territory. 
The Frontline is Everywhere: 
 The late 2004 strikes by the AFP against targets in MILF territory were not an 
aberration, but heralded sweeping changes in the MILF’s behavior. In February 2005, the 
MILF shunned calls by ASG to abandon the peace talks.  The MILF even offered its 
assistance as an intermediary later in the month when fighting again erupted on Jolo 
between forces loyal to ex-MNLF leader Nur Misuari and the government.128 More 
significantly, the MILF began to radically alter how it treated the extremists in its midst.  
MILF Chairman Murad Ebrahim indicated to the Philippine government in March that he 
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was aware of “troublemakers” within the MILF who were close to JI and he expressed a 
clear desire to work with the Philippine government to deal with these menaces.129   
 Following Murad’s comments, the Philippine government took up the issue with 
the United States of labelling certain elements of the MILF as terrorist organizations.130  
This designation had previously been avoided out of fear that it would complicate 
negotiations with the MILF.  However, it now appeared to be a useful tool to target and 
isolate those reticent factions within the MILF who rejected the peace process and 
enabled JI and ASG.  In May, Ambassador Ricciardone publicly stated that the U.S. was 
considering the tagging of MILF leaders who continued to cooperate “with world-class 
murderers” as terrorists.131  There was no ambiguity in Ricciardone’s statement.  It both 
identified ongoing support of ASG and JI by rogue MILF commanders as unacceptable 
and threated real consequences in the form of automatic sanctions that followed an 
individual being added to America’s list of terrorist suspects.  The tactic payed dividends 
with the threat of being labelled a terrorist swaying the thinking of key MILF leaders.  
For example, MILF base commander Hadjj Samir Hashim wrote a personal letter to the 
embassy denying any ties to JI and pledging to apprehend and turnover to the authorities 
any JI operatives found in his area.  The Embassy considered that Samir “may be 
reaching a point where he …is ready to make a choice toward peace and against 
terrorism, and the threat of designation as a foreign terrorist may be helping in making 
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the right choice.”132  Similarly, the embassy learned through MILF contacts that 
Chairman Murad had authorized his own covert operation to locate and apprehend 
terrorist suspects in MILF territory.  Given the MILF’s less than glowing track record on 
this issue, the Embassy was initially skeptical.  However it did concede that there may 
have been “a possible sea change” in the groups thinking and that “any true efforts, 
especially successful ones, will be important in stimulating momentum in the peace 
process and in isolating individual MILF commanders who may harbor such terrorists.” 
133 
 The most significant shift in the MILF’s behavior though came in its growing 
willingness to coordinate and cooperate with the AFP during counterterrorism operations.  
Central to this evolution was the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG).  Initially created 
in May 2002 as an aside to MILF-RP peace talks in Malaysia, the AHJAG did not receive 
its implementing guidelines until December 12, 2004 and was not formally organized 
until January 2005.  MILF unhappiness about the airstrikes in November 2004 spurred 
the AHJAG’s long delayed activation by highlighting the practical need for better 
coordination between the AFP and MILF.134  Consisting of eight core members, evenly 
divided between the MILF and Philippine government, the AHJAG functioned as “an 
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overseeing body tasked to coordinate, monitor and disseminate information” between the 
government authorities and the MILF.135  The purpose of the AHJAG was to allow for 
effective counterterrorism action in MILF controlled areas while defusing the inherent 
risk that such operations posed to the ongoing peace talks.  Through the AHJAG the two 
sides could share intelligence about suspected terrorists thought to be in MILF territory.  
Notably, in June 2005, the MILF was provided a list of 53 terrorist suspects 
(encompassing ASG, JI members as well as the criminal Pentagon Group), which would 
serve as the basis for joint investigations and arrests through the AHJAG.136  The list 
included Dulmatin, Umar Patek and Khaddafi Janjalani.  In 2005 alone, the AHJAG 
would conduct 21 operations which would result in the death of 8 ASG/JI members, the 
arrest of 6 other criminals, the rescue of 14 kidnap victims, as well as the confiscation of 
large caches of weapons and drugs.137   
More than its own undertakings, the central contribution of the AHJAG was 
enabling the AFP to undertake counterterrorism operation in MILF territory without fear 
of inadvertently inflaming the conflict.  In April, the U.S. trained Light Reaction 
Companies were employed for the first time in a raid against a suspected meeting 
between Dumatin, Janjalani and Abu Solaiman.  The operation was the first ever 
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nighttime helicopter insertion by Philippine forces and was aided by a 10 member 
American fusion team from JSOTF-P who were present at the operational command 
center during the engagement.138  Despite an impressive showing by the AFP forces, the 
operation itself stumbled.  The LRCs were in nearly continuous combat for 24 hours, but 
were unable to sustain the operation and had to break contact when reinforcements were 
slow to materialize.  The American embassy blamed Major General Raul Relano, who 
commanded the 6th Infantry Division and who had been purposefully left in the dark 
about the operation out of concern for operational security.  According to the Embassy, 
Relano was “once again evidently playing a dilatory role at a critical moment,” and 
“hesitated for four key hours when the MILFs 104 Base command threatened to 
counterattack what the MILF commanders labeled a violation of GRP/MILF ceasefire.”  
While the embassy was effusive in its praise of the LRCs, it bemoaned that “once again, 
the AFP’s decision-making process froze in response to the MILF’s threat to 
intervene.”139 
 These mishaps were resolved by July when, again aided by American operational 
and intelligence assistance, the AFP began a multi-battalion sweep into MILF territory 
around Maguindanao which specifically targeted Khaddafi Janjalani and the ASG.  
Unlike in April the AHJAG provided an effective means of liaison between the MILF 
and AFP throughout the operation’s duration.  Aware of where the AFP would be 
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operating, the MILF temporarily evacuated some of its forces from the area in order to 
leave the battlefield clear for the AFP and allow counterterrorism operations to proceed 
uninhibited.140  There were even reports of MILF brigades being purposefully stationed 
to block potential escape routes for the ASG.141  A few minor skirmishes between AFP 
and MILF forces did occur, but each was quickly stifled and none flared into a major 
engagement.  Amid the ongoing operation, “’renegade’ MILF commander Wahid Tondok 
and the deputy commander of Ameril Umbra Kato were ‘suspended from the MILF’” 
because of their “their disregard of the Central Committee directive to cease harboring or 
cooperating with the JI and ASG.”142  In October, the Central Committee further rebuked 
Kato by taking the unprecedented step of formally “deactivating” Kato’s 105 Base 
Command.  Collier labelled the move “an unprecedented show of open dissention within 
the MILF and the leadership’s first indication that it took its obligations to isolate 
terrorists within its ranks seriously.”143 
As important as the changes in the MILF were, it is important to not overlook 
how the AFP itself had started to change thanks to American involvement.  The embassy 
judged that “US doctrine and advice has begun to shape and influence AFP thinking and 
operations,” adding that “our involvement makes a difference, and our absence would be 
                                                 
140 Collier, “Failure in Mindanao,” 32-33; ICG Asia Report  N °110, 19 December 2005, 14;  John Unson, 
“Five Abus killed as troops close in on Janjalani,” Philippine Star, 13 July 2005; Telegram from 
Mussomeli (Manila) to State, No. 3435, “GRP-MILF Talks Postponed: Latest News Regarding Terrorism,” 
27 July 2007.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/].  
141 Raymond Bonner and Carlos Conde, “U.S. and Philippines Join Forces to Pursue Terrorist Leader,” The 
New York Times, 23 July 2005, A4. 
142 Telegram from Johnson (Manila) to State, No. 3843, “GRP-MILF Optimistic on Talks, Malaysian 
Monitors, and Continued Cooperation Against ASG/JI,” 19 August 2005.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public 
Library of US Diplomacy [https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/].   




telling.”144  Operationally, American training and intelligence assistance allowed for 
more sophisticated missions which purposefully targeted suspected ASG/JI locations 
while minimizing disruptions to the local population.  
The United States also began to speak directly with the MILF in order to 
emphasize the seriousness that Washington attached to both the peace talks as well as the 
effort to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in Mindanao.  In a series of meetings beginning in 
the fall of 2005 between representatives of the American embassy and that MILF, the 
American diplomats made clear that American aid was predicated on the MILF’s 
unequivocal break with terrorist groups.  Rather than distinguishing between the Central 
Committee and rogue commanders like Umbril Kato, the United States demanded that 
“all elements of the MILF  must permanently cut all contacts with terrorist organizations 
including training activities.”145  By emphasizing that the MILF as a whole would be held 
responsible for the actions of its members, the diplomats aimed to underscore the primacy 
they attached to this issue and strengthen accountability within the MILF.146 
Improvements in the AFP’s abilities paired with broader engagement with the 
MILF to enlist its assistance (or at least acquiescence) in counterterrorism operations had 
the effect of undermining Mindanao’s status as a terrorist safe haven. Several ASG 
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fighters were either captured or killed on Mindanao and in October the leader of RSM 
was captured in Zamboanga.147  According to the U.S. Embassy the arrest of RSM’s 
leadership group appeared “effectively to have dismantled the RSM as an active terrorist 
force.”148 
With Mindanao becoming increasingly hostile territory and the MILF no longer a 
welcoming host, ASG and JI’s leaders, forced to work ever more closely together by their 
circumstances, decamped from Mindanao to the Sulu archipelago.149  In April 2006, 
Senior Superintendent Romeo Ricardo of the Philippine National Police’s anti-terrorism 
task force announced that while JI continued to be active in the Philippines, the MILF 
had made significant progress dismantling the JI camps which had for so long been 
central to the group’s ties to terrorism.150   
 Abu Sayyaf’s expulsion from MILF territories on Mindanao signaled an 
important evolution in the War on Terror in the Philippines and the overall trajectory of 
the country.  In the 1990s, it had been the limited nature of the Philippine state and 
minimal control over the archipelago’s south which had provided an incubator for 
extremism amid the wider Moro conflict. Counterterrorism efforts like Balikatan 02-1 
undertaken in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 endeavored to excise these extremist 
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elements whilst avoiding entanglement in the far more complex problem of the MILF.  
Yet, merely trying to lance the sore of Abu Sayyaf independent of the Moro insurgency 
at-large was a fool’s errand.  Attempts to eliminate ASG’s leaders had not alleviated the 
permissive conditions in the Philippines as much as advertise their continued utility.  
Faced with a concerted campaign by the AFP and United States, leaders like Janjalani 
and Solaiman had slipped away from Basilan to again find safe haven under the auspices 
of MILF and outside the reach of government forces.  It is little wonder that faced with its 
own crackdown in Indonesia after the 2002 Bali bombing, JI had sought shelter from the 
storm in Mindanao. 
 The events of late 2004 and 2005 marked a distinct shift in philosophy on the part 
of both the Philippine government and the United States.  Whereas the imperative of 
maintaining the ceasefire with the MILF and fear of unintentional escalation had 
tempered the AFP’s willingness to undertake operations in MILF territory, the peace 
process could also be used to hold the MILF leadership accountable for the actions of its 
more wayward commanders.  The MILF-RP peace process would become an asset for the 
War on Terrorism instead of a potential liability.  The AHJAC was a prime example of 
this.  Rather than letting concern over the MILF turn Mindanao into a terrorist safe 
haven, the parties involved developed mechanism which allowed the War on Terrorism 
to progress without compromising the peace process. 
 2005 did not mark the end of the MILF-RP peace process, but just its beginning.  
The process itself, which continues today, has been fraught with setbacks and often 




autonomy over independence in negotiations, the ever intransigent Commander Kato 
formally broke with the group and formed his own splinter group the Bangsamoro 
Islamic Freedom Fighters.  Despite the exhaustive process and pitfalls yet ahead, 2005 
revealed that the permissive conditions which had made the southern Philippines such a 
convenient base for ASG and JI were gradually being corrected.  Unable to extend its 
own writ in Mindanao, Manila and the MILF found a way to work together to police the 
territory.  Similarly, as the United States guided the peace process as best it could, it also 
furnished the development assistance and institution building needed to improve the lives 
of citizens throughout the region.  Lastly, owing to American training and assistance, the 
AFP was finally emerging as an effective fighting force.  Capable of conducting complex 
operations which directly struck at its targets, the AFP was no longer a corrupt and poorly 
maintained paper tiger.  Across the board, the political, economic and military factors 
which had perpetuated Mindanao’s reputation as ungoverned territory were gradually 
being rectified.   
That Janjalani and his compatriots again managed to steal away to the Sulu 
Archipelago indicated how far these improvements still had to go.  Any yet, four years 
into the War on Terror, the number of safe harbors in the Philippines open to the ASG 
commander were steadily dwindling. 
US-RP Defense Diplomacy Comes of Age:  
 
Sustaining the War on Terror: 
Even as improving conditions on Basilan and Mindanao testified to the utility of 




numerous polls showing public support in the Philippines for counterterrorism 
cooperation with the United States, this enthusiasm did not negate lingering concerns 
about Philippine sovereignty nor erase the memory of past American misdeeds.151  From 
its onset Operation Enduring Freedom –Philippines had been a two front war waged 
against both terrorist groups active in the archipelago as well as the storm of public 
opinion.  To succeed, the United States needed to aptly manage its relationship with the 
Filipino people while at the same time combating the most extreme elements in their 
midst. 
Defense diplomacy played a critical role in this endeavor. The overall strategy of 
emphasizing cooperation and collaboration as a means of defeating a shared opponent 
illustrated an alternative mode of defense relationship which stood in stark contrast to the 
often patronizing rapport of the Cold War.  As much as individual activities sought to 
improve AFP capabilities, the dominant theme was one of bilateral partnership rather 
than subservience.  Joint military exercises and training programs highlighted this 
phenomenon and were an increasingly common occurrence.  26 such activities were 
undertaken in 2005 alone and that total was expected to increase considerably in 2006.152  
These exercises also provided real improvements in Philippine security force which were 
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apparent even in areas outside of Mindanao.  Five years after the Das Palmas raid, the 
AFP had comprehensively overhauled maritime security around Palawan with American 
help (Palawan had hosted part of Balikatan 2004), and now the island was judged secure 
from both terrorist and criminal infiltration.153  According to Arroyo’s Executive 
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, “regular joint military exercises between the Philippines and 
the US, which are accompanied by humanitarian and civic projects, have made residents 
more receptive to American initiatives.”154  To further promote a wider appreciation of 
such contributions by U.S. forces to Philippine security, both governments actively 
engaged in public diplomacy efforts to educate the population.  The DND launched a 
public communications effort in 2005 titled “freedom from fear” about the benefits of 
enhanced US-RP counterterrorism cooperation.155  Furthermore, both the American 
embassy and Philippine government commissioned documentaries detailing the work of 
USAID and JSOTF- P in Basilan and Jolo as a means of improving popular 
perceptions.156  
 The most effective means of altering public perceptions of the American military 
presence in the Philippines was their active participation in humanitarian operations 
                                                 
153 Telegram from Kenney (Manila) to State, No. 2302, “Palawan: Confidence about Security Five Years 
After Dos Palmas,” 2 June 2006.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/].  
154 Paolo Romero, “RP wants more American assistance for Mindanao,” Philippine Star, 5 May 2005. 
155 Telegram from Ricciardone (Manila) to State, No. 286, “AFP/DND Talks Produce Progress on 
Counterterrorism Scenarios,” 19 January 2005. Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]. 
156 Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 5510, “Scene Setter for Director of National Intelligence 
Negroponte,” 28 November 2005. Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/];  Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 72, “Arroyo Showcases 
US-Philippine Partnership on Jolo and Defends VFA,” 9 January 2007.  Accessed via, Wikileaks Public 





throughout the country.  An unfortunate reality of the Philippine geography is its 
vulnerability to a bevy of natural disasters including typhoons, earthquakes, landslides 
and volcanic eruptions.  Despite the regularity of such occurrences, each event constitutes 
a distinct tragedy characterized by its own desperate race to provide relief to those 
affected.  American forces present in the Philippines or stationed nearby were frequently 
dispatched in the wake of these disasters to provide immediate assistance through rescue 
and recovery operations.  This had been the case in December 2004 when, despite the 
ongoing fallout from the Philippine withdrawal from Iraq, American forces from 
Okinawa had immediately been dispatched to help after a series of landslides on Luzon.  
Recalled Undersecretary Oban of the event “right there, I felt the joint-ness of the United 
States and the Philippines.”  Added Oban, 
This time it was real life – and you could see the impact of the exercises. You 
could see immediately how both parties reacted quickly and could already see 
how each one would act in accordance with the situation on the ground – 
coordination was quick, there was already a framework of relationships and it 
went well.157 
 
A similar event occurred during the winter of 2006 when on February 17, a 
massive landslide buried the village of Guinsaugon on Leyte leaving an estimated 1,800 
people missing and feared dead.158  Coinciding with the start of Balikatan 2006, the 
American forces then arriving in the Philippines were diverted to Leyte to provide 
assistance.  The American disaster response and relief effort included two navy warships, 
two additional supply ships, nearly two dozen helicopters and 1,100 marines.  The group 
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worked feverishly to try and rescue a buried school where it was believed 246 people, 
mostly children, had been trapped.159  American concern for the tragedy in Guinsaugon 
reached the highest levels of the Bush administration.  Secretary Rumsfeld took special 
interest in the relief mission and President Bush also called President Arroyo to discuss 
the situation and offer his condolences over the tragedy.160 
American humanitarian assistance and engagement with the Philippine people 
was not confined to the wake of natural disasters.  Civil-Military Operations continued 
throughout the country and particularly in vulnerable areas like Tawi-Tawi which had 
long been a key transit route for both ASG and JI.  For example during a two-day civic 
engagement operation on Tawi-Tawi in August 2005, US and AFP forces, “saw almost 
3,000 patients, built furniture for 2 schools, distributed 1000 text books and identified 
288 for elective surgery (through surgical charities).”161 
Naval ship visits proved to be a critical tool of both geopolitics and public 
diplomacy.  In the realm of statecraft, ship visits signaled continued American 
engagement with the Philippines and the importance that it attached to the defense 
relationship.  Julio Amador offered insight into how Filipinos perceived these naval 
stopovers, “ship visits are very important to the region and everyone wants to let other 
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countries know that ‘hey we’re being visited by great powers – you shouldn’t try and 
threaten us.’”162  Each visit also constituted an act of public diplomacy which was often 
accompanied by festivals and tours of the ships for local citizens.  According to Amador, 
“the people love them,” adding that the ship visits “are evidence of our friendship.”163  
The potent combination of humanitarian aid and ship visits was illustrated in May 
2006, when the USNS Mercy, a naval hospital ship, conducted an extended tour of the 
Philippines. During her five month long Pacific Partnership goodwill cruise, the Mercy 
made port calls throughout South Pacific and provide medical care to the local 
populations.  In the Philippines, Mercy stopped in the Zamboanga Straits where it 
provided medical care to the residents of both Basilan and the Zamboanga peninsula.  It 
also visited Sulu and Tawi Tawi.164  As an added nod to public diplomacy, the Mercy’s 
crew contained many Filipino-Americans who worked as goodwill ambassadors between 
the two countries.165  Mercy’s visit was cheered as a success by visitors like President 
Arroyo and Secretary Cruz who each toured the ship.  Arroyo even mused about having 
her presidential yacht converted to a hospital ship.166  Such high profile ship visits paired 
with humanitarian assistance emerged as an important means for the United States to 
engage with the wider Philippine population and shift the popular narrative of US-RP 
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defense cooperation away from its checkered past and towards its mutually beneficial 
present.167 
 Unfortunately, efforts to change how US-RP defense ties were popularly 
perceived were not without setback.  A particularly challenging episode occurred after 
Lance Corporal Daniel Smith and three other American Marines were accused of raping a 
Filipino girl in the Subic Bay Freeport on the evening of November 1, 2005.168  As much 
as the sordid details of the incident attracted public attention, the case gained political 
significance as the Visiting Force Agreement affords U.S. servicemen in the Philippines 
significant legal privileges when charged with a crime.  Particularly galling in this 
situation was the VFA’s requirement that Smith and his fellow Marines remain in 
American custody at the embassy during the trial rather than being surrendered to 
Philippine authorities.169  Anger over this seemingly preferential treatment led to street 
protests outside the embassy.  Seizing upon the rancor, opponents in the Philippine 
Congress demanded the complete abrogation of the VFA or at least its renegotiation to 
strip American servicemen of their special legal privileges.170  Smith was found guilty in 
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early December and sentenced to 40 years in jail.  He was then immediately sent to a 
Philippine prison to the dismay of American officials who believed that under the VFA 
they should retain custody of Smith.171  Under the VFA, the United States was to 
maintain custody of all suspects until the completion of all judicial proceedings.  While 
Smith had been convicted, he immediately filed for appeal and the United States asserted 
that under the terms of the VFA the judicial process was still ongoing and thus Smith 
should remain in American custody.172  After a judge reaffirmed Smith’s detention in the 
Philippines, Admiral Fallon and the United States took the unprecedented step of 
unilaterally cancelling the Balikatan 2007 exercises in order to force the issue.  The 
American positon stated that Balikatan and all other exercises were on hold until the 
government could ensure the protection of all participating American troops in line with 
the conditions of the VFA.173  President Arroyo ultimately backed the American stance 
and ordered Smith to be transferred to the U.S. Embassy thus defusing the crisis.  Smith’s 
return to American custody led both to the reinstatement of all pre-planned exercises 
including Balikatan, and renewed demands to revise the VFA.174  
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 Despite its ugliness, the Corporal Smith case actually indicated that American 
efforts to change perceptions about the defense relationship were working.  Amid the 
rancor over who should have custody of Smith, several prominent politicians vocally 
defended the VFA and the good that it did.  Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Zosimo 
Paredes who served as the Executive Director of the Presidential Commission on the 
Visiting Forces Agreement championed retaining the VFA and its advantages.  
Specifically citing Balikatan 2006, Paredes urged that “the VFA continues to serve the 
Philippines and Filipino People.  We are benefiting so much from the exercises with our 
American friends.”175  Even the apparent peevishness of American officials temporarily 
canceling Balikatan 2007 underscored precisely how much defense cooperation benefited 
the Philippines.  In the immediate aftermath of the cancellation, government officials, 
especially in Jolo bemoaned the move and the loss of important American aid projects 
which accompanied the exercises.176  The appreciation that such comments showed for 
the positive contributions made by US-RP defense cooperation to Filipino lives did not 
mollify the strong emotions surrounding the Smith case, but did at least show how the 
understanding of America’s military activities in the Philippines had evolved since the 
Cold War. 
Moving Forward with Defense Cooperation: 
Disaster relief, civic engagement and ship visits helped to alter how the American 
military presence in the Philippines was popularly perceived, but did nothing to alter the 
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constitutional dilemma which had stalked OEF-P since its inception.  That most Filipinos 
approved of joint counterterrorism cooperation was secondary to the fundamental 
question of whether such activities were even legal under Philippine law.  Uncertainty 
about precisely what kind of actions American servicemen could conduct in the 
Philippines, how close they could get to combat and the conditions surrounding their 
deployment had already led to notable controversies like the Balikatan 03-1 and had yet 
to be resolved.  Finally settling the legal parameters for American forces aiding in 
counterterrorism efforts stood as one of Secretary Cruz’s core priorities and a key 
component of the Kapit Bisig strategy.   
The goal of the staff meetings held in January 2005 between Pacific Command, 
the AFP and the DND had been to discuss expanding American involvement in 
counterterrorism operations and placing such activities within a defined legal framework.  
The second set of meetings occurred in late February and centered on developing specific 
counterterrorism cooperation scenarios where U.S. forces could actively contribute to 
operations.  For example, navy and marine officers discussed developing an “operational 
box” in parts of Mindanao where U.S. navy ships could stage combined operations with 
the Philippine navy.  The potential legality of each scenario was then assessed with each 
ranked as being unassailably legal under Philippine law, borderline legal or potentially 
illegal.  The example of the operational box concept for joint U.S. naval operations was 




specific details of its implementation.177  The shared objectives on both the American and 
Philippine sides were to identify the most forward and active forms of joint 
counterterrorism cooperation possible whilst remaining within the confines of the law.  
Those scenarios judged to be purposefully pushing the limits of legality were called “3rd 
course of action scenarios.”  As explained by Undersecretary Santos who was present at 
these meetings and an advocate of this process, “we came up with a test of what activities 
under the VFA were within the law, what was at the law and how can we stretch it to be 
under the law – and we were successful in this approach.”178 
Specific details of scenarios judged to be legally viable were fleshed out during a 
third round of talks in March and a visit by Admiral Fallon in June.179  Both sides 
expected legal challenges to American counterterrorism assistance from opponents inside 
the Philippine Congress and began to develop both legal defense strategies for each 
specific scenario as well as detailed refinements to bring the activities within the confines 
of Philippine law.  For 3rd course of action scenarios like the maritime box strategy these 
refinements included posting Philippine naval officers onboard U.S. naval ships who 
would be responsible for coordinating joint activities and interdiction operations.180  
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Secretary of National Defense Cruz played a central role in developing this approach.  
The American embassy was consistently impressed by Cruz’s willingness to tackle tough 
policy questions in US-RP defense relations and work to find practical solutions to 
political and legal obstacles which had long hamstrung counterterrorism cooperation.  
Given his own legal expertise, Cruz was essential on developing a formal legal 
framework for enhanced cooperation under the auspices of the existing Mutual Defense 
Treaty and Visiting Forces Agreement.181  
 Despite the progress made in bilateral talks, the imperative of getting the legal 
question right remained.  The central legal dilemma facing joint counterterrorism 
operations and enhanced cooperation was that it simply did not comport with the original 
sentiments of the MDT or the VFA.  Both of the bilateral agreements had been crafted 
when the primary threat to the Philippines had been external in nature and the documents 
reflect this orientation.  While both had been stretched to encompass internal threats from 
within the Philippines and these extensions had been upheld by the Supreme Court, the 
fact remained that be it counterterrorism or disaster relief the legal permissibility of 
American involvement remained contested.  As such, political pressure in Manila, 
especially from Senate foreign relations committee chair person Miriam Santiago and 
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, worried the DND.  “Legally speaking, we cannot afford even 
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one thing to go wrong or the entire edifice of the MDT and VFA could fall down,” 
warned Undersecretary of National Defense for Legal and Priority Affairs Rodel Cruz.  
He added that the “‘Kapit Bisig' proposal for upgraded [Philippine] and [American] 
counterterrorism cooperation could benefit from a more solid legal framework under 
which to operate.”182   
Rather than skirt the legal issue as had been attempted in 2003 with calamitous 
results, Secretary Cruz determined to settle the matter.  In December 2005 he flew to the 
United States to meet with both PACOM in Hawaii and Secretary Rumsfeld in DC.  
There he discussed the importance of the PDR, plans for expanded counterterrorism 
cooperation as well as his designs for a new legal framework to encompass the evolving 
state of US-RP defense relations.183  
 Cruz’s proposal was for the creation of the Security Engagement Board or SEB.  
The SEB would be modelled on the Mutual Defense Board established under the 
MDT.184 The U.S. Embassy explains the distinction thusly:   
The Mutual Defense Board provides continuing inter-governmental machinery for 
direct liaison and consultation on military matters of mutual concern to develop 
and to improve both countries’ common defense. The Security Engagement Board 
on the other hand, provides the framework and mechanism for continuing liaison 
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and consultation on non-traditional threats to security such as terrorism, 
transnational crimes, maritime security, and natural and man-made disasters.185 
 
Whereas the MDB would remain focused on traditional security threats, the SEB would 
replace the ad hoc approach to non-traditional threats which had been practiced since 
9/11.  This would give “the AFP the constitutional protection needed to justify its 
activities, if required, to the Philippine Senate.”186  Perhaps most significantly, Cruz 
believed that the implementation of the SEB would not need to be passed by the 
Philippine Congress, but could be accomplished via an exchange of diplomatic notes and 
an Executive Order from President Arroyo.187  
 The SEB concept was unveiled publicly in May 2006 and characterized as a 
mechanism for US-RP cooperation on all nontraditional security issues such as terrorism, 
piracy, transnational crime and natural disasters.  Officials emphasized that the SEB did 
not constitute a new treaty but was simply “an institutional framework” to cover matters 
not specifically cited by the MDT and VFA.188  When critics charged that the SEB 
needed to be ratified by the Senate, Cruz retorted that no ratification was necessary since 
“in essence, it is just a venue where you can talk, discuss and consult on what activities 
the Philippine government is going to agree to cooperate (on) with the US.  It does not 
entail any change in policy.”189  Functionally, the SEB would coincide with the regular 
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meetings of the Mutual Defense Board and be attended by the same government 
representatives.  For example both the MDB and SEB were co-chaired by the AFP Chief 
of Staff and the PACOM commander.  Cruz explained the dichotomy this way prior to 
the SEB’s first meeting on June 10, “in the first hour, they will discuss preparations for 
external armed attack and in the second hour they will discuss how to address non-
traditional concerns.”190   
During the first SEB meeting, the Board endorsed enhanced counterterrorism 
cooperation and began to formulate a plan for combined counter-terrorism and 
humanitarian activities to be carried out in the Philippines.  In early July, Secretary Cruz 
announced that he and Rumsfeld had agreed to conduct an expanded joint military 
exercise later in 2006 and that the Terms of Reference had already been agreed to. 
Instead of Balikatan, which was the purview of the MDB, the new exercises would focus 
on nontraditional security and counterterrorism under the auspices of the SEB and be 
known as “Kapit Bisig” 191  The switch from the ad hoc approach, known as 
“Bayanihan,” to Kapit Bisig would occur in August and would include an expansion of 
both war game and humanitarian activities based on the Basilan model.192 
 Even before the Kapit Bisig program began, it was a personal triumph for 
Secretary Cruz.  Within two years of assuming his post he had revolutionized his 
department, the AFP and the defense relationship with the United States. The vigor with 
which Cruz attacked and rectified the ills that had hamstrung joint US-RP 
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counterterrorism efforts since 9/11 warrants particular praise.  Since 9/11, US-RP defense 
cooperation had been trapped on a limb of questionable legality that alternately 
hamstrung joint counterterrorism efforts or led to humiliating events like Balikatan 03-1.  
Uniquely, Cruz did not seek to avoid the challenges to American activities in the 
Philippines, but rather sought to place the entirety of OEF-P on a firm legal footing.  As 
with the PDR, Cruz did not get mired in the minutia of individual critiques, but rather 
worked with his staff and PACOM to design an institutional framework in the SEB that 
accommodated both the specific counterterrorism scenarios of immediate concern as well 
as the long term performance of the US-RP alliance.  Such maneuvers in themselves 
would not win the War on Terror in the Philippines, but they ensured that joint 
counterterrorism operations could commence in earnest after five years of uncertainty.  
The Battle for Jolo: 
 
Ghosts of Missteps Past: 
 From the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines, the southern island 
of Jolo in the Sulu archipelago had held a significance for the American counterterrorism 
efforts that far exceeded the island’s deceptively placid shore.  As much as shades of 
American imperialism and its aftermath colored the bilateral relationship, there were few 
places in the country where the ghosts of historic misdeeds were more palpable than on 
Jolo.  During the Moro War from 1898 to 1913, Jolo had been the site of repeated 
pacification efforts including the infamous Bud Dajo Massacre in 1906 during which 




Pershing in 1913.193  Memories of these events remained alive on Jolo and were 
inescapable.  Since the early days of the War on Terror, commentators openly wondered 
whether history had so poisoned the well of public sentiment on Jolo as to make any 
American military presence on the island untenable.194 
 Nor was the United States alone in having a complicated relationship with the 
Muslim population of Jolo.  Long a hotbed of Moro nationalism, numerous clashes 
between the AFP and the MNLF had occurred on the island including a battle in 1974 for 
control of the island.  Though the battle had been a victory for the national government it 
had devastated the island.195  Fighting between the AFP and factions of the MNLF on 
Jolo became a common occurrence again in the early 2000s.  In both 2001 and 2005, 
MNLF forces loyal to Nur Misuari launched open rebellions against the national 
government in failed attempts to preserve Misuari’s waning authority.  Both uprisings 
centered on Jolo and displaced tens of thousands of people.  The 2005 uprising, launched 
to free the then imprisoned Misuari, had especially worried the United States.  Coming at 
a delicate time in the wider counterterrorism effort in Mindanao, the heavy fighting 
between the AFP and Misuari forces in February and March displaced as many as 50,000 
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residents on Jolo.196  Such episodes not only contributed to the chronic instability of the 
region but exacerbated lingering tensions between the local population and the AFP 
which was seen as a neocolonial army.197   
 Within the purview of the war against Abu Sayyaf, Jolo also become a source of 
ignominy for both the U.S. and the AFP.  The island had been the proposed site of 
Balikatan 03-1 before the entire endeavor had collapsed over the disputed Terms of 
Reference.  Not only had the episode been embarrassing for both capitals, it had also 
stalled the drive for American forces to play a more active role in counterterrorism 
operations.  Whereas gaffes had undone American designs for Jolo, the failure of AFP 
offensives on the island, like 2002’s Operation Endgame, to capture key ASG leaders had 
only further underscored the limitations of the Philippine armed forces.  The legacy of 
these shortcomings when combined with the complicated history of both governments on 
Jolo created apprehension as they embarked on a new effort to combat violent extremist 
groups in Sulu. 
 Despite the collapse of Balikatan 03-1, the United States had never lost sight of 
Jolo as a major area of concern for joint counterterrorism operations.  Throughout the 
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turbulence in the US-RP relationship, JSOTF-P had remained active from its base in 
Manila and continued to provide training for the AFP.  Removed from the active theater 
of operations, the task force had languished despite its ongoing work with the total 
number of American personnel falling to a low of 50-80 in 2004.198  Amid the upsurge in 
terrorist related violence in 2005, JSOTF-P commander, Colonel David Fridorovich, 
ordered an assessment of Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines.  This assessment 
had a profound impact on the American mission and ultimately the role of American 
forces on Jolo.  The review led to the indefinite extension of OEF-P, and a change in how 
it operated.  Fridorovich recommended increasing direct assistance to AFP forces in the 
field and suggested that the same approach used on Basilan be applied to central 
Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago with Jolo in particular being a focus of U.S. efforts.  
In line with these recommendations, in 2005 JSOTF-P relocated its operations from 
Manila to Camp Navarro in Zamboanga where it resumed its advisory role with for 
ongoing AFP operation in Mindanao and provided other assistance.199 
 JSOTF-P had aided AFP operations on Mindanao proper, but Jolo remained the 
primary focus of American interests in the Philippines.  U.S. forces envisioned Jolo as the 
epicenter of terrorist activities in the archipelago with the area around Jolo City in 
particular being deemed a veritable “heart of darkness.”200  Even though military 
operations had fizzled, USAID development programs had continued on the island and 
included road building, village electrification and donating computers to schools.  During 
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a visit in late April 2005 for a ceremony marking the handover of some of these projects, 
Ambassador Ricciardone and Brigadier General David Fridovich, (now Commander of 
Special Operations Command, Pacific) met privately with local leaders including ARMM 
Governor Parouk Hussin, Sulu Governor Benjamin Loong and AFP Southern Command 
Commander Lieutenant General Alberto Braganza.  During the meeting, the Americans 
asked the Philippine officials their thoughts on dispatching an assessment team from 
JSOTF-P to Jolo as a prelude to an America CMO program for the island.  All three of 
the Philippine officials expressed an eagerness for the assessment and believed such an 
initiative would be welcomed by the local population.  Hussin however, cautioned that 
the inhabitants of Jolo were known for their combativeness and would react poorly if it 
appeared that U.S. soldiers were there to “conduct operations against them.”201  Fridovich 
responded that the JSOTF team would be small in size and “would come only if and 
when they are welcomed by the local communities.”202  The meeting with the three 
officials as well as other contacts on Jolo buoyed American plans for the island.  
Ricciardone noted,   
Through our development assistance projects, we have come to know many local 
leaders who have made a choice in favor of peace and stability. US military 
support to improve AFP civil affairs programs could help move relations between 
government and people toward normalcy in this conflict‐affected area. At the 
national level, to a man and woman, all Cabinet‐level leaders involved in 
Mindanao peace, security, and development issues have welcomed the prospect of 
greater US assistance and visibility in Jolo, explicitly including a careful JSOTF‐P 
assessment of community civil affairs needs as related to the security situation.203 
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 American activities on Jolo gained added impetus in late 2005 in conjunction with 
the improving situation on Mindanao.  Confronted by the MILF’s flagging tolerance for 
their presence and its willingness to accommodate aggressive counterterrorism 
operations, militants from both ASG and JI decamped from Mindanao to seek refuge in 
Sulu.  This migration of militants reportedly included leaders like Janjalani who no 
longer felt safe on Mindanao.204  The influx of ASG members resulted in a series of 
major clashes on Jolo in mid-November.  Despite poor weather, the AFP conducted 
offensive operations against ASG locations with assistance from American 
intelligence.205  However, the situation became further complicated when the Misuari 
Breakaway Group joined the fighting against the AFP.  After several weeks, the fighting 
petered out but hostilities had displaced 15,000 Jolo residents.206   
 American forces provided intelligence and communication support to AFP forces 
active on Jolo, but the centerpiece of American engagement on the island continued to be 
civic-engagement.  In November, JSOTF-P elements deployed to Jolo with the goal of 
replicating the “Basilan Model” in Sulu.  Governor Loong reportedly even told American 
officers, “I want in Sulu what you did on Basilan.”207   This initial deployment in 
late 2005 was only the first step in “a multi-year engagement plan aimed at marginalizing 
the terrorists by restoring trust in the AFP and local governments through targeted, 
rapidly implemented infrastructure development projects, improved AFP 
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counterterrorism capabilities and Country Team coordinated strategic communication 
effort.”208  Early activities included mine clearing operations and providing relief services 
for Jolo residents effected by the fighting that winter.209  However, as had been indicated 
in April, the team’s primary task was assessment.  Jolo had been selected to host 
Balikatan 2006 and the JSTOTF-P team was responsible for working with local 
community leaders to identify a host of aid projects which could be undertaken as part of 
the program.   
 With approximately 5,500 U.S. and 2,800 AFP personnel participating, Balikatan 
2006 was “the most robust operation held since 2002.”210  Owing to the still unresolved 
questions about rules of engagement, American forces were kept away from the actual 
fighting and the AFP provided security for the Balikatan activities. American soldiers 
continued to be armed during Balikatan, but there was no longer any discussion of live 
fire exercises or having U.S. advisors joining AFP units on patrol.211  Rather, the focus of 
Balikatan 2006 activities on Jolo remained strictly fixated on civic-engagement.  Only 
about 250 U.S. troops were on Jolo who mostly worked on engineering projects and 
                                                 
208 Telegram from Jones (Manila) to State, No. 190, “Philippines: Counterterrorism Assistance (Part 2),” 13 
January 2006. Accessed via, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
[https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/]. 
209 Thomas Lum, Larry Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. Relations,” 
Congressional Research Services Report RL33233, 10 January 2006; “Sulu residents benefit ffrom RP-US 
medical program,” Philippine Star, 23 December 2005. 
210In addition to the activities on Jolo, there were also combined task force staff exercises in Cebu, and 
cross-training/field training exercises on Luzon.  Cohn, “Lingering Threat,” 44; “5,500 US troops arrive for 
exercises,” Philippine Star, 18 February 2006. 
211 Ibid., “Sulu to host ‘Balikatan 2006’” Philippine Star, 4 January 2006; “No combat for US troops in 
Sulu,” Philippine Star, 5 January 2006; “Military throws tight security for Sulu ‘Balikatan,’” Philippine 




medical missions.  Importantly, Nur Misuari ordered his forces to remain in their camps 
throughout Balikatan and not to interfere with the undertaking.212 
 Balikatan 2006 ran from February 20 to March 5, 2006 and was considered a 
rousing success.213  According to Major Stephen Cohn, “successes of the exercise 
included free medical and dental care to over 11,000 Filipinos, veterinary care for 
animals, as well as the construction of four new school buildings,” and several large 
infrastructure projects which remained after the operation’s completion.214  The residents 
of Jolo were widely appreciative of the American efforts and were reportedly sorry to see 
the end of the exercise.  During the closing ceremony, residents sang songs and expressed 
deep gratitude for the American assistance. Touched by the reception he and his forces 
had received on Jolo despite its reputation, JSOTF-P Commander Colonel James Linder 
pledged:  
Jolo is sending a clear message to everyone that the Tausug want a better life and 
they are willing to do what needs to be done to achieve a brighter future.  With the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines to provide security and assistance, you are only 
beginning to taste the fruits of freedom and prosperity.215 
 
Balikatan 2006 was not the end of American engagement on Jolo, but merely an 
early step in a much larger process.  Indeed, within weeks of Balikatan ending, a follow-
up deployment was expected to continue the engineering and humanitarian programs 
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begun during the exercise.216  Noted Linder in his closing remarks, “I want the world to 
know what we are doing in the Philippines, in Jolo.  We are waging peace and we are 
winning that peace.”217 
OPLAN Ultimatum: 
 Balikatan 2006 was merely a prelude for a far more expansive operation.  As 
Colonel Linder praised the people of Jolo and vowed to help them in their quest for a 
better life, the final arrangements were underway for the establishment of the SEB and 
the implementation of the Kapit Bisig framework.  Despite the formal ending of 
Balikatan 2006, U.S. forces remained active on Jolo, “building deepwater wells, roads 
and schools and conducting medical civic action programs (Medcaps) to build local 
goodwill and turn the population against ASG.”218  These activities provided immediate 
improvements for local residents, but also served as a primer for far larger operations to 
follow under Kapit Bisig. 
 After the SEB’s first formal meeting and authorization of enhanced cooperation, 
Secretary Cruz met privately with the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy in mid-
July to express satisfaction at the successful completion of the Kapit Bisig negotiations.  
The negotiations with the U.S. military had been accompanied by “implementing 
guidelines,” which Cruz viewed as “a standing offer of US assistance that Philippine 
commanders could draw upon, should the need arise, to support their counterterrorism 
operations.”  Cruz was especially interested in the added flexibility of the guidelines 
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afforded which could be used “to accommodate operations necessary to neutralize High 
Value Targets.”  Accordingly, the AFP was already developing potential forms of 
cooperation to use during the exercises “such as joint intelligence fusion and analysis 
centers; joint civil‐military and psychological operations; and use of precision‐guided 
munitions delivered from either AFP or U.S. (with accompanying AFP crew) platforms.” 
219 
 Helping both Cruz and the AFP in the implementation of Kapit Bisig was 
Lieutenant General Hermongenes “Jun” Esperon Jr. the newly minted AFP Chief of 
Staff.  Known as “the Battering Ram,” Esperon had the reputation of a tough combat 
soldier who was both feared and respected by his colleagues.  Esperon was firmly 
committed to the PDR and maintained close ties to President Arroyo owing to his time as 
commander of the Presidential guard.  The American Embassy in particular was pleased 
with Esperon’s ascendance noting that he had “worked closely with US counterparts 
throughout his career,” and though “he is clearly no push-over, we expect this close 
relationship to continue during his service as Chief of Staff.” 220  Perhaps most 
importantly, Esperon’s extensive combat experience, including the capture of Camp 
Abubakar in 2000, would pay dividends as the AFP sought to finally end the terrorist 
presence on Jolo. 
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 Preparations for the campaign on Jolo had begun months in advance.  In 
conjunction with Balikatan 06 and other CMO programs on Jolo, US-AFP forces had 
used the opportunity to increase their information gathering and intelligence efforts on 
the island in order to “develop a clear enemy situation.”221  Based on this information and 
other intelligence, JSOTF-P and the AFP worked closely together to plan a detailed 
attack plan for the island.  Once the plan was set, the US-RP forces conducted detailed 
rehearsals of key aspects of the operation.  According to the RAND Corporation, “the 
AFP had never before conducted or participated in such large-scale, joint combined 
rehearsals,” adding that “the planning, rehearsals, and combined employment of U.S. and 
AFP resources would prove to be key to Operation Ultimatum’s success.”222 
Oplan Ultimatium commenced on August 1, 2006.  A craggy island pockmarked 
by mountains and volcanoes, Jolo is actually two larger islands joined by a narrow waist.  
After receiving intelligence on the location of several high value targets (including 
Janjalani, Patek and Dulmatin who had all reportedly left Mindanao for Jolo), operations 
began with a coordinated strike on ASG camps near Indanan on the western half of the 
island.  
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Figure 18: Map of Jolo 
 
Combining ground troops, artillery and helicopter strikes, AFP forces overran ASG 
camps near Mount Tumatangis in the first week of the operation and quickly took control 
of the mountain itself.223  Coordinated raids with the Philippine National Police in Jolo 
City captured bomb making facilities and led to the death of several known members of 
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ASG’s urban terrorist group.224  At Ultimatum’s forefront were the Light Reaction 
Companies and Marines who had received special training under JSOTF-P.  Recorded the 
embassy, “Light Reaction Companies are conducting night combat patrols, with 
additional quick reaction forces standing by in Jolo City once the location of the terrorists 
is specifically identified.”225 
 The AFP offensive had been designed as a prolonged campaign rather than a few 
quick strikes.226  With a total force of about 5,000 men, AFP units were regularly 
resupplied and rotated in order to sustain pressure on ASG targets.  This constant stress 
denied ASG a chance to regroup and gradually pushed them away from their camps and 
farther north to the vicinity of Patikul.  AFP units repeatedly overran ASG positions 
leading to sustained engagements.  Unlike past offensives, the AFP forces did not break 
contact with ASG, but continued to fight until the ASG fighters broke and were forced to 
retreat. 227  The AFP did incur its own casualties as well and by the end of August, 3 
soldiers had been killed and additional 31 wounded.  As on Basilian, the United States 
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had done its best to keep these government casualties to a minimum by evacuating 
wounded soldiers via helicopter.228  
 In the early hours of September 4, 2006, a team from the Marine Force 
Reconnaissance Company breached the lines of an ASG camp in a pre-dawn raid on 
Luda Hill near Patikul.  The AFP troops had been guided there by American intelligence 
teams and encountered what was believed to be the main body of the ASG force on Jolo 
consisting of between 150-200 fighters.229  The ensuing firefight was one of the largest 
encounters of the entire offensive.  Persistent rumors followed the attack that Janjalani, 
Patek and Dulmatin had been present in the camp at the time of the raid and may have 
been killed or wounded during the engagement.  Though it was not possible at the time to 
confirm such reports, bomb making instructions believed to belong to either Patek or 
Dulmatin were recovered at the camp site.230  Whilst the U.S. Embassy remained 
noncommittal on the subject of high valued targets, it was unreserved in its assessment of 
Oplan Ultimatum’s early returns.  The operations had “provided indisputable evidence,” 
of broader international cooperation between terrorist groups, including “sophisticated 
improvised explosive devices similar to what U.S. troops have encountered in Iraq and 
Afghanistan,” which seemingly attested to ASG and JI’s continued transnational terrorist 
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links.231  The Americans planned to work with their Philippine counterparts to highlight 
the transnational nature of the terrorist threat as a means of depicting the terrorist 
presence as being alien to the archipelago maintaining public support for the offensive in 
Jolo. 
 This recognition of the need to maintain pubic support during the offensive speaks 
to a wider phenomenon which helps account for Ultimatum’s early success.  With the 
War on Terrorism in the Philippines now entering its fifth year, Philippine and American 
officials had the opportunity to learn from past experience and apply those lessons to this 
new undertaking.  Such institutional learning was particularly evident in how the MNLF 
was handled.  Misunderstandings with the MNLF had led to serious clashes the previous 
fall, yet prior to Ultimatum the AFP made a conscious effort to prevent a repeat of that 
misstep and applied the same engagement formula which had worked with the MILF on 
Mindanao the previous year.  The AFP and MNLF reached “a gentleman’s agreement” in 
May which enlisted the MNLF’s help in the forthcoming operation and established an 
informal Ad Hoc Coordinating Group (AHCG) similar to the AHJAG in Mindanao.232  
Working with the MNLF yielded significant benefits during Ultimatium.  In August, 
ASG fighters attempted to flee into MNLF areas in order to avoid pursuit from the AFP.  
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However, the MNLF coordinated with the AFP to relocate its own forces in order to 
avoid accidental clashes and allow the military to pursue its targets unhindered.233   
 Likewise, the AFP worked diligently to prevent the daring escapes which had 
repeatedly foiled past attempts at eliminating high value targets.  On Basilan in 2002, 
Jolo in 2003 and Mindanao in 2005, key ASG and JI leaders had slipped the closing net 
of AFP operations by taking to the sea and resettling on a new island.  Both the U.S. and 
the AFP vowed that this would not happen again during Ultimatum.  The solution was the 
establishment of a naval cordon around the area of the island where operations were 
taking place.  AFP and US navy ships intercepted and searched virtually every vessel 
departing from Jolo.  Hundreds of these interdictions occurred each month during the 
duration of Oplan Utimatium [see chart below].  Boats departing Jolo would be tracked 
and shadowed by either helicopters or U.S. ships who in turn provided an intercept vector 
for Philippine craft to actually stop the boats.  Upwards of 50 ships a day were 
intercepted in this manner and the maritime cordon succeeded in frustrating repeated 
escape attempts by ASG fighters and captured several boats belonging to individuals 
known to have provided logistical support for ASG.234   
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Figure 19: Total Naval Intercepts Reported by U.S. Embassy-Manila 
 
One notable incident occurred in mid-August, when several members of the ASG 
Urban Terrorist Group (UTG) attempted to escape Jolo on a speedboat.  An AFP sniper 
onboard a helicopter fired on the boat and forced it back to shore near the town of Parang.  
A raid the following day resulted in the death of several UTG members.  Although the 
embassy who reported the incident did not specify whether the helicopter had been 
American or Philippine, the prospect of placing AFP snipers onboard U.S. helicopters 
had repeatedly been mentioned as one possible mode of legally-defensible enhanced 
cooperation between U.S. and Philippine forces.235   
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 The United States military and the Joint Special Operation Force –Philippines 
provided critical assistance to the AFP throughout the duration of Oplan Ultimatum. 
American advisors were embedded at the headquarters of Task Force Comet (the combat 
command for Ultimatum) and Southern Command where they furnished advice and 
intelligence support to Philippine units engaged in active operations.236  Advisors were 
also attached to battalion-level headquarters on Jolo itself.  Prior to the operation, the 
rules of engagement had been revised to allow JSOTF-P personnel in combat 
environments “provided that they positioned themselves in locations where they would 
not come into contact with the enemy.”237  In its overview of JSOTF-P operations, the 
RAND Corporation provides an illustration of how this dynamic functioned in practice 
during Ultimatum: 
CPT Herb Daniels led a split team assigned to advise the 51st BN, which was new 
to combat operations and inexperienced in jungle terrain. In the weeks prior to 
Operation Ultimatum, the team focused on improving the unit’s soldier- and unit-
level skills and hardening the base’s fortifications. The battalion had already 
instituted formal courses for its NCOs, which the SOF team took as a heartening 
sign of AFP professionalization; U.S. forces rely heavily on NCOs for tactical 
level leadership. The team also conducted assessments and CMO in the Talipao 
municipality. Although U.S. SOF were prohibited from engaging in combat 
patrols, U.S. forces were permitted to patrol 4 km around their base after dark. 
Initial patrols brought enemy fire, but, after a few weeks of patrolling, the unit 
was no longer taking fire. The activity pushed the ASG out or into a quiescent 
posture. The joint patrols also raised the confidence level of the 51st.238 
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American intelligence fusion teams in particular were repeatedly identified as a 
critical asset to the AFP.  American drones and spy planes patrolled above Jolo and 
supplied real time intelligence to AFP units in the field which could immediately be acted 
upon.239  Chief of Staff Esperon praised the utility of this intelligence fusion and 
informed the Ambassador that the AFP “could not ask for more.”240  One unique program 
attached two FBI agents to JSOTF-P in Zamboanga who helped evaluate materials 
recovered from raids and developed procedures for the handling of such items.241 
 Even though U.S. forces eschewed combat operations, they did provide direct 
support to AFP forces during the offensive.  American helicopters continued medical 
evacuations of wounded soldiers from the battlefield and helped save the lives of 
numerous Filipino soldiers.242   
American forces also participated in the maritime cordon around Jolo.  American Mk-V 
ships and rigid-hull inflatable boats were “fully integrated” into the Philippine naval task 
force, and “provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.”243  Such 
close cooperation was made possible by the joint training exercises like the annual 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercises (CARAT) conducted over the 
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previous years and which had furnished the two countries with an operational familiarity 
in the maritime arena.  The cordon around Jolo not only proved the utility of this 
experience, but the motivation for further cooperation in this area to bolster Philippine 
naval capabilities.244 
 Ongoing CMOs and development programs also continued to yield dividends.  As 
much as infrastructure projects like road construction and harbor renovations were 
designed to stimulate long term development, they provided an immediate boost to AFP 
mobility throughout Ultimatum.245  More importantly, engaging with Jolo’s population 
greatly aided the ongoing quest to win public sympathy for the government and curtail 
local support for the ASG.  Max Boot visited Jolo and commented on some of the actions 
taken to undermine the terrorist mystique:  
Psychological operations specialists showed us two initiatives designed to counter 
the terrorists' propaganda. One is a text messaging campaign (texting is the 
preferred medium of communication here) that encourages recipients to 
participate in peace-promotion programs and report information to Philippine 
authorities on terrorist activities. The other is a slickly produced comic book 
series aimed at 18-to-24-year-old males, the prime recruits for all extremist 
groups, featuring a Jack Bauer-style hero battling villainous terrorists. All of the 
products have to be translated into multiple languages because of the multiplicity 
of regional tongues spoken in these polyglot islands.246 
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Joint US-AFP MedCaps also continued to offer residents medical and dental care.  Noted 
one AFP soldier, “it's important that they don't leave empty handed…we treat those who 
need medical attention, and give vitamins and toothbrushes to those who don't. Everyone 
receives something.”247 Each MedCap would routinely see up to several hundred of 
patients a day and provide critical treatments to long neglected populations.248  A parade 
of U.S. officials including Ambassador Kenney, Admiral Fallon, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen and Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii 
visited Jolo to assess the progress of Ultimatum.  Senator Inouye in particular “enthused 
at the ‘Philippine model’  which extends a ‘hand of friendship’ to local populaces 
afflicted by terrorism through significant humanitarian, development, and civil-military 
assistance, while also strengthening the ‘iron fist’ of military/police capabilities to fight 
terrorists.”249  
 Yet the most valuable contribution of the American forces to Oplan Ultimatum 
was not its own activities, but the effect of its past efforts on the AFP. On Jolo, the 
influence of American defense diplomacy on the AFP was undeniably evident both 
operationally and philosophically.  Historically, AFP campaigns like the capture of Camp 
Abubakar and repressing of the Nur Misuari’s revolts had been typified by the mass 
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movements of large numbers of troops in conventional assaults on rebel strongholds.  By 
way of contrast, during Ultimatum the AFP conducted focused and localized operations 
which were driven by intelligence and designed to minimize collateral damage.250  The 
goal was to prosecute the war against Abu Sayyaf while minimizing disruptions to the 
local population.  The International Crisis Group reported that “an estimated 3,000 
villagers were displaced in August 2006, compared with up to 70,000 during clashes with 
the MNLF in February 2005 and 12,000 during renewed fighting that November.”251 
American training was essential to this evolution.  Brigadier General Juancho 
Sabban, III who was a marine brigade commander made this link explicit stating that “the 
one US-trained marine battalion had adapted the doctrine and tactics it had learned to the 
fight on Jolo and was providing the bulk of the troops hunting the ASG.”  Sabban added 
that the training had been “very very effective” and exactly “what we needed.”252  From 
night-time helicopter missions by AFP pilots to small unit maneuvers, all of the tactics 
which had been at the center of the U.S. train and assistance mission since 2001 were 
utilized on Jolo.  Noted one U.S. officer on Jolo who had also been on Basilan during 
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Balikatan 02-1, “there’s been a marked improvement in four years—this is a different 
AFP.”253  
Perhaps the greatest testament to the influence of American defense diplomacy on 
the AFP was its ability to spur the Philippine military to look beyond the use of force as 
the sole means of combatting terrorism.  General Juancho Sabban offered insights into 
the AFPs historic approach: 
For three decades we were using a strategy of force… It turned out to be a vicious 
cycle. We would have body count syndrome. Commanders would become 
popular because they were warrior-like. But I saw the more we destroyed, the 
more the number of the enemy increased. There were so many instances of 
collateral damage and innocent lives being sacrificed. Just by passing through 
fields with so many battalions we were already stomping on crops and that makes 
people resent the military. In the course of a firefight school buildings would get 
burned, houses would be razed to the ground, civilians caught in the crossfire. 
Everything was blamed on the military.254 
 
A key objective of American defense diplomacy efforts in the Philippines had been to 
correct this antagonistic cycle between the AFP and the Moro population by instilling 
civil-military operations as a critical component of all AFP undertakings. This endeavor 
began in earnest on Mindanao in 2005, where JSOTF-P developed as “a comprehensive 
plan to bolster AFP civil-military operations capabilities in the Sulu Archipelago and 
Central Mindanao.”255  The plan supported the AFP’s own initiatives “to improve its 
ability to meet the needs of disaffected populations in conflict-affected areas,” and would 
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operate in conjunction with existing USAID efforts.256  Later, Khaled Musa, the deputy 
chairman of the MILF committee on information, commented that the AFP’s use of 
CMOs was “more lethal than brute force” to the MILF.257 
A targeted civic action program on Tawi-Tawi in August 2005 served as a model 
for what would ultimately be implemented on Jolo.  In two days, the joint AFP-US effort 
“saw almost 3,000 patients , built furniture for 2 schools, distributed 1,000 text books and 
identified 288 for elective surgery (through surgical charity).”258  As important as the 
enthusiastic response of the people of Tawi-Tawi had been, for the Americans the process 
itself was the critical benefit. “These types of programs bolster the AFP’s own ability to 
conduct civic/military operations successfully - - one of the objectives of the Philippine 
Defense Review program –as well as help to (re-) establish the links between the 
Philippine governments and people.”259 
 Throughout Oplan Ultimatum, Joint US-AFP civic action programs were relied 
upon to both engage with the local population and burnish the credibility of the 
Philippine government.  When residents were displaced by fighting, it was Philippine 
government agencies working with NGOs and U.S. personnel who provided medical care 
and relief goods.260  When Assistant Secretary of State Hill visited Jolo, he toured a 
Medcap in Indanan municipality where AFP, U.S. and NGO personnel were providing 
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care to 600 patients.261  A similar AFP led Medcap in December near Pitogo was the first 
of its kind in the area and treated 715 patients.  To show their gratitude, the local 
community delivered lunch to every service member participating in the operation.262   
In his review of OEFP-Operations for PRISM, Major General Geoffrey Lambert 
and his coauthors directly trace the inculcation of CMOs as critical missions within the 
AFP to American defense diplomacy. 
JSOT F-P “advise and assist” efforts helped to professionalize the AFP and 
improve proficiency and professionalism, enabling both the more effective use of 
civil-military operations and the conduct of focused operations with minimized 
collateral damage. International Military Education and Training efforts also 
exposed AFP officers to U.S. doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures that 
aided in operationalizing the intent of the Philippine leaders in their 
counterterrorism campaign. So, while the changes in the AFP approach to more 
carefully conform to human rights considerations and reduce civilian casualties 
was a Philippine-led transformation, JSOTF-P probably provided tools that helped 
the AFP achieve those changes.263 
 
On Jolo, though the presence of American personnel and resources remained 
constant, the impetus continued to be on building the AFP’s credibility.  Max Boot 
reported that the Americans were quick to deflect all credit to their Philippine partners.  
As stated by one sergeant “we want to show what the AFP have done for the people…and 
we want the people to ask what has ASG ever done for us?”264 
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Such sentiments underscored the important role CMOs played in effective 
counterterrorism strategy on Jolo.  As explained by General Sabban: 
I have told my commanders that all military operations should be intelligence-
driven and surgical. How do we do this? Through intelligence enhanced by civil-
military operations. We do civil-military operations to get people onto our side. 
More people on your side will produce more and better intelligence, and if you 
have better intelligence you'll have more successful operations that are precise 
and surgical and that don't hurt innocent civilians. Thus we will get more support 
from the people and you will be denying the enemy resources and space to 
operate. People will drive them from their own areas. So now their space is 
getting smaller and smaller, until we can pinpoint them with information coming 
from the people themselves.265 
  
And it worked.   
Throughout the months of Oplan Ultimatium, continued civil-military operations 
helped improve the AFP’s reputation on Jolo and sever ASG’s support network. Colonel 
Linder reported, “the biggest change I have seen is the people are coming together and 
teaming up with the government, the PNP, AFP, and getting together to go after the Abu 
Sayyaf, JI…that’s the biggest change.”266  Instead of aiding Abu Sayyaf, civilians began 
to provide intelligence about their locations.  This was encouraged through the heavy 
dispersal of Rewards for Justice Leaflets which advertised the hefty cash rewards offered 
for information on the whereabouts of Janjalani, his deputy Abu Solaiman, Umar Patek, 
and Dulmatin.267  The AFP conducted a series of raids based on locally sourced 
information throughout Ultimatum including one in early October on a safe house near 
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the town of Patikul, where the AFP captured Istiada Oemar Sovie, one of Dulmatin's 
wives, who was also “believed to be a major link in terrorists' logistics network.”268 
 As the duration of Oplan Ultimatum expanded from weeks to months, the changes 
in the AFP became more apparent.  In October, the Embassy noted of Ultimatum that 
“while not yet meeting with full success, the AFP has shown remarkable determination in 
keeping its troop in the field and its ships at sea.”269  Aggressive patrols by the AFP 
marines, scout rangers and LRCs doggedly pursued ASG fighters across Jolo, leading to 
numerous engagements.  Improved logistics made this possible as the AFP was able to 
sustain operations for a prolonged period which ASG could not match.270  Exhaustion and 
desperation increasingly took their toll on ASG.  On October 20, three malnourished 
ASG members deserted Janjalani’s group and turned themselves over to the AFP 
claiming that they had been misled.  The three had wanted to turn in Janjalani himself for 
the reward money, but unfortunately didn’t know where he was hiding.271  By mid-
December fresh troops from the 2nd Marine brigade were dispatched to maintain AFP 
operations.  From August to December 15 the AFP had lost 22 soldiers and had another 
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103 wounded in action.  Abu Sayyaf had reportedly lost 31 fighters, but the actual 
number was suspected to be considerably higher.272 
 As impressive as Ultimatum appeared from an operational perspective, it 
continued to teeter on the brink of failure.  Despite all of the AFP’s improved capabilities 
and new strategy, Janjalani and the other high value targets remained at-large.  Without 
actually eliminating the ASG’s leadership, Ultimatum appeared destine to join the ranks 
of Balikatan 02-1 and Oplan Endgame which had been impressive efforts but ultimately 
failed to eliminate ASG as a threat.  Fortunately, Oplan Ultimatum’s prospects improved 
dramatically in January 2007.  A series of events unfolded in rapid succession which 
cemented Oplan Ultimatum’s status as a major GWOT success. 
 On the night of January 6, a boat carrying a group of militants fleeing Jolo 
attempted to run the naval cordon and reach Tawi Tawi.  The boat was intercepted off of 
Tawi-Tawi’s coast and a firefight ensued.  All six of the militants onboard were killed 
including two known ASG commanders (Abu Hubaida and Jundam Jumalul) as well as 
close associates of both Janjalani and Dulmatin.273  The episode demonstrated that the 
naval cordon worked and that Janjalani and his compatriots would not easily escape from 
Jolo.  On January 9, AFP forces raided a safe house near Patikul and killed Binang Sali 
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(aka Abu Freedom) who was the head of ASG’s urban terrorist group and an important 
lieutenant within ASG.  The U.S. embassy concluded 
The January 6 and January 9 actions reflect the Philippine military's increasing 
ability -- with U.S. help -- to link intelligence to operations. Both operations also 
demonstrated improved operations security and compartmentalization, as well as 
the determination of the Philippine government -- with President Arroyo's full and 
highly visible support… to go after all terrorists in the Philippines, including the 
high-value targets still believed to be in hiding in northeast Jolo.274 
 
These victories were soon followed by the death of Abu Solaiman, Abu Sayyaf’s 
second in command and spokesman, on January 16, 2007.275  According to the Rand 
Corporation, Solaiman’s downfall actually began nearly a year earlier in March 2006, 
when ASG conducted a bombing operation against a food co-op in Jolo City which killed 
3 people and wounded at least 20 others.  After the attack, which killed Muslim civilians, 
the wife of a mid-ranking ASG member chastised her husband for belonging to a group 
which so wantonly killed Muslims while failing to provide adequately for their families.  
The wife then brought her husband leaflets advertising the American Rewards for Justice 
Program which offered a $5million bounty for information leading to Abu Solaiman.  
The ASG member became an informant and provided intelligence about Solaiman’s cell 
phone which eventually led to his location and the January 16 raid.276  The raid was a 
particularly daring affair with AFP forces infiltrating an ASG camp on top one of Jolo’s 
highest mountains through driving rain.  Afterwards, both Chief of Staff Esperon and 
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Executive Secretary Ermita cited American training and assistance as “the key factors in 
their growing successes in combating terrorism.”277   
Gracia Burnham even offered a rare statement following Solaiman’s death.  She 
stated that her former captor “now faces judgement by God,” adding that “based on the 
six months I had close contact with Sulaiman [sic] during our year of captivity, I would 
say he was the most dangerous of the Abu Sayyaf leaders because he was filled with 
hate.”278  President Arroyo would later describe Solaiman as “the brains” behind ASG 
adding “he was the intellectual of the group and really the head.”279  
The celebrations around Solaiman’s death were soon eclipsed with news that 
Khaddafy Janjalani had also been killed.  In late December, four ASG fighters had 
surrendered to AFP forces.  The captives led officials to a burial site near Barangay 
where they claimed Janjalani had been buried.  The location was about 2 kilometers from 
the site of the September 4, engagement on Luda Hill.  According to the prisoners, 
Janjalani had been killed in the battle and quickly buried.  However, the AFP treated this 
information with a degree of skepticism since past rumors of Janjalani’s demise had so 
often turned out to be false.280  On January 19, DNA testing by the FBI in consultation 
with Philippine experts confirmed that the skeletal remains recovered from the grave 
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were indeed Khaddafy Janjalani.281  For months the AFP had scoured the mountains of 
Jolo in pursuit of the elusive Abu Sayyaf leader when in reality he had died during the 
first weeks of Oplan Ultimatum and had been slowly decaying in a shallow grave. 
A Shared Victory: 
Confirmation of Khaddafy Janjalani’s death arrived like the monsoon rains after a 
long drought.  President Arroyo stated that Janjalani’s death marked the “mortal turning 
point for Abu Sayyaf.”  She added, “all in all, Armed Forces tactical prowess, the fusion 
of intelligence and training with the United States and our allies in the region and most of 
all, the vigilant support of the people and communities have combined to breach the 
deadly ring of evil, put its cells in disarray and laid them open for the final blow.”282  
Executive Secretary Ermita suggested that “the world of terrorists in the Philippines or 
even in the region is getting smaller every day.”283  A few days later, President Bush 
called to congratulate Arroyo on the downfall of her nemesis and praised her ongoing 
leadership in the fight against terrorism.284 
The death of Janjalani and other high-ranking ASG leaders were triumphs for the 
Philippine government, but ones in which the United States had played an indispensable 
role.  With the confirmation of Janjalani’s death the Embassy recorded, “while this was a 
truly Philippine counterterrorism success, [JSOTF-P] directly assisted in planning 
‘Operation Ultimatum,’ and they and other relevant [American] agencies provided 
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constant intelligence support, operations advice, and assistance since the start of the 
operation in August 2006.”  The Embassy further noted that American programs, “have 
played a key role in separating terrorists from the population and creating an environment 
in which the local population did not defend, shelter, or otherwise assist these wanted 
terrorists.”285 
For her part, President Arroyo did not obscure the role that the United States 
played in Oplan Ultimatum’s success but repeatedly cited American assistance as being 
critical to the mission.  “Our strategic relationship with the US has always been a leading 
point for Philippine and regional security,” observing that  
Our victories against Abu Sayyaf highlight the success of our training and 
intelligence fusion programs with the US and these are reinforced by broader 
programs of peace and development, trade and investment that enlarge the space 
of Philippine security while constricting the space for terror and transnational 
crime.286 
 
Coming in the immediate aftermath of the Lance Corporal Smith case and American 
threats to scrap Balikatan 2007, President Arroyo’s comments left no doubt about the 
value of the US-RP defense relationship or how the Philippines had benefited from the 
alliance. Privately she also express her gratitude to the U.S. to both the Embassy and 
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Karen Hughes, who visited Manila in late 
January.287 
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 On Jolo, operations did not end with the death of Janjalani and Solaiman.  Rather, 
it became a rallying cry within the AFP to continue the offensive with renewed vigor in 
order to eliminate the remaining high value targets like Dulmatin and Patek and finally 
put an end to terrorism in the Philippines.288  With the resolution of the Corporal Smith 
custody issue, Balikatan 2007 moved forward on Jolo in coordination with the still 
ongoing Ultimatum.  Over the subsequent weeks, nearly 400 American soldiers were 
dispatched to Jolo where they focused on engineering projects like drilling new water 
wells and road construction.289 
 On April 1, 2006, eight months after it began, AFP Chief of Staff Esperon 
announced the end of Oplan Ultimatum.  In total the AFP initiated 53 armed clashes 
during Ultimatum which led to the capture of 53 ASG operatives and the death of an 
estimated 144 militants.290  What remained of Abu Sayyaf had splintered into smaller 
groups who continued to be hounded by the AFP.  Indeed, Esperon even informed 
Ambassador Kenney that the “end of operations will only be semantics,” and that the 
AFP had no intention to “let up on the hunt” for wanted terrorists.  He also planned to 
expand civil-military operations on Jolo to further isolate ASG and JI suspects and maybe 
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“fool” them into thinking the AFP was “letting its guard down.”291  Kenney applauded 
this initiative.  “The emphasis on civil‐military operations is astute, and builds on our 
partnership with the AFP in Basilan and now Jolo,” adding that “much of the AFP's 
success on Jolo can be attributed to its careful, targeted efforts to win over the civilian 
population and to its increasingly precise, intelligence‐driven combat operations.”  She 
surmised that, “the AFP's dogged pursuit of the remaining terrorists until they face justice 
(or death in battle) will endure.”292 
Conclusion: 
 
Notably absent amongst the many officials publicly rejoicing at the downfall of 
Janjalani and the success of Operation Ultimatum was Secretary of National Defense 
Avelino Cruz.  Though the primary architect of the Kapis Bisig framework which 
enabled Ultimatum’s success, Cruz played the role of Moses on Mount Nebo who was 
left to witness the triumph of his labors from afar but not himself enjoy their fruits.  Amid 
Oplan Ultimatum, Cruz had been ousted from his position as head of the Department of 
National Defense following a public disagreement with President Arroyo over her plans 
to amend the Philippine Constitution and her unrealistic expectations for the defeat of the 
NPA.293  On November 5, 2006 Cruz had announced his intent to resign his position at 
the end of the month.  
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 In private conversations, Cruz admitted to longstanding differences with Arroyo 
about a host of issues including the constitutional change, the NPA and pace of the PDR.  
Though confident the PDR would continue to move forward, Cruz expressed regret that 
he would not be able to oversee more of the process himself.  He urged the United States 
to remain involved in the reform process and maintain its close level of cooperation with 
the AFP.294  Cruz reinforced these points later in a meeting with Undersecretary of State 
for Political-Military Affairs John Hill.  According to Cruz, the Security Engagement 
Board proved that “a good idea could trump politics.”  Though heartened by the progress 
already made by the PDR, Cruz stressed that “we need to stay focused on what we’re 
doing.”295  For its part, the U.S. delegation in Manila was notably anxious about Cruz’s 
departure.  They had admired his sober guidance of both the PDR and Kapit Bisig 
initiatives.  Politically, the embassy worried about the loss of Cruz’s rare willingness to 
cordially dissent from President Arroyo’s positions and successfully dissuade “her away 
from ill-conceived ideas.”296 
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 Despite the Embassy’s trepidations, Cruz’s greatest achievement only became 
apparent with his exit.  Following the announcement of his resignation, officials 
throughout the Philippine government pledged their continued support for the PDR as an 
essential undertaking.  Executive Secretary Ermita labelled the PDR an “irreversible” 
program of institutional change which the government “remained fully committed to.”297  
President Arroyo, who temporarily assumed the DND portfolio herself after Cruz’s 
resignation, assuaged American fears by firmly committing to the PDR and the 
institutionalization of defense reform.298  AFP Chief of Staff Esperon assumed much of 
the responsibility for the PDR and emerged as the program’s new champion.  In a private 
meeting with Ambassador Kenney in November, Esperon said of Cruz, “I’ll hate to see 
him go,” but conceded that the departure had been necessary after the public 
disagreement with Arroyo.  For his part, Esperon voiced his confidence in his own ability 
to handle the occasionally prickly Philippine President and push forward on key 
initiatives.  Specifically, Esperon expressed a clear determination to continue the PDR as 
well as instill discipline and respect for the rule of law throughout the chain of 
command.299  The firm embedding of defense reform within the fabric of both Philippine 
military and political leadership was a personal triumph for Cruz whose success at 
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institutionalizing the PDR meant that the reform process he had begun would continue 
even though his time in office did not. 
 Whereas the continuation of the PDR was a personal triumph of Secretary Cruz, 
the success of Oplan Ultimatum was a vindication of American defense diplomacy and 
its overall strategy in the Philippines.  For all of the missteps and false starts along the 
way, the persistent engagement with the AFP had finally yielded undeniably positive 
results.  Though these achievements came in a rush during Ultimatum, they constituted 
the result of a multi-year process that had begun during the earliest days of the Global 
War on Terror.  When the first American assessment team arrived in Mindanao in 2001, 
it assessed the operational and institutional changes required to make the AFP an 
effective force in the fight against international terrorism.  From that initial ember grew 
the joint exercises, training missions and civil-military programs which ultimately proved 
so effective on Jolo.  
 Ambassador Kenney seized upon this distinction following the public 
announcement of Janjalani’s death.  In a detailed report to Washington, Kenney stated 
that this singular GWOT victory was “testimony to the effectiveness of our 
comprehensive Mission-wide effort to improve the capacities of the Philippine military 
and, through civil military operations, USAID assistance and public diplomacy, to shrink 
the ASG and JI terrorists’ margin of maneuver into an ever diminishing physical and 
psychological space.”300  Jolo had previously been regarded as ASG’s “most impregnable 
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redoubt” where the militants could operate “with near impunity.” Yet, U.S. civic-
engagement missions like Balikatan and the visit by the USNS Mercy “succeeded in 
isolating the terrorists, who found - to their surprise - the population of Jolo was not 
sympathetic to their cause.”  American assistance through JUSMAG and JSOTF-P 
furnished the critical training and operational planning necessary to make the AFP a 
potent counterterrorism force.  This aid revolutionized how the AFP operated and was 
described as “very critical” by AFP leaders.301  Chief of Staff Esperon explicitly made 
this link in his statement marking the end of Oplan Ultimatum.  He specified that the 
future of AFP operation on Jolo would be based on the American strategy of increased 
civic-engagement in order to fortify local support against the insurgents.302 
However, even with the death of Janjalani, Kenney conceded that the War on 
Terror in the Philippines was not yet over.  “Nonetheless,” she concluded “we can take 
satisfaction in Philippine successes and in the knowledge that many elements of our 
Mission have played a role in this effort.”  She cautioned her superiors in Washington 
that the “final eradication of terrorists from the Philippines required continued intensive 
engagement and support.”303  
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Conclusion: The Sustainable War on Terror 
 
After Ultimatum: 
 Chief of Staff Esperon’s affirmation on the need for ongoing operations turned 
out to be prescient.  Oplan Ultimatum did not end the War on Terror in the Philippines 
nor even on Jolo.  Within weeks of Esperon’s announcement formally halting Ultimatum, 
Abu Sayyaf abducted and beheaded seven road workers.1  Worse soon followed.  The 
AFP’s fragile arrangements with the MNLF and MILF proved to be extremely tenuous.  
During 2007, the truces with both groups frayed leading to clashes throughout the 
Mindanao region.  Typified by some of the worst fighting in nearly a decade, acts of 
terrorism were a frequent feature of the resurgent conflict including the beheading of 14 
AFP marines on the erstwhile pacified Basilan.  The fighting eventually subsided with the 
resurrection of the peace process, but the renewal of hostilities underscored the brittle 
nature of progress in Mindanao.2 
 Though a grim reminder of the unresolved challenges before a lasting peace could 
take hold in Mindanao, it is important not to lose sight of Oplan Ultimatum’s 
achievements amid the turbulent course of the larger Moro-Philippine conflict.  Abu 
Sayyaf survived Ultimatum, but as a vastly diminished entity.  The combined losses of its 
leadership group, operational expertise and sanctuary deprived Abu Sayyaf of its ability 
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to conduct complex attacks.  Lacking in both fervor and know-how, Abu Sayyaf 
devolved back into a criminal band with only the thinnest veneer of Islamist ideology.  
No longer capable of sophisticated operations, ASG reverted to its historic practice of 
kidnap-for-ransom schemes as its primary hallmark.  Though punctuated by the 
occasional beheading, ambush of a government target, or rare use of an improvised 
explosive device, Abu Sayyaf endures only as a shadow of its previous self.3   
 Dulmatin and Patek, the two principle JI targets on Jolo, both survived Oplan 
Ultimatum but their respective fates speak to the wider achievement of the operation.  
Broadly circulated rumors that either or both of the JI leaders had been killed on Jolo 
proved unfounded.4  However, finding the Philippines to no longer be a welcoming 
haven, each eventually fled the country hoping to find shelter abroad.  Dulmatin was 
killed in Indonesia in March 2010.  Less than a year later, in January 2011, Pakistani 
authorities arrested Patek.  Umar Patek had been staying in Abbottabad where Osama bin 
Laden himself was firmly ensconced prior to his own demise a few months after Patek’s 
arrest.  It was a disappointment that Dulmatin and Patek both managed to evade 
Philippine authorities.  Yet that each was compelled to flee the country illustrates the 
changes in Mindanao.  From its past status as a country of convenience and safe harbor, 
the Philippines had emerged as inhospitable territory for transnational terrorists.  
 As for Oplan Ultimatum itself, neither it nor OEF-P in general has been wholly 
free of detractors despite its achievements.  As quick as officials were to champion the 
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influence of civic engagements programs for winning over the general population, several 
commentators have dissented from this verdict.  The International Crisis Group notes that 
many residents disliked the militarized, top-down approach to civil-military operations 
which failed to adequately account for local perspectives.  Relates the ICG, “lack of 
community consultation in planning civic action, and its non-participatory approach, 
deprive it of sustainable, long term impact- which is not even good counterinsurgency.”5     
 Other critics like Alfred McCoy and Herbert Docena took umbrage at the overall 
approach of American forces in the Philippines.  In Policing America’s Empire, McCoy, 
a historian, traces the evolution of American policing methods in the Philippines.  He 
argues that since colonial rule, the Philippines has functioned as a laboratory for 
American intelligence, surveillance and enforcement tactics which have then be applied 
in other countries as well as repatriated back into the United States.  For McCoy, OEF-P 
represented only the latest iteration of this evolutionary process in policing tactics.     
Docena expresses grave concern over the apparent disparity between public 
statements about the American role in Mindanao and its actual activities.  This gap 
engendered a deep distrust of the American military presence, its actions and their 
legality.  Docena strongly argues that American “unconventional warfare” in the 
Philippines is still a form of offensive warfare waged against Filipinos even if American 
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soldiers were not themselves pulling the trigger.6  More importantly, Docena rejected the 
larger War on Terror narrative and saw OEF-P as a prelude to a prolonged American 
military presence in the Philippines designed principally to further Washington’s standing 
as a super power rather than Filipino interests.7  Such objections epitomized the 
checkered legacy of the United States in the Philippines and the continued skepticism of 
Washington’s motives in the archipelago.   
A more acute criticism characterized the impact of OEF-P within the realm of 
Philippine domestic politics and the nature of state power.  McCoy and East among 
others argue that the War on Terrorism in the Philippines primarily served to strengthen 
the Presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who manipulated the conflict to her 
advantage.  Specifically, Arroyo and her compatriots manipulated the War on Terror for 
their political advantage while also affording her a rhetorical (and occasionally literal) 
cudgel with which to assail opponents.8   Relates McCoy, “the millions in military aid 
and thousands of American troops …served to shore up Arroyo’s shaky administration, 
checking Islamic rebels in the south, strengthening her ties to the armed forces, and 
assuring U.S. diplomatic support against her domestic rivals.”9   
This troubling trend was evident in the worrisome rise of extrajudicial killings 
(EJKs).  According to McCoy, American aid to the AFP, Philippine National Police and 
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other Philippine security services had the result of strengthening the coercive power of 
these agencies. These new capabilities in turn were used for political aims via 
extrajudicial actions, militias and like unofficial organs.  This was never the intent of the 
United States, but Washington’s own imperatives in fighting terrorism provided 
diplomatic cover.10  Extrajudicial killings were never officially endorsed as policy of the 
Philippine government.  However, the increasing regularity of extrajudicial incidents and 
the impunity which the perpetrators seemed to enjoy emerged as a major point of 
contention between the American and the Philippine governments.11 The U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs even held a special hearing on EJKs in 
the Philippines in 2007 in order to highlight the issue.12  
Despite these critiques, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines has been 
celebrated as a rare victory in the campaign against global terrorism.13  Joint Philippine-
U.S. counterterrorism operations succeeded on two distinct levels.  At an elementary 
level, OEF-P managed to either apprehend or kill specific terrorist leaders who had been 
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active in the Philippines and materially contributed to attacks in the country.  Though the 
focuses on defeating individual terrorists has often been misconstrued in GWOT as an 
indicator of overall progress, the Philippines illustrates how the removal of particular 
operatives can have a serious and deleterious impact on a terrorist organization.  For all 
of his bluster, Abu Sabbaya’s death removed Abu Sayyaf’s public face, whose Robin 
Hood-esque approach to jihad had served to bolster ASG’s popular image.14   More 
importantly, the subsequent losses of Khaddafi Janjalani, Abu Soliaman and the Urban 
Terrorist Group during Oplan Ultimatum cost ASG its spiritual heart and operational 
expertise.  This human capital has not been easy to replace and its absence accounts for 
ASG’s devolution from terrorism back to banditry.  By 2010, 15 of the 24 most wanted 
suspects in the Philippines had either been killed or arrested.15 
More importantly OEF-P did not merely target individual terrorists but also the 
underlying conditions in the Philippines which had empowered such extremists.  Though 
both the Moro conflict in general and the systemic underdevelopment in Mindanao will 
take decades to overcome, OEF-P ensured that these chronic maladies did not translate 
into support for terrorism.  Engaging both the MNLF and MILF in a political process 
helped to drive a wedge between the mainstream elements of the Moro struggle and its 
extremist fringe.  By enlisting the assistance of these Moro groups, the Philippine 
government deprived terrorist organizations of both their local patrons and the safe haven 
that had proven so useful in the past.  Beyond coopting the political leadership of 
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Mindanao in the cause of counterterrorism, civic-engagement operations and sweeping 
development program curbed support for extremist elements amongst the general 
population as well.16  Stated Sulu Provisional Administrator Don Loong, “"The legacy of 
the American people is not these projects alone…It is giving us hope again, by showing 
us that peace is possible.”17 Added Ambassador Kenney after a visit to Jolo in April 
2007: 
The warmth and enthusiasm of local residents was a moving demonstration of the 
desire of the local population for peace and against terrorism. The work of 
USAID and JSOTF‐P, together with their civilian and military partners, has given 
the population of the Province of Sulu a taste of life without terrorism, effectively 
reclaiming the area from the terrorists operating there. Such programs remain the 
key to continuing to isolate the population from the terrorists.18 
 
As a result, the decline of both foreign and domestic terrorist activities in the 
Philippines since Ultimatum has proven strikingly robust with the steady reduction in 
attacks continuing over subsequent years.19  
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Figure 20: Enemy Initiated Attacks in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi 2000-2012 20 
The Sustainable War on Terror? 
Following Oplan Ultimatum there has been an effort to promote the Philippines 
and OEF-P as offering a successful counterterrorism model for other countries to 
emulate.  Few advocates have more vocally championed this idea than President Arroyo 
herself.  Stated the Philippine President, “nations grappling with terrorism can learn some 
lessons from the Philippines’ successful efforts at running after terror groups,” and its 
mix of “both soft and hard power.”21   In his analysis of OEF-P for Military Review, 
Colonel Gregory Wilson posited the Basilan model as “a template for a sustainable, low-
visibility approach to supporting America’s allies,” concluding that “in an irony befitting 
                                                 
20 Chart from Robinson, Special Operations, XIX 
21 Aurea Calica, “Defeating Abu Sayyaf is RP’s biggest contribution to world security –GMA,” Philippine 




the often paradoxical nature of counter-insurgency warfare, ‘the indirect approach’ offers 
us the most direct path to victory.”22  In The Weekly Standard, Max Boot and Richard 
Bennet observed that the combination of a “soft counterinsurgency strategy” and “light 
American footprint” in the Philippines was “a model that has obvious applications to 
many countries around the world where we cannot or will not send large numbers of 
troops to stamp out affiliates of the global jihadist network.”23  In line with this 
perspective, the Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review explicitly identifies OEF-
P as a model of how the deployment of a modest number of U.S. forces and emphasis on 
host-nation leadership can obviate the need for a larger military intervention.  The review 
notes that this model has already been applied in places like the Horn of Africa and the 
Sahel.24  
However, the desire to promulgate OEF-P as a successful model for the War on 
Terrorism based principally on its positive outcome neglects the actual course of events 
that the operation took.  In truth, until Oplan Ultimatum or at least the operations on 
Mindanao in 2005, the defining sense of OEF-P was one of immense frustration – not 
triumph.  Although the nature of the American involvement was fundamentally different, 
during its initial stages the “second front” in the Global War on Terrorism seemed to 
echo the experience of the primary front in Afghanistan.  As in Afghanistan, America 
provide crucial assistance to local allies during Balikatan 02-1 who in turn bore the 
primary responsibility for fighting.  The American role in the Philippines was as a 
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noncombatant, in sharp contrast to the lethal force it applied in Afghanistan, but in 
Mindanao the American military still fulfilled the same fundamental role of using its own 
capabilities to supplement those of an indigenous force.  In both countries this strategy 
initially appeared to be effective.  As the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban from 
power, so the AFP ejected Abu Sayyaf from Basilan.  Yet in both instances this early 
success proved to be illusory.   As Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan failed to 
destroy either the Taliban or al-Qaeda, so too did OEF-P fail to eliminate Abu Sayyaf in 
the Philippines.  Rather, in both instances the terrorists whom the United States had 
hoped to defeat slipped away to recoup in new safe havens.  On Mindanao as in Pakistan, 
these militants found powerful patrons who afforded them protection from aggressive 
counterterrorism operations.  Allowed to recover from their initial losses, it did not take 
long for either al-Qaeda, the Taliban or Abu Sayyaf to resume their attacks.  
What distinguishes the War on Terrorism in the Philippines as a success was not 
Balikatan 02-1 but what followed it.  Oplan Ultimatum has been mischaracterized as 
simply the replication of “the Basilan model” on Jolo.  Instead Ultimatum constituted a 
stark departure from its predecessor.  Though “the indirect approach” remained intact, 
both the operation’s context and instruments were categorically different.  The additions 
of the naval cordon and arrangements with the MNLF were important steps which 
illustrated how Washington and Manila had learned from past missteps on Basilan and 
Mindanao.  However, of equal consequence were the changes within the AFP itself.  In 
contrast to the moribund display on Basilan, the Philippine forces on Jolo evidenced an 




enhanced its effectiveness.  From mass offensives against mobile enemies, the AFP now 
embraced the challenge of winning the support of the population while conducting target 
operations designed to minimize civilian casualties.25  These substantive changes in the 
AFP materially contributed to the success of Oplan Ultimatum and the War on Terror in 
the Philippines.  These changes in the Philippine military were not the byproduct of 
wishful thinking, but a dedicated American strategy of using defense diplomacy to 
achieve its objectives in the Philippines.   
Uniquely, American efforts to combat terrorism in the Philippines succeeded 
because of the constraints placed on Washington’s efforts not despite them. In terms of a 
military response to terrorism in the Philippines, the United States had the choice of 
either continuing its reliance on the AFP or dispatching American combat forces to fight 
Abu Sayyaf directly.  Balikatan 02-1 demonstrated that the first option was impractical 
given the AFP’s dysfunctional state while the furor over Balikatan 03-1 showed the latter 
to be impossible given both constitutional prohibition on foreign combat operations in the 
Philippines and the vigor with which this ban was enforced.  In the Philippines, there 
were no easy solutions or practical pathways for a quick victory in the War on Terrorism.  
Deprived of a convenient policy for quick results, Washington undertook the far more 
substantial task of using defense diplomacy to reform the poor state of the AFP in order 
to make it an effective GWOT ally. This strategy worked as it allowed the United States 
to both address the fundamental flaws of the AFP while also navigating the numerous 
political pitfalls inherent to the US-RP relationship. 
                                                 




Indeed, arguably OEF-P’s greatest accomplishment was that it continued to exist 
at all.  The shock and horror of 9/11 spurred initial enthusiasm for a global campaign 
against terrorism, but this eagerness flagged as the costs of such a crusade and the 
practical difficulties of joint operations took their toll.  Few places illustrated this cooling 
enthusiasm in the face of GWOT’s realities more than the Philippines where President 
Arroyo’s unconditional support for the War on Terror soon yielded to bitter disputes over 
the role of American soldiers in the archipelago, the shortcomings of Philippine security 
forces, Balikatan 03-1, the Iraq War, the fate of Lance Corporal Smith and numerous 
other disputes.   
Defense diplomacy played a critical role in navigating such bilateral turbulence.  
Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs for American Affairs Austria characterized defense 
exchanges as “invaluable for the health of relationship” given how they “create personal 
links, they create understanding of each other’s culture and perspective.”26  At critical 
points during OEF-P, such links provided conduits for the exercise of foreign policy. In 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11, relationships like that between Roilo Golez and Admiral 
Fargo dating back to their time as midshipmen at Annapolis played a vital role in 
resolving disputes and developing a shared understanding of how the Philippines fit into 
the War on Terror.  Defense ties provided a communications link where Washington 
could stress the severity of its concerns and the Philippines could inform the United 
States of when it was being pushed too hard.27  
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Every time that a particular dispute threatened to buck the defense relationship 
from the rails of cooperation, the transnational links cultivated by defense diplomacy 
asserted their influence to steady the relationship and restore civility.  The fallout from 
the Philippine withdrawal from Iraq aptly illustrates this point.  America’s vocal 
disapproval of the withdrawal mixed with Filipino resentment of Washington’s 
churlishness and lack of understanding threatened to significantly harm the alliance.  Yet, 
ongoing defense activities created a sense of normality which sustained the relationship 
and propelled it forward.  Joint exercises underscored the partnership that continued to 
exist and American help with disaster relief illustrated the comradery between the two 
countries which superseded any momentary unpleasantness.28  As noted by Dr. Renato 
Cruz de Castro, a key contribution of US-RP defense diplomacy was that such “low-key 
forms of security cooperation have ensured that the governance costs of the alliance 
would be reasonable and long-lasting, considering the uncertain and indefinite time 
needed to contain the terrorist challenge.”29 
Yet, defense diplomacy’s success in sustaining the bilateral relationship through 
difficult periods would have been peripheral were it not also an effective means of 
combatting terrorism in the Philippines.  Here again, defense diplomacy demonstrated its 
value by affording the United States a means of influencing the AFP in a substantive way 
which both altered the operational and philosophical orientation of the Philippine 
military.  Admittedly, adapting to the role of advice and support did not come easily for 
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all U.S. service men.  One Special Forces member bemoaned to Max Boot that, “if I had 
the ability to do here what I did in Iraq last year, this fight would have been over in two 
days.”30  However, the purpose of defense diplomacy and the doctrine of working “by, 
with and through” the AFP was not to win the fight in a matter of days, but to develop the 
institutional capacity within the AFP to ensure that the gains made against violent 
extremists were actually sustained.  In the Philippines, victory for American forces would 
be built rather than merely won. 
 Joint Special Operation Task Force –Philippines played the critical role in altering 
how the AFP conceived of and conducted its operations in Mindanao.  Specific training 
initiatives, like the development of the Light Reaction Companies and nighttime 
operations, helped to develop capacities within the AFP to counter the threat of terrorism.  
Importantly, though these precise areas were cultivated with an eye towards 
counterterrorism, U.S. defense diplomacy did not neglect the wider health of the AFP.  In 
concert with Secretary Cruz and the PDR, Washington endeavored to reform the nature 
of training for the entire AFP.   The net result was a reawakening of the AFP’s own latent 
capabilities through a renewed emphasis on military professionalism and adequate 
training.  
 Whereas improved training allowed the AFP to recover capabilities that had either 
never previously existed or atrophied during the 1990s, defense diplomacy altered how 
the Philippine military thought about counterinsurgency as well as how it fought.  
Previous efforts against Abu Sayyaf and the bevy of other Moro insurgent groups had 
                                                 




been characterized by mass troop movements and a heavy reliance on artillery.  Such 
tactics had helped seize camp Abubakar in 2000, but were inapt against mobile opponents 
like Abu Sayyaf and imposed tremendous hardship on the local population.  With 
American assistance, the AFP adopted targeted, intelligence driven operations which 
targeted enemy locations specifically whilst minimizing disruptions to the local 
population.  Furthermore, instead of treating the residence of Mindanao as a hostile 
population that needed to be cowed, the United States instilled within the AFP the 
importance of winning hearts and minds.  Popular sentiment became the most important 
center of gravity in Mindanao with the AFP recognizing that proactively engaging the 
population was crucial to the ultimate success of their mission.  American forces 
spearheaded civil-military operations like the popular MedCaps, but the AFP soon 
embraced these undertakings and made them central to its mission.31    
It was the changes within the AFP induced by American defense diplomacy and 
furthered by individuals like Cruz and Esperon which accounts for the sharp disparity 
between the muddle of Balikatan 02-1 and accomplishments of Oplan Ultimatum.  OEF-
P is not a model for a successful counterterrorism strategy.  Instead, it is an unwavering 
advertisement for the power of process to triumph over circumstances.  Confronted by 
both the challenge of terrorism in the Philippines and the inability of Philippine security 
forces to redress this issue, the United States implemented an ongoing defense diplomacy 
program to engage with their Philippine counterparts and reform the underlying 
conditions which made this dilemma initially appear intractable.  Through this 
                                                 




engagement, the U.S. both accurately gauged the extent of the problems within the 
Philippines and provided the appropriate assistance warranted by these circumstances.  
This process proved to be both highly adaptable and robust, surviving the dual torrents of 
bilateral politics as well as practical difficulties.  Even initial critics of this reliance on 
defense diplomacy like Donald Rumsfeld were persuaded by its effectiveness.  In a 
memo to President Bush, Rumsfeld cited the experience of the Philippines as a prime 
example of why the United States needed to develop “considerably larger and better 
organized U.S. and international institutional capabilities to train, equip and strengthen 
the capacity of partners so they can better assist in finding, fixing and finishing the 
increasingly dangerous threats to their security and ours.”32  
Beyond the immediate confines of Mindanao, the utilization of defense diplomacy 
in the Philippines and the transnational links that it has spurred have yielded considerable 
benefits for the bilateral relationship. For example, throughout the War on Terrorism, the 
Philippine government grew increasingly wary of the activities of several Saudi Arabian 
nationals and charities active in the archipelago.  Unable to press the issue itself, Manila 
relied upon the same ties with the United States that underpinned OEF-P to enlist 
Washington’s help as an intermediary with Riyadh and resolve this troubling situation.33 
Similarly, when a charm offensive by the People’s Republic of China towards the 
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Philippines threatened to disrupt the US-RP alliance in 2004, the long standing links 
between the US and the AFP were cited as a bulwark against any potential challenge 
from Beijing.  Reported the U.S. Embassy in 2005 following Primier Hu Jintao’s visit to 
Manila, “the conservative Philippine defense establishment –whose doctrine, equipment, 
and training are all US-based—will be cautious so as not to jeopardize its close 
relationship with the United States military.”34  Perhaps most significantly, the defense 
diplomacy program inaugurated after 9/11 and the ties it nurtured provided the 
foundation for expanded defense relations between the two countries.  Specifically, the 
successes of the Balikatan exercises and OEF-P paved the way for the Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the two countries which was signed in 2014.  
EDCA allows for a deeper level of defense cooperation between the two countries 
including the use of several facilities in the Philippines as cooperative security locations 
(CSLs).  Though not permitting American bases in the Philippines, EDCA sanctions the 
extended stay of American forces in the Philippines as well as the building and operating 
of joint military facilities.35  Nearly a quarter-century after the departure of American 
forces from Clark Airfield and Subic Bay, EDCA stands as the crowning achievement of 
the reinvigorated alliance and a testament to the enduring strength of bilateral defense 
ties.     
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Ironically, it is the nature of these defense ties which has led some commentators 
to question the salience of OEF-P to the wider War on Terrorism.  Though not detracting 
from the achievements of OEF-P, the deep historic ties and close relationship between the 
American and Philippine militaries afforded Washington a privileged place of influence 
in Manila. Such strong ties provided clear advantages but would prove harder to find in 
other situations.  As The Economist quipped, the United States, “is unlikely to find other 
partners as perfect as the AFP, which is modelled on America's armed forces. Filipino 
officers speak English, know and admire America, once the colonial power, and can bond 
with their comrades over beer and karaoke. Try that in Yemen.”36   
  Such caveats on the use of OEF-P as a model for counterterrorism are warranted, 
but neglect both the greater context of the operation as well as its underlying significance.  
The American legacy in the Philippines cut both ways during OEF-P.  As much as it is a 
legitimate point to emphasize the strong institutional links between the United States and 
the AFP, this point cannot be raised without also acknowledging the significant political 
backlash stemming from that same history.  The relationship between the U.S. and 
Philippine militaries did not occur in a vacuum but rather carry with them the legacies of 
“little brown brother-ism,” numerous massacres during the colonial period and the links 
to Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorial regime.  These ghosts of past abuses did not dissipate 
with 9/11 but rather erected distinct obstacles to joint-counterterrorism operations which 
served to complicate OEF-P at nearly every turn.  Arguments over the Terms of 
Reference for U.S. servicemen, obstructionism in the Philippine Congress, repeated 
                                                 




challenges to the U.S. presence in Philippine courts and the dispute over Lance Corporal 
Smith illustrated the long shadow that history cast over US-RP defense cooperation.  As 
history afforded the United States specific advantages in the Philippines, it equally 
created significant impediments.  That the strong institutional ties between the United 
States and Philippines ultimately overcame these difficulties is not grounds to dismiss 
OEF-P as an aberration in the War on Terror but rather a testament to the power of 
transnational links to overcome adversity.  
 More importantly, the ties between the American and the Philippine militaries did 
not spring fully formed like Athena from the head of Zeus.  Rather they were 
conscientiously built and maintained over decades through training programs, officer 
exchanges and joint exercises.     Despite its current health, the U.S.-Philippine 
relationship could have easily withered and died like any number of other post-colonial 
associations.  Indeed, as the bilateral affairs curdled in the 1990s they had threatened to 
do precisely that.  Yet, during the Cold War and again in the late 1990s, both 
governments recognized the importance of defense cooperation and were willing to take 
the steps necessary to fortify such endeavors.  Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines 
did not simply succeed because of its effective use of defense diplomacy, but because 
defense diplomacy had already created the conditions for it to succeed.  By cultivating 
strong interpersonal ties and institutional links, defense diplomacy created a network 
between Washington and Manila which sustained the relationship through troubled 
periods and supplied critical conduits for the molding of policy preferences.  Though it is 




familiarity as that which binds the United States and the Philippines; it is equally flawed 
to see this relationship as an immutable feature of world affairs. 
 It is the importance of defense diplomacy to the diligent building and maintaining 
of transnational relationships that remains the lasting lesson of both U.S.-Philippine 
relations in general and Operation Enduring Freedom –Philippines in particular.  Whereas 
the relations between Washington and Manila can be characterized as distinctive, the 
process through which this dynamic has been maintained is not.  Rather it simply requires 
the prescience to recognize the utility of defense diplomacy as a tool of international 
statecraft and the patience required for it to yield results.  As warfare again engulfs Iraq 
and Afghanistan backslides into chaos, neither the progress in the Philippines nor the 
means through which it has been sustained should be overlooked.  Yet, OEF-P cannot be 
a model for how the War on Terrorism can be won since it is not a model at all.  
American operations in the Philippines after 9/11 did not succeed because of a set 
operational design or even the ballyhooed Basilan model.  They succeeded because of the 
underlying processes at play.  Defense diplomacy afforded Washington both the means of 
traversing the rigors of the turbulent U.S.-Philippine relationship as well as a way by 
which to mold how the Philippine government addressed its own internal security.  It is a 
recognition of the importance of this process and the central role of defense diplomacy 







Since first gaining prominence in the 1990s, the study of defense diplomacy has 
existed been hamstrung by its own conceptual morass.  This difficulty stemmed from the 
inverted nature of defense diplomacy’s origins as a term.  Instead of evolving organically 
as a distinct concept, its purpose was to give structure to a vast array of cooperative 
military activates which were geopolitically useful but defied traditional conceptions of 
how the armed forces were employed.  This imperfect creation hindered both our 
understanding of defense diplomacy.  Instead of developing either theoretical or 
descriptive substance, defense diplomacy has persisted as a conceptual enigma which can 
be manipulated as needed to encompass any number of activities.  Unfortunately, this 
ambiguity has hindered how defense diplomacy has been studied.  Lacking any shared 
theoretical foundation or common frame of reference, defense diplomacy scholarship has 
grown as a series of independent silos.  Unable to satisfactorily answer what defense 
diplomacy is, scholars have instead focused on simply detailing how the practice has 
been employed by individual governments.  The result is that we recognized defense 
diplomacy’s role in world affairs, but still lack any deeper understanding of its function. 
This dissertation endeavored to remedy the hobbled state of defense diplomacy 
scholarship in two critical ways.  The first step was to resolve the conceptual haziness 
which has plagued defense diplomacy since its inception.  To achieve this objective, I 
inverted the original error in defense diplomacy’s creation which privileged inclusiveness 
over analytical distinction.  Instead of building my conception of defense diplomacy 




question of how states achieve their goals in world affairs. By identifying defense 
diplomacy as a military variant of soft power (direct model), I provide an intellectual 
foundation for defense diplomacy which has previously been lacking.  Specifically, by 
defining defense diplomacy based on its function instead of around its uses, I encapsulate 
both what defense diplomacy is and how it works to advance a country’s foreign policy.  
This approach effectively resolves the previous issue of ambiguity and establishes a firm 
understand of what defense diplomacy actually is.    
Importantly, this conception of defense diplomacy is not temporally bounded and 
as equally applicable in ancient Rome as in Mindanao.  Far from being an academic 
novelty, this avoidance of temporal myopia is a critical facet of understanding defense 
diplomacy.  Although the term itself did not gain prominence until the 1990s, its uses 
have long featured prominently throughout international history.  This reservoir of 
historical defense diplomacy is a tremendous resource which contains valuable insights 
on best practices and pitfalls within the overall use of defense diplomacy in foreign 
policy.  Indeed, expanding our understanding of historic, nonviolent uses of military 
force constitutes a promising line of inquiry which merits additional scholarly attention.   
The persistence of defense diplomacy across history is a testament to both its 
lasting utility as a tool of statecraft, but also its yield meaningful gains in world affairs. 
Beyond defining what defense diplomacy is, I also detail the process through which 
activities like officer exchanges and regular conferences can help a country achieve its 
global ambitions.  The essential step in identifying defense diplomacy’s causal 




representatives of a foreign government.  As such defense diplomacy activities are social 
as well as military undertakings.  By bringing soldiers from different countries into 
contact with one another it offers a chance to alter an individual’s worldviews and 
thought process.  Educating a foreign soldier at a military academy like West Point isn’t 
just a means of providing a military education, but also of introducing that cadet to new 
ways of thinking.  When that soldier graduates, he will return to his home country with 
both new insights learned as a student as well as friendships forged with other students.  
These social links are essential to defense diplomacy’s enduring effectiveness as they 
form transnational links between governments and critical pathways for the diffusion of 
information and policy preferences.  Whereas such transnational networks are seen in 
many fields, what makes the links fashioned by defense diplomacy particularly potent is 
the second aspect of the participants’ identities and their roles as government officials.  
This allows for the direct translation of shared ideas and worldviews into policy. The 
result is that defense diplomacy participants return to their home countries as agents of 
change who can reorient the policies of their own government through processes like 
state socialization.   
That this process can result in substantial geopolitical gains for defense diplomacy 
practitioners is the second point of emphasis for this dissertation.  While the mechanics of 
defense diplomacy are interesting, such insights would be hollow were it not for defense 
diplomacy’s demonstrated ability as an effective tool of statecraft.  Sections II and III 
burnish defense diplomacy’s bona fides as strategic tool by illustrating how it was used as 




aftermath of the Vietnam War and during the Global War on Terror the effective use of 
defense diplomacy ultimately succeeded in yielding positive results. 
After the conclusion of the Vietnam conflict the United States faced a dire 
situation with its Pacific allies.  The failure in Indochina and gnawing doubts about the 
American security commitments led both the Philippines and Australia to question their 
longstanding reliance on their American allies. In both situations, this new uncertainty 
could have consumed the relationship with dire consequences for American policy.  This 
was precisely what happened in Thailand where the country’s uncertain future led the 
government in Bangkok to evicted U.S. forces from its territory in 1976.   Yet, to assuage 
the fears of Manila and Canberra, the United States adapted its own policy to 
accommodate the growing defense aspirations of its allies.  Whereas the United States 
had previously directed both relationships in a domineering manner, the impetus shifted 
to collaboration rather than hierarchy.  With both the Philippines and Australia, defense 
diplomacy played a critical role in shepherding their respective alliances into a new era of 
partnership.  For the Philippines, the renegotiation of the base agreements to recognize 
Philippine sovereignty over the American bases paved the way for closer cooperation 
between the two countries and made the U.S. an active participant in efforts to improve 
the AFP.  For Australia, the ascendance of Prime Minister Malcom Fraser provided a 
political opening to move past the tumultuous tenure of Gough Whitlam.  New 
undertakings like the Kangaroo exercises and joint maritime surveillance flights helped 




defense diplomacy helped overcome the damage resulting from the American failure in 
Indochina and allowed both partnerships survive thrive during the post-war era. 
In the case of the Philippines, a direct line can be traced from the defense 
diplomacy programs initiated in the wake of the 1979 base renegotiation to Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines.  Programs like the Balikatan exercises and the reformed 
Mutual Defense Board, initiated after the integration of the American bases actually 
survived the base closures in 1992.   After the 9/11 terrorist attack, both the defense 
diplomacy programs already in place and the deep intuitional ties which they had 
cultivated, were mobilized to address the terrorist threat within the Philippines.  
Forbidden by the Philippine constitution from conducting its own combat operations in 
the Philippines, the U.S. military instead adopted the strategy of working “by, with and 
through,” the AFP to achieve its objectives.  At the operation’s onset, the American 
forces worked to supplement the capabilities of the AFP and provided assistance in 
critical areas where the Philippine military was deficient.   
However, the greatest utility of defense diplomacy during the War on Terror in 
the Philippines was helping to navigate the political disputes which frequently irrupted in 
both Washington and Manila.  Even amid the backlash following the Philippine 
withdrawal from Iraq, defense cooperation provided a needed source of stability within 
the relationship which helped reorient national leaders away from their disagreements 
and back to towards shared endeavors.  Defense diplomacy’s effectiveness in helping the 
U.S. reform the AFP and enhance its capabilities was evident on Jolo in 2006 and 2007.  




operations and civic engagement.  As a direct result of American support, the AFP 
succeeded in both eliminating Abu Sayyaf’s leadership group and mitigating many of the 
conditions which enabled its operations.  Beyond constituting one of the rare victories in 
the Global War on Terror, OEF-P also demonstrates the how defense diplomacy can be 
used to overcome seemingly intractable problems in world affairs. 
Taken together, my dissertation advances both our theoretical and practical 
understanding of defense diplomacy as a geopolitical phenomenon.  It both provides a 
theory which resolves defense diplomacy’s lingering conceptual difficulties and 
demonstrates how the practice can be effectively employed by governments.  Yet, both of 
these facets exist only as a means of advancing defense diplomacy scholarship forward 
from its present state of limbo.  As such, this is not the final word on defense diplomacy 
by merely the opening gambit in the larger quest to understand defense diplomacy. 
Critically, defense diplomacy does not exist as a monolith.  There is no singular 
form, but rather a vast spectrum of varying philosophies and strategies.   Although many 
countries have embraced defense diplomacy as a component of their foreign policy, each 
government’ possesses its own defense diplomacy strategy and applies it in a unique 
manner.  Even within a country, different regimes conceive of defense diplomacy 
differently and adapt the practice to match their worldview.  In contrast to past U.S. 
Presidents, Donald Trump’s transactional view of world affairs has meant that rather than 
a means of sustaining and alliance, defense diplomacy has become a form of negotiating 
tactic.  Nor is defense diplomacy the purview of practitioners alone. The pathways 




recipients to advance their own international agendas.  Indeed, one of the critical 
observations from my work in the Philippines is how smaller countries often engage in 
defense diplomacy with a great power not because of specific military benefits, but as a 
means of generally improving relations with a potential patron.  This diversity in 
philosophies only grows further in the context of multilateral defense diplomacy and the 
stark differences that exist between groups like NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, the African Union and ASEAN.   
Unfortunately, such questions have not yet been addressed by scholars.  Nor have 
we addressed such interesting dilemmas as identifying conditions which enable 
individual cooption through defense diplomacy, tools for facilitating state socialization, 
best practices or even means of assessing how well particular programs work.  It is my 
hope that in providing a common intellectual framework for the understanding of defense 
diplomacy, the scholarly community can now move past the basic questions which have 
hamstrung the study of cooperative military practices and begin investigating these new 
questions.   
Yet in addition to advancing defense diplomacy as a field of inquiry, the 
underlying goal of this dissertation has been to engender an appreciation for defense 
diplomacy as an important tool of international statecraft.  Every day thousands of 
soldiers engage in defense diplomacy activities with peers from other countries.  These 
engagements are in classrooms, board meetings, as part of exercises and in corner 




(excluding NATO members) participated in the IMET program alone. 1  Those 
individuals will carry with them the experience and the lessons they learned throughout 
their life.  Based on past experience, many of those individuals will become general 
officers and potentially key government officers or even heads of state.  The entirety of 
the IMET program costs $108.8 million, which is roughly equivalent to the cost of a 
single F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the tens of billions of dollars spent each year in 
Afghanistan.   Although not every IMET participant will be persuaded by the experience 
and most will not attain a meaningful position, in terms of sheer numbers it offers 
considerable returns for a modest cost. 
Today, as the violent use of military force and inter-state war continue to fade as 
part of the geopolitical landscape, the need to understand practices like defense 
diplomacy has never been greater.  From the South China Sea to the Arctic Ocean, 
governments have recognized the utility of defense diplomacy and employed it as a 
crucial foreign policy tool.  It is now time for scholars as well to embrace this subject as 
an important facet of international relations.  Indeed, he question today is not whether 
defense diplomacy will continue to endure as a prominent tool of international statecraft, 
but whether we will invest the time to understand its nuances and make the most out of 
its potential.  
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